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This dissertation addresses the question: what should 
Discipline be for in Schools? It does so from a primarily philosophical 
and specifically neo-Aristotelian perspective. Indeed, the thesis would 
seem to be the first to try to derive an account of the possible 
purposes of modern day school discipline from Aristotle‘s works. The 
discussion also provides an original evaluation of the educational 
place and significance of Aristotle‘s intellectual virtues. The thesis 
proceeds from a conviction that: 1) recent policy and research 
concerning pupil behaviour in Scottish schools has not clearly enough 
articulated what discipline should be for; and 2) previous theoretical 
attempts to explain the purposes of school discipline have not been 
grounded upon sufficiently robust moral and/or epistemological 
foundations.  The most relevant extant treatises of Aristotle are 
therefore explored in depth, in search of a more justifiable theory of 
school discipline.  In this respect, particularly detailed scrutiny is 
given to the various traits of character (virtues) that Aristotle believed 
to comprise human flourishing. During this analysis and discussion, 
it is argued that educators should try to foster such virtuous habits of 
thinking, acting and feeling in pupils, in the course of seeking to instil 
discipline in their schools and classrooms. It is concluded that school 
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‗When discipline goes, self-discipline goes as well 
…Failure of rule 
Is the most destructive thing. Obedience 
And respect must be instilled.‘ (King Creon in Heaney, 2004, pp 30-31) 
 
  The subject of this thesis is the concept of discipline, and more 
particularly, what it should be for in schools. Discipline is the focus of 
discussion rather than another related, yet importantly distinct 
concept: namely, punishment. While issues of discipline and 
punishment very often do go hand in hand, both in schools and wider 
society, I think it is crucial that educators are clear in their minds 
about the differences between the meaning and application of the two 
notions. Arguably, punishment is more closely connected to 
indiscipline than discipline. Richard Peters1 suggested that both 
discipline and punishment should promote ‗the good‘ of pupils and 
classes. However, he maintained that punishment has a much more 
specific function than discipline. Peters held that: 1) discipline 
involves a pupil observing the rules of a worthwhile activity whereas; 
2) punishment is normally only justifiable when a pupil has breached 
the rules of such activity.  
 
The need for issues of discipline to be considered in relation to 
the wider ethical and epistemological purposes of schooling was not 
lost on Peters. In this respect, I am generally sympathetic to the 
liberal theory of education championed by him. Although rules may 
often in practice support disciplined behaviour, in this dissertation it 
will be argued there is no necessary correlation between discipline and 
the observance of rules. Indeed, it is probable that important learning 
opportunities may be missed, if those enacting discipline aim at 
nothing more than pupil observance of, or submission to rules. It will 
instead be argued that pupils are disciplined in school when they are 
                                                 
1
 Peters‟ views on discipline will be explored in chapter 2. 
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properly engaged in and committed to (rather than just following the 
rules of) worthwhile activities.  Significantly, it will also be claimed 
that repeated involvement in such activities might, over time, help 
pupils to foster virtuous habits of thinking, acting and feeling. It will 
thus be hypothesised that school discipline should have a broadly 
neo-Aristotelian2 goal: namely, the development of virtue in pupils. 
The emergence of such desirable character traits plausibly depends, 
not so much upon the observance of rules, but more on the consistent 
and active involvement of pupils in intellectually, morally and 
technically valuable learning tasks. 
 
I would however be inclined to agree with Peters‘ more general 
view that punishment has only limited educational application and 
scope. Punishment need not, and probably should not, be the first 
response to a breakdown in classroom discipline. Indeed, if 
punishment is only a retrospective tool employed to deal with 
indiscipline, then it also seems illogical to begin thinking about how to 
establish discipline by focussing on punishment. Throughout this 
thesis it will therefore be argued that the best way to instil school 
discipline is to focus on learning, not punishment. This is not to say 
that some sorts of moderate punishment can never be justified in 
schools. Detention for example is ‗unlikely to represent a deprivation 
of liberty‘ (Scott, 2003, p 164) of the rights of the child. However, there 
are now clear legal-humanitarian restrictions upon the physical 
chastisement of schoolchildren. The prohibition of corporal 
punishment was originally introduced in Scotland‘s schools in 19863, 
partially in response to cases brought before the European Court of 
                                                 
2
 Kristjánsson (2007) has suggested that Aristotelian inquiry involves delving deep into Aristotle‟s 
texts to work out what he said or should have said about a given matter. Schnaedelbach (1987) 
indicates that „reasoning from tradition‟ is almost unavoidable for the neo-Aristotelian. In an important 
rejoinder to Schnaedelbach, Passerin d‟Entrèves (1987) implies that Aristotle does not offer a 
prescriptive account of tradition, but a view of tradition as an „active passing on‟.  In part one and two 
of this thesis it will be maintained that the importance of tradition and experience in Aristotelian 
thought render it more balanced than the educational philosophies of so called „traditionalists‟ on the 
one hand and „progressives‟ on the other. 
3
 Corporal punishment is now restricted by the Standards in Scotland‟s Schools Act, 2000 (Scott, 
2003). 
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Human Rights (Scott, 2003). It was held that educational authorities 
had a duty to respect the legitimate philosophical and religious 
convictions of parents in a democratic society; in this case, that their 
children avoid being subject to punishment in school that would 
constitute physical assault (Scott, 2003).  
 
Although this dissertation seeks to defend a broadly Aristotelian 
theory of school discipline, I must part company with some of the 
views that Aristotle expresses in relation to the physical punishment of 
children. While he is, on the whole, committed to the principle that 
education should be based on fidelity to reason4, in the Eudemian 
Ethics, he remarks that children do have some puzzling views that 
cannot be altered by rational argument. What children need in such 
instances, he says, is maturity, or correction through flogging (EE, 
1214b30-1215a). Aristotle does qualify his opinion of physical correction 
implying that it should not be cruel but rather ‗for the sake of the 
person punished‘ (Rhetoric, 1369b16-17). However, to the modern eye it is 
extremely hard to square the idea that the ‗flogging‘ of children could 
in some way be educational, or for their sake. Sherman‘s suggestion 
that Aristotle endorsed ‗gentle methods of external sanction‘ (2004, p 
164) in education, is perhaps therefore, a little off the mark. However, 
Aristotle does only seem to have advocated physical chastisement in 
cases where the rationality of children could not be appealed to. While 
Aristotle may have implied that the ‗flogging‘ of irrational children was 
justified, his wider philosophy overwhelmingly favoured the 
employment of reason, rather than force, to foster moral habits in the 
young, both for their sake, and for that of the wider community.  
 
It should also perhaps be borne in mind that Aristotle hailed 
from a society radically different to our own. Democracy was still a 
relatively recent development in Athens when he lived there. Indeed, 
Sophocles‘s ancient drama Antigone was frequently performed at this 
                                                 
4
 For a detailed defence of Aristotle‟s commitment to this principle see Curren (2000). 
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time5. This tragedy has for centuries provided audiences and readers 
alike, with a powerful reminder of the harm that can result when 
leaders of society equate discipline with obedience, punishment, and 
absolute conformity to rule of law. In comparison to the tyrannical 
ruler King Creon (whose comments on discipline6 and obedience open 
this thesis), Aristotle and other famed philosophers of Ancient Athens 
were rational, humane and progressive in their outlook7. As we shall 
see, Aristotle in particular thought that virtue and wisdom were more 
conducive to human flourishing than obedience to rule and force.  
 
Leaving issues of punishment to one side, in this thesis it is 
maintained that school discipline ought to promote the development of 
pupil virtue and wisdom, rather than pupil obedience. Although, 
policy and legislation specific to the current Scottish educational 
system is later scrutinised, it is hoped that a broad attempt to 
formulate a neo-Aristotelian theory of school discipline will also be of 
wider interest and application. It should be noted that I am not, and 
do not claim to be, a classical scholar. I therefore depend upon the 
translations of others when referring to Ancient Greek works. I draw 
upon these and other texts in order to concentrate discussion upon a 
question that is, I think, of considerable contemporary educational 
relevance, namely: what should discipline be for in schools?  
 
 
                                                 
5
 Knox makes this observation in his introduction to Antigone (Sophocles‟, 1984). He also states that 
Aristotle lived within a century of the first production of Antigone adding that the philosopher made 
frequent allusions to this play in his Politics. 
6
 These comments are taken from Seamus Heaney‟s modern adaptation of the tragedy. In this crucial 
act of the tragedy, King Creon engages in a passionate discussion with his son Haemon. During this 
exchange, the King attempts to justify the enforcement of a rule (that no traitor of Thebes will be 
rewarded with the burial rights due to loyal citizens) on the grounds that it will benefit the polis (city) 
by instilling discipline and obedience amongst the populace.  Haemon in turn implores his father to 
listen to wise advice, and the will of the polis (the polis would rather see Antigone allowed to bury her 
brother). Creon however refuses to soften his stance, autocratically insisting that „the city is the king‟s 
– that‟s the law‟ (Sophocles, 1984, Antigone, 825). Creon‟s determination to implement the rule of law 
is accompanied by a desire to cruelly punish anyone who breaches it. It is, however, this very cruelty 
and inflexibility of judgement that lead in the end to the death of Creon‟s own wife and son. 
7
 MacIntyre (1984) suggests that the philosophers of Ancient Athens initiated a cultural shift whereby 
human virtue came to be principally understood in terms of reason, rather than the Pre-Socratic heroic 




‗Aristotelianism is a condition more than a scholarly position; one acquires 
the ability to smell out what Aristotle would say on a given issue and then follows 
one‘s scent into the thicket of his writings. If it turns out that one‘s scent is 
mistaken and Aristotle did not really say anything important on the issue, or, worse 
yet, was mistaken in his view, then the consolation lies in ascertaining what 
Aristotle should have said.‘ (Kristjánsson, 2007, p 6) 
 
This dissertation is structured around the question: what 
should discipline be for in Schools? The main hypotheses set forth, is 
that the purpose of school discipline should be to develop a range of 
moral and intellectual virtues in pupils. It is in particular maintained 
that Aristotle‘s theory of virtue may afford new and valuable insight 
into contemporary debate about school discipline. Thus a vital aim of 
this thesis is to philosophically analyse the extant treatise of Aristotle 
so as to explore what he did or should have said about school 
discipline. Bearing in mind the foregoing comments of Kristjánsson, 
this thesis is an interpretive as much as it is an exegetical endeavour. 
To an extent, it will therefore be assumed that the a priori (by which is 
meant before reference to experience and/or scientific experiment) 
values broadly articulated by Aristotle can go a long way to justifying 
many of the conclusions that are reached in this dissertation. The 
justification of claims through reference to the values held by a 
philosopher (in the case of this thesis, Aristotle) rather than empirical 
study is a method of argumentation found in much educational (See in 
particular ‗The Journal of Philosophy of Education‘, Ed. Standish, 2010) and for 
that matter moral philosophy. Indeed, as we shall see in chapter four, 
a moral philosopher as esteemed as Kant (2007) maintained that moral 
values can only be derived a priori rather than empirically.  
 
However, I would agree with Peters (1972b) and Macleod (2010) on 
an important methodological point. Questions relating to education 
generally (Peters) and pupil behaviour specifically (Macleod) are 
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probably best answered via a multi-disciplinary approach. The scope 
of a doctoral study is naturally however, constrained by time, and in 
depth exploration of one body of worthwhile literature may come at 
the cost of the neglect of another. While I would certainly not want to 
deny that empirical investigation could shed considerable light on 
many of the arguments put forward in this thesis; given the necessary 
constraints placed on a doctoral study, the approach to and content of 
this study is largely philosophical. I have not chosen this focus and 
method of inquiry because I think it can or might provide definitive 
answers to educational questions, far from it. However, philosophy is 
arguably a logical point of departure for this particular research 
question. For one thing, there has been surprisingly little recent 
philosophical interest in matters of school discipline. For another, it is 
quite possible that ethics (moral philosophy) and epistemology (the 
philosophy/theory of knowledge) are especially relevant to questions 
concerning the moral and pedagogical purposes of discipline. It is 
almost certain, however, that other branches of knowledge, and types 
of inquiry not explored here, could yield further, deeper and different 
insight into issues of discipline and behaviour in schools. However, it 
would seem quite unrealistic to expect a single study to provide a 
complete understanding of such a thorny problem as the proper 
nature and uses of discipline in schools. It is nonetheless hoped that 
this dissertation might make a small contribution to the debate on 
this large educational matter. 
 
In this respect this is, to the best of my knowledge, the first 
study to explore in depth the possible benefits of a neo-Aristotelian 
theory of school discipline. Although no surviving Aristotelian treatise 
specifically addresses this issue, it is suggested that a theory of school 
discipline may nevertheless be inferred from Aristotle‘s various 
comments on virtue, moral habituation, childhood and pedagogical 
instruction. With this end in mind, this study is divided into three 
sections and ten chapters. In the first section entitled ‗What should 
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school discipline be for?‘ some well (and less well) known theories and 
philosophies of school discipline are examined. In chapter one, the key 
questions are located in the Scottish context. It is argued that surveys 
carried out in Scottish schools in the past 15-20 years have helped to 
build up an impressive foundation of empirical knowledge regarding 
pupil behaviour. However, Scottish educational policy concerning 
pupil behaviour does not rest on a clear account of what discipline is 
or should be for. It is therefore proposed that a philosophical inquiry 
might help to provide a clearer and more justifiable explanation of the 
purposes of discipline in Scottish schools.    
 
In chapter two, ‗traditional‘ views of discipline, knowledge and 
learning are explored.  Richard Peters‘ liberal theory, whereby pupils 
are disciplined both for and by traditions of knowledge is discussed in 
detail.  In chapter three, some ‗child centred‘ objections to traditional 
theories of learning and discipline are documented. Dewey‘s and P S 
Wilson‘s accounts of discipline based on pupil interest and experience 
are subjected to particular scrutiny. It is acknowledged that discipline 
should involve sustained pupil engagement with the task in hand. 
Still, while some advocates of liberal education perhaps placed too 
great an emphasis on developing theoretical knowledge, arguably 
some ‗child centred‘ theorists did not value such development enough. 
It is concluded that a better long term purpose for discipline in 
schools might rather be to engender neo-Aristotelian wisdom in 
pupils, as this concept incorporates into it aspects of both 
practical/experiential and theoretical knowledge. 
 
The second part of this thesis, subtitled ‗Wisdom and the life of 
virtue‘ delves deeper into the ‗thicket‘ of Aristotle‘s ethics and 
epistemology. In chapter four and five it is maintained that school 
discipline should aim to inculcate virtuous rather than rule-following 
habits in pupils within a wider perspective of human flourishing. In 
chapters six and seven, it is maintained that in a neo-Aristotelian 
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theory of school discipline the focus should be on educating the 
thoughts, actions and feelings of pupils. It is suggested that a theory 
of moral development may be extrapolated from Aristotle‘s texts and 
that persuasion, imitation, shame, and emulation, are all different 
motives through which the young can learn. In chapter eight some of 
the various states of mind that Aristotle analysed in Book VI of his 
Nicomachean Ethics are considered alongside more recent 
developments in virtue epistemology. It is claimed that: 1) knowledge 
(in speculative form at any rate) should be defined as eternally true 
belief; 2) Aristotle held wisdom in higher regard than knowledge; 3) 
Aristotle's intellectual virtues are virtues because they directly 
contribute to or, are constitutive of, human flourishing; 4) as such 
resourcefulness and understanding are valuable intellectual qualities, 
but not virtues. It is concluded that the prospects of children 
becoming educated, and flourishing, centrally depend upon their 
receiving the right sort of habituation and intellectual instruction. 
 
 In the final section of the thesis called ‗Discipline and education 
for virtue‘, it is maintained that teacher character, style and 
curriculum content are influential factors on pupil discipline in 
schools. At this juncture, aspects of the preceding two sections are 
synthesised into a range of general pedagogical and curricular 
recommendations. In chapter nine, consideration is given to how neo-
Aristotelian teaching approaches might have a positive impact upon 
pupil discipline. It is there indicated that broadly conceived processes 
of instructional encounter and discipline should be central to school 
education. In discussing such processes it is stressed that their 
proper promotion presupposes: 1) that teachers themselves possess a 
plurality of moral and intellectual qualities and; 2) that learners 
actively exercise the discipline necessary for each aspect of their 
schooling. Importantly, it is concluded that discipline has most value 
when it involves the repeated pupil performance of worthwhile 
learning activities. It is suggested that such a neo-Aristotelian theory 
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of school discipline is preferable to Peters‘ one, on account of the 
emphasis the former places on: 1) developing character traits most 
conducive to long term pupil flourishing; and 2) educating the 
emotions of pupils in the course of school discipline. In respect to 2) it 
is, in particular suggested that discipline may contribute to the 
development of virtuous affective dispositions, especially if pupils are 
supported to tolerate and overcome any adverse feelings that occur 
during difficult valuable learning. 
 
In chapter ten, some attempt will be made to make sense of the 
proposals underpinning the new Scottish Curriculum for Excellence. 
It will be suggested that the principal innovation of the policy has 
been to make the excellent pupil the aim of schooling rather than the 
educated pupil. However, it is argued that Scottish educators should 
seek to promote pupil virtue rather than pupil excellence because the 
virtues are implicated in flourishing human life in a way that other 
excellences need not be. As such, it is concluded that schools should 
primarily build learning around worthwhile (intellectual, moral and 
practical/technical) activities. It is also concluded that school 
discipline, curriculum content and teaching and learning should all 



















What should school Discipline be for?
 1 
Chapter 1: Pupil Behaviour, Empiricism and Educational Philosophy 
  
In this chapter, findings from the most recent surveys of pupil 
behaviour in Scottish Schools will be summarised, and their 
recommendations critiqued. It will be observed that though these 
reports have helped build up an accurate general picture of the nature 
of pupil behaviour in Scottish Schools this picture is importantly 
incomplete. It will be suggested that the main policy to improve pupil 
behaviour, Better Behaviour Better Learning (BBBL) does not precisely 
articulate what discipline in schools is, nor does it provide a coherent 
and normatively defensible account of what it should be for. It will be 
suggested that philosophical inquiry can help to provide a more 
justifiable and clear explanation of the purposes that should be 
ascribed to discipline in schools.  It will be argued that educational 
philosophy has historically had two central tasks: to analyse 
educationally salient concepts so as to resolve ambiguities where they 
occur; and to reintegrate such concepts into a broader account of 
educational aims. It will be concluded that questions of discipline 
should not be considered in isolation from the wider aims of 
education.  
 
1.1 Better Behaviour Better Learning 
 
Since 1992, the Scottish Government has published a series of 
reports regarding pupil behaviour in schools (Johnstone & Munn, 1992) 
(Munn et al, 2004) (SEED, 2001) (SEED, 2004) (SEED, 2006) (SG, 2009).  Taken 
together, these surveys provide an impressive dossier of information 
regarding general perceptions of the behaviour of pupils in Scotland‘s 
schools. Three broad trends of indiscipline have emerged (Munn et al, 
2004): boys are perceived by teaching staff as particularly challenging; 
low level disruption of teachers by pupils in class is perceived by 
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teaching staff as the most wearing problem8; and reports of violence 
towards teaching staff remain rare.  
 
‗The data as a whole suggests that pupil-to-pupil relations are the main locus of 
serious indiscipline around the school.‘ (SG, 2009, P 115) 
 
Notably, there is a different pattern in relation to violence 
between pupils in schools with 1 in 4 primary teachers and 1 in 5 
secondary teachers having witnessed pupil on pupil physical violence 
and aggression within the past week (SG, 2009). However, less than 
25% of head teachers thought this violence had a serious or very 
serious impact on the running of the school (SG, 2009). Examples given 
of low level disruption are pupils talking out of turn (only 4% of 
primary and 2% of secondary teachers indicated that this had not 
happened in their classes in the past week, SG, 2009) or talking to 
others when the teacher is trying to teach. Recently 61% of secondary 
head teachers reported that lessons had been interrupted in the past 
week by pupil use of mobile phones (SG, 2009). More encouragingly 
93% of primary teachers and 87% of secondary teachers were 
confident or very confident in their ability to promote positive 
behaviour (SG, 2009).  93% of primary teachers and 86% of secondary 
teachers also thought that all or most of their pupils were generally 
well behaved. Whereas teaching staff highly value the support they 
receive with regard to managing negative pupil behaviour and 
promoting positive behaviour, support staff only reported satisfaction 
with the training they received (SG, 2009). The pupils themselves were 
also broadly positive with 81% of primary and 59% of secondary 
school children indicating that they witnessed their peers 
participating in all or most lessons (SG, 2009).   
 
Though the most recent survey (SG, 2009) does identify specific 
examples of both positive and negative pupil behaviour, there is a 
                                                 
8
 Over 60% of teachers encountered low level disruption twice a day or more (SG, 
2009). 
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general tendency in the earlier reports to focus on the latter. The 
reports undoubtedly paint a clear picture of the behavioural problems 
and indiscipline in schools. However, I do not think that sufficient 
attention has been given to the accurate conceptualisation of good 
behaviour and discipline. Moreover, I do not think that the 
recommendations to improve pupil behaviour contained in the Better 
Behaviour Better Learning policy (SEED, 2001) are coherent either. 
Bridges and Watts (2008) stress that policy has an inescapably 
normative character and that meaningful policy must interpret 
empirical research data (if appropriate to the enquiry) within a 
defensible normative framework. They usefully set out four criteria of 
value judgement and suggest that ‗if policy cannot pass these critical 
tests it is arguably ill-prepared‘ (Bridges and Watts, 2008, p 59).   
 
Firstly, Bridges and Watts ask whether or not the normative 
principles underlying the educational policy are intelligibly 
articulated. In this regard, to the credit of the policy makers under 
present discussion, the answer seems to be affirmative. Arguably, the 
most promising line of thought in Better Behaviour Better Learning is 
to be found in the following comment: ‗Discipline policy cannot, and 
should not, be separated from policy on learning and teaching – the 
two are inextricably linked‘ (SEED, 2001, p 8). A similar view is expressed 
in the Insight 15 report which advocates that discipline be seen as a 
means to effective learning: ‗Good discipline, however, is also an end 
in itself, an outcome of schooling‘ (Munn at al, 2004, p 1). However, the 
aim of uniting discipline, teaching and learning would not appear to 
have been discovered in the course of empirical data collection; it is 
more in the nature of an a priori or conceptual assumption. Indeed, it 
is arguable that BBBL does not provide sufficiently clear guidance 
about what teachers should do to engender ‗good discipline‘ in their 
classes because the policy does not say enough about what ‗good 
discipline‘ actually is. Beyond identifying discipline and effective 
learning as desirable, little consideration is given in Better Behaviour 
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Better Learning or any of its follow up publications about what exactly 
these terms are supposed to mean. As we shall see in chapters two 
and three, in educational theory, discipline has been conceptualised 
in a least two very different ways: as a necessary part of a wider 
initiation into traditional forms of knowledge, and as a child centred 
educational order. Each of these concepts brings with it divergent 
practical implications but BBBL does not unambiguously endorse one 
model of discipline over another. 
 
It is possible that the title of the policy Better Behaviour Better 
Learning might give some indication of how teachers are expected to 
foster positive behaviour. It seems to imply that good behaviour 
precedes learning9. The title suggests that educators should first learn 
how to get pupil attention so that they can thereafter help them to 
learn. In this regard Better Behaviour Better Learning and its follow-
ups are liberally peppered with the language of classroom 
management and the reports do advocate this approach. In fact the 
stated conclusion of the Insight 15 report is that the ‗picture suggests 
it is essential to continue to focus on behaviour management as a key 
policy area‘ (Munn et al, 2004, p 8).  Similarly, the most recent survey 
indicates that: Better Behaviour Better Learning is still seen as 
foundational to behaviour management in schools (SG, 2009).  
 
It is arguable that Better Behaviour Better Learning is ‗ill-
prepared‘ to meet another criterion stipulated by Bridges and Watts 
(2008): namely, that the recommended actions in a policy are 
consistent with the principles that underpin it. In the next section 
(1.2) it will be suggested that the principle (stated in BBBL) of uniting 
discipline with teaching and learning is at odds with the conclusion 
that behaviour management should be a focal point for discipline 
policy and practice. In order to bring learning and discipline properly 
                                                 
9
 George Head (2007, p 94) makes much the same point, suggesting that the report might be perceived 
as „prioritising behaviour over learning‟. He adds that „dealing with behaviour as a prerequisite to 
addressing learning, therefore, may be the wrong starting point‟. I tend to agree.  
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together it would seem necessary for discipline to be conceptualised as 
something that is integral to rather than prior to, learning. Behaviour 
management on the other hand (as 1.2 will explain) has the end of an 
orderly class, ready to learn, under the extrinsic control of the teacher. 
To try to tackle the main problem identified in the Insight 15 report 
(namely persistent low level misbehaviour by pupils that inhibits 
learning) by focusing on behaviour management seems at odds with 
the integration of discipline, teaching and learning.  Indeed, as we 
shall see, some philosophers doubt that it is justifiable to regard 
people and/or a class of pupils as entities that can or should be 
managed.  
 
1.2 Should schools really aim to merely manage pupil behaviour? 
 
Roger Slee (1995) argues that discipline needs to be reclaimed as 
an educational concept because a paradigm of social control exists in 
schools whereby discipline is construed as no more than a managerial 
skill. He bemoans the nature of the literature that dominates the 
school discipline debate, remarking that it centres primarily on 
classroom management techniques, techniques aimed not at what 
might best be done, but rather on what works in managing pupils in, 
very often, extremely difficult circumstances. Such pragmatic 
approaches to discipline he says are born from an uncritical 
acceptance that discipline is a synonym and ‗ultimately a verb, for 
control‘ (Slee, 1995, p 7).  He points out that though recent policy has 
ostensibly changed and become less punitive in nature, these changes 
are essentially cosmetic: the ‗functional imperative of control has not 
significantly altered‘ (Slee, 1995, p 7).  Although discipline complements 
teaching ‗control assumes a conflict of interest, disagreement 
concerning goals, and is tangential to the aims of education‘ (Slee, 1995, 
p 28). Slee may have been commenting on discipline policy in Australia 
but I believe that his observations may be transposed and equally 
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applied to the current Scottish context and to Better Behaviour Better 
Learning.  
 
Richard Smith (1985), like Slee, is also very sceptical of 
managerial approaches to discipline affirming that they mask an 
essentially manipulative treatment of pupils as means to ends and not 
as ends in themselves, worthy of dignity. MacIntyre (1984) too, has 
suggested that a manager cannot engage in moral debate because of 
the ways in which he relates to (or fails to relate to) people in his or 
her managerial role. A manager, he says, is someone who ‗treats ends 
as given, as outside his scope‘, his ‗concern is with technique‘ (ibid, p 
30). However, although managers may not engage in moral debate, 
management itself is far from being normatively neutral. Management, 
Smith says, is ‗bound up with a way of regarding human relations in 
which manipulating people into compliant ways of behaving is 
thought acceptable.‘ (Smith, 1985 p 22) 
 
Smith suggests that management gives a misleading impression 
that its skills will enable teachers to be more detached, rational and 
ultimately professional. He argues that education ‗is a transaction 
between persons who have depth, and we ignore at our peril the role 
of feelings, the affective dimension to that depth‘ (Smith, 1985 p 23). I too 
think that it may be problematic to place impersonal behaviour 
management techniques at the centre of approaches to improving 
discipline in schools. As I hope to make clear over the course of the 
thesis, discipline is just not something that a teacher can do to his or 
her pupils through the use of a repertoire of superficial techniques 
aimed at establishing and maintaining attention. The personalities 
and characters of teachers are more likely to help foster a climate of 
genuine discipline in class10. Discipline probably most often occurs in 
school, when focus is placed on education and learning, rather than 
on what precedes them. Indeed, in this thesis it is instead argued that 
                                                 
10
 I will in particular elaborate on the educational benefit of teachers having desirable character traits 
and practical dispositions in chapter nine. 
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discipline should centrally involve pupils consistently engaging in 
worthwhile learning11. At any rate, in regard to discipline, schools 
must I think aim to do more than merely manage pupil behaviour. 
 
It is notable that reports on pupil behaviour in Scotland have 
been largely informed by empirical enquiry - by surveys, interviews 
and focus groups with various educational professionals and school 
pupils. Slee (1995), Smith (1985), Clark (1998), P S Wilson (1971) and J 
Wilson (1981) have all insisted that issues of discipline in schools can 
only hope to be fully understood and resolved through moral 
philosophical rather than empirical investigation. Clark12 suggests 
that much of the unrest in schools can be traced back to teachers not 
being clear about the distinction between control and discipline more 
than to the absence of an empirical knowledge base to guide their 
performance. Smith (1985) similarly observes that teachers should 
explore the ambiguities of the concepts underlying the discipline 
problem. He says that any attempt to solve disciplinary problems 
needs to be prefaced by a discussion of concepts. ‗Sometimes we may 
find that in the process of clarification the substantial problem 
effectively disappears‘ (Smith, 1985, p 4). I however am unconvinced that 
such conceptual clarifications could ever resolve discipline issues 
altogether. Nonetheless, in the remainder of this chapter (and 
especially 1.4 & 1.5) it will be suggested that educational philosophy 
is a discipline that has historically involved the careful analysis of 
educational concepts and that as such, it can provide particular 
insight into the broader question of what school discipline ought to be 
for. In the following section (1.3) it will first however be stressed that 
no educational research (be the methodology largely conceptual 
and/or empirical) is ever likely to generate final answers to 
educational problems generally, or school discipline particularly. If 
                                                 
11
 Peters‟ description of worthwhile activities is described in chapter 2 and contrasted with P S 
Wilson‟s in chapter 3. 
12
 Clark‟s distinction between discipline and control is explored in more detail in chapter 2 (at 2.1) and 
the concepts are discussed in depth in chapter 3. 
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social scientific and philosophical inquiries cannot provide definitive 
answers to educational matters, what can they tell us?  
 
1.3 Knowledge and the limits of experience 
 
‘Let others creep by timid steps, and slow, 
On plain Experience lay foundations low, 
By common sense to common knowledge bred, 
And last, to Nature’s Cause thro’ Nature led.’ 
 
‘See skulking Truth to her old cavern fled, 
Mountains of Casuistry heap’d o’er her head! 
Philosophy, that lean’d on Heav’n before, 
Shrinks to her second cause, and is no more.’  
(Pope, The Dunciad Book IV, 2008) 
 
Alexander Pope (2008), in his mock epic poem The Dunciad, 
depicts a time at which humanity (or at least London) is presided over 
by the Goddess of Dullness. Whereas the deities or demigods of 
Homeric Greece intervened in the lives of mortals for a range of 
different purposes, Dullness has only one: the stultification of critical 
thought, of creativity and of imagination, to the end of ensuring that 
humanity with ‗trifling head‘ and ‗contracted heart‘ knows itself less. 
Williams argues that the poem is amongst other things a 
‗thoroughgoing Socratic allegory‘ (1953, p 810) which warns of the 
danger of mistaking lowly sense-derived knowledge for true wisdom. 
From the stanzas above, it would appear that Pope construed 
experience and the laws of nature and causation as all too often 
obstructive to the pursuit of higher ideals of wisdom, truth and 
philosophy. Indeed, Pope‘s apocalyptic vision of a modern world of 
dullness suggests that scientific inquiry based on experience alone 
may no longer identify the truth but actually obscure it while 
destroying philosophy entirely.  
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Smith (2008) speculates that art and literary criticism13 might 
inform a more broadly conceived idea of educational research. Putman 
also indicates that social scientific inquiry might benefit from 
becoming ‗more ―literary‖‘ (1978, p 77) and Sleigh (2011) implies that 
literature can help to make sense of both the history of and the claims 
made in science. Griffin (1988) however comments that we do not 
primarily read Pope for his theory, but for his poetry, and in the 
context of this discussion there is substantial merit in this point. 
Indeed, Collier also cites Pope‘s poetry and concludes that his views 
are tantamount to ‗anti-science rhetoric‘ (1994, p 238). Thus, it is my 
view that while imaginative literature might be a source of ideas it is 
probably not helpful to think of such material as substitute for 
reasoned argument14. Indeed, though reasonably frequent reference 
will be made to poetry in this thesis, the intention of this is not to 
evidence but rather stimulate thought about a particular claim or 
direction of inquiry. With this in mind, it does seem that many 
educational philosophers think that research in education has more 
recently neglected theory relevant to the field and focussed too much 
upon empirical data collection processes. 
 
Three recent issues of the ‗Journal of Philosophy of Education‘ 
(May 2006 vol. 40 (2); Nov 2006, vol. 40 (4) both Ed. by Bridges & Smith and August 
2008 (42) S1) were devoted to concerns a little like those expressed by 
Pope and in particular, the trend towards understanding all wisdom 
as originating from experience. The function of educational research 
has, as a consequence, it is claimed, become conceived of, as 
‗essentially, or even solely, a matter of discovering what works‘ (Bridges 
& Smith, 2006, p 132). Indeed, for the last fifteen years or more, some 
philosophers of education have argued that there has been increasing 
pressure on educational research to provide practical answers and 
solutions to practical problems. Hammersly (1997, 2006) Pring (2000) 
                                                 
13
 Smith exemplifies the specific sort of process he has in mind by sensitively critiquing the poetry of 
Wordsworth and Auden. 
14
 I should acknowledge particular gratitude to Professor Lindsay Paterson who has helped my thinking 
on this matter. 
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Smith (1987, 2006) and Biesta (2007) all observe the promulgation of this 
tendency and in their different ways locate as its primary driver a view 
that knowledge generated by social science can be without difficulty 
applied to predict and influence human behaviour. Such a simplistic 
view of educational research, threatens to ‗consign to oblivion 
philosophy, history, much sociology and, in fact, anything that is 
explicitly theoretical‘ (Bridges & Smith, 2006, p 132). Hammersly (1997, 
2006) Pring (2000) Smith (1987, 2006) and Biesta (2007) all suggest that 
the arguments of Hargreaves (1996a & 1996b) embody this tendency to 
think that if only enough empirical evidence was gathered, practical 
educational problems could be resolved. What though does 
Hargreaves say about research in education?  
 
‗In education there is simply not enough evidence on the effects and effectiveness of 
what teachers do in classrooms to provide an evidence-based corpus of knowledge. 
The failure of educational researchers, with a few exceptions, to create a substantial 
body of knowledge equivalent to evidence-based medicine means that teaching is 
not—and never will be—a research-based profession unless there is major change in 
the kind of research that is done in education‘. (Hargreaves, 1996b, p 3) 
 
Hargreaves asserts that teaching should be, but is not, a 
research based profession and that unlike medicine it has no agreed 
knowledge base of evidence to guide it. Establishing a research base of 
evidence about effective practice should Hargreaves says be ‗a 
singularly important‘ (ibid, p 1) priority for educational research15. He 
maintains that that there is almost no compelling evidence which 
‗demonstrates conclusively that if teachers change their practice from 
x to y there will be a significant and enduring improvement in 
teaching and learning‘ (ibid, p 5). The lack of powerful evidence about 
effective practice is, he says, the main reason why educational 
research ill serves teachers. Education, like medicine, thus needs 
                                                 
15
 Hargreaves does, to be fair, acknowledge that enhancing the effectiveness of teaching can only be 
achieved by a combination of means (1996b, p 1). He nevertheless does immediately thereafter assert 
his view that establishing education as an evidenced based profession is the single most effective way 
of improving practice.  
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‗evidence about what works with whom under what conditions and 
with what effects‘ (ibid, p 7). 
 
Hargreaves states that the ‗the so-called foundation disciplines 
of education – psychology, sociology, philosophy and history... are 
seen to consist of ―theory‖ which is strongly separated from practice‘ 
(ibid, p 1-2). Hargreaves suggests that it is because of this disconnection 
(between theory and practice) that educational research provides ‗low 
value...as a guide to the solution of practical problems‘ (ibid, p 2). He 
thus argues that practitioners ought to have a greater involvement in 
educational research. Indeed, he states that a ‗new partnership 
between researchers and practitioners must be at the heart of any 
reform‘ (Hargreaves, 1996b, p 5) in educational research. Hargreaves also 
importantly says that research in medicine, like that in natural 
science, ‗has a broadly cumulative character‘ (ibid, p 2) in that research 
projects build on previous evidence or theory so as to refine the 
knowledge base in the field. Hargreaves however adds that much 
research in education is ‗non-cumulative‘. His reasoning here seems 
to suggest he thinks that researchers in education need to move away 
from the ‗so-called foundation disciplines‘ and instead adopt a more 
natural scientific approach (and greater practitioner input in any such 
research process) in order to build up a more compelling body of 
evidence that can better guide practice.  
 
 ‗Those who want researchers to cut the theory and simply to say ―what works‖, 
forget that what counts as ―working‖ makes many unquestioned assumptions which 
need to be examined‘ (Pring, 2004, p 220). 
 
Pring states that educational research does not fail to provide teachers 
and policy makers with the answers they want because of an 
insufficient empirical knowledge base as Hargreaves would have it. 
The reasons for the perceived failure, Pring indicates, lie elsewhere. He 
(2000) contends, as has Atkinson (2000) that the true nature of many of 
the problems that Hargreaves raises need to be recognised for what 
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they are: as philosophical and conceptual rather than empirical 
problems.  
 
‗Evidence-based policy and practice‘ are demanded without analysis of what counts 
as evidence in different kinds of discourse. Certainty is sought where there is no 
option but to live in a world of uncertainties.‘ (Pring, 2004, p 7) 
 
Pring explains there are various different notions of what 
evidence is and that the term has different meanings and associations 
depending on the ‗kind of discourse one is engaged in‘ (Pring, 2004, p 
197). He distinguishes between evidence that governments might seek 
to support a particular policy and the evidence scientific research can 
actually provide about social behaviour. He is insistent that evidence 
should not be mistaken for proof arguing that there ‗is always a logical 
gap between the conclusion and the evidence for the conclusion.‘ 
(Pring, 2004, p 199) There is an inherent unpredictability he says in 
complex social situations like teaching and as such there is a logical 
limit to which any intervention (evidence-based or otherwise) can 
ensure a given set of consequences.  Hammersley concurs with this, 
saying that there are serious difficulties in forming conclusive bases of 
knowledge relating to ‗causal patterns in social phenomena‘ 
(Hammersly, 1997, p 212). At the core of these problems he says is the 
degree to which ‗we can have a science of human behaviour of the 
kind that models itself, even remotely, on the natural sciences‘ 
(Hammersly, 1997, p 212). Peter Winch, fifty years ago also argued that 
the core features of our understanding of modern social life are 
‗incompatible with concepts central to the activity of scientific 
prediction‘. (Winch, 1958, p 88)  
 
The converse view that scientific methods can produce certain 
knowledge that enables accurate prediction of social situations would 
seem to be the only16 philosophical justification for the wholesale 
adoption of a ‗what works‘ pedagogy. Hammersly has more recently 
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 Albeit, in my view wrong-headed. 
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been particularly critical of quantitative social science methods being 
perceived as the research ideal, reiterating that they ‗can only tell us 
what is false, not what is true (Hammersly, 2006, p 275)‘. He maintains 
that when experimental error is considered, even what is false is not 
certain. Smeyers (2006), in his article on Winch, observes that even if 
science could tell us what was real in social situations this would not 
be a view from within science but about science; it would essentially 
come from outside of science and is as such only verifiable outside of 
science. However, the criticisms of social science made by Hammersly 
and Smeyers are probably well wide of the mark as many philosophers 
of social science have themselves all stressed that the discipline ought 
to combine empirical data collection with wider conceptual 
considerations. Putman (1978), Hacking (1981) and Collier (1994) all 
indicate that rigorous social scientific inquiries do not presuppose 
that: 1) methodology in social science can be modelled on that by 
which the natural world is studied, nor that; 2) human behaviour can 
be invariably predicted through scientific experiment. Putman states 
that it is ‗accepted doctrine in Philosophy of Science that inductive 
testing of theories presupposes some a priori (in the sense of 
antecendent) weighting of the theories – a weighting prior to the 
checking‘) (1978, p 75).  
 
For Putman abstract theory and empirical evidence both have a 
role to play in the formation of defensible theories of social behaviour. 
Importantly, he suggests that in terms of increasing our 
understanding of practical knowledge (a category which school 
discipline would seem to almost invariably fall under) human 
judgement may be just as important and necessary as formal 
scientific experiment. Putman states that in scientific investigation, ‗it 
is a feature of practical knowledge that we often have to use ourselves 
(or other people) as the measuring instruments‘ (1978, p 72). Putman 
indicates that skilled human judgement probably matters just as 
much in natural as well as social scientific inquiry. Collier too makes 
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clear the view that social science does not and should not exclusively 
concern itself with establishing social facts (based on either Hume like 
casual laws or positivist assumptions) that can be used to predict 
future social conduct. He states that: ‗in philosophy as in science, 
while there can be justified beliefs and there can be progess, there can 
be no final theory, unsusceptible to revision and improvement‘ (Collier, 
1994, p 23). As we shall now go on to see, it seems that many 
philosophers of social science and education actually agree on an 
important point – that theories (and the evidence which informs such 
theory) that seek to predict social behaviour cannot be irrevocably 
proven.  
 
Atkinson (2000) argues that is highly debatable whether 
educational research can ever come up with final solutions to 
pedagogical problems. Carr too similarly maintains that ‗the questions 
raised in the context of anything worth calling a moral life are also 
interminable...and resistant to closure (Carr, 2007 p 402)‘. Better 
Behaviour Better Learning does appear to appreciate some of these 
concerns stating that ‗if there was a straightforward answer to the 
problem of discipline in schools, someone would have discovered it by 
this stage‘ (SEED, 2001, p 7). If the reason that no solutions to ill 
discipline have been found is that there will likely never be any, then 
it would seem nonsensical to criticise (as Hargreaves has more 
broadly) any educational research (empirical or otherwise) that fails to 
provide solutions to problems that cannot by their nature be finally 
solved. It seems to me that in terms of discipline the best we can hope 
for is the identification of clear reasons why some approaches are 
more defensible than others. Empirical evidence may well have 
important insights into this process but it can only provide part of the 
picture. It certainly does seem mistaken to hope or think that 
research into pupil behaviour could yield a body of evidence of final 
solutions to the many practical problems of discipline that teachers 
face. 
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Atkinson (2000) and Biesta (2007) suggest that ‗what works‘ 
merely records what has worked for some people in specific 
circumstances in the past. The real duty of research is to look forward 
‗not to guaranteed improvements, but to the rich potential of critical 
discourse and the promise of an uncertain future‘ (Atkinson, 2000, p 328). 
Similarly, Biesta indicates that educational research should not be 
used to provide teachers with prescriptive rules for action but rather 
hypotheses for their intelligent problem solving. Reid (1968) also 
observes that the practice of teaching should be constituted by more 
than the application of intellectual rules. It should involve, he says, 
original and intelligent decision making that is influenced by 
educational theory. Arguably research into pupil discipline should 
centrally involve a sustained critical discourse for the purpose of 
assisting teachers to make intelligent, well informed practical 
decisions.  
 
Better Behaviour Better Learning is it seems to me though very 
light in terms of such critical discourse. Though the fundamental 
purpose of Government policy is clearly not to conduct abstract 
philosophy, Conroy, Davis and Enslin (2008) have recently argued that 
philosophical investigation should be integrated with empirical 
evidence throughout policy development. As they put it, ‗philosophy 
helps policy through assisting in the clothing of numbers‘ (Conroy et al, 
2008, p 171). If it is accepted that some sort of philosophical debate is 
central to the discipline problem and that such debate has not been 
substantially engaged with anywhere else, it would seem important 
that educators themselves scrutinise their conceptualisations of 
discipline. How though might educational philosophy support the 
practical decision making and problem solving of educators? Indeed, 
is educational philosophy a discipline that may be entirely conducted 
by practitioners themselves? Is there such a thing as a philosophic 
method? In addressing these questions I will suggest that some recent 
caricatures of analytical philosophy of education have: 1) not done 
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justice to the diversity of thought within the tradition and; 2) 
underestimated the clarity and insight that such inquiry can bring to 
bear on matters of educational importance. 
 
1.4 What is Educational Philosophy? 
 
‗The philosophy of education must help make clear those factors that are relevant to 
wise decision making in education. It cannot make them. Yet it must keep the live 
context in mind.‘ (Archambault, 1968, p 9) 
 
There has been much recent debate within educational 
philosophy over what this field of inquiry is, or perhaps, ought to be. 
Paul Hirst and Wilfred Carr recently engaged in a significant exchange 
on this subject (Hirst & W Carr, 2005). Hirst affirms that ‗philosophy, like 
psychology, sociology and history, is an abstracting, academic and 
theoretical discipline‘ that can significantly aid ‗the exercise of 
practical reason in educational affairs‘ (ibid, p 618). In defining 
educational philosophy in theoretical terms, Hirst rejects the argument 
of Wilfred Carr, who maintains that educational philosophy is 
inherently, indeed, exclusively practical. Carr says that the ‗philosophy 
of education cannot inform educational practice because it is itself a 
form of practice‘ (ibid, p 623).  In his rejoinder to Hirst, Carr adds that 
educational philosophy is ‗entirely17 dependent on the willingness of 
educational practitioners to reflectively recover the unacknowledged 
prejudices at work in their practical knowledge and understanding‘ 
(ibid, p 625-626). Hirst does not soften his overall opposition to Carr‘s 
practical philosophy but he does agree that educational philosophy 
‗needs educational practitioners‘ (ibid, p 630) willing and able to reflect 
on their own practice. Educational philosophy has, since this 
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 Wilfred Carr makes much the same point in an earlier paper remarking that „any satisfactory 
resolution‟ to the discipline‟s problems „will only be achieved by the philosophy of education‟s 
proficient and experienced practitioners‟ (2004, p 70). 
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exchange, been characterised in a range of others ways that do not 
descend into a seeming dichotomy, between theory and practice18. 
 
A recent issue of the Journal of the Philosophy of education 
specifically considered issues of philosophical methodology (Ruitenberg, 
2009). A diverse range of articles in this issue are grouped around the 
general question of what philosophers of education do and how they 
do it. A variety of different methodological approaches are advocated. 
Holma (2009) suggests that analysis, synthesis and dialogue ought to 
be combined. Smith (2009) emphasises the need for attentiveness to 
those with whom we engage in dialogue about educational issues. 
Vokey (2009) persuasively argues that dialectical argument can shed 
light on why one conceptual scheme is preferable to another. He 
argues that the merit of particular theoretical frameworks can be 
assessed against four virtues of intelligibility, internal coherence, 
plausibility and practical success. Bonnet (2009) stresses the role of 
phenomenological investigation and Biesta (2009) that of witnessing 
deconstruction. The latter argues that a degree of miscommunication 
is inevitable in education.  
 
Bingham (2009) suggests that methodology in philosophy should 
be taken literally and metaphorically. The term ‗method‘, he says, 
should at least in part ‗be taken as just that, a name‘ (Bingham, 2009, p 
416). Educational research that ‗names‘ a philosopher, for example 
Aristotle19, gives the reader a clue that the inquiry in question is likely 
to be shaped by distinctively Aristotelian thought and content. 
Similarly, Ruitenberg notes that ‗research methods in philosophy of 
education cannot be divorced from content‘ (2009, p 318). Thus, while 
there is far from contemporary consensus about the precise nature of 
                                                 
18
 I must confess to finding the views of Hirst much more balanced and plausible than Carr‟s. The logic 
of Carr‟s stance suggests he thinks professional philosophers can offer no insight to educational issues. 
For a critique of the debate between Hirst & Carr, see Long (2008) who proposes a „third way‟ that 
finds value for both the theoretical, and the practical, in educational philosophy. Importantly, in 
Chapter 2 Hirst‟s educational philosophy will be further explored.  
19
 I „name‟ Aristotle here as his thought significantly shapes this dissertation. Bingham cites Rancière 
to exemplify his theory. 
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educational philosophy, there remains widespread recognition 
amongst most20 of its proponents that content and theory are central 
to philosophical inquiry. Importantly many educational philosophers 
also agree that one of their main tasks is to think critically about 
content and about educational problems, through conceptual analysis.  
In their different ways 0‘Connor (1957), Archambault (1968), Reid (1968), 
Best (1968), Peters (1970), Hirst & Peters (1975), Curren (2007) and 
Holma (2009)) all agree that conceptual analysis is one of, if not the, 
principal tools at the educational philosophers disposal.  
 
Although diverse philosophers since antiquity21 have provided 
considerable insight into educational problems, the philosophy of 
education did not really emerge as a distinct discipline until the 
twentieth century (Archambault 1968, Blake et al 2003 & Hirst & W Carr 2005). 
D J O‘Connor (1957) was one of the first to employ the methods of 
philosophical analysis to specifically educational problems. He argued 
that philosophy was an ‗activity of criticism and clarification‘ (O‘Connor, 
1957, P 4) that could be exercised on any subject matter. The phrase 
‗philosophy of education‘ refers to ‗those problems of philosophy that 
are of direct relevance to educational theory‘ (O‘Connor, 1957, p 14-15). 
The later groundbreaking work of Richard Peters and Paul Hirst22 in 
the United Kingdom in the 1960‘s and 1970‘s, established analysis as 
the predominant and even paradigmatic style in the philosophy of 
education (Blake et al 2003). However, the analytic tradition has not been 
without its critics23. Moreover, a separate continental tradition has 
also flourished alongside it.  
 
Abraham Edel (1972) argued that the British analytic movement 
had a ‗soft spot‘ (1972, p 132) and had not fulfilled its potential as a 
                                                 
20
 Wilfred Carr being a prominent exception 
21
 For example Plato‟s Republic (1987), Aristotle‟s The Politics (1981), Rousseau‟s Emile (1993) and 
Dewey‟s Democracy and Education (2008) 
22
  Ethics and Education (1970) by Peters and the Logic of Education by Hirst and Peters (1975) are 
paradigmatic examples of philosophical analysis being applied to education. These texts will receive 
more detailed discussion in chapters 2 & 3. 
23
 Wilfred Carr is perhaps the most prominent – however, there are as we shall see others too. 
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result. He disparaged Peters in particular for drawing too sharp a 
distinction between linguistic and empirical analysis. Edel suggested 
that the analytic method either excludes empirical, normative and 
contextual factors from consideration altogether or it only adds them 
on at the end after the analysis is over. He stated that the ‗remedy 
would seem to lie in a fuller integration of the empirical, the 
normative, and the contextual (especially the socio-cultural) within the 
analytic method‘ (1972, p 132). In the opening chapter of the Blackwell 
Guide to the Philosophy of Education Blake, Smeyers, Smith and 
Standish (2003) also argue that analytical philosophy is too dependent 
upon clarifying obscurities in ordinary language. The analytic 
movement, they say was furthermore guilty of ‗almost wholly‘ ignoring 
educational philosophy conducted outside English speaking countries. 
Whilst English speaking philosophy of education focussed attention 
on concepts of schooling, the Continental movement primarily 
considered the transition from childhood to maturity (Blake et al 2003).  
Significantly however, English speaking philosophers of education 
have more recently been influenced by Continental thinkers like 
Foucault and Lyotard, who both reject the possibility of establishing 
ethical or epistemological foundations (Blake et al 2003) that can have 
universal explanatory power.  
 
If the search for universal foundations and principles to direct 
educational practice is abandoned, the ‗role of theory begins to look 
like interpretation rather than explanation‘ (Blake et al 2003, p 8-9). The 
Continental tradition, they argue, holds particular promise as a way of 
engaging in more interpretive educational dialogue. Whilst analytic 
techniques remain useful, educational philosophers can no longer 
afford to stand apart and merely clarify concepts like ‗Kings in 
disguise‘ prescribing and proscribing (Blake et al, 2003). They suggest 
that the philosophy of education should perhaps prioritise insight over 
clarity (Blake et al, 2003). Although it is true that Peters and other 
philosophers in the analytic mould did perceive linguistic analysis as 
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a central method of better understanding the field of education, I 
think the criticisms (of Edel 1972 and Blake et al 2003) glibly misrepresent 
or misinterpret both the tradition as a whole and the thinkers in 
question.  
 
Firstly, I think the distinction between insight and clarity is a 
questionable one. To be sure, clarity need not be insightful and it 
arguably often does arise without much wider understanding of all the 
factors that bear on a given matter. However, it seems to me that a 
central feature of genuine insight is clarity.  Although perspicacity 
may initially be experienced ‗through a glass darkly‘, it is difficult to 
see how a deep insight could remain usefully ambiguous for too long. 
Importantly, the conceptual clarity achieved by analytic philosophers 
such as Peters and Hirst has had enduring influence precisely 
because it retains the capacity to provide rich insight into educational 
problems. Secondly, Peters (1970) and Archambault (1968) both make 
clear that the analytic educational philosopher should not be thought 
of as some sort of masked regent who dispenses instructions from on 
high. Peters acknowledges that there was a time24 when ‗the 
philosophy of education consisted in the formulation of high level 
directives‘ (1970, p15). However he emphasises that it is because of the 
analytic revolution in the twentieth century that the vast majority of 
philosophers no longer ‗think it is their function to provide such high-
level directives for education or for life‘ (1970, p15). Best is even more 
emphatic on this point, declaring that the articulation and 
prescription of ‗educational aims is not, and never has been, the 
appointed task of the philosopher‘ (Best, 1968, p 52).  
 
My principal point of dispute, however, with Edel and the 
Blackwell Guide is that they treat the analytic movement as if it is of 
one mind only. They both suggest that analytic philosophers‘ of 
education restrict themselves to being conceptual under-labourers; 
                                                 
24
 Archambault and Peters appear to have antiquity in mind here as they both identify Plato 
specifically. 
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the labour being the clarification of concepts. D J O‘Connor however 
makes clear in his Introduction to the Philosophy of Education that 
philosophical analysis ‗does not, as is often supposed apply to a single 
‗school‘ of philosophy but is used to refer to the work of a very large 
number of philosophers of widely differing views‘ (O‘Connor, 1957, v). In 
the opening section of Philosophical Analysis and Education (edited by 
Archambault 1968) Reid and Best present two such alternative analytic 
perspectives of educational philosophy. Best argues that the 
educational philosopher should be a mere under-labourer. He thinks 
the function of philosophical analysis should be the relatively modest 
one of systematically erasing ambiguous language from educational 
theory. Reid however articulates a much more wide ranging account 
and it seems to me that Peters and Hirst‘s views have much more in 
common with his.  
 
‗Philosophy of education will be the use of philosophical instruments, the 
application of philosophical methods, to questions of education…both the more 
analytic emphases of philosophy (with linguistics) and the synthetic ones. This is the 
―philosophy of education.‖‘ (Reid, 1968, p 26) 
 
Reid suggests that analysis constitutes only half of educational 
philosophy. As he puts it: ‗analysis is, in fact, one moment, one 
emphasis, in the strictly indivisible life of philosophy; synthesis is the 
other moment‘. (Reid, 1968, p 24) The purpose of thinking about 
concepts (of breaking them down and putting them together) is to cast 
light upon educational practice. More recently, Holma (2009) has also 
argued that educational philosophy should involve a thorough 
methodological process of analysis and synthesis. She argues that the 
‗process of disassembling and reassembling…is…the way of getting 
access to a new, more profound understanding of the issue‘ (Holma, 
2009, p 326). What though should educational philosophers be trying to 
rebuild out of their profounder grasp of concepts? The potential for 
educational theory to aid practical decision-making has already been 
noted. Archambault, however, observes that the synthesis also often 
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leads philosophers to articulate a more coherent set of educational 
aims.  
 
Reid (1968) conceded that some analytical philosophers had 
downplayed the significance of their inquiries or neglected to 
synthesise and reformulate educational aims on the basis of prior 
analysis (Best being an obvious example). However, I do not think the 
implication (Blake et al, 2003) that the entire analytic tradition confined 
itself to under-labourer status is in any way justified. Peters (1970) 
stresses that educational philosophy should analyse concepts and 
apply insights from other relevant theoretical disciplines so as to 
synthesise an account of what worthwhile educational activities are. 
Peters and Hirst (1975) similarly indicate that individually analysed 
concepts ought to be considered in relation to other educationally 
salient concepts. They insist that conceptual analysis must have a 
wider point beyond analysis itself and they are quite explicit about 
theirs in the first chapter of Logic of Education (1975).  
 
They state that their purpose in analysing authoritarian and 
child-centred pedagogies is to synthesise and compose new concepts 
of education and human development and think through their 
curricular implications. To be sure, many analytic philosophers have 
prescribed aims for education but these have generally been quite 
modest (Archambault, 1968) and certainly not hidden. Contrary to the 
charges of Blake and others there is nothing covert about the 
aspirations articulated by philosophers such as Peters and Hirst. A 
central feature of the work of various educational philosophers25 has 
involved and resulted in the identification of ends and aims for 
education. Pointedly, the authors of the Blackwell Guide would not 
seem to disagree with this function; philosophers can and should be 
motivated to ‗engage in explorations of what education might be or 
                                                 
25
 See for example Dewey‟s Democracy and Education , Whitehead‟s The Aims of Education, 
O‟Connor‟s An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education (1957), Marples R (1999) The Aims of 
Education and Peters Ethics and Education (1970).  
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might become‘ (Blake et al, 2003, p 15). The important point seems to be 
that educational aims should not be thought of as final. Arguably 
philosophers from both the Analytic and Continental traditions have 
grasped the necessity that any purposes identified for education be 
subject to a cyclical process of statement, interpretation, criticism, 
dialogue, appropriate amendment and restatement. Archambault 
(1968), for example indicates that educational aims must keep the 
actual, live context in mind. O‘Connor similarly argues that though 
the open and critically minded person often makes up their mind, 
they do not do so irrevocably (O‘Connor, 1957). A central claim of this 
chapter has been that social science and philosophy can both shed 
light upon research into education generally and school discipline 
particularly. However, throughout this thesis it will be maintained 
that philosophy (and especially that of Aristotle) can offer particular 
insight into the question of the pedagogical purposes that school 
discipline ought to be directed towards. 
 
1.5 What is the purpose of school Discipline? 
 
In this chapter, it has so far been argued that key policies 
regarding pupil behaviour in Scotland do not rest upon a clear notion 
of what discipline is, or what it should be, for. In particular, it has 
been claimed that the broad endorsement of managerial strategies to 
improve pupil behaviour does not seem like the most morally or 
pedagogically sound way to unite discipline, teaching and learning in 
classrooms.  This thesis will therefore try to articulate a more 
coherent and justifiable theory of discipline. It will specifically address 
the question of what purposes discipline ought to be put to in schools. 
Given the fundamentally normative nature of this question and the 
conceptual confusion observed in answers given to date, especially in 
Scottish policy, this inquiry will proceed in a largely philosophical 
manner. It has been intimated that there are a number of different 
ways in which educational philosophy may be legitimately conceived. 
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Arguably however, it has historically26 had two core features: the 
analysis of concepts of educational import so as to resolve ambiguities 
where they occur; followed by the synthesis of these newly clarified 
concepts into a broader account of educational aims.  
 
The first and second sections of this dissertation will therefore 
analyse the concept of discipline, to better understand the justifiable 
purposes to which it might be put in schools. Importantly, 
philosophical analysis of discipline will not be considered in isolation 
from, but in relation to, other bodies of knowledge bearing on 
education. I will particularly draw upon epistemology and ethics in 
this regard. In chapters two and three, it will be maintained that both 
traditional and child-centred theories of discipline and education, are 
beset by epistemic problems, and in chapter 8 it will be argued that an 
Aristotelian epistemology is more promising.  
 
In chapters four, five, six and seven, it will be argued that the 
aspiration to develop neo-Aristotelian habit-virtues in pupils, through 
discipline, is also more ethically defensible than any rule-focussed 
approach. Crucially, in the third section of the thesis a neo-
Aristotelian conceptualisation of discipline will be synthesised into a 
reconstructed framework of wider educational aims. In chapter 9, a 
definition of discipline will be delineated, and it will be argued that it 
broadly accords with Aristotle‘s wider theory of moral and intellectual 
development. Importantly, the role that the teacher might have in 
enacting such a concept of discipline will be explored. In the final 
chapter, Aristotle‘s ethics and epistemology will be employed to 
critique the recent Curriculum for Excellence.  
                                                 
26
 Wilfred Carr has tried to articulate an „alternative history‟ (2004, p 69) of the philosophy of 
education. He did this to overcome what he saw as the limitations in, and the „hegemonic dominance‟ 
(ibid, p 67) of, the analytic tradition. Carr remarks that although enthusiasm for analytic educational 
philosophy has waned in some parts, the „historical understanding of the discipline that it conveyed has 
not yet been replaced‟ (ibid, 58). I do not, however find Carr‟s alternative history very convincing -
especially his interpretation of Aristotle. As chapter 8 will show, Aristotle, far from advocating a 
„practical philosophy‟ that had little or no room for „theory‟; actually thought that mans‟ highest 
flourishing was realised in distinctively theoretical contemplation.  
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The philosophical approaches explored over the course of this 
thesis will arguably have potential to contribute to educational 
discourse and practice in at least two, important ways. Firstly, the 
concepts delineated, might help to clarify the values that could, and 
perhaps should, underpin Scottish policy in regard to the curriculum 
and pupil behaviour. Secondly, it is hoped that the theory discussed 
might also inform teachers‘ practical decision making. Throughout 
this thesis it will be maintained that discipline should not be thought 
of as a formula or set of techniques that can be applied to pupils 
without difficulty to get their attention.   It will rather be stressed that 
discipline ought to be infused throughout the educational process 
both as a means to and part of valuable learning. In the second and 
third parts, it will be argued that Aristotle‘s moral and intellectual 
virtues may offer a particularly good framework for such valuable 
learning. However, the ideas formed in this dissertation should not be 
thought of as final and complete in themselves. It is clear that the 
merit and status of educational objectives should be continually 
questioned and revised where necessary, through criticism, practical 
reflection and dialogue. Over the next two chapters it will become 
apparent that discipline in schools has in the past been 
conceptualised in at least two contrasting ways. To begin with, 
therefore, a ‗traditional‘ view of discipline and education will be 











Chapter 2: Discipline, Traditions of Knowledge and Rules 
 
In this chapter a ‗traditional‘ view of discipline will be analysed. 
Initially, Clark‘s distinction between ‗traditional order by control‘ and 
‗progressive order by discipline‘ will be outlined. It will be contended 
that Clark unfairly infers that Peters is a proponent of order by 
control. Peters rather defends the view that pupils should be 
disciplined both for, and by, traditions of knowledge. Some of the main 
features of a liberal view of knowledge, culture and education will 
thereafter be explored. Notably, it will be explained that discipline in a 
liberal education either prepares the way for or actually constitutes, 
the initiation of pupils into worthwhile forms of public knowledge. It 
will be speculated that John Wilson and Emile Durkheim might be 
better representatives of a traditional theory in so far as they construe 
obedience as the definitive quality of the disciplined pupil. However, 
Clark‘s caricature of traditional order by control does not really fit 
Wilson or Durkheim either, as both these thinkers emphasise that 
school discipline must be morally educational. It is concluded that 
discipline in schools has been paradigmatically conceptualised as the 
necessary submission of pupils to rules. 
 
2.1 Discipline and Control: Two kinds of School Order 
 
‗Controlled children believe in the external value of the directions of the 
controller at least sufficiently to follow them. Disciplined children, on the other 
hand, observe the internal value of the activities that they are engaged in because 
they subscribe to them.‘ (Clark, 1998, p 295) 
 
In chapter one, class management techniques were criticised for 
being manipulative and for hinging on the idea that good pupil 
behaviour must be established before any useful learning can occur. 
Traditional models of education and discipline have also faced similar 
accusations. In his article ‗Discipline in Schools‘, Clark (1998) 
articulates what he takes to be the fundamental differences between 
two conceptions of educational order. He firstly identifies nine criteria 
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that typically underpin the dominant paradigm of order in schools 
that he calls traditional order by control. He thereafter contrasts this 
model with a child centred order by discipline and he delineates a set 
of nine features that help to flesh out this concept. Order by control 
and order by discipline are, he stresses, rival moral traditions that 
cannot be reconciled27. The dual perspectives he details diverge in a 
number of ways but perhaps most crucially in relation to their 
assumptions about human nature and in particular, the nature of the 
child. Clark paraphrases Peters (1968) and indicates that order by 
control firmly attaches itself to a view of the child as an uneducated 
barbarian at the gates of civilization. It is the teacher‘s responsibility, 
on this view, to initiate pupils into ‗forms of knowledge‘ and external 
sanctions and rewards may be employed in this process where 
necessary. Important learning, on the traditional view, can be forced 
on pupils. He states that ‗children‘s choices can be overridden in the 
light of higher considerations known only to the teacher…order must 
be established before any learning is possible‘ (Clark, 1998, p 291).  
Obedience, Clark says, is the central virtue of order by control and 
such order must be established prior to any teaching and learning. 
Order by control ‗prevails where there is a coincidence between the 
teacher‘s wishes and what the children do (Clark, 1998, p 291)‘; as such 
all pupil learning can be directly attributed to teacher effort. 
 
‗Order by discipline‘ conversely for Clark, rests on a view of the 
child as self-reflective and self-directing. Here order arises when 
children pursue their own interests rather than those of their 
teachers. Discipline on this model requires pupil submission to the 
learning they are engaged in rather than to the propositions or 
instructions of the teacher. As such, he says, order cannot be 
established before learning begins; the order is part of and not prior to 
the learning in question. Children should select for themselves, or at 
least assent to, the curriculum they experience and there must ‗be the 
                                                 
27
 However, Clark is doubtful that pupils who are forced to learn something are being treated morally at 
all. 
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possibility of a child veto on teacher initiated curricula‘. (Clark, 1998, p 
294) The teacher should act as consultant in, rather than director of, 
the child‘s life and learning. External rewards should also only be 
utilised in cases of genuine achievement. 
 
‗Educating children morally consists not of insisting on their being moral, 
but of their learning (and, I think, being persuaded) to become so.‘ (Clark, 1998, p 
299) 
 
I wholeheartedly endorse Clark‘s sentiment that teachers should 
persuade children to become morally educated28. For Clark, there is 
an inherent moral educational dimension to the view of order by 
discipline that is not apparent in order by control. Indeed, Clark 
appears to think that order by control is essentially immoral insofar 
as pupils do not have the opportunity to shape the direction of their 
own lives; their choices are made for them by their teachers. It is for 
this reason, he says, that educators often take discipline to be a 
euphemism for control. By calling control, ‗discipline‘, it is possible for 
teachers to think that by getting what they want and think best, they 
are getting what is best for pupils. However, Clark implies that if 
pupils are denied choice with regard to their learning experiences they 
are being relegated to the status of non-moral beings. ‗Each individual 
child‘s freedom to conduct her narrative is inviolable on pain of her 
status as a person being compromised (Clark, 1998, p 294)‘. 
 
Clark indicates that pupil behaviour in schools is an arena in 
which moral education must occur. It is incoherent, he says, to make 
pupils morally liable for their behaviour without making them morally 
responsible for it. One of the salient distinguishing features of the 
concepts of discipline and control, he suggests, is that the former is by 
its very nature morally educational. The latter, however, is not, at 
least in those moments when teachers compel pupils to do things 
against their will. It is for this reason, more than any other, that Clark 
                                                 
28
 The role of persuasion in moral education will be explored in detail in part 2 of this thesis. 
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advocates rejection of traditional order by control and the adoption of 
a curriculum governed by pupil interest. In chapter three PS Wilson‘s 
(Wilson, 1971) more clearly articulated philosophy of discipline founded 
on pupil interest will be analysed alongside Clark‘s. In this chapter, 
however, Clark‘s ‗traditional‘ concept of order by control will be 
critiqued; his implication that Peters was a traditionalist in this 
limited mould will also be challenged. At 2.4 it will be acknowledged 
that Peters did think that aspects of discipline ought to be reinforced 
prior to learning to ensure the minimum order necessary for that 
learning to be possible. However, Peters endorsed a much broader 
concept of discipline. He also thought that discipline was a vital part 
of learning. Advocates of a liberal education, of the sort advanced by 
Peters, invariably believe that discipline should centrally involve 
pupils coming to comprehend the distinctive point of disciplines of 
knowledge.  
 
2.2 Epistemology and Liberal Education  
 
‗Education implies the intentional bringing about of a desirable state of mind.‘ 
(Peters, 1968, p 91) 
 
In Education as Initiation (1968) Richard Peters does indicate that 
a child is a ‗barbarian at the gates of civilisation‘. However, the 
meaning of this aphorism seems dependent on the particular 
conception of ‗knowledge‘ that Peters‘ develops in this essay. The 
significance of the epistemic component appears to have been unduly 
downplayed by Clark as he pays no careful attention to Peters‘ theory 
of knowledge. Peters is not arguing that the child is a barbarian per 
se; he is rather making the point that individuals are incompletely 
developed at the start of their formal schooling, at least in part 
because they have yet to be educated. Peters thought that it was only 
through engagement with specific forms of knowledge that anyone 
could become educated. He believed that children could not fulfil their 
potential if left to their own devices. He insisted that no teacher 
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should be indifferent to the nature of human growth. He observed that 
‗human beings are not like flowers in having growth as a 
predetermined end‘ (Peters, 1968, p 94). Education is not just a process 
of natural maturation29, since the ‗teacher has to choose what is 
worth-while encouraging children in‘ (Peters, 1968, p 95).  For Peters, the 
concept of education required initiation into particular forms of 
knowledge. What forms of knowledge, though, did he have in mind? 
 
It has been argued that Kant is the main inspiration behind the 
theory of knowledge explicated by both Peters and Hirst30. A Kantian 
influence is, to be sure, apparent in the ethical justification of Peters‘ 
notions of worthwhile activities and school discipline. However, in this 
chapter it will be argued that Peters‘ epistemology seems to derive 
more from Plato31. More recently, John White (2009) has also 
speculated that the liberal education advocated by Peters and Hirst 
might have been informed by radical Protestantism and the French 
philosopher Pierre de la Ramée (Ramus 1515-1573). White indicates 
that Peters‘ justification of a largely knowledge-based education is 
problematic. There are undoubtedly difficulties with Peters‘ account of 
the relation of knowledge to education, but I do not think they are the 
ones that White identifies. White is in fact in danger of muddying the 
waters on an important point about the extent to which a liberal 
education is based upon subjects or knowledge32. Crucially, both 
Peters, and Hirst argue (I think rightly), that their theory of a liberal 
education in forms of knowledge emerged out of Ancient Greek and 
specifically, Platonic doctrines. However, given some evident confusion 
over the epistemological foundations of liberal education, it seems 
necessary to clarify what is distinctive about Platonic and Liberal 
theories of knowledge and education.  
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 Peters identifies Rousseau and Dewey as growth theorists here but acknowledges that neither 
philosopher thought education consisted purely in the unfolding of natural potentialities. Rousseau and 
Dewey‟s views of discipline will be explored in the next chapter. 
30
 See Blake et al, 2003 chapter one p 5.  
31
 See for example Ethics and Education (1970) pp 114-116 and especially chapters 5, 8 and 10. More 
will be said about how Kant‟s ethics shaped the thought of Peters‟ at 2.4 and in chapters four and five. 
32
 This element of the discussion will be fleshed out at 2.3. 
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Epistemology is itself widely considered to be the branch of 
philosophy concerned with the theory or concept of knowledge33. It is 
less well known, however, that it was not until the 19th century that a 
Scottish philosopher, James Frederick Ferrier, first used the term 
‗epistemology‘ to refer to the theory of knowledge34. At all events, 
taking Plato‘s Theaetetus (1987) as inspiration, knowledge has 
generally been defined by philosophers as justified true belief 
expressible in propositional form35. However, Plato has Socrates 
interestingly refute this definition of knowledge at the end of the 
dialogue (Theaetetus, 210a). Plato does however endorse a famous theory 
of knowledge in book VI of his Republic (1987). It is also well known 
that Plato there argues that ‗the highest form of knowledge is 
knowledge of the form of the good‘ (Republic, 505a2-3).  
 
He argues that there are two worlds of possible human 
acquaintance: 1) the intelligible world of ideas and ideal forms and; 2) 
the visible world of appearances (Republic, 507a). Plato insisted that the 
forms were permanent and true representations of reality, only 
intelligible to the mind through intellectual reflection. He argued that 
human senses such as sight could only ground opinions, in so far as 
they could observe the visible world of change and decay (Republic, 
508d-509). The Republic thus presents readers with a metaphysical 
‗epistemic ideal‘ (Burnyeat, 1980b, p 187) whereby the mind alone has 
privileged access to knowledge36. In the simile of the cave (514-521b) 
Plato hypothesises that it is through education, through a ‗turning of 
the psyche‘ (Curren, 2007) that one can be mentally guided to appreciate 
such immutable, ideal forms. Significantly, Plato argues that the 
calculative reasoning of mathematics and arithmetic is extraordinarily 
effective in leading the mind towards truth (Republic 525a-b1). 
                                                 
33
 See for example, the opening pages of Craig 1990, Kvanvig 2003 & Roberts & Wood 2007. 
34
 Ferrier speculated that knowledge was only possible when there was a union between a person and 
an object. For a good summary of Ferrier‟s theory of knowledge and ignorance see Keefe (2007). 
35
 A definition noted by amongst others Riggs 2002, Blaauw & Pritchard 2005, & Pritchard 2007. 
36
 In chapter 8 it will become clear that Plato‟s concept of theoretical knowledge was broadly accepted 
by Aristotle. Aristotle‟s concept of wisdom however, it will be said, is crucially different. 
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 ‗We must reject the conception of education professed by those who say they can 
put into the mind knowledge that was not there before…the capacity for knowledge 
is innate in each man‘s mind…the mind as a whole must be turned away from the 
world of change until its eye can bear to look straight at reality…this turning round 
of the mind itself might be made a subject of professional skill.‘ (Republic 518b7-
518d4) 
 
Plato argues that those (and he is thinking primarily of 
philosophers) who have apprehended the intelligible world have a duty 
to return to the cave as community leaders to help and advise the 
people who dwell there in the ‗sensible‘ darkness of ignorance (Republic 
520a-e). Curren speculates that teaching is something like ‗an art of 
turning the student in the right direction‘ (2007, p 8) in the Platonic 
epistemic schema. Significantly, it is from Plato‘s theory of forms that 
Peters and Hirst claim to derive their ‗forms of knowledge‘. In 
Education as Initiation Peters argues that ‗Plato‘s image of education 
as turning the eye of the soul outwards towards the 
light…emphasised, quite rightly, what growth theorists evaded, the 
necessity for objective standards being written into the content of 
education‘ (1968, p 97). Hirst (1968) too argues that the Greek notion of 
a liberal education hinged on the (Platonic) idea that the good life is 
spent freeing the mind from error and searching for knowledge. He 
similarly adds that it is from these Greek doctrines that ‗there 
emerged the idea of liberal education as a process concerned simply 
and directly with the pursuit of knowledge‘ (Hirst, 1968, p 114).  Indeed, 
a fine defence of the epistemic foundations of a liberal education is to 
be found in Paul Hirst‘s essay Liberal Education and the Nature of 
Knowledge (1968).  
 
‗It is a necessary feature of knowledge as such that there be public criteria whereby 
the true is distinguishable from the false, the good from the bad, the right from the 
wrong. It is the existence of these criteria which gives objectivity to knowledge; and 
this in its turn gives objectivity to the concept of liberal education.‘ (Hirst, 1968, p 
127) 
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It is stressed by both Peters (1968 & 1970) and Hirst (1968 & 1973), 
that a liberal education entails the development of the mind through 
engagement with objective forms of knowledge. However, it is 
important to note that the less plausible metaphysical aspect of 
Plato‘s forms is not invoked by Peters and Hirst. The liberal forms of 
knowledge aim to understand and make sense of the world of 
experience too (Peters, 1970 & Hirst, 1968). It is in this regard that Kant‘s 
signature can be most keenly discerned in their liberal theory of 
knowledge. However, Peters explicitly criticises Kant for focusing his 
theory of mind on the private individual and for failing properly to 
appreciate the extent to which cognitive development is only enabled 
through initiation into public traditions37. The impersonal content of 
knowledge by which experience is structured, is, for Peters and Hirst, 
enshrined in public traditions that have taken mankind millennia to 
refine. Peters observes that the Ancient Greeks did not really have a 
concept of private consciousness; the lives of the populace in city 
states like Athens were invariably conducted in public. Indeed, the 
Greek word for idiot (idiōtēs) ‗disdainfully picked out the man who only 
concerned himself with private matters‘ (Peters, 1970, p 48). In this 
regard, it is interesting to note that the Ancient Greek word for 
barbarian 38(barbaros) referred to or identified persons who were non-
Greek. Arguably, Peters only characterises children as barbarians 
because they have not yet had their heads turned towards the light of 
public forms of knowledge.  
 
It is possible that a liberal education relates more to Platonic 
than Kantian or religious epistemology. White suggests that there are 
parallels between Hirst‘s seven forms of knowledge39 and the academic 
disciplines identified by Ramus. Hirst, however, remarks that his 
concept of liberal education as development of the mind derives from 
                                                 
37
 See Ethics and Education (1970) page 49. 
38
 I owe this translation to the glossary of The Politics (1981). 
39
 Hirst and Peters notoriously identified seven forms of knowledge and discussed the curricular 
implications arising from them in their book Logic and Education (1975). These forms will be explored 
in chapter 3. 
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‗the development by the Greeks of the seven liberal arts‘ (Hirst, 1968, p 
115). It may be that such connection with Ramus may be due more to 
the impact Hellenism had on the educational theory of both Ramus 
and Hirst. Ramus had after all also ‗been brought up in a tradition of 
Aristotelian scholarship based on Greek texts‘ (White, 2009, p 7).  
Significantly, Hirst cites neither Kant nor Ramus but the nineteenth 
century poet and schools inspector Matthew Arnold40, as a modern 
precursor of the view that education should involve initiation into 
public forms of knowledge.  
 
2.3 Culture, traditions and the criteria of Liberal Education 
 
‗The whole scope of this essay is to recommend culture as the great help out 
of our present difficulties; culture being a pursuit of our total perfection by means of 
getting to know…the best that has been thought and said in the world, and, through 
this knowledge, turning a stream of fresh and free thought upon our stock notions 
and habits‘. (Arnold, 2006, p 5) 
 
In his famous essay Culture and Anarchy (2006), Arnold 
expressed concern about the impact of the industrial revolution on 
society. He argued that mechanisation was in great danger of 
stultifying the lives of individuals and communities. He stated that 
individuals had to engage with culture ‗by means of reading, observing 
and thinking‘ (Arnold, 2006, p 60) so that they could become truly 
fulfilled as persons. Human perfection and the finding of one‘s ‗best 
self‘ (Arnold, 2006, p 71) was for Arnold the aim of culture. Arnold lauded 
Hellenic culture and considered it to represent a highpoint in human 
history. However, he insisted that the man who only read his own 
letters or the newspapers also had culture if this reading enabled ‗a 
fresh and free play of the best thoughts upon his stock notions and 
habits‘ (Arnold, 2006, p 6). The point of focusing upon culture was thus 
                                                 
40
 Hirst also indicates that Newman influenced liberal education. Bantock (1952) and Mulcahy (2008) 
agree that Newman‟s epistemology was broadly Aristotelian. Williams (1992) suggests that: 1) 
Newman‟s scepticism belongs to the naturalist tradition in British philosophy; 2) Newman also in turn 
influenced Wittgenstein. 
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not merely to learn about it but from it; culture was for Arnold a rich 
moral educational source. Arnold thought that culture could ‗direct 
our attention to the current in human affairs‘ (Arnold, 2006, p 50) in a 
way that could improve our ‗doings‘. The ‗inward operation‘ (Arnold, 
2006, p 6) of culture was essential to the concept as ideal actions flow 
out of each person‘s best thoughts. Arnold‘s conclusion that 
‗education is the road to culture‘ (Arnold, 2006, p 153) arguably expresses 
his hope that educators would steer the next generation in that 
direction.  
 
‗Education, then, can have no ends beyond itself. Its value derives from principles 
and standards implicit in it. To be educated is not to have arrived at a destination; it 
is to travel with a different view‘ (Peters, 1968, p 110) 
 
The imprint of Arnold appears evident in the work of Peters and 
Hirst. All three thinkers broadly held that education must introduce 
the young into inherently worthwhile traditions of public knowledge. 
Importantly, Peters stressed that the cardinal role of teachers is to 
help pupils to get on the inside of the traditions and ‗contours of the 
public world‘ so that the pupils can, to a degree, make these traditions 
their own. Peters remarks that the process of initiation and inner 
remaking ‗is the process of education‘ (Peters, 1970, p 51). I think that 
Peters‘ concept of education thus bears more than a passing 
resemblance to Arnold‘s notion that inward operation is the ‗very life 
and essence of culture‘ (Arnold, 2006, p 6). Peters insisted however, that 
education involves no specific process or activity. As he puts it, 
‗education marks out no particular type of transaction between 
teachers and learners; it states criteria to which such transactions 
have to conform‘ (Peters, 1968, p 102)41. But what are the criteria of a 
liberal education? 
 
Peters (1970) and Hirst (1968) both suggest that a liberal 
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 Peters reiterates this view in Ethics and Education where he suggests that education picks out no 
particular activity or process. 
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education may be conceived of in broad negative or refined positive 
terms. A broad liberal education is negative in the sense that its 
function is to restrict any specialist activities that promote narrowly 
defined extrinsic ends such as material and economic production or 
preparation for the workplace. A broad liberal schooling is thus ‗a plea 
for education rather than vocational training‘ (Peters, 1970, p 43). 
Significantly, however, both Peters and Hirst endorse a much 
stronger, more positive variety of liberalism. The ‗appropriate label for 
a positive concept‘ Hirst explains, is that education be ‗based fairly 
and squarely on the concept of knowledge itself‘ (Hirst, 1968, p 113). 
Peters similarly identifies three criteria that he thinks are conceptually 
presupposed to any educational process, all of which arguably relate 
to knowledge. These are: 
 
i) ‗That education implies the transmission of what is worthwhile to 
those who become committed to it; 
ii) That education must involve knowledge and understanding and 
some kind of cognitive perspective, which are not inert; 
iii) That education at least rules out some procedures of transmission, 
on the grounds that they lack the wittingness and voluntariness on 
the part of the learner.‘ (Peters, 1970, p 45) 
 
I think that White‘s recent critique of Peters‘ views on 
curriculum formation misses the mark precisely because it downplays 
(or even fails to recognise) the importance of Peters‘ criteria of 
education. White (2009) begins his article by saying that he was both 
taught by and has worked with Peters, so he may well have insight 
into aspects of his thought that are not immediately apparent to any 
mere reader of Peters‘ work. Nevertheless, I suspect that White‘s 
interpretation is confused. He cites from Ethics and Education and 
argues that Peters defended a general education broadly based upon 
traditional subjects studied for their own sake. White thinks that the 




‗Why start with academic disciplines and seek justifications of them? Logically 
curriculum planning has to start with aims, not with vehicles whereby aims may be 
realised.‘ (White, 2009, p 3) 
 
To this reader, however, it seems that Peters did not start his 
project from academic subject disciplines at all. Chapter 1 of Ethics 
and Education clearly states what Peters takes the criteria of a liberal 
education to be. None of these criteria suggest that he thought that 
education must or should be subject-based. When Peters does make 
his case for curriculum activities (1970, p157-166) his point is not to 
justify the teaching of subjects, but to defend a concept of education 
as initiation into worthwhile activities. Peters repeatedly asks the 
question, why do this activity rather than that? He repeatedly answers 
that activities are worthwhile when they have a distinctive cognitive 
content. He does, to be sure, adopt a somewhat restricted concept of 
cognition that casts serious doubt on the possibility for or value of 
practical knowledge42. But he does not defend the retention of 
traditional schools subjects per se.  
 
Hirst too, could hardly be much clearer about the relative 
importance that he attributed to traditional subject disciplines. 
‗School subjects in the disciplines as we at present have them are in 
no way sacrosanct…They are necessarily selections from the forms of 
knowledge that we have and may or may not be good as introductions 
for the purposes of liberal education‘ (Hirst, 1968, p 135-6). White, to his 
credit, does remark that Hirst‘s thought represents the most original 
and tightly structured attempt to derive an educational theory, a priori 
from the nature of knowledge itself, since the ‗Ramist pedagogical 
tradition‘ (White, 2009, p 15) of the sixteenth century. This concession, 
however, makes his implication that Hirst‘s arguments overlap those 
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 This aspect of Peters account of „educational‟ activities has come in for particular criticism from 
Reid (1996a 1996b & 1997) and Carr (1997) who in their different ways dispute the implication that 
PE is only a „knack‟. In chapter 3 and 10 of this thesis the validity of Peters‟ rather narrow 
interpretation of practical knowledge will be questioned. 
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of Peters all the more puzzling43. A liberal education of the sort 
advocated by Hirst and Peters is defined by the pursuit not of subjects 
but of knowledge44for its own sake. It is really only accurate therefore 
to portray Peters as being a defender of traditional disciplines or 
subjects in as much as he thought that pupils should be disciplined 
by traditions of knowledge. Hirst and Peters both thought that 
discipline had a crucial role to play in the initiation of pupils into 
forms of knowledge. As they put it: ‗education necessarily involves 
discipline‘ (1975, p 125).  
 
2.4 Discipline, Rules and Obedience 
 
‗Discipline, etymologically speaking, is rooted in a learning situation; it conveys the 
notion of submission to rules or some kind of order.‘ (Peters, 1970, p 267) 
 
 Chapter ten of Ethics and Education is entitled ‗Punishment and 
Discipline‘. However, Peters says surprisingly little about discipline at 
that point; rather he explores the concepts of authority and 
punishment in much more detail. Nevertheless, Peters does generally 
present a considerably more nuanced and broad concept of discipline 
than Clark implies. Peters indicates that the essence of discipline lies 
in submission to the rules that inhere in a given learning situation. 
The rules to which pupils should submit can have a wide variety of 
purposes and involve a range of different activities. Arguably Peters‘ 
rules can be grouped into two categories: those that directly involve 
the pursuit of knowledge and those that clear the way for the pursuit 
of knowledge. He argues that rules may pertain to what is to be 
learned or they may be necessary to ensure that something can be 
learned. In the former case discipline involves grasping the rules that 
govern a particular worthwhile activity or aspect of knowledge. 
Discipline is here intimately related to the specific thing to be learned 
(Hirst & Peters, 1975). Hirst and Peters speculate that there is a reason 
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 I refer here to White‟s (2009) inference on p 1 that Peters problematically argued for a general 
education based on truth seeking traditional subjects. 
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 And in the case of Peters knowledge developed through participation in worthwhile activities. 
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why traditional school subjects are sometimes referred to as 
‗disciplines‘. ‗Presumably they are so called because the learner 
submits himself to the rules implicit in them‘ (Hirst & Peters, 1975, p 127).  
 
However, discipline can also involve pupils submitting to more 
practical and procedural rules that ensure the order necessary for 
learning to occur.  There must, Peters argues, be minimum conditions 
of classroom order ‗sufficient to let a large number of children work in 
a small space‘ (Peters, 1970, p 193). Peters states that teachers may at 
times need to ‗exert pressure on children so that they can master 
something irrespective of what they want‘ (Peters, 1970, p 194). 
Importantly, rules can be self imposed or imposed by someone in 
authority (Peters 1970 & Hirst & Peters, 1975). Despite their belief that 
teachers should where appropriate enforce rules in class, Peters & 
Hirst indicate a preference for self-discipline (Hirst & Peters, 1975). All 
school rules must have a point; they must be intimately related to 
what is worthwhile and desirable. If restriction is imposed on pupils ‗it 
must promote what is good‘ (Peters, 1970, p 195). Arguably, then, the 
discipline and rules of a liberal education are vital for the promotion of 
knowledge, because knowledge is ‗what is good‘. Hirst and Peters also 
defended the use of appropriate punishment but suggested that it is 
important to distinguish between discipline and punishment. 
Punishment is a very specific concept that is normally only justifiable 
when the rules of a given order have been breached (Peters, 1970 & Peters 
& Hirst 1975). Discipline is by contrast a ‗very general notion which is 
connected with conforming to rules‘ (Peters, 1970, p 267). More recently, 
John Wilson also developed a philosophy of school discipline based on 
submission to rules. Wilson‘s concept of discipline, however, is much 
narrower and ostensibly more ‗traditional‘. 
 
‗If a child did not grasp and act upon the principle of discipline, of obedience to 
established authority, he could hardly survive at all, and a proper grasp of it is an 
essential enablement for the child to learn other things.‘ (Wilson, 1981, p 44) 
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Wilson (1981) suggests, in a somewhat traditional vein, that one 
aspect of discipline is the prior establishment of the class order that is 
necessary for learning. However, he also (agreeing with Clark and his 
namesake P S Wilson45) insists that it is vital to observe a distinction 
between a well-disciplined and a well-controlled class. He emphasises 
that a ‗trouble-free‘ (Wilson, 1981, p 37) and organised class is not a 
disciplined class if order has arisen because pupils are in chains or 
under the effects of sedatives. John Wilson, like Peters and Hirst, 
perceives the rule to be the proper compelling force in discipline. 
However, Wilson thought that school discipline is ultimately a matter 
of obedience to the teacher. But he also held that such obedience is 
morally educational.  
 
Wilson reasons that discipline is itself morally educational if it is 
rightly conceived (Wilson, 1981). Notably, Wilson thought that the 
morally formative potential of discipline lay in the child‘s dutiful 
adherence to the authority of rules, precisely because the rules are 
authoritative. He insisted that a disciplined person should not submit 
to a rule because it comes from an admired source, or even because 
the rule in question is a good one. The reason why rules should be 
observed is so that legitimate authorities can rightly continue to 
influence practical action. Wilson argues that authority is a necessary 
foundation for any institution or society. Without it, the only recourse 
available for getting things done is an ‗ad hoc variety of bribes or 
threats‘ (Wilson, 1981, p 39). Pupils should dutifully submit to rules in 
school because such rules provide necessary guidance for action. 
Wilson emphasises that there is a difference between reluctant or 
overtly prescribed behaviour46 and genuine discipline that is also 
characterised by a ‗disposition to obey‘ (Wilson, 1981, p 38). Wilson 
claims that discipline itself has little to do with self-discipline or 
autonomy. Discipline ultimately requires no more or less than 
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 Wilson gives the example of a soldier who slothfully does what he should whilst muttering under his 
breath. 
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obedience. What should be made of Wilson's ‗rather austere doctrine' 
(Smith, 1985, p 40) of discipline?   
 
Wilson‘s contribution to moral education was the subject of a 
special issue of the ‗Journal of Moral Education‘ ten years ago, 
(September 2000, Vol. 29, 3) where it was widely agreed that his work has 
not received as much attention as it merits. Straughan (2000) 
speculates that Wilson‘s reluctance to place himself within a 
particular theoretical tradition may have substantially contributed to 
the relative marginalisation of his moral thought. Tellingly, even in 
this special issue, Wilson's views regarding school discipline only 
receive mention in relation to a wider discussion of authority (Steutel & 
Spiecker, 2000). The lack of interest, philosophical or otherwise, that 
educators have taken in Wilson‘s views on discipline may partly stem 
from the fact that he conceptualises it (on the surface at least) in an 
unfashionably limited and illiberal way. Richard Smith, one of the few 
educationists who has discussed Wilson‘s notion of discipline in some 
detail, appears to think as much. Smith (1985) is sceptical of Wilson‘s 
tendency to compare military discipline and school discipline. He 
observes that whilst life and death situations might be common for 
the soldier on duty, the same can hardly be said of the pupil. If the 
class is conceived of as a quasi-military group, then there lies a 
danger that the teacher might repeatedly invoke situations of crisis47 
to justify ‗compliance without consultation‘ (Smith, 1985, p 46) and 
obedience without critical thought. Smith implies that Wilson‘s 
conception of discipline borders on the authoritarian. But is this 
implication fair? 
 
‗Discipline is concerned with the consistency and strength of those on-the-spot 
acceptances or cases of obedience to authority.‘ (Wilson, 1981, p 40) 
 
It may not do justice to the nuance of Wilson‘s thought to provide 
                                                 
47
 Smith offers the example of the need to get through a packed curriculum in time for an exam. 
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a straightforward yes or no answer to this question. When his concept 
of discipline is viewed in isolation I would be inclined to agree with 
Smith‘s implication. Wilson did state that the disciplined class need 
only be in the habit of obeying the rules relayed to them by authority 
(most often in the guise of their teacher). However, Wilson emphasises 
that it is only legitimate authority that should be obeyed without 
question and he seems to have believed that such authority should be 
deeply infused with rationality. In Wilson‘s picture, discipline is 
essentially concerned with certain practical matters where immediate 
obedience is required from pupils and where now is probably not the 
appropriate time to explain the reasons why obedience is justified. 
However, Wilson seems to have held the view that a necessary part of 
moral formation involves comprehending (at the proper time) why 
obedience is sometimes necessary. He does after all make clear that 
discipline is one concept amongst others vitally connected to a pupil‘s 
broader moral education, and moral education for Wilson, centrally 
involves reason. Reason, he says ‗requires sharing and dialogue and 
that has more to do with desire than obligation‘ (Wilson, 2000, p 274). 
Wilson also stresses that the actions of the morally educated person 
must arise from the right reasons. For Wilson, rule following alone ‗is 
an impoverished view of moral action‘ (Mclaughlin & Halstead, 2000, p 251). 
If Wilson‘s more expansive account of moral education is borne in 
mind then his theory of discipline takes on a less authoritarian 
flavour48.  
 
Wilson held that family and school were the principal influences 
on a child‘s moral development. He says that the ‗family and the 
school necessarily form the arena of the child‘s first encounter with 
the whole business of rules and authority‘ (Wilson, 1981, p 44). Wilson 
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implies that parents are at least as responsible as schools for 
administering rules. Although he does concede that it is possible for a 
person to be disciplined by the rules inherent in certain activities (he 
cites the example of a person playing chess), he also intimates that it 
is not really natural to speak of a disciplined individual. Individuals, 
he says ‗are more likely to be described as simply ‗disobedient‘ (Wilson, 
1981, p 41). Wilson insists that it is much more appropriate to adopt the 
term discipline when referring to a group that has a fairly specific 
practical task.  
 
Thus, Wilson thought discipline centrally involves being part of 
a social group. However, unlike Durkheim (whose views we will shortly 
turn to), Wilson did not think that discipline is essentially for the sake 
of that social group. Wilson attests that there is an objective morality 
upon which all moral rules should be based. He impresses the point 
that particular sets of social values have nothing to do with moral 
values. As he puts it, moral education, like education in science or 
maths, ‗means the same at all times and in all places…In particular 
we cannot derive our aims in moral education from ‗society‘ (Wilson, 
1981, p 40). Wilson‘s view that moral education is and should be 
rational and cross-cultural49represents (as we shall see) a clear 
demarcation between his moral thought and the social thought of 
Durkheim.  
 
2.5 Durkheim and Discipline for Society 
 
‗This then is the true function of discipline…It is essentially an instrument – difficult 
to duplicate – of moral education‘ (Durkheim, 1961, p149).  
 
At the turn of the twentieth century two eminent educationists 
argued that scientific methods should play a much more prominent 
role in education. Emile Durkheim and John Dewey were writing from 
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different cultural contexts yet in this era both France and America 
(and the wider western world) underwent unprecedented intellectual, 
economic and social change (Dill, 2007). These adjustments could be 
somewhat simplistically caricatured as a shift of the population from 
agricultural, family based communities to industrialised cities, 
populated with individualistically minded people (Dill, 2007). Like 
Arnold before them, both Dewey50 and Durkheim saw schools as 
institutions with potential to enable greater social cohesion in this 
increasingly complex and fragmented, modern world. Crucially, it was 
a ‗rational, secular morality that would bind pluralistic society 
together for a common end‘ (Dill, 2007, p222). Durkheim thought that 
education should centrally involve one generation imprinting its 
wisdom and customs on the next (Dill, 2007).   
 
In Moral Education; A study in the Theory & Application of the 
Sociology of Education (1961), Durkheim devoted considerable attention 
to the subject of disciplining schoolchildren. He identified two distinct 
stages of childhood: the first stage consisting of the child‘s life prior to 
attending school; the second stage commencing when children start 
their formal education. If, by the end of the second period of 
childhood, (that is the end of formal schooling) ‗the foundations of 
morality had not been laid they never will be‘ (Durkheim, 1961, p 18). In 
the familial stage of childhood, the child becomes attached to his 
social group (the family) by being gently reproached in a nurturing 
environment. Durkheim thought that possessing a sentimental 
attachment toward the social group was an important step in a child‘s 
moral development. However, for Durkheim, the function of the school 
is to unite the child with larger society. The role of the teacher is to act 
as an intermediary between the child and society. Just as the priest 
interprets the message of God to his congregation, so the teacher 
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and purposes of education. Arnold was much more sceptical than Dewey or Durkheim about the 
potential impact of science on culture and education. Dewey‟s views will be explored in the subsequent 
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must establish and reinforce the values of society (Durkheim, 1961, Dill, 
2007). Durkheim insisted that schooling should mark a radical 
departure from a pupil‘s home life. It should not, he argued, foster 
personal attachments similar to those learned in the first stage of 
childhood, since 'the passions first must be limited' (Durkheim, 1972, p 
176). Durkheim was insistent that formal education should remove 
and suppress personal emotion and ambition and rather develop in 
pupils an impersonal respect for societies‘ broader expectations. The 
school ‗must sustain this feeling for discipline in the child. This is the 
task the educator must never give up (Durkheim, 1961, pp101-2)‘. 
Durkheim held that dispassionate and objective forces should counter 
pupil‘s unruly appetites in schools. 
 
'By means of discipline we learn the control of desire without which man 
could not achieve happiness.' (Durkheim, 1961, p 48) 
 
Durkheim believed that social cohesion depended on individual 
desires being limited and controlled. The constraint of desire was also 
a necessary condition of individual happiness as he thought that man 
by nature possessed passions that could never be satiated. For 
Durkheim discipline was a vital part of a child's wider moral 
education. He speculated that there were three elements to morality: 
those of discipline, spirituality (which for him consisted in attachment 
to a social group) and self-determination or autonomy. Discipline was, 
in a vital sense, the fundamental element of morality that unites the 
others. Without discipline a person could not hope to attain the other 
elements of spirituality and self determination. To lead a disciplined 
life, persons must have a preference for a regular existence; their 
aspirations must have determinate limits. Persons unable or unwilling 
to be disciplined would inevitably be doomed by their limitless 
aspiration and anomie51. Durkheim was of the view that children were 
especially prone to irregularity and instability and largely driven by 
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primitive proclivities.  
 
A child's disposition is essentially volatile: he 'breaks out in 
anger and is mollified with the same suddenness. Tears succeed 
laughter, friendliness displaces hatred or vice versa' (Durkheim, 1961, 
p130). He believed that childhood curiosity is similarly unstable and 
fleeting. Durkheim remarks that children can only maintain attention 
on an object that attracts them for a matter of seconds. He argued 
that the conduct of pupils was none the less malleable. He thought 
that externally imposed habits could favourably curb and alter 
childish inconstancy. The function of discipline for Durkheim was to 
monitor irregular conduct through the imposition of regular habit.  
Like Dewey52, he did perceive a correlation between discipline and the 
capacity to establish and reach determinate goals. However, for 
Durkheim discipline was not in itself indicative of this quality; it 
rather enabled it. A preference for regularity prefaces the emergence of 
any ability to set targets for one self.  
 
'Morality is a totality of definite rules; it is like so many moulds with limiting 
boundaries, into which we must pour our behaviour'. (Durkheim, 1961, p26) 
 
For individuals to develop discipline, Durkheim contended that 
they must first feel the force of authority acting on them, a force to 
which they must yield. Durkheim claimed that discipline was strongly 
dependent on authority for its success. He defined the notion of 
authority as a characteristic, ‗with which a being, either actual or 
imaginary is invested through his relationship with given individuals 
and it is because of this alone that he is thought by the latter to be 
endowed with powers superior to those they find in themselves‘ 
(Durkheim, 1961, p88).  But who, or what, did he think should exercise 
authority over children? Durkheim contended that the authority to 
which individuals must yield on moral matters is the rule, the rule 
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being written over time by the collective conscience of society. A rule 
is, ‗essentially something that is outside a person…it is a way of acting 
that we do not feel free to alter according to taste…it is beyond 
personal preference… it dominates us‘ (Durkheim, 1961, p 28). A rule is 
an external command that individuals are duty bound to obey. He 
argued that the act of being disciplined by a rule was essentially an 
act of duty, duty being prescribed behaviour.  
 
Durkheim believed that a classroom was its own society and 
that an undisciplined classroom was lacking in morality.  The morality 
of the class society was, for Durkheim, determined by the resolution 
with which a teacher reinforces the impartial rule. When one 
considers the rules that a teacher is required to enforce one by one 
and in detail, it might be concluded that they are useless and petty 
vexations. However, if these rules are rather perceived as part of a 
larger, holistic code of conduct ‗the matter takes on a different aspect‘ 
(Durkheim, 1961, p151). In conscientiously fulfilling the disciplined 
obligations of the class society, the child comes to embody, ‗the virtue 
of childhood…the only one that can be asked of him‘ (Durkheim, 1961, 
p151) at that age and stage53.  
 
'For to teach morality is neither to preach nor indoctrinate; it is to explain...if 
we do not help him to understand the reasons for the rules he should abide by, we 
would be condemning him to an incomplete and inferior morality.' (Durkheim, 1961, 
p120-121)  
 
 On top of connecting the child to wider society, Durkheim 
suggests that the rules externally imposed by the teacher can over 
time become part of the pupil‘s internal moral constitution. Although 
the child does not begin life as master of his or her appetites, 
discipline in schools can and should enable such self mastery to 
emerge. Self-mastery of desire and attachment to the social group did 
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not represent moral maturity for Durkheim since the capacity for self 
determination was also necessary. However, Durkheim gives 
surprisingly little indication as to how schools should help to cultivate 
the final autonomous element of morality (Carr, 1991).  Durkheim seems 
to think that teachers should help pupils to see the value of the rules 
so that they can come to freely desire them on their own terms. Self-
determination appears to consist in a sort of rational or 'enlightened 
assent' (Durkheim, 1961, p120) to prevailing social standards rather than 
a merely habitual acceptance of them. When one considers in depth 
Durkheim's remarkable conception of society as the moral ideal 
however, his theory of school discipline swiftly unravels. There are I 
think, at least three fundamental problems with his notion of society. 
He firstly insists that only actions carried out for the sake of society 
were moral. He secondly, rather implausibly, posited that society was 
a sort of transcendent or divine being. Thirdly, he argued that 
morality is an essentially social construct measurable by science.  
 
Durkheim consistently emphasised that if actions only benefit 
individuals, they cannot be classified as moral. The term moral has 
never been employed, he says, to describe an act that has individual 
interest as its object (Durkheim, 1951). He maintained that moral acts 
are always in pursuit of impersonal ends. Behaviour 'directed 
exclusively towards the personal ends of the actor does not have moral 
value' (Durkheim, 1961, p 57). Disciplined and moral conduct must be 
altruistic and it must be so, for society. Durkheim stated that if, 
‗society is the end of morality it is also its producer‘ (Durkheim, 1961, 
p86). Durkheim‘s moral theory was then, like Dewey's54, centrally 
concerned with promoting the good for society. However, Durkheim 
had a very novel notion of society.  
 
He intimated that prior to modernity ‗certain moral ideas became 
united with certain religious ideas to such an extent as to be 
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indistinct from them‘ (Durkheim, 1961, p 8). The teacher was invested 
with authority and extra energy because he was, at least in part, 
‗speaking in the name of a superior reality‘ (Durkheim, 1961, p 10) of 
whom the symbolic expression was God. Durkheim however held that 
morality must become the sacred domain, not theology. He thought 
that society must strip morality of its religious symbols and replace 
them with rational substitutes. The rationalisation of morality was 
perilous however as the very ‗character of morality is without 
foundation‘ (Durkheim, 1961, p 10) unless it could also be bolstered by a 
new transcendent power. For Durkheim, the omnipresent force 
capable of preventing individuals from forever grasping for the infinite 
was society itself: ‗once we rule out recourse to theological notions, 
there remains beyond the individual only a single, empirically 
observable moral being…society‘ (Durkheim, 1961, p60).  
 
Durkheim argued that morality begins with membership of a 
group (Durkheim, 1951 & 1961, Dill, 2007). Without society there could be 
no morality. Durkheim believed that society possessed a special, 
independent quality that rendered it superior to the sum of the 
individuals that constitute it. ‗Human groups have a way of thinking, 
of feeling and of living differing from that of their members when they 
think feel and live as isolates‘ (Durkheim, 1961, p62). A society, he 
remarks, is qualitatively different to the individual persons that 
comprise it; it commands individuals because it represents the best 
part of them (Durkheim, 1951). He insisted that socio-moral commands 
alone could deliver people to freedom from the blind, limitless and 
unthinking forces, that otherwise torment them (Durkheim, 1972). 
However, Durkheim's all important moral rules are effectively social 
rules. He was fully aware of this, of course, and famously argued that 
there were moral facts that could and should be understood through 
empirical science (Durkheim 1961 and particularly Durkheim, 1951). He 
remarks that: 'I have not found in my researches a single moral rule 
that is not the product of particular social factors' (Durkheim, 1951, p 
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56). Carr states that 'serious mischief is done by construing moral 
facts as social facts and only deep confusion lies at the heart of any 
idea of a 'science of morality' (Carr, 1991, p 121).  
 
It is difficult if not impossible to see how Durkheim‘s social rules 
are in fact, moral rules. A rule is arguably distinctively moral when 
reasons can be identified which explain how the rule in question 
contributes to a better life for some person or group of persons.  
Durkheim's social rules do not carry with them any such capacity for 
normative justification. He does not satisfactorily explain how his 
ideal secular society is ethically superior to any other actual or 
possible society.  Nor, for Durkheim, should individuals seek to 
evaluate the moral worth of their own society as he held that morality 
essentially entails being socialised into and in time rationally 
choosing, the values of one's own community. Challenger (1994) argues 
that the mature Durkheim recognised the importance of individual 
agency in social life. However, the passage to which Challenger refers 
(Durkheim, 1951, pp 65-68) does not appear to support this conclusion.  
 
To be sure, Durkheim does acknowledge that a rebellion against 
traditional morality is justified where such revolt may lead to a society 
with a higher collective conscience. However, for him, any such 
rebellion would be brought about by the pre-eminently impersonal 
and social force of science. Durkheim in this passage even declares 
that 'individual (my emphasis) reason has no particular prestige' 
(Durkheim, 1951, pp 65). Durkheim elsewhere repeatedly insists that 
different societies may have different moralities; but he stresses that 
individual people can and should only rationally desire the morality of 
their own society. Durkheim ultimately thought that moral autonomy 
involved rational assent to rather than critical questioning of one‘s 
social values. Moral autonomy does not consist in taking personal 
responsibility for one's behaviour either. It involves acquiescence to, 
and dependence upon, society‘s‘ impersonal prescriptions. In 
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Durkheim's moral theory there is little if any scope 'for the genuine 
exercise of individual moral reason and judgement beyond what is 
minimally required to recognise or acknowledge what that group 
ordains' (Carr, 1991, p 128). Carr concludes that Durkheim's Moral 
Education is an impressive work that is importantly wrong. I would 
have to agree. Durkheim had a seriously attenuated notion of 
individual moral agency. His insistence that school discipline is a 
matter of conformity to rules for the benefit of a ‗divinized‘ society is 
moreover, more than a little bizarre.  
 
2.6 School discipline as submission to rules 
 
‘It is stormy, and raindrops cling like silver bees to the panes, 
The thin sycamore in the playground is swinging with flattened leaves; 
The heads of the boys move dimly through a yellow gloom that stains 
The class; over them all the dark net of my discipline weaves… 
 
I must not win their souls, no never, I only must win, 
The brief material control of the hour, leave them free of me. 
Learn they must to obey, for all harmony is discipline, 
And only in harmony with others the single soul can be free.’ (From Discipline by D H 
Lawrence, 1994) 
 
In this chapter, Clark‘s characterisation of traditional discipline 
as a narrow and ‗brief material control of the hour‘ has been 
delineated. It has been argued that Peters endorses a much broader 
concept; discipline is both for the sake of, and part of, pupils‘ 
engagement with worthwhile forms of public knowledge. Indeed, it 
seems to me that one of the great strengths of the theory of liberal 
education articulated by Peters and Hirst is the extent to which the 
relationship between knowledge and discipline is systematically 
fleshed out. John Wilson and Durkheim both thought pupils ‗must 
learn to obey‘ rules as this process is morally educational. Durkheim 
also believed discipline was the force that enabled individual and 
wider social ‗harmony‘. In their different ways Peters, John Wilson and 
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Durkheim all thought that school discipline essentially required 
children to submit themselves to rules. In contrast to this view, a 















































Chapter Three: Discipline and Interest in a Child-centred Education 
 
 
In this chapter, the concept of discipline will be explored in 
relation to child-centred theories of education. Initially, it will be 
argued that Rousseau thought education should be founded on the 
individual experiences and curiosities of the child in order to foster 
useful knowledge. Thereafter, the interest-based theories of school 
discipline advanced by Pat Wilson and John Dewey will be analysed. It 
will be argued that both these philosophers persuasively explain how 
genuine school discipline may best follow when learning activities are 
successfully married to pupil interests and experiences. However, it 
will be concluded that the epistemic positions adopted by Wilson and 
Dewey are nevertheless problematic. Although advocates of a liberal 
education may place too great an emphasis on developing theoretical 
knowledge, perhaps child-centred theorists do not value that 
development enough. It will be concluded that a better long-term 
purpose for discipline in schools might rather be to engender pupil 
wisdom, as this concept incorporates into it aspects of both theoretical 
and practical knowledge. 
 
3.1 Emile, Experience, and Instrumentalism 
 
 
In the previous chapter, a liberal theory of school discipline was 
delineated. On this view, discipline is either: an instrument whose 
purpose is to bring about the classroom order necessary for teaching 
and learning, or; it is indicative of the process of knowledge 
acquisition itself, whereby pupil effort is submitted to the challenge of 
making some aspect of worthwhile knowledge their own. It was also 
argued that the epistemic foundation of a liberal education might be 
found in Plato‘s Republic. Jean-Jacques Rousseau who is often 
credited as the founding father of child-centred education55 also greatly 
admired the Republic. He remarked that ‗it is the finest treatise on 
                                                 
55
 See for example Plamenatz (1972) Darling (1986 & 1993) and Carr (1985, 1998 & 2003). 
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education ever written‘ (Rousseau, 1993, p8). However, in his own equally 
famous treatise on education56 Émile, he articulated some profoundly 
un-Platonic views. Whereas Plato explained the role that education 
ought to play in moulding an ideal society, Rousseau‘s protagonist 
Emile is to be educated to live well in, and remain uncorrupted by, 
existing society.  Rousseau thought that the social and cultural57 
order of his time was generally liable to adulterate the innate and 
natural goodness of humanity generally and of the child particularly 
(Plamenatz, 1972). Furthermore, whereas the education in Plato‘s 
Republic involves a turning of the soul towards the intelligible world of 
non-empirical forms; the education of Emile is to be firmly rooted in 
the world of sense experience. 
 
‗Give your scholar no verbal lessons; he should be taught by experience alone; never 
punish him for he does not know what it is to do wrong‘ (Rousseau, 1993, p 66) 
 
John Plamenatz (1972) attributes eleven educational precepts to 
the Swiss philosopher in his article, ‗Rousseau: The Education of 
Emile‘ (Plamenatz, 1972). Plamenatz observes that all these principles are 
united by one common aim, ‗to make the boy self reliant and free… 
Emile is not to become learned but is to know how to learn‘ (Plamenatz, 
1972, p 181). Plamenatz argues that no two precepts are more 
significant to education than those of not giving orders to the child ‗and 
especially not orders backed by threats‘ and of not providing the child 
with ‗the impression that you are at his service’ (Plamenatz, 1972, p 183). 
Authority should generally not come to impinge unduly on the 
individual child because ‗he will cease to reason; he will be a mere 
plaything of other people‘s thoughts‘ (Rousseau, 1993, p 156-157). 
Although children should be prevented from harming themselves or 
others this prevention should not be brought about through orders or 
punishments, particularly when children are too young to see the 
                                                 
56
 Plamenatz (1972) makes the point that Émile is as much a work on child psychology as it is on 
education. 
57
 This also marks a clear demarcation between his thought and that of Arnold (2006). 
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point of these measures. He insisted that the ‗very words obey and 
command‘ should be eliminated from educational ‗vocabulary, still 
more those of duty and obligation’ (Rousseau, 1993, p 62). 
 
Rousseau believed that it was only in adolescence that children 
enter the ‗moral order‘. He therefore thought that punishment was 
entirely out of place for the young until they become capable of 
distinguishing right from wrong. He believed that children naturally 
reach a mature state of moral autonomy if they are largely left to their 
own devices. Rousseau suggests that it is improper to rally children to 
emulate adult behaviour. Adults should not require children to put on 
an ‗outward show of feelings‘ (Plamenatz, 1972, p 180) they do not have. It 
is well known that he thought that ‗childhood has its own ways of 
seeing, thinking and feeling; nothing is more foolish than to try to 
substitute our ways‘ (Rousseau, 1993, p 64). Rousseau argues that 
children learn from their personal curiosity about the concrete world 
of sense experience. He suggests that educators ought not to teach the 
child anything or tell them to do anything (Rousseau, 1993, p 169). Our 
real teachers he says are the conditions of our own experience and 
emotion. Senses alone provide ‗the first workings of reason‘ (Rousseau, 
1993, p 156).   
 
‗The man is truly free who desires what he is able to perform, and does what he 
desires. This is my fundamental maxim. Apply it to childhood, and all the rules of 
education spring from it.‘ (Rousseau, 1993, p 56) 
 
Rousseau wanted to produce ‗independent learners with 
resourceful minds‘ (Darling, 1993, p 32). In Émile he makes the 
extraordinary claim that ‗the child who reads ceases to think58‘ 
(Rousseau, 1993, p 156). He held that reading can fill one with fantasies 
about reality. Books (like many of the other influences from wider 
society) can instil in the child wants that are not within his reach. 
                                                 
58
 Both Plamenatz (1972) and Darling (1993) note this point too. The former argues this claim is 
extravagantly disingenuous as Rousseau himself learnt a great deal from books. 
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Rousseau thought that most of mankind‘s ills could be traced back to 
impossible desires. Realism and pragmatism were for Rousseau 
‗essential for freedom‘ (Darling, 1993, p 34). Education should provide 
children with the skills they need to obtain what they want; Rousseau 
thus advocates children learning a trade (Darling, 1993). He emphasised 
that knowledge should have practical utility59. Although experiential 
learning may be slower than traditional teaching, Rousseau thought it 
much more effective at developing useful knowledge (Darling, 1993). It is 
from their own experiences that children will come to perceive the use 
of what they learn (Plamenatz, 1972). Rousseau thus held that there is 
‗no pre-existing curriculum‘ (Darling, 1993, p32) apart from experience.  
 
The policy of minimal educational intervention endorsed by 
Rousseau, leads Plamenatz to speculate that by contemporary 
standards ‗Emile might be called a deprived child – emotionally 
deprived‘ (Plamenatz, 1972, p 181) because he is so starved of social 
affection. Rousseau‘s less well known and conservative account of an 
education for girls in Émile has also been criticised. Darling (1986) 
suggests it is ironic that a seemingly progressive thinker like 
Rousseau depicts such a traditional education for Émile‘s female 
counterpart, Sophie. Sophie should explicitly not enjoy the freedom 
from interference that Emile does. She should rather be schooled for 
the future purpose of becoming a ‗compliant wife, mother and home-
maker‘ (Darling, 1986, p 33).  
 
Child-centred education has been substantially influenced by 
Émile‘s legacy. I will continue to refer to child-centred rather than 
progressive educational theories60. The former term best captures the 
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 Plamenatz and especially Darling (1993) make convincing cases that Rousseau was in fact a 
„progressive instrumentalist‟. 
60Perry (1967) suggests that the reforms advocated by even the most articulate „progressive‟ educators 
were based upon misrepresentative caricatures of traditional education. Carr (1998) also rightly 
observes that the terms „traditional‟ and „progressive‟ are „variously ambiguous‟ in that they can be, 
and have been, used to refer to different features of educational theory, policy and practice. Dewey 
(1997) and Freire (2001) for example both employ the term „progressive‟ but they do so in different 
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basic idea, generally agreed upon by proponents of such theories, that 
the interests of the child should be placed at or near the centre of the 
educational project. However, such child-led theory and practice has 
undoubtedly been interpreted in a variety of different ways. A. S. Neill, 
Homer Lane, John Dewey and W. H. Kilpatrick all justifiably became 
associated with the child-centred educational movement of the 
twentieth century, yet all four had quite distinct (and sometimes 
contradictory) pedagogical visions61. Whereas Dewey and Kilpatrick 
were broadly united by pragmatist views about how knowledge is 
acquired and the purposes it should be put to, the thoughts of Lane 
and Neill were much more informed by psychological and therapeutic 
literature. Arguably, the influence of Rousseau is particularly 
apparent in the work of Neill and Dewey. Moreover, Neill does little to 
acknowledge the ‗striking resemblance‘ (Carr, 1985, p 55) between his 
thought and that of Rousseau‘s. This may be because he came to 
study Rousseau late in his life (Darling, 1984). Although Neill was in 
many respects a radical educator, he nevertheless had deeply 
conservative views about the processes of teaching and learning 
themselves. 
 
At Summerhill, where Neill was headmaster, pupils were not 
obliged to attend any classes: the ‗Summerhill pupil had to make his 
own decisions about what classes, if any, he would take‘ (Darling, 1984, 
p 160). However, if pupils did opt into a lesson they were expected to 
participate. The teacher, moreover, largely dictated to the pupils in a 
traditional manner62. Much like Rousseau before him, Neill expressed 
a certain disdain for books, commenting that they are the ‗least 
important apparatus in the school63‘. Despite this polemical posture64 
                                                                                                                                            
ways. The former sees progress in terms of a new focus on pupil experience whereas the latter thinks 
education should focus on addressing the global effects of western capitalism. 
61
 For detailed accounts of the similarities and differences between these thinkers, see (Carr, 1988) and 
Perry (1967). Perry also discusses the educational thought of Bertrand Russell. 
62
 Both Carr (1998) and Darling (1984) note this point. Darling also documents school inspectors‟ 
surprise at finding very traditional teaching and „old fashioned pedagogy‟ at Summerhill. 
63
 This quotation of Neill is taken from Darling (1984, p 159). 
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however, he did not perceive little or no educational value in books. 
Neill certainly wanted to re-assert the value of practical activities and 
creative arts, but he was not opposed to book learning. He just did not 
believe that the essential task of the school was to facilitate knowledge 
acquisition in pupils. He ‗rather saw the job of the school as laying the 
foundations for a happy life‘ (Darling, 1984, p 160). Like Durkheim and 
John Wilson, Neill thought that obedience was central to discipline. 
However, he had a much more democratic understanding of 
obedience; the teacher might obey the pupil or the pupil the teacher, 
depending on the circumstances in the school community. Neill was 
also vehemently opposed to the physical chastisement of pupils65. 
 
Neill‘s underlying conviction that the emotional well-being of 
pupils was as, if not more, important than how knowledgeable they 
became may also explain his absence of interest in the nature of 
knowledge itself. Darling observes that ‗while Neill had much of 
interest to say about the people he was educating, he had little to say 
about the nature of the stuff they might learn‘ (Darling, 1984, p 170). Neill 
was not alone on this point. Perry (1967) suggests that child-centred 
educators such as Lane, Russell66 and Neill all largely ignored 
philosophical questions about education. They had more faith in 
psychology and thought it had much more to say about fundamental 
problems of education and processes of learning. However, this meant 
that concepts such as the nature of knowledge and pupil interest were 
left largely unexplored in their educational thought. Dewey, however, 
did develop a more coherent and substantial philosophy of education, 
although his treatment of ‗interest‘ was not very sustained (Perry, 1967). 
In the next section Dewey‘s thoughts on interest and discipline will be 
explored. Then, in sections 3.3 and 3.4, P S Wilson‘s more detailed 
                                                                                                                                            
64
 Perry (1967) accuses Neill of being an „agent provocateur‟ and „gadfly of reform‟. Darling describes 
his writing as „intemperate‟ and „polemical‟. 
65
 See Perry (1967) pp 158-168 for a more detailed breakdown of Neill‟s views on discipline and 
punishment. 
66
 He rightly notes that it is particularly remarkable that Russell did not philosophically analyse 
educational concepts given that he was a philosopher. 
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discussion of the two concepts will be examined; and at 3.5 it will be 
concluded that Peters articulates a more balanced account of the 
concept of educational interest than either P S Wilson or Dewey. 
 
3.2 Dewey and Discipline for Social Progress 
 
‗A person who is trained to consider his actions, to undertake them deliberately, is 
in so far forth disciplined. Add to this ability a power to endure in an intelligently 
chosen course in face of distraction, confusion, and difficulty, and you have the 
essence of discipline.‘ (Dewey, 2008, p 156) 
 
Dewey was, like Rousseau before him, critical of the view that 
society should transmit and communicate ‗habits of doing, thinking 
and feeling from older to younger‘ (Dewey, 1997, p 3). Like Rousseau, he 
also endorsed an ‗instrumentalist‘ theory of knowledge and an 
education based on experience. Dewey‘s famous work Democracy and 
Education contains some pertinent observations on the nature of 
discipline, particularly in the tenth chapter which bears the title 
Interest and Discipline. There, he firstly explicates the concept of 
interest. The interested person, he says, is simultaneously lost and 
found in some matter or other of experience. The term interest 
indicates the ‗engrossment of the self in an object‘ (Dewey, 2008, p 153). 
Dewey argues that, etymologically speaking, interest is that which 
provides a link between otherwise disparate things.  
 
This aspect of interest, he continues, has important educational 
ramifications. He states that guiding someone to perceive the 
connection that exists between the agent of learning and any material 
to be learned is ‗simply good sense; to make it interesting by 
extraneous and artificial inducements deserves all the bad names 
which have been applied to the doctrine of interest in education‘ 
(Dewey, 2008, p 155). However, interest does not terminate when a 
person comes to understand an object. Interest is the ‗moving force‘ 
(Dewey, 2008, p 156) in a process of broader developing events, whose 
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fruition is reached in action. To be interested in something necessarily 
involves having wider aims and purposes. Such instrumental interests 
are in fact a prerequisite feature of Dewey‘s concept of discipline. 
 
Discipline was for him a disposition of persistence and 
endurance in the face of challenge and difficulty. The disciplined 
person has the important ‗executive‘ ability to set goals based on their 
interests as well as the wherewithal to think about what actions are 
necessary to achieve these goals. The merely obstinate, by way of 
comparison, carry an action through just because they have started 
down that road. Their stubborn activity need not bear any relation to 
their wider ambitions; indeed they need not have any conscious 
purposes. Discipline, Dewey stresses, is a positive quality. It involves 
the considered development, rather than suppression of, one‘s own 
inclinations and powers. The idea (here hinted at by Dewey) that 
discipline involves a disposition to consciously foster ones natural 
capacities is I think very appealing.67 
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 Dewey and Aristotle (whose philosophy will be explored in section 2) arguably both share the broad 
view that people develop dispositions out of repeated experiences. Baldacchino (2008, p 150) suggests 
that for Dewey the „power to modify actions‟ from previous experience is the „power to develop 
dispositions’. Pring (2007, p 45) similarly notes that the development and internalisation of habits was 
crucial to growth for Dewey; habits that are used flexibly and critically can help learners to make better 
sense of new experiences.  Dewey did too (much like Aristotle before him) think that education should 
make use of the „accumulated wisdom of the word‟ (quoted in Priestely & Humes, 2010, p 355). 
However, as we shall see, Dewey and Aristotle seem to have had very different views about the nature 
and value of the received wisdom of a culture. Dewey, as we shall see, stated that the instincts and 
immediate experience of children should form the content and starting point of all education; this 
would seem to conflict (at least in part) with any notion of accumulated wisdom that is abstract and 
external to the child. Pring does, to be sure, suggest that for Dewey the „systematised experience of the 
“adult mind” helps in the interpretation of the child‟s mind, and shows how it might better do what it is 
trying to do‟ (2007, p 100). However, the accumulated wisdom of the world seems to have the function 
of extending the experience of the child (Pring, 2007, p 124). In section 2, I hope it will become 
apparent that Aristotle had a rich concept of wisdom that meaningfully incorporates into it components 
of virtue, action, feeling, experience, knowledge, truth and abstract theory. Aristotle too, much more 
so than Dewey, thought that education should involve the active passing down of virtuous intellectual, 
affective and moral habits from one generation to the next. Frankena (1970, p 34) suggests that 
Dewey‟s thought is open to criticism on the grounds that it does not value enough the previous 
discoveries of others - especially those connected to the good life. Furthermore, to my mind, certain 
aspects of Deweyian logic are circular and unconvincing. As Baldacchino notes, Dewey maintained 
that growth is for the sake of further growth and democracy for further democracy. Aristotle in contrast 
(as we shall see in sections 2 and 3) was clear that education should provide for 1) wise democracy and 
2) the rich realisation of each person‟s intellectual and moral potential according to socio-normative 
standards and personal capacities. 
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However, Dewey‘s concept of discipline is arguably weakened by 
its relation to his larger socially instrumental68educational philosophy. 
Despite his avowal that education should transcend binaries of 
traditionalism and progressivism, and individual and social need69, 
Dewey favoured the rejection of teaching subjects for their own sake. 
He ultimately thought that individual actions were worthwhile in so 
far as they fuelled social development. Dewey voices his suspicion of 
disciplinary subjects within chapter ten of Democracy and Education. 
Traditional schooling he implies reifies knowledge that is divorced 
from experience. The presence of interest, he says, demonstrates that 
a subject is not ‗something complete in itself‘ (Dewey, 2008, p 158) that 
can just be learned or known. Although he states that the school 
should have neither narrowly utilitarian nor narrowly traditional 
purposes (as in a schooling based on academic subject disciplines), he 
does seem to place much more importance upon the former. True 
conceptions of interest and discipline, he argues, should develop the 
natural intellectual and emotional dispositions of pupils, but for the 
larger purpose of driving social progress. Dewey is undoubtedly more 
receptive than P S Wilson70 to the idea that education and discipline 
are necessarily social processes. He makes this particularly pellucid in 
My pedagogic Creed where he famously remarked that ‗education is 
the fundamental method of social progress and reform‘ (Dewey, 1941, 
p15).   
 
He there reiterated his view that the ‗child‘s own instincts and 
powers furnish the material and give the starting point for all (my 
emphasis) education‘ (Dewey, 1941, p15).  However, he insisted that 
individuals can only comprehend and further their interests and 
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 Carr suggests that Dewey‟s philosophy of education was „his own personal brand of pragmatism – 
which he called Instrumentalism‟ (Carr, 2003 p124) 
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 For example of this in his thought see Dewey 1997 chapter 1, Dewey 1941, and for discussion of this 
see Pring (2007). 
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 Pring suggests Dewey thought that the interests that shaped human growth necessarily occur in social 
contexts (2007, p 85). Pring adds: „Above all…Dewey sees the development of discipline to arise 
through …cooperative activities, the end of which is of social significance‟ (ibid, p 106). P S Wilson‟s 
much more romantic and individualistic notions of discipline and interest are explained at 3.3 & 3.4. 
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powers in the social relationships and situations they find themselves 
in71. Education is an inherently social process for Dewey and it has 
social improvement as its aim. Dewey believed that education could 
and should enable society to formulate better purposes for itself. 
Every teacher‘s calling is to be ‗a social servant set apart for the 
maintenance of proper social order and the securing of the right social 
growth‘ (Dewey, 1941, p17). It has of course been well documented that 
Dewey was critical of the view that the child is a ‗passive spectator‘ in 
the educational process72. Teaching, he says, should not entail the 
external imposition of static knowledge onto the passive child; such 
an education will not enable the child to shape and control their 
future experiences (Dewey, 1997). He rather believed that education 
should foster the active powers of the child, for it is these that will be 
of most profit to society. It is through immediate experience that active 
powers grow. Education he argues ‗must be conceived of as a 
continuing reconstruction of experience‘ (Dewey, 1941, p12). Dewey 
insisted that people can only live and learn in the actually occurring 
moment. He stipulated that students would be best equipped for later 
life if education enabled them to consistently extract the meaning from 
their current situations. This he remarks ‗is the only preparation 
which in the long run amounts to anything‘ (Dewey, 1997, p 49). 
Traditional subject-based schooling in comparison is ‗mis-educative‘ 
(Dewey, 1997, p 25) because it prioritises knowledge disconnected from 
the pupil‘s present experiences. Dewey thought that teachers should 
give children greater liberty to shape their own educational 
experiences. 
 
‗The only freedom that is of enduring importance is freedom of intelligence, that is to 
say, freedom of observation and of judgement exercised on behalf of purposes that 
are intrinsically worthwhile.‘ (Dewey, 1997, p 61) 
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 Baldacchino (2008) somewhat similarly indicates that for „Dewey, the clarity of ideas and 
understanding cannot be subservient to anything but the truth that we recognise by dint of our own 
growth‟ (p 151). 
72
 See for example Biesta (2007), Carr (2003) and Bingham (2009). 
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Dewey believed that pupils ought to have more choice over their 
outward conduct so that they can develop the power to perform 
purposeful, disciplined and intelligent actions. He stated that threats 
and penalties are futile forms of educating for social progress (Dewey, 
1941). He thought that discipline in traditional schooling (Dewey, 1997) 
tended to be socially controlling and overly reliant on artificially 
engendered teacher authority. Enforcing pupil silence for the alleged 
sake of decorum puts ‗seeming before being‘ (Dewey, 1997, p 62). He 
inclined to the view that school discipline prospers when pupil‘s 
rightful freedom is balanced by legitimate teacher authority73.  
Education he explains need not do away with authority entirely but it 
should re-focus it onto the pupil‘s active experiences. Bingham (2009) 
suggests that Dewey wanted education to embrace a different form of 
authority, one that is capable of directing, shared collective change. 
 
Dewey (1997) does indicate that the teacher should be a ‗leader‘ 
not a ‗dictator‘ of group activities. He thought that school life should 
ensure ‗continuity in the child‘s growth‘ (Dewey, 1941, p 7). He held that 
authority and discipline in schools should develop harmoniously out 
of each child‘s family experiences. There are, to that extent, certain 
limited parallels between the thought of Emile Durkheim and Dewey74. 
P S Wilson, however, shared many of Dewey‘s significant concerns and 
the latter greatly influenced the former. Pring remarks that Interest 
and Discipline in Education ‗remains one of the best expositions of 
Dewey‘s thinking‘ (Pring, 2007, p 77); whereas Peters75 suggests it 
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 In their different ways Freire (2001) and Bantock (1952) also argue that discipline arises when the 
freedom of pupils and authority of teachers can be balanced. 
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 Both defended a theory of school discipline that had society as an end. Durkheim (as 2.5 explains) 
however believed that discipline and authority should be arranged in a wholly different way and he 
developed a rather implausible concept of society. 
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 R S Peters makes this remark in his introductory comments to, Wilson (1971). 
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3.3 Needs and Interests 
 
‗What are we going to do now, without the barbarians? 
Those people, they were a kind of solution.‘ (Cavafy, 2008, p 16) 
 
Like Clark76, P S Wilson was very sceptical of the idea that the 
child is a barbarian in need of education. He thought that such a view 
helped teachers to justify treating their pupils as non-persons during 
their schooling because ‗children, as a matter of ‗fact‘, are not ‗really‘ 
persons until they have been educated‘ (Wilson, 1971, p 36). Wilson 
therefore sought to develop a more humane philosophy of education. 
At the start of his neglected work Interest and Discipline in Education 
(1971) he posed two questions that provided a central focus for this 
inquiry. He firstly asked why should children go to school and 
secondly, why should they have to? The first question is, he says, 
concerned with accounting for how pupil attendance at school is or 
can be warranted.  In the opening two chapters of his book he 
considered two different explanations of why schooling is justified; 
pupils should go to schools because they need to (chapter 1) or because 
it is in their interest (literally) to (chapter 2).  The second question, 
Wilson stated, is about educational compulsion. It relates to how 
teachers can compel pupils to go to schools and do certain things as 
opposed to others with them, when they get there. In effect the first 
half of Interest and Discipline offers a defence of a child-centred 
education77, whilst the second explains how discipline (chapter3) and 
punishment (chapter 4) should be arranged within such a pupil-led 
educational philosophy.  
 
‗What ‗drives‘ the individual, whether it is food or independence that he is seeking, is 
not his ‗needs‘ but his sense of what is important and valuable. It is from his 
evaluations that his needs derive, not vice versa.‘ (Wilson, 1971, p 21) 
 
Wilson stipulates that a need is a prerequisite that cannot be 
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 Clark‟s views of discipline are delineated at 2.1. 
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 R S Peters concluded as much in his introductory comments to, Wilson (1971). 
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truly determined before value judgements have been made about 
aspirations and ends. As he puts it: agreement about needs ‗depends 
upon agreement about values‘ (Wilson, 1971, p 6). The argument that 
education should focus upon meeting pupil need is therefore 
meaningless Wilson reasons, unless consensus is reached about what 
desirable educational goals are. The ‗need‘ for schooling Wilson 
specifies can be described in either societal or individual terms. He 
argues that each type of need generates a different model of education 
to serve it. However no concept of instrumental need, he implies, can 
ever in itself adequately account for why children should be sent to 
school. Wilson dismisses the argument that children need to be in a 
safe place during the day so that adults can be liberated for work. He 
is similarly disdainful of the idea that pupils should go to school 
because society needs a continuous supply of well-educated or trained 
adults to make up the labour force. These are hardly he says morally 
convincing explanations of why children should go to school.  
 
‗The educative task of teachers is not to give them (pupils) a series of shocks 
followed by motivational pushes and pulls in directions alien to their own, but to try 
to help them to see the significance of goals which they already find interesting and 
take to be of some possible value.‘ (Wilson, 1971, p 34) 
 
Wilson is also critical of branches of educational psychology 
that portray learning as a sort of conditioning of behaviour fashioned 
by the issuing of rewards and punishments. Human learning is not 
like the manipulation of a machine he says; the former venture must 
have an intrinsic point. Notably, for Wilson, it is not intrinsically 
worthwhile to study something whose principal value will accrue 
later78. Learning, Wilson says rather entails grasping the meaning of 
an area of one‘s own immediate experience. Similarly, he states that 
teaching ‗involves something to do with trying to show someone the 
significance or import of some feature of their experience‘ (Wilson, 1971, 
p 23). Wilson not only wanted to offer an alternative to the traditional 
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view of childhood and education; he was also keen to distance himself 
from progressivism. The latter refers, he says, neither to the content 
nor the goals of education, but only to its method. Neither stereotype 
of traditionalism or progressivism, he adds, has ‗any notion of what 
could be valuable in the child‘s life here and now and therefore of 
intrinsic value to the curriculum‘ (Wilson, 1971, p 32). Wilson therefore 
argues that it is not instrumental need but pupil interest that should 
be the cornerstone of the curriculum. 
 
‗Needs are ‗reasons for action‘, then, only because someone (and not necessarily the 
person ‗in need‘) can point to extrinsic reasons for the needs. By contrast, although 
‗interests‘ are ‗reasons for action‘ too, this is not because of any extrinsic reasons 
which there may happen to be for those interests.‘ (Wilson, 1971, p 64) 
 
In his second chapter, Interests, Wilson explains that children‘s 
interests provide a substantially better justification for education than 
individual or social need. However, Wilson has a very specific 
conception of interest in mind. Children‘s interests, he notes, are often 
assumed to be essential to education by progressively minded 
teachers. But he thought that the notion of interest should not be 
employed as a caveat by teachers to generate higher motivation for 
pupil inquiry into ‗something otherwise dull‘ (Wilson, 1971, p 38). The 
term interest, Wilson implies, had become over-used but under-
conceptualised by proponents of progressive education in the 1960‘s 
and 1970‘s. He argues that the identification of a child‘s genuine 
interest is an extremely elusive and complex business. Simply asking 
children to state verbally the subjects they are drawn to, is unlikely to 
make manifest their interest. Nor, for that matter is observation of a 
child‘s behaviour a reliable indicator of interest. 
 
‗Implicit in a child‘s interest is all that is most personal and unique about him. To 
claim to have discovered this after a few weeks in a crowded classroom is absurd.‘  
(Wilson, 1971, p 53) 
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It is clear that Wilson thought that it takes time for interest to 
be revealed: but how exactly did he think that a child‘s interest could 
be revealed? His statements about this are not entirely clear. On the 
one hand, he argues that ‗letting children do as they like or prefer, or 
as habit inclines them is…not the same things at all as letting them 
pursue their interests‘ (Wilson, 1971, p 49). However he elsewhere 
declares that children‘s interests are ‗fairly settled dispositions which 
they have to notice, to pay attention to, and to engage in some 
appropriate activity with certain sorts of things rather than others‘ 
(Wilson, 1971, p 43). Significantly, Wilson emphasises that the 
appropriateness of an activity should be determined first and foremost 
by the child. 
 
Although these seemingly conflicting utterances about habit are 
open to interpretation, I think Wilson is trying to say that interest is 
not just any disposition but a particular sort of disposition. Interest is 
not a disposition to pay half-hearted attention to any passing whim. 
Interests in themselves could be a ‗perfect rag bag of the trivial‘ (Wilson, 
1971, p 37) that are not actually in that child‘s or anyone else‘s 
interests. Interest, he says, is significantly more than spontaneous 
and indiscriminate fancy. It involves the observation and scrutiny of 
an object of experience in a sustained and serious way. Interest 
entails persistence in the task of understanding why something one is 
attracted to is worthy of attention. To develop an interest is to become 
progressively able to relate to an object of experience in such a way as 
to locate its intrinsic point. Wilson argues that learning through 
performance is not the same thing as learning through interest. 
Teaching should not be a matter, he says, of influencing children to 
‗take‘ a subject. He puts it thus.  
  
The, ‗only way of engendering interest in anything is through helping the 
child to see something of its significance…unless there is something of intelligible 
interest in what the teacher is doing nothing of interest is likely to develop. The most 
that a teacher can do, I think, is try to communicate his view of what is interesting 
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in an intelligible way‘ (Wilson, 1971, p 60).  
 
Some of the general spirit of this is plausible. Most, if not all, 
good teaching would necessarily seem to involve the pupil coming to 
appreciate (with the support of the teacher) the intrinsic value of 
something. However, not all things have intrinsic value. For Wilson 
the teacher’s perspective of worth is and can only be based upon a 
prior interest of the child‘s. Interest and any value in it, must start 
with the child. A child‘s interest, he says, is always a good reason for 
engaging in an activity. Indeed, the sole educational function of 
teachers is to aid their pupils‘ capacities to understand aspects of 
experience that they (the pupils) are captivated by. There is always 
value in pursuing such interests, even if what is valued turns out to 
be ‗utterly worthless‘ and ‗positively detrimental to the achievement of 
other valued goals‘ (Wilson, 1971, p 66). Wilson pronounces that there is 
nothing apart from a child‘s interest79that can be educated. The 
philosophy of education that emerges in the second chapter of 
Wilson‘s treatise is thus radically child-centred. It comes as no 
surprise that his philosophy of discipline in schools is too. 
 
3.4 Discipline for pupil Interest 
 
‗The question of the morality of compulsion lies at the heart of the problem of 
discipline in schools. Centrally its difficulty stems – as does much of the difficulty 
which besets educational theory – from the fact that the problem itself is a 
particular formation or version of a much more general problem, central to moral 
philosophy. Trying to understand that (as we are now) the morality of compulsion in 
the particular context of schooling is but one instance of the difficulty of 
understanding the compulsion in morality in general.‘ (Wilson, 1971, p 73) 
 
Having argued in the first section of Interest and Discipline in 
Education that children should only go to schools if their interests can 
be appropriately developed, Wilson turns his attention to the second 
issue of why children should have to go to schools. Wilson‘s view of 
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 69 
what constitutes proper compulsion in schooling reflects his wider 
concern to educate interests. Discipline in schools, he stresses, is a 
moral problem because of the compulsion it involves. Wilson reasons 
that moral compulsion entails doing what one should because one 
knows that one must. Wilson arguably endorses a theory of moral 
duty in regard to discipline in schools, albeit a rather unique and 
peculiar one. He states that the compelling force of a moral imperative 
originates in the ‗interest which one finds in trying to live according to 
it, rather than anyone‘s pleasure, happiness or any other ‗good‘ to 
which it may contingently prove conducive‘ (Wilson, 1971, p 74). Proper 
discipline in schools does not entail the following of a code of conduct 
written by someone else, nor does it for that matter involve any 
relation to the wider happiness and flourishing of self or other80. The 
morally compelling feature of discipline in schools is rather the pupils 
own interest.  
 
‗In schools, then, the children‘s discipline must derive ultimately not from empirical 
considerations or calculations (by the children or anyone else) of the ways in which 
to obtain or produce goods, but from the moral compulsion implicit in their own 
interests in the school activities themselves.‘ (Wilson, 1971, p 74) 
 
Wilson, like Clark after him, contrasts discipline and control. He 
states that both are forms of order that necessitate compulsion. 
However, the compulsion particular to each is quite different.  Control 
he says is a way of ordering things to get something done and the 
compulsion involved can be physical and/or psychological. The 
compulsion involved in discipline by comparison, is both logical and 
moral. Interest is a quality that is deeply receptive to being 
disciplined. An interest could not in fact be a genuine interest if it 
were not susceptible to discipline. Issues of non-moral compulsion 
only arise when the interests of children are lost from view. He says 
that such loss can be attributed to the children themselves or to 
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thought of Aristotle, whose views will be discussed in depth in part two of this thesis.  
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teachers. In the former case Wilson implies that it is incumbent on 
teachers to help discipline the interests of children when lost, to 
refocus them, to educate them and to help them find new ones.  
 
Where teachers themselves lose sight of the interest of children, 
compulsion can only take on the more sinister form of manipulation. 
It can only be instrumental: ‗a kind of motivational leverage brought to 
bear upon the child in order to control his behaviour in desirable ways 
of whose intrinsic value he has no inkling himself (Wilson, 1971, p 75)‘. 
When the discipline of children in schools is external to a child‘s 
interest the order is not educational but controlling and should not be 
called or thought to be, discipline. He states that when ‗we exercise 
control over people…we are not disciplining them‘ (Wilson, 1971, p 78). 
Discipline does not arise when a person or persons are subject to the 
will and control of others. Discipline comes from immersion in the 
‗work itself‘ (Smith, 1985, p 60).  Pupil interest is for Wilson the educative 
order that is most worth pursuing. Control is a merely non educative 
order. A child subject to control is perhaps better schooled but they 
are not better educated. Although discipline is not something that 
teachers can exercise to establish control over their pupils, Wilson did 
believe that teacher and pupil alike can enter into a disciplined 
relationship.  
 
‗A disciplined relationship is one in which both parties to the relationship (the 
teacher as well as the class) submit to the educative order of the task in hand. The 
discipline is not something which one party to the relationship possesses over or 
manages to impose on the other.‘ (Wilson, 1971, p 79) 
 
There is something apposite about this aspect of Wilson‘s 
concept of discipline. I think the disciplined pupil or class should be 
defined in an important sense by their proper commitment to and 
engagement with the educational activity in question. Discipline in 
schools should I think entail pupils‘ endeavouring to ‗reach 
appropriate standards…in a valued activity‘ (Wilson, 1971, p 79). I am 
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also sympathetic to his view that a disciplined class, is not disciplined 
because someone is in control but because all of the members of it 
share a concern to advance their education. To their great credit both 
Wilson and Clark appreciate the vital connection that exists between a 
disciplined pupil and a pupil who is learning something of value. 
However, there are, I think, at least two fundamental problems with 
their view of discipline for pupil interest; these are epistemic and 
moral. 
 
Wilson‘s theory firstly rests on very shaky epistemological 
foundations. Interest and Discipline in Education has in fact next to 
nothing to say about knowledge and how it might be related to all 
important pupil interest. Wilson arguably recognised this gap in his 
theory as he attempted to trace the links between interest and 
knowledge in a later paper (Wilson, 1974). Knowledge of educational 
value, Wilson controversially argued is precisely and only that 
knowledge which interests the pupil (Wilson, 1974). He also perplexingly 
insisted that all actions are instrumental and that all knowledge has 
the instrumental function of enabling the discovery of further 
knowledge. The educational value of knowledge depends on its 
capacity to generate more knowledge. His attempt to explain the worth 
of knowledge founded on interest is, I think, less than satisfactory. I 
do not appear to be alone in reaching this conclusion as this paper 
‗was dismissed with less than philosophical decorum‘ (Pring, 2007, p 77) 
at a dramatic meeting of the Philosophy of Education Society for Great 
Britain. Wilson was given short shrift it appears because he had 
subverted the traditional educational aims of initiating pupils into 
worthwhile forms of knowledge. To be sure, there is little if any room 
for the received knowledge or wisdom of a culture within Wilson‘s 
educational philosophy, a point of which he was fully aware.  
 
He argued that children should only go or be compelled to go to 
schools if these are the sorts of places in which worthwhile activities 
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occur. He emphasised that his characterisation of a worthwhile 
educational activity departed from that put forward by Richard Peters. 
Although Wilson shares the view that educational activities are 
worthwhile if they are intrinsically valuable (in his later explained 
partially instrumental sense), he thought that no subject should in 
itself have a privileged place on the curriculum. He explains his 
reasoning accordingly: ‗what makes his (the child‘s) curriculum 
educationally worthwhile is not the presence on it of any particular 
school subject, but the presence in it of serious thought about 
whatever he is doing‘ (Wilson, 1971, p 86). In this regard, Wilson is I 
think like White81; he is guilty of misunderstanding or 
misrepresenting what Peters actually said about educational activities. 
Although it is true that Peters thought education should consist of 
certain activities or bodies of knowledge that are worth pursuing for 
their own sake, he did not argue that any subject must be on the 
curriculum. 
 
Wilson is also sceptical of the traditional idea that discipline 
and force should be employed where necessary to ensure that certain 
inherently valuable subjects can be studied. Teachers who persist in 
the instruction of subjects irrespective of pupil interest are unlikely to 
help their pupils uncover the ‗illuminating point in his instructions 
since there will be nothing in the pupils‘ experience for those 
instructions to connect with‘ (Wilson, 1971, p 88). Teaching, he says, that 
is only upheld by the possibility of physical or psychological sanction 
is not and cannot be educational. Proper teaching and instruction 
involves informing not commanding. Wilson reiterates the contrast 
between his stance and that of Peters by insisting that the content of 
information shared between teacher and pupil should not come from 
the teacher’s tradition and culture, but from each pupil‘s.  
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‗The pupil‘s thinking, too, has a tradition, and, unless the teacher begins his 
instructive communication with the pupil in a language and in relation to 
experiences and activities which already the pupil understands something of the 
point of, then no conceptual development and no development of interest will result 
directly from the encounter.‘ (Wilson, 1971, p 90) 
 
I agree with Wilson‘s general assertion that new learning must 
proceed from what is already known82. However, his insistence that 
pupils have their own culture and tradition upon which teaching 
should be based is I think somewhat paradoxical. It seems to me that 
a tradition and culture is something that is to an important degree 
both external to particular individuals and already relatively stable 
and enduring. Matthew Arnold83certainly construed culture in such 
terms. He distinctly stated that ‗the disparagers of culture make its 
motive curiosity‘ (Arnold, 2006, p 32). Arnold, however, emphasises that a 
cultured person is able to ‗see things as they are‘ and ‗augment the 
excellence‘ (Arnold, 2006, p 33) of their nature accordingly. He insists 
that the origin of culture is not to be found in mere interest and 
curiosity but rather in a love of human perfection. His argument that 
education should involve individuals engaging with the best that has 
been thought and said seems to me much more defensible than 
Wilson‘s. I think there is considerable confusion in the idea that 
education should almost exclusively entail children developing 
interests in their own personal traditions. Children may not be 
barbarians at the gates of knowledge, but nor are they fully mature 
and independent inquirers capable of generating their own knowledge 
from within. 
 
Wilson‘s conception of discipline as an educative order 
ultimately rests, I think, on far too romantic and utopian a conception 
of the child. In this regard, Wilson‘s educational theory is very 
reminiscent of Rousseau‘s. The latter, however, was only concerned to 
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describe the education of an individual boy who had a tutor entirely to 
himself, paid for by his wealthy family (Plamenatz, 1972). Few, if any, 
schools today have the luxury of being able to match every child to his 
or her own teacher. Wilson did not, I think, give nearly enough 
thought to how the competing demands of individuals may often clash 
in a class of pupils. An education and discipline arranged solely 
around personal interest concedes far too much freedom to individual 
pupils in their immediate contexts. Teachers can and should take a 
continuing and active interest in their pupils‘ interests. They should, 
moreover, be committed to forging disciplined personal relationships 
with their pupils. However, a teacher who is convinced that individual 
pupil interest should determine the entire content of the curriculum, 
and procedures of class discipline seems to be in the grip of an 
extremely romantic view of education. It is a view that fundamentally 
misconstrues the necessarily social nature of school life and learning 
and it is a view that does not pay enough attention to public traditions 
of knowledge. 
 
Wilson‘s philosophy of discipline also rests on a decidedly 
limited and individualistic view of moral agency. Wilson‘s argument is 
after all that pupil interests are the only things that can or should be 
educated or disciplined. All attempts to control ill-disciplined 
behaviour by means external to pupil interest are for Wilson morally 
misguided. He argues that there are no ethically or educationally 
redeeming features of a situation where a child is subject to the 
controlling features of schooling, no matter what the desirability of the 
ends may be, for the moral benefits of education lie only in the child‘s 
own interest. The sole intervention a teacher is justified in making in 
their pupils‘ moral formation is the refocusing of their interests, 
whatever those interests may be. Wilson‘s vision of the educated 
person is, I think, dangerously one-dimensional; the only moral 
quality he thinks worth pursuing is personal curiosity. Wilson‘s 
philosophy of discipline is, I think, ultimately undermined by his 
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radical, wider philosophy of education.  
 
3.5 Theoretical knowledge, Practical knowledge and Wisdom 
 
‗Sustaining interest is perhaps a greater educational problem than appealing to it‘. 
(Hirst & Peters, 1975, p 36) 
 
Peters notably devoted a chapter (VI) to the ‗Consideration of 
Interests‘, in Ethics and Education (1970)84. Far from ignoring its 
educational importance; Peters arguably develops a more rounded 
notion of interest than P S Wilson. The term, he says, has both 
psychological and normative meanings and only the former is similar 
to Wilson‘s.  In the ‗psychological sense we speak of what people are 
interested in…in a more permanent sort of way‘ (Peters, 1970, p 167-168).  
The normative import of the concept in contrast is to be found in what 
is actually in a person‘s interests. The ethical appropriateness of 
interest, Peters implies, requires that a balanced evaluation be made 
by teachers about what it is worthwhile for individual pupils to do in 
relation to their ability to do it. Interest is normative, he says, because 
it ‗combines judgements about what is worthwhile or desirable 
(judgements of content) with judgements about individual capacity 
and potentiality‘ (Peters, 1970, p 171). The notion that teachers need to 
make balanced judgements about the nature of the educational 
activities to be pursued in relation to pupil‘s current abilities seems to 
me to be a very sound one85. Importantly, Peters also makes clear that 
the value of individual interests must be considered in relation to 
more universal public interests86. All schools he says have educational 
and social functions. 
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‗Education is not simply for the intelligent. It is not a question of some being 
capable of it and others not. It is a matter, rather, of how far individuals can 
progress along the same avenues of exploration‘ (Peters, 1970, p 178). 
 
He states that the onus on teachers to consider pupil interest is 
not an excuse ‗for duller children‘ to ‗simply be encouraged to build 
boats, make guitars, do cookery and metal work‘ (Peters, 1970, p 177) 
while the more intellectually able pursue less practical activities. 
Peters‘ willingness to classify pupils as ‗dull‘ or more ‗intelligent‘ may 
appear to be a little less than politically correct in the contemporary 
context. However, his point here is not to label children; he is actually 
seeking educational equality. Peters thought that all children were, 
regardless of ability, entitled to an education that might maximise 
their potential. Peters thought that such an education should involve 
a thorough engagement with what is most worthwhile: knowledge that 
helps pupils to understand their world. This philosophy did, however, 
famously lead him to make some problematic statements about the 
value of practical knowledge.  
 
In chapters five and six of Ethics and Education he expresses 
scepticism about the educational merit of practical activities such as 
games and cookery87. Skills like swimming and golf too ‗do not have a 
wide-ranging cognitive content…It is largely a matter of ―knowing how‖ 
rather than of ―knowing that‖, of knack rather than of 
understanding…what there is to know throws very little light on much 
else‘ (Peters, 1979, p159). Hirst and Peters (1975) together cast doubt on 
the educational status of subjects that do not promote forms of 
knowledge; they deride games as being essentially ‗non-serious‘. All 
seven forms of knowledge delineated in The Logic of Education have a 
distinctively theoretical rather than practical foundation. Hirst and 
Peters (1975, pp-63-64) argue that education should focus on developing 
knowledge of: mathematics, the physical sciences, interpersonal and 
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educational value‟ (Peters, 1970, p 177). 
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linguistic aspects of experience, morality, aesthetic experience, 
religion, and philosophy; because all of these forms support objective 
truth claims. Liberal education as conceived by Peters and Hirst 
arguably did therefore place too high a premium on theoretical 
knowledge88. To their credit, child-centred educationists such as Lane, 
Neill, Rousseau and Dewey helped to reassert the educational value of 
practical activities, but they probably tended to go too far in the other 
direction. They arguably all underestimated the worth of theoretical 
knowledge. Should education and discipline be more for the one than 
the other, or is there some middle-ground where both theoretical and 
practical knowledge can be equally valued? The beginnings of an 
affirmative answer to this question can perhaps be sought in the 
educational promotion of wisdom. 
 
‗In the schools of antiquity philosophers aspired to impart wisdom, in modern 
colleges our humbler aim is to teach subjects. The drop from divine wisdom, which 
was the goal of the ancients, to text-book knowledge of subjects, which is achieved 
by moderns, marks an educational failure, sustained through the ages‘. (Whitehead, 
1967, p 29) 
 
In his seminal exposition, The Aims of Education and other 
essays, Alfred North Whitehead indicates that the purpose of 
education ought to be the inculcation of wisdom in pupils. Whitehead 
maintains that all mental development consists of rhythmic cycles. 
Each cycle consists of three phases; romance, precision and 
generalisation. In the beginning the subject matter is vivid and 
exciting and full of unexplored connections: the ‗territory of romantic 
interest is large and ill-defined‘ (Whitehead, 1967, p 36).  However, 
Whitehead thought that genuine educational achievement requires 
both exactness of knowledge and the ability to generalise from this 
firmly grasped knowledge.  At the stage of precision, it must be 
recognised that there are inescapable facts, ‗that there are right and 
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wrong ways and definite truths to be known‘ (Whitehead, 1967, p 34). 
Although precise knowledge89 is one principal aim of education, 
wisdom is an even more important quality; it is the fruition and 
culmination of all learning. Wisdom he says is a personal liberation; it 
is a mastery of the principles that underpin knowledge; ‗wisdom is the 
way in which knowledge is held‘ (Whitehead, 1967, p 30).  
 
‗With good discipline, it is always possible to pump into the minds of a class a 
certain quantity of inert knowledge‘. (Whitehead, 1967, p 5) 
 
Whitehead thought that discipline was a vital part of all 
educational cycles. He actually introduces the idea that wisdom is the 
proper end of education in a chapter entitled, The Rhythmic Claims of 
Freedom and Discipline. Freedom and discipline he says are not 
‗antagonists‘ in education; no part of learning can do without them. 
The two concepts, he says, ought rather to be adjusted to match the 
natural rhythm of the child‘s life. At the beginning and end of any 
learning cycle, discipline should be present, but freedom should 
dominate. Even in the phase of romance, discipline is important for it 
is ‗necessary in life to have acquired the habit of cheerfully 
undertaking imposed tasks‘ (Whitehead, 1967, p 35). However, the 
imposition of tasks must not ‗assassinate interest‘ as interest is 
necessary for all learning. Whitehead argues that education often fails 
precisely because the importance of the rhythm of learning has been 
neglected. It is an all too common mistake of schooling, he says, that 
mere knowledge is imparted before the stage of romance has been 
properly completed. Education should rather respond to the ‗rhythmic 
cravings‘ of pupils. However, he also insisted that discipline should 
help romance to find its ‗due place‘ throughout the educational cycle. 
In the stage of precision, it is discipline that is to the fore. 
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 He argues that to write „poetry one must have studied metre, and to build bridges you must be 
learned in the strength of material‟ (Whitehead, 1967, p 34). 
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‗What we should aim at producing is men who possess both culture and expert 
knowledge in some special direction‘. (Whitehead, 1967, p 1) 
 
I think that Whitehead‘s theory does in important respects 
successfully combine central aspects of both theoretical and practical 
knowledge, and of liberal and child-centred educational theory. His 
concept of culture is remarkably similar to Arnold‘s. Culture, he says, 
has nothing to do with mere bits of information. He defines is as 
‗activity of thought and receptiveness to beauty and humane feeling‘ 
(Whitehead, 1967, p 34). He also insists that the stage of precision must 
accumulate a store of ‗best practice‘ (Whitehead, 1967, p 34). In a similar 
way to Hirst and Peters, he thought that possession of objective 
intellectual knowledge was a necessary attribute of the genuinely 
educated person.  However, he was also, like Dewey and Peters, very 
sceptical of the value of inert knowledge90. He thought education must 
be rooted in the present yet practically useful for the future. He states 
that: ‗the habit of the active utilisation of well understood principles is 
the final possession of wisdom‘ (Whitehead, 1967, p 37). Although I share 
Whitehead‘s view that wisdom is superior to knowledge, I do not think 
that wisdom‘s pre-eminence is derived from its greater utility. I think 
Whitehead too highly prized the instrumental application of the 
knowledge component of wisdom. Thus, in section two, Aristotle‘s 
account of the concept will be explored, as he arguably better explains 
how wisdom can and should have intrinsic value in the theoretical 
and practical spheres of people‘s lives. I do nevertheless consider 
Whitehead‘s view that school discipline should be for the sake of 
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Whitehead‟s castigation of inert knowledge. 
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3.6 Discipline, for Wisdom?  
 
‗The subordinate stiffening of discipline must be directed to secure some long term 
good‘. (Whitehead, 1967, p 31) 
 
In this chapter the role of discipline in child-centred theories of 
discipline has been discussed. P S Wilson and to a lesser extent 
Dewey are, it has been alleged, articulate defenders of the 
fundamentally sound idea that school discipline should centrally 
involve individuals and classes engaging in worthwhile activities in 
sustained ways. They also emphasise well the important point that 
discipline will most likely arise in schools when there is a close match 
between the individual interests, experiences and capacities of pupils 
and the proposed learning activities. Unlike Peters, however, Wilson 
fails to appreciate the extent to which schools are necessarily shared 
public spaces where the value of one person‘s interests must be 
weighed alongside those of others. The wider needs and interests of 
society must also surely figure in the matter and manner of school 
discipline.  
 
Dewey did advance a significantly more social concept of 
interest, experience and discipline. However, the ends that both 
Wilson and Dewey want school discipline to serve rest, I think, on very 
problematic epistemologies. Wilson effectively neglects or downplays 
the merit of all public traditions of knowledge. Dewey, Neill, Lane, 
Rousseau and to a lesser extent Whitehead, all also valued the useful 
over what has traditionally been taken to be inherently worthwhile. 
Peters‘ view that education should illuminate the human predicament 
by initiating all children into the knowledge and understanding that 
can help them to optimise their potential has been noted. It has, 
however, been argued that neither liberal nor child-centred theories of 
education satisfactorily explain how both theoretical and practical 
knowledge are educationally valuable. It has been put forward that 
discipline in schools might be able to help pupils to secure the long 
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term good of wisdom. A sort of neo-Aristotelian wisdom is, I think, an 
especially appealing epistemic aim, for education and discipline, 
because this aim places considerable intrinsic value on both 
theoretical and practical knowledge. In the second section of this 







































































Chapter 4: Kantian Discipline and the Moral Duty of Autonomy 
 
 
In this chapter and the next, it will be argued that the essential 
aim of school discipline should be to contribute to the inculcation of 
virtuous rather than merely rule following habits in pupils. The moral 
philosophies of Peters, Kant, and Aristotle will be discussed in order to 
unpack what is distinctive about an ethics of virtue. Comparison will 
be made between their respective views on the nature of childhood 
and moral development. In this chapter, it will be indicated that Peters 
and Kant were in agreement that virtues of character had at least 
some normative merit. However, it will be maintained that Peters 
endorsed a more wide-ranging and pluralistic approach to ethical 
formation than Kant. Importantly, it will also be argued that both 
philosophers took moral maturity to reside in the attainment of 
rational autonomy; as such, habits of action and feeling are 
subservient to rationally formed principles in their respective moral 
frameworks. Indeed, Kant, in his treatise On Education explicitly 
states that habits ought not to be fostered in children at all. In the 
subsequent chapter, it will be maintained that an Aristotelian concept 
of virtue holds more promise as an end for school discipline, as it can 
better explain how the various principles, feelings, experiences and 
habits that largely comprise moral agency ought to be fostered.  
 
4.1 School Discipline for pupil Virtue? 
 
In the first section of this thesis, two broad accounts of school 
discipline were analysed and compared. In chapter two it was 
suggested that discipline in schools has traditionally been 
conceptualised as the necessary submission of pupils to rules91, rules 
that either govern a worthwhile activity or ensure the class order 
necessary for the pursuit of worthwhile activity. In the third chapter, 
it was conversely suggested that disciplined pupils ought to be able to 
                                                 
91
 The views of Peters & Hirst and Durkheim were in particular discussed. 
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choose freely the educational activities they engage in based on their 
own interests and experience92. It was my argument that neither 
theory of discipline rested on a wholly satisfactory epistemology. 
Whereas the former view of discipline may not have valued 
experiential, practical and ‗useful‘ knowledge enough, the latter 
perspective generally veered too far in the other direction to the 
possible neglect of theoretical knowledge. It was suggested that the 
epistemic purpose of discipline in schools might rather be for the sake 
of pupil wisdom, in so far as wisdom (at least from an Aristotelian 
perspective) successfully combines elements of both theoretical and 
practical knowledge. In chapter 8 of this dissertation, the nature of 
theoretical wisdom and knowledge will be considered and an attempt 
made to construct a more favourable epistemology, founded on 
Aristotle‘s intellectual virtues. The rest of the second section of this 
thesis, however, will first consider the various qualities that the 
practically wise person might be expected to possess. It will also 
importantly consider how education might best facilitate the 
development of such qualities in pupils.  
 
Although the narrative of the first section of the thesis focused 
upon the epistemic weaknesses of the accounts of school discipline 
hitherto explored, there may also be profound moral philosophical 
(ethical) difficulties with both conceptualisations. The ethical flaws in 
these theories, broadly put, reflect different ways in which discipline 
may fail to facilitate fully the holistic long term moral education of 
pupils. Some child-centred accounts are, I think, particularly 
problematic in that discipline only seems to contribute to moral 
development if it enables pupils‘ interests to be pursued93. The 
difficulties of the traditional account concern the degree to which 
compulsion and rules are essentially related to the wider moral 
educational purposes of school discipline. If school discipline is too 
focused on rules, there may be a danger that the long-term 
                                                 
92
 P S Wilson and Dewey were identified as articulate exponents of this perspective. 
93
 This is especially evident in the thought of P S Wilson as was explained in chapter 3. 
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development of other important qualities that impinge upon pupils‘ 
moral actions (and I am thinking here of habits and feeling in 
particular) might be marginalised. In chapter two, it was noted that 
Durkheim, Peters and John Wilson all characterised school discipline 
as primarily involving obedience and/or submission to rules. 
Significantly, both Durkheim and Wilson thought that discipline was 
to a large extent for the sake of the rules. In so far as this is so their 
theories are broadly Kantian in spirit94. Peters‘ emphasis on rules 
however, did not go quite so far and his theory is to that extent more 
convincing. 
 
Peters did not provide much detail about his particular concept 
of school discipline. It is therefore not surprising that he says very 
little about the moral philosophy that informed it either. He did, 
however, elsewhere write extensively about the broader moral 
formation of persons, so it is possible to speculate that the ethical 
foundations of his concept of discipline might be found within his 
wider thought on moral education. The particular value Peters places 
on rules and necessary order arguably aligns his theory of school 
discipline within broader deontological95 and/or utilitarian ethical 
frameworks. He did after all state that the ‗most promising 
justification of punishment is provided by the utilitarians‘ (Peters, 1970, 
p 270). Although a consideration of the wider interests of the majority 
of a class of pupils may have influenced his thoughts on the use of 
punishment, Peters does state that the essence of discipline involves 
pupils either: 1) getting on the inside of the rules that govern an 
activity; or 2) following the rules that ensure the order necessary for 
that activity96. The intrinsic value of rules is, as we shall see at 4.4 & 
                                                 
94
 Kant‟s views will be explained at 4.4 & 4.5. 
95
 A deontological ethics is, broadly put, based on the ethical primacy of duty, as will shortly be 
explained at 4.4 & 4.5. There it will also be noted that Utilitarian Ethics takes the predicted 
consequences of an action, on the interests of the majority, to be the most salient factor in determining 
the moral worth of that action. 
96
 See section 2.4 for detailed discussion of his views on discipline. That Peters thought a degree of 
order necessary for teaching arguably suggests some utilitarian influence on his notion of discipline 
too. 
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4.5, central to Kantian moral and educational theory and Peters does 
discuss Kant at some length in Ethics in Education (1970).  
 
But Peters‘ moral thought was also significantly influenced by 
Aristotle and in Moral Development and Moral Education (1981) he 
identified four different categories of virtue that he thought schools 
should promote.  However, in this chapter and the next, it will be 
intimated that Peters‘ moral educational vision is strictly speaking, 
neither Kantian nor Aristotelian. Rather, Peters endorsed his own 
version of ‗moral pluralism‘ that had rational autonomy as its ultimate 
end. It will be argued that his call for pluralism does not entirely 
convince for two reasons. Firstly, Peters‘s plea rests on a broad and 
rather uneasy blurring of Kantian (rule directed) and Aristotelian 
(virtue directed) ethical theories. Peters, secondly, underestimates the 
importance of fostering the emotions in pupils that are proper to each 
virtue. In chapters four and five (and in particular between 4.4 and 
5.4), some significant differences between Kantian and Aristotelian 
moral philosophy will therefore be explicated. At 5.5 it will be argued 
that an education in virtues need not be opposed to rules. On the 
contrary, discipline should involve virtuous adults persuading and 
enabling the young to follow rules where such rules are likely to lead 
to the formation of virtuous habits. It will be concluded that the 
Aristotelian concept of virtue is more persuasive than that provided by 
Kant or Peters because of its wider scope and long term emphasis on 
developing excellent habits of thinking, acting and feeling. 
 
Appreciation of the features that distinguish the ethical theories 
formulated by Kant, Peters and Aristotle seems vital as one of the 
central claims of this thesis (articulated again at 5.6) is that the moral 
educational potential of school discipline should be centrally focussed 
on developing virtuous rather than merely rule following97 dispositions 
in pupils. I do not think that this claim in any way contradicts my 
                                                 
97
 I include here the „following of rules‟ autonomously written by oneself here too. Kant‟s notion of 
legislating laws or maxims for the self is discussed in more depth at 4.4. 
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suggestion in chapter three that schools should try to lay the 
foundations for a sort of Aristotelian wisdom in pupils. The person 
who has come to possess the moral and intellectual virtues is, in 
virtue of these virtues, both practically and theoretically wise. For the 
consistent exercise of the virtues is, in Aristotle‘s schema, the prime 
indicator of wisdom. If a type of neo-Aristotelian wisdom is a 
legitimate aspiration for education, then a disciplined initiation into 
the virtues in the early years of life would seem to be the surest route 
to its long-term achievement.  
 
4.2 The plea for moral pluralism in education 
 
In both Ethics and Education and Moral Development and Moral 
Education, Peters discussed (amongst others) Kant, Plato, Kohlberg, 
Freud and Aristotle. In the latter work he attempted to integrate these 
diverse influences in a general plea for moral pluralism in education. 
Arguably though, his ethical thought was most profoundly shaped by 
Kant and Aristotle. In chapter eight of Ethics and Education, Peters 
explored elements of Kantian and Marxist theory98. He stated that 
there is ‗much to be said‘ (Peters, 1970, p 209) for Kant‘s doctrine of 
practical reason. He was particularly impressed by Kant‘s notion of 
‗respect for persons‘ which, he says, is derivative from that 
philosopher‘s ‗respect for law‘99. Peters considers the possibility that 
Kantian principles of respect for persons might be viewed through a 
more fundamental prism of collective kinship. However, he indicates 
that Marxist notions of fraternity are ‗not quite on the same footing as 
the justification of respect for persons‘ (Peters, 1970, p 223). Peters states 
that it is possible for ‗men and women to live together in society 
without any clear consciousness of themselves as persons‘ (Peters, 1970, 
p 210). However, in a manner not dissimilar to Kant, he suggests100 
that ‗persons‘ are due respect, in so far as they are able to consciously 
                                                 
98
 He also here discusses Freud and briefly mentions Aristotle. 
99
 Kant‟s notion of respect for law will be explored at 4.4. 
100
 Peters‟ argument is open to interpretation as it is not, I think, entirely clear. 
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formulate a concept of themselves, as rational beings able to 
determine their own destiny. Peters also maintained that richer 
concepts of self are developed in at least partly social circumstances.  
 
He maintains that people only really develop as ‗persons‘ when 
they have a concept of themselves that is ‗taken to be a matter of 
importance in society‘ (Peters, 1970, p 211). He adds that a ‗strong case 
can therefore be made for saying that concepts of man are culture 
bound‘ (Peters, 1970, p 232). Peters was no relativist however. He believed 
that rules were central to bringing about a broadly Kantian end that 
he greatly valued: namely, that of moral autonomy. This is arguably 
nowhere more apparent than in Moral Development and Moral 
Education where he remarks that; ‗I am a staunch supporter of a 
rationally held and intelligently applied moral code‘ (1981, p 48). 
However, I do not think Peters can be properly described as a Kantian. 
The main reason for this is that while Peters held that moral 
education should inculcate certain habits in pupils, Kant was opposed 
to any habits being fostered in children101.  
 
Peters also held that moral rules as well as concepts of self are 
formed in the societies and communities we actually live in. He 
defines a society as ‗a collection of individuals united by certain rules‘ 
(Peters, 1981, p49); but he implicitly criticised Kant for not saying 
enough about the concrete social conditions which make possible the 
transition to moral self rule102. Peters also implies that our status as 
persons and choosers worthy of dignity is not exclusively dependent 
upon our individual capacity to rationally generate maxims in the 
intelligible world to govern our at times unruly behaviour in the 
sensible world103. As will be explained at 4.4, Kant thought that 
people were only really worthy of respect as persons in so far as they 
                                                 
101
 Kant‟s dismissal of the role of habit in education will be explored at 4.5.  
102
 See pages 226 & 229 of Ethics and Education (Peters, 1970) in particular. Peters‟ comments seem to 
refer to Kant‟s Moral Law. Kant actually wrote a fairly extensive treatise on education of which Peters 
may not have been aware. This treatise is discussed at 4.5. 
103
 Kant‟s demarcation between the intelligible and sensible worlds will be explained at 4.4. 
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were capable of being members of the entirely rational kingdom of 
ends.   
 
If Peters was not a Kantian in any strict sense, what did he 
think that the principal means and ends of moral education were? 
Haydon (2009) has recently suggested that Peters was more than 
anything a ‗moral pluralist‘.  In his article Moral Development: A plea 
for Pluralism, Peters did argue that ‗monolithic‘ moral theories of the 
Kantian or utilitarian kind had ‗never quite rung true‘ (1981, p 83) 
because they had over-emphasised the role of principles in the moral 
sphere. He maintained that while principles can be appealed to in 
situations of moral uncertainty, ‗for the most part they enter into our 
lives in a much more concrete, specific way‘ (Peters, 1981, p 95). Much 
moral philosophy, he states, had been ‗unconvincing because it had 
not dwelt sufficiently on the different views about what is morally 
important‘ (1981, p 83). Peters suggests that the important role of ‗habit‘ 
in moral education stemming from the tradition of Aristotle (1981, p 96) 
had been particularly neglected by the educational theorists of his 
time. Was Peters then a virtue theorist104? He certainly does discuss 
virtues in some detail, in his collection of essays, Moral Development 
and Moral Education (1981).  
 
4.3 Two concepts of Virtue: Peters and Aristotle compared 
 
‗To summarise, there are (a) highly specific virtues, such as punctuality, tidiness 
and perhaps honesty, which are connected with specific types of acts, and which 
lack any built-in reason for acting in the manner prescribed - that is, are not 
motives, unlike (b) virtues such as compassion, which are also motives for action. 
There are, then, (c) more artificial virtues, such as justice and tolerance which 
involve more general considerations to do with rights and institutions. Finally there 
are (d) virtues of a higher order such as courage, integrity, perseverance and the like 
which have to be exercised in the face of counterfactual inclinations.‘ (Peters, 1981, 
                                                 
104
 Haydon (2009) asks this very same question. Saugstad (2002, p 377) somewhat glibly remarks that 
R S Peters was „inspired by Aristotle‟s philosophy‟. Whilst Peters does undoubtedly draw upon 




Peters‘s most extensive exploration of the virtues is contained in 
the essay entitled Moral Development: A plea for Pluralism (1981)105. 
There, Peters takes issue with Kohlberg‘s notorious dismissal of a ‗bag 
of virtues‘ approach to moral education and instead proposes four 
categories of virtue of his own. The aforementioned quotation appears 
to suggest that Peters thought there were: a) act specific but 
motiveless virtues; b) motivational virtues that are motives for action; c) 
artificial virtues, that arise in us through socialisation, rather than 
nature and; d) higher order virtues which involve a degree of conflict 
between a person‘s principles and inclinations. Haydon suggests that 
there are ‗echoes of Aristotle‘ (Haydon, p 9, 2009) here. He elsewhere 
comments that Peters perceived his concept of virtue ‗as being in the 
tradition of Aristotle‘ (Haydon, 1999, p 99). However, of the four 
categories of virtue Peters proposes, only one, type b) is, I think, 
remotely recognisable as Aristotelian106.  
 
To be sure, Peters, does indicate that ‗habitual forms of 
reasoning can involve intelligence‘ (1981, p 98). However, he intimates 
that habits are not sufficient to explain moral conduct generally, or 
the majority of virtues, as he conceives them, specifically. In contrast, 
Aristotle‘s moral virtues centrally107 involve habits of character. On 
closer inspection, only Peters type a) virtues look anything like habits 
of character108. Peters specifies that the concept of habit (1981, p 98-99) 
cannot get a grip on the virtues he classifies as type b), c) or d). Even 
Peters‘ type a) virtues are not habits in any discernibly Aristotelian 
sense. Peters indicates that type a) virtues are motiveless habits or 
character traits. Aristotle in contrast thought the moral virtues were 
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 Haydon similarly remarks that „his main discussion of virtues comes‟ there (p 7, 2009). 
106
 Aristotle‟s notion of how virtue involves the right measure of feeling will be further explored at 5.2 
and 5.3, and again in chapters 6 & 7. 
107
 As we shall see in the next chapter, Aristotle does also specify that the habits of the mature virtuous 
person will be mediated by practical reason. 
108
 Haydon (2009, p 7) also interprets Peters to be saying that only his type a) virtues are distinctively 
habitual. Steutel & Spiecker (2004, p 541) similarly remark that Peters thought it „would be wrong to 
regard the motivational virtues as habits‟. 
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dispositions (NE, 1106a13) that involve the right measure of action and 
feeling (NE, 1106b15-25). Nor did Aristotle secondly, suggest that there 
was a class of socialised or artificial virtues (the type c) category). 
Aristotle was clear that though we are constituted by nature to receive 
the moral virtues, we owe their full maturation to habit (NE, 1103a24-
26).  
 
Thirdly, in terms of type d) virtues: although Aristotle was like 
Peters, of the view that courage often would involve conflicting 
inclinations; Aristotle did not think that all such ‗higher order‘ virtues 
necessarily had to involve inner conflict. Indeed, the absence of any 
psychological conflict is the primary difference between the continent 
and the fully virtuous Aristotelian agent, as we shall see in chapter 6. 
Furthermore, Aristotle‘s most likely candidates for ‗higher order‘ 
virtues, connected to the moral sphere, are probably justice, practical 
wisdom and great-mindedness109. Peters does not identify any of these 
as ‗higher order‘. He maintains that justice is an artificial virtue 
whereas Aristotle describes it as the ‗complete‘ and ‗sovereign‘ virtue 
(NE, 1129b26-28). Peters clearly does think that the judicious wielding of 
moral principles in specific contexts is an important aspect of morality 
and this arguably resembles a sort of practical wisdom110. In his essay 
Concrete principles and the rational passions (1981), Peters implies that 
it is a ‗rationalistic delusion‘ (p 79) to think that moral principles can 
be properly applied without wise judgement and careful attention to 
the specifics of the concrete situation. However, Peters does not 
describe such intelligent moral judgement as a ‗higher order‘ process, 
or as a virtue. The practically wise person in Aristotle‘s account would 
also consider both principles and concrete passions111 when forming 
judgements about their actions. It is practical wisdom, he implies, 
that enables proper moral goals to be identified and reached (NE, 
                                                 
109
 Kristjánsson (2007, p 16) actually describes great-mindedness as „a higher order virtue which 
incorporates the others‟. For a fuller discussion of this virtue see Kristjánsson (1998). 
110
 Aristotle‟s notion of Practical wisdom will be further explored at 5.3 and in chapter 8. 
111
Carr (2005) also argues that practical wisdom entails wise judgement involving reason and feeling.  
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1144a6). However, practical wisdom is for Aristotle an intellectual 
virtue of considerable importance as the possession of it also entails 
possession of all the moral virtues (NE, 1145a3-4).  
 
Peters is arguably a virtue theorist in a broad sense112, but he is 
not one in any strictly conceived Aristotelian vein113. Haydon also 
acknowledges that while ‗the development of virtues is important to 
Peters; its importance appears to be in the service of a rational 
morality‘ (Haydon, p 8, 2009). I agree with Haydon‘s assessment. Peters 
after all states that morality is concerned with ‗what there are reasons 
for doing or not doing‘ (Peters, 1981, p 47). Importantly, he specifies that 
it is a higher order code of reasoned principles that can justify and 
provide grounds for particular moral actions (Peters, 1981, p 49). Strictly 
speaking, I think that Peters is neither a Kantian nor an Aristotelian; 
he appeared to rather advocate a pluralistic approach to moral 
education whose essential purpose was the development in pupils of a 
rationally held code of principles. Given this valorisation of rational 
principles, Peters‘ particular formulation of virtues is arguably more 
Kantian than Aristotelian.  
 
Carr and Steutel suggest that although Peters recognised the 
importance of building moral knowledge through a sort of Aristotelian 
habituation, ‗he seems not to have recognised the insuperable extent 
to which an Aristotelian view of practical reason is at odds with any 
kind of moral deontology‘ (Carr & Steutel, 1999, p 143). Peters‘ famous 
paradox of moral education will therefore be discussed in relation to 
Aristotle‘s notion of habituation at 5.3 and 5.4. However, it first seems 
important to document some of the central differences between 
Kantian and Aristotelian ethics. In what remains of this chapter (and 
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 This seems to be Haydon‟s (2009) view. Broad and narrow concepts of virtue will be explained at 
5.3. 
113
 Steutel & Spiecker (2004, p 541) with good reason maintain, that Peters only thought that the highly 
specific, motiveless virtues could be acquired through habituation. As we shall see, in chapter 5, this is 
hardly an Aristotelian view. Aristotle was clear that the moral virtues are acquired through habituation, 
and that they necessarily involve right feeling. 
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especially in chapter 5 (4.4 – 5.4)) it will be contended that there are at 
least three.  
 
Firstly, while Kant did look upon the virtues favourably, he 
maintained that genuine moral action consisted in emotion-free, 
dutiful adherence to the rationally conceived categorical imperative for 
its own sake114. Aristotle, by contrast, thought that mature moral 
action involved interplay of habit, reason, feeling and experience for 
the wider purpose of human flourishing. Secondly, whereas Aristotle 
thought that the acquisition of moral precepts (as part of practical 
wisdom) necessarily involves sense experience, Kant insisted that we 
must ultimately form our own moral laws through the exercise of 
autonomous reason. Thirdly, Kant largely115 construed discipline as a 
negative force and he did not think that moral education should foster 
habits or feelings in children. Aristotle, by contrast, emphasised that 
adults should habituate the young into virtues of thinking, acting and 
feeling. Unlike Kant, Aristotle was also clear that imitation should play 
a crucial part in moral learning116. 
 
4.4 The Moral Law and Kantian Deontology  
 
‗Therefore nothing but the idea of the law in itself, which admittedly is present only 
in a rational being – so far as it, and not an expected result, is the ground 
determining the will- can constitute the pre-eminent good which we call moral‘. 
(Kant, 2007, p 73) 
 
In The Moral Law; Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals 
(2007) Kant famously set about trying to ascertain the supreme 
principle of morality. Kant saw the final end of morality as residing in 
man‘s rational capacity to formulate universal, action-directing 
principles. The function of reason in the moral sphere, he says, is to 
                                                 
114
 At least he does, as we shall see, in the Groundwork (2007) and his treatise On Education (2003). 
115
 I say largely here because Kant, as we shall see, provides partially conflicting stories over the role of 
imitation in moral formation. 
116
 Aristotle‟s concepts of imitation, emulation and admiration will be discussed in relation to learning 
in chapter 7. 
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influence action by producing a will which is good, not as a means to 
an end, but rather as, an end itself (Kant, 2007, p 64-67). In the opening 
sentence of the text he famously stated that a ‗good will‘ is the only 
thing that is good without qualification117. The ‗will‘ he says is a power 
to choose what reason recognises to be good independent of sensory 
inclinations. Kant thought desires or inclinations from the world of 
experience often incapacitate the ability to determine the good will. 
However he argued that maxims (self made rules) can liberate the will 
from the influence of such unruly inclinations.  
 
Our fundamental moral motive, Kant says, is duty which 
consists in reverence for, and adherence to, the moral law (Kant, 2007, p 
68-76). Kantian morality is therefore often described as deontological, 
stemming from the classical Greek for duty (Deon)118. Kant thought 
that it is only dutiful application of the universal maxim (the 
categorical imperative) that can ensure that the will is always good. 
Notoriously, Kant did not consider actions motivated by beneficent 
feeling towards others to have any ‗genuine moral worth‘ (Kant, 2007, p 
73). Rather, he continues, an action done from duty ‗has to set aside 
altogether the influence of inclination‘ (Kant, 2007, p 73). Kant claimed 
that there was only a single categorical imperative: ‗Act only on that 
maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should 
become a universal law.‘ (Kant, 2007, p 97) What does he mean by this? 
Kant thought that people could only morally justify acting on maxims 
if such maxims could also be equally applied to all rational beings. 
The categorical imperative is thus an objective, universally binding 
moral law. It must also, however, be individually created. A maxim, he 
says, is a ‗subjective principle of volition‘ (Kant, 2007, p 72), a rule we 
have written ourselves, that we have a duty to submit to. 
 
                                                 
117
 See Kant (2007, p 61). 
118
 I owe this insight to Carr & Steutel (1999) chapter one. Hursthouse (2003) and Slote (1995 & 2003) 
also describe Kant‟s ethics as deontological. 
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‗The will is therefore not merely subject to the law, but is so subject that it must also 
be considered as also making the law for itself‘ (Kant, 2007, p 109)  
 
His formula of autonomy (ibid pp-108-109) states that each person 
is not merely subject to the law; he/she must also be the author of it. 
Kant argued that maxims could only be written by the self in the 
intelligible world119, even though their purpose is to direct action in 
the sensible world. We must, he says, make some sort of distinction 
between the intelligible120 and sensible world (Kant, 2007, p 133). Kant 
thought that all rational persons have the capacity to transfer 
themselves to the intelligible world by willing to be free from sensuous 
influence. Through this process they can develop ‗a greater inner 
worth‘ (Kant, 2007, p 137). The intelligible world he says is a rational or 
purely intellectual world constituted of things-in-themselves. By 
contrast, the sensible world can only provide us with knowledge of 
things as they appear to us (Kant, 2007, p 133).  
 
Kant stated that regarding ourselves as makers of our own 
moral law is crucial to the related concept of the ‗kingdom of ends‘ 
(Kant, 2007, p 111). Kant describes the kingdom of ends (Kant, 2007, p 111-
113) as an ideal community, constituted of entirely rational beings that 
write and live, according to their own maxims, and treat all other 
persons there with dignity. The dignity of persons, he says, consists in 
their rational autonomy, in their ability to formulate their own maxims 
(Kant, 2007, p 113-115). Kant thought that all people were capable of 
having an idea of the intelligible world - but only an idea, as they 
could have no sensory and physical acquaintance with such a world. 
Kant therefore endorsed a radically rational theory of moral self-
determination121, grounded in a speculative metaphysical ideal. Kant 
did not, to be sure, directly discount the moral value of qualities of 
                                                 
119
 Although the more usual Kantian word for „intelligible‟ may be „noumenal‟, the translated text I 
refer to tends to employ „intelligible‟. 
120
Kant‟s depiction of the contrast between these worlds is arguably reminiscent of Plato‟s famous cave 
metaphor. Plato‟s metaphor from the Republic is described at 2.2. 
121
 Taylor (1989, p 83) also thinks that Kant „vigorously‟ advocates a rational morality, free from 
nature with self determination as its ultimate goal. 
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character that were related to a wider naturalist teleology122. O‘Neill 
(2003) and Slote (1995, 1997 & 2003) have sympathetically explored the 
idea that Kant propounded a theory of virtue. However, as the 
following quotation shows, if Kant did intend to articulate something 
like a virtue theory, he is quite clear that genuine virtue must be a 
quality that is entirely devoid of feeling and emotion.  
 
‗To behold virtue in her proper shape is nothing other than to show morality 
stripped of all admixture with the sensuous‘. (Kant, 2007, p 103) 
 
Kant also expressed doubt that genuine virtue could ever be 
found in the world of experience (Kant, 2007, p 81). He maintained that 
‗making a man happy is quite different from making him good‘ (Kant, 
2007, 122). Moderate passions he says, like ‗self control and sober 
reflection are not only good in many respects: they may even seem (my 
emphasis) to constitute part of the inner worth of a person. Yet they are 
far from being properly described as being good without qualification‘ 
(Kant, 2007, p 64). Without a good will, Kant continues, such affections 
may make a man ‗exceedingly bad‘. For Kant, happiness was only an 
indirect duty that required rational conditioning by the good will (Kant, 
2007, p 70-71). Slote (1995, 2003) and O‘Neill (2003) also both concede that 
in The Groundwork, virtue is presented as an ‗imperfect duty‘. Indeed, 
some inclinations towards happiness constituted a ‗great temptation to 
the transgression of duty’ (Kant, 2007, p 70). Slote (1995) seems right to 
conclude that in Kantian ethics we have no obligation to pursue our 
own happiness. Slote (1995) also maintains that Kantian ethics is 
asymmetric in that the good of others is placed above that of the 
individual moral agent. Notably, Slote does not think such 
unsatisfactory moral asymmetry is present in the Aristotelian scheme 
of virtues.  
 
                                                 
122
Telos is often taken to mean „end‟ or „purpose‟, from the Ancient Greek; see for example The 
Politics (1981, p 493). Aristotle is arguably the most famous exponent of a purposive teleology. As will 
be explained at 5.2, he thought man‟s ultimate „end‟ was a rich notion of happiness or flourishing. 
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4.5 Kantian Duty and the Discipline of Children  
 
Kant‘s less well-known treatise On Education (2003) also contains 
some interesting observations about virtue. These are articulated 
within a wider account of his views on how the young should be 
disciplined and morally educated. Towards the end of this text, Kant 
asks if man is by nature good or bad. He concludes that: 
 
‗He is neither, for he is not by nature a moral being. He only becomes a moral being 
when his reason has developed ideas of duty and law...he has a natural inclination 
to every vice...He can only become morally good by means of virtue – that is to say, 
by self-restraint‘ (Kant, 2003,p 108) 
 
Kant regarded education, properly conceived, in very high esteem. He 
thought it necessary, indeed fundamental, to our becoming persons 
capable of mature moral action and reflection. He states that ‗man can 
only become man by education. He is merely what education makes of 
him (Kant, 2003, p 6). Kant does, to be sure, say that the ultimate aim of 
education is the formation of character. However, the moral qualities 
that he considers worth educating seem to be confined within the 
bounds of reason and dutiful human submission to it. Character, he 
says ‗consists in the firm purpose to accomplish something and then 
also in the actual accomplishing of it‘ (Kant, 2003, p 98-99).  
 
‗A child should always say what‘s true 
And speak when he is spoken to‘ (Stevenson, 1994, p 7) 
 
Robert Louis Stevenson‘s verse, Whole Duty of Children, 
arguably expresses well the Kantian view that children should always 
be encouraged to do their duty. Kant after all indicates that children 
must be presented with duties they have to perform, for themselves 
and others, if they are to develop any proper foundation in moral 
character (Kant, 2003, p 100-103). Kant maintains that the purpose of 
character formation is to make the child conscious that ‗man 
possesses a certain dignity, which ennobles him above all other 
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creatures‘ (Kant, 2003, p 101). He adds that it is the child‘s duty not to 
violate this ‗dignity of mankind‘. Kant seems to have in mind here the 
distinctively rational conception of dignity that he formulated in the 
Moral Law. He after all states that ‗everything in education depends‘ 
(Kant, 2003, p 108) upon leading children by instruction to correctly 
established moral principles. Kant even rebuked parents for failing 
properly to ‗form and correct the judgement of children about the 
worth of things they may commonly adopt as ends‘ (Kant, 2007, p 90). 
However, he seems to have drawn a sharp distinction between moral 
instruction, on the one hand, and discipline on the other. He thought 
that both virtue and discipline were essentially negative forces whose 
function was to curb the more unreasonable instincts of pupils. 
 
‗It is discipline, which prevents man from being turned aside by his animal impulses 
from humanity, his appointed end. Discipline, for instance, must restrain him from 
venturing wildly and rashly into danger. Discipline, thus, is merely negative, its 
action being to counteract man‘s natural unruliness. The positive part of education 
is instruction‘. (Kant, 2003, p 3) 
 
Kant suggests that discipline is a vital, if largely restrictive, part 
of education in the early years. Neglect of discipline he says ‗is a 
greater evil than neglect of culture, for this last can be remedied in 
later life, but unruliness cannot be done away with, and a mistake in 
discipline can never be repaired.‘ (Kant, 2003, p 7) The unruly are, Kant 
says, independent of law and it is by discipline that men are brought 
to feel the constraint of law123. The moralising force that Kant appears 
to have in mind here is rational duty. Children, he says ‗ought not to 
be full of feeling, but they should be full of the idea of duty‘ (Kant, 2003, 
p 104). Kant maintains that the moral culture that children should be 
brought up into ‗must be based upon ―maxims‖, not upon discipline; 
the one prevents evil habits, the other trains the mind to think‘ (Kant, 
2003, p 83). Kant does in two places suggest that moral education 
                                                 
123
 Kant (2003) specifies this on p 3. His emphasis on children needing to feel the force of law may 
well have informed Durkheim‟s, and John Wilson‟s ideas of discipline discussed in chapter 2. 
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might also properly involve elements of emulation124. He firstly says 
that duties should be presented to children in the form of rules and 
examples (Kant, 2003, p 100). Secondly, in a correspondence with a 
Professor Sulzer, Kant responds to the question of what it is that 
makes moral instruction so ineffective.   
 
‗My answer came too late. Yet it is just this: The teachers themselves do not 
make their concepts pure, but – since they try to do too well by hunting everywhere 
for inducements to be moral – they spoil their medicine altogether by their very 
attempt to make it really powerful. For the most ordinary observation shows that 
when a righteous act is represented as being done with a steadfast mind in complete 
disregard of any advantage in this or in another world…it uplifts the soul and 
arouses in us a wish that we too could act in this way. Even children of a young age 
feel this impression, and duties should never be presented to them in any other 
way.‘ (Kant, 2007, p 84-85) 
 
Here Kant seems to be saying that teachers should model dutiful 
behaviour themselves to encourage their pupils to emulate them. 
However, I think a careful reading of Kant‘s The Moral Law shows it is 
far from clear that Kant really intended to endorse imitation and 
moral example as a desirable method of moral education. For there, 
he also offers an alternative, more strongly worded, conflicting view 
that reasserts the rational primacy of the moral law. 
 
‗Imitation has no place in morality and examples serve us only for encouragement – 
that is, they set beyond doubt the practicability of what the law commands; they 
make perceptible what the law expresses more generally; but they can never entitle 
us to set aside their true original, which resides in reason‘ (Kant, 2007, p 82) 
 
Kant (2007) also argued that a rule that does not spring from the 
reasoning part of that individual will always be ‗conditioned‘ rather 
than fully ‗moral‘. While Kant is ambiguous about the desirability of 
emulation in moral education he is unequivocal about the 
undesirability of habit. Children must, he says, ‗be prevented from 
                                                 
124
 By emulation I mean that pupils could, indeed, should learn from the positive moral example set by 
adults around them. Aristotle‟s concept of emulation will be discussed in chapter 7. 
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forming any habits, nor should habits be formed in them‘ (Kant, 2003, p 
45). Kant believed that dispositions inhibit a person‘s capacity for 
independence and freedom when they become embedded in their 
nature. As Maxwell puts it; ‗Kant is wary of more or less mindless 
habituation because it is difficult to square with his ideal of rational 
autonomy‘ (Maxwell, 2008, p 145). Kant says of habit that it: ‗is the result 
of the constant repetition of any one enjoyment or action, until such 
enjoyment or action becomes a necessity of our nature (Kant, 2003, p 
44)‘. This concept of habit per se, is reminiscent of Aristotle‘s. 
However, Aristotle was unlike Kant, in favour of fostering habits of 
action and feeling. 
 
4.6 Should discipline be grounded in Deontology or Teleology? 
 
‗Teleology views nature as a kingdom of ends; ethics views a possible kingdom of 
ends as a kingdom of nature. In the first case the Kingdom of ends is a theoretical 
Idea to explain what exists. In the second case it is a practical Idea to bring into 
existence what does not exist but can be made actual by our conduct‘. (Kant, 2007, 
p 115)  
 
On the basis of the preceding passage Kant certainly seems to 
discern a difference between his moral theory and teleological 
accounts of morality; but how exactly do these ethics differ? Slote 
(1997) plausibly suggests that the differences between deontological 
and teleological ethical theories have often been overstated125. He 
rightly notes that there are, nevertheless, very different points of 
emphasis in each approach. I have suggested there are at least three. 
Firstly Kant, unlike Aristotle, thought that morality and virtue ought 
to limit feeling as much as possible. Secondly, Kant thought that 
                                                 
125
 Maxell claims that Kantian scholars and commentators now „increasingly reject the notion that 
Kant‟s ideal of the mature moral agent as steely eyed calculator in favour of interpretations that show 
that Kant had in fact a rather rich appreciation of the affective side of moral life‟ (2008, p 103). Carr 
(2000) (in a book review for the Journal of Moral Education) indicates that Munzel‟s largely exegetical 
(1999) work explains that while there are certain irreconcilable differences between the two ethicists – 
their views do not diverge as radically as has been supposed by many. Kant and Aristotle did to be sure 
both think that principle, virtue and affect were involved in morality, and for that matter, a proper 
education. However, they disagreed it will be argued, in chapter 5, about which of these concepts had 
ethical primacy. 
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moral principles were ultimately established through rational 
reflection, whereas Aristotle thought they could only be revealed 
through sustained engagement with the world of experience. Thirdly, 
Kant‘s theory is not a naturalist teleology whereas Aristotle‘s is. As we 
shall now go on to see, in Aristotle‘s teleological theory, the normative 
value of an action is not essentially weighed by itself or in relation to a 
rational principle to be followed. The moral worth of an action is 
rather measured within the context of an entire life; actions are 
always inextricably linked to their ultimate purpose or end (telos). In 
chapter 5, it will be argued that such a long-term teleological view 
























Chapter 5: Disciplined Habits and Moral Virtues 
 
In the previous chapter, it was suggested that practices of 
discipline in school should aspire to more than merely encouraging 
pupils to follow rules. In this chapter, it will be said that discipline 
should instead focus on helping children form Neo-Aristotelian habits 
of thinking, acting and feeling. Initially, it will be noted that 
Aristotelian virtue theory can be differentiated from the moral theory 
of Kant and Peters particularly on account of its teleological emphasis. 
Aristotle‘s virtues are both necessary for, and constitutive of, 
mankind‘s ultimate ethical purpose (telos); namely flourishing 
(eudaimonia). Importantly, it will be argued that virtue ethical 
approaches to moral education need not lead to paradox and that the 
adoption of rules need not be precluded from a Neo-Aristotelian 
account of school discipline either. Far from it, rules can and should 
inform the habits that teachers help pupils to acquire. However, there 
is a crucial difference between a discipline that is for, and a discipline 
that involves rules. It will be contended that rules do matter in virtue 
ethics in so far as they can help to habituate the young into the more 
fundamentally important character traits that comprise moral virtue. 
It will be concluded that children are capable of forming virtuous 
moral dispositions and that schools can play an important part in this 
process. The acquisition of complete virtue, however, is altogether 
more exacting. 
 
5.1 Modern Moral Philosophy  
 
In ‗Modern Moral Philosophy‘ (1958) Elizabeth Anscombe argued 
that concepts of moral duty and obligation should be jettisoned 
altogether from moral philosophy126. Anscombe thought that the 
ethical enquiries of her time had failed to recognise the contrasting 
ways in which ancient and modern philosophers characterised the 
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 Zagzebski (1996) Slote (1997) (Crisp, 2003) & Carr & Steutel (1999) all also take Anscombe‟s 
paper as the starting point of their enquiries into virtue ethics.  
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term ‗moral‘. ‗Should‘ and ‗ought‘ she said, indicate an absolute 
verdict of ‗right‘ and ‗wrong‘. Anscombe notes, however, that Aristotle 
intended the term ‗moral‘ to refer to states of persons that involve 
actions and passions127. She attributed the dominance of notions of 
obligation and law in modern morality to the rise and fall in influence, 
of Christianity. Even after the belief that God was a divine law giver 
had been ‗given up it is a natural result that the concepts of 
―obligation‖, of being bound or required as by law, should remain‘ 
(Anscombe, 1958, p 6).   
 
She was rather disdainful of this turn to rational and rule-
governed, ‗law conceptions of ethics‘ (Anscombe, 1958, p 5). She described 
Kant‘s notions of ‗legislating for oneself‘ as ‗absurd‘, and she was 
similarly dismissive of utilitarian ethics. She favoured a return to the 
ancient tradition of moral and intellectual virtues advanced by 
Aristotle. Although she did not go into much detail herself, she 
maintained that the subject matter of moral philosophy ‗is completely 
closed until we have an account of what type of characteristic a virtue 
is‘ (Anscombe, 1958, p 5). If Anscombe intended to give a shot in the arm 
to modern moral philosophy, it is probably fair to say in hindsight that 
she succeeded, as there has been a growing momentum of interest in 
Aristotle and virtue ethics in the sixty years since the publication of 
her influential paper. This scholarly interest has manifested itself in 
both philosophy128and education129. 
 
Iris Murdoch in The Sovereignty of Good over other Concepts 
                                                 
127
 More will shortly be said about Aristotle‟s definition of a virtue. The importance of a virtue being a 
state of a person involving action and feeling will also be explored.  
128
 See for example Von Wright (1963) Murdoch (2003) Rorty (1980b) Macintyre (1984) Slote (1995) 
(Crisp, 2003) & Zagzebski (1996). The collection of Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics (Rorty, 1980b) 
explores the philosophers thought in impressive exegetical detail. 
129
 David Carr has made numerous insightful contributions to the debate on the relationship between 
Aristotle‟s virtues and education. See for example Educating the Virtues (1991) and Virtue Ethics and 
Moral Education (1999) edited with Steutel J. Frankena (1970) Burnyeat (1980) Peters (1981) and Carr 
(1991) were among the first to consider the educational import of Aristotle‟s virtues. Curren (2000) 
Steutel & Speicker (2004) and Kristjánnson‟s (2007) more recent inquiries have significantly added to 
understanding of this area of Aristotle‟s thought.  
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(1970)130 also noted that the ‗Kantian Man God‘ (2003, p 78) had too long 
dominated the horizon of modern moral philosophy. She suggested 
that it is more morally praiseworthy to be good than dutiful. Charles 
Taylor (1989, pp 79-83) similarly argued that ethics should pay more 
attention to ‗who it is good to be‘, rather than what it is ‗right to do‘. 
However, Murdoch‘s brief attempt to define the virtues somewhat 
muddied the waters over whether she thought duty or goodness 
should supervene over moral conduct. She stated that ‗virtue is good 
habit and dutiful action‘ with a background awareness of the ‗world as 
it is‘ (2003, p 89). Von Wright‘s earlier Varieties of Goodness (1963) 
contained a more promising chapter on virtues that correctly 
identified Aristotle‘s concept of virtue as centrally concerned with 
traits of character. However, Von Wright‘s account does not really fit 
with Aristotle‘s either, as the former seems to have thought that the 
virtues should govern or control the ‗unruly passions‘‘131. This 
arguably gives Von Wright‘s virtues a mostly Kantian and/or 
Platonic132 hue. Philippa Foot in her essay Virtues and Vices (1981) 
similarly suggests that the virtues are excellences of the will that can 
act as ‗correctives‘ to human nature. However, Aristotle himself 
allocated many virtues a much more positive and fundamental role in 
ethical life.  
 
5.2 Aristotelian Teleology and the Moral Virtues  
 
‗Happiness, then, is found to be something perfect and self-sufficient, being the end 
to which our actions are directed.‘ (NE, 1097b, 20-22)  
 
Whereas Kant thought that the fundamental purpose of ethical 
inquiry was to construct moral principles for a possible rational world, 
Aristotle perceived the essential benefit of such inquiry to lie in our 
feelings and conduct in the actual world. He famously remarked that 
                                                 
130
 Though it was first published in 1970, the edition I refer to was published in 2003. 
131
  Carr (1991) in chapter 9 makes this point in a sensitive critique of Von Wright‟s account of virtue.  
132
 Plato‟s moral theory will be discussed in the subsequent chapter. 
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we study moral philosophy, not so that we may ‗know what goodness 
is‘, but so that we may ‗become good men‘ (NE, 1103b, 28-29). Aristotle 
therefore emphasised that ethical inquiry is specifically concerned 
with ‗human goodness‘ (NE, 1102a14). He understood ethics to be 
inherently practical (Sherman, 1999) and maintained that the highest of 
all practical goods is happiness (NE, 1095a15-30). However, Aristotle had 
a particularly rich notion of happiness or (more accurately) flourishing 
(eudaimonia) in mind. Flourishing, he says, is a supreme and final 
good that is always worth pursuing for its own sake (NE, 1097a29-
1097b). Aristotle qualified this concept of flourishing by arguing than a 
person‘s happiness can only be properly measured over a complete 
lifetime (NE, 1098a18-22). His theory is thus often described133 as 
teleological because he thought that a deep kind of well-being and 
prosperity was the proper end of all human action. But what did he 
think such happiness consisted of? 
 
Aristotle defines the truly happy person as ‗one who is active in 
accordance with complete virtue, and who is adequately furnished 
with external goods…throughout a complete life‘ (NE, 1101a15-18). 
Aristotle acknowledged that happiness requires the possession of 
certain external goods and resources (NE, 1099a32). A life is hardly 
felicitous, he says, if it is spent without friends or children, or worse, 
with worthless friends and children (NE, 1099b3-6). However, the 
attainment of the goal of long-term happiness was for Aristotle to be 
centrally achieved through the active performance of virtue. Aristotle 
indicates that the happy man will spend the majority of time in 
virtuous conduct and contemplation (NE, 1100b16-19). He adds that no 
human operation is more permanent than virtuous activity (NE, 
1100b13-14). Happiness he says ‗is an activity of the soul in accordance 
with perfect virtue‘ (NE, 1102a5-6134). It has been suggested that 
Aristotle could not imagine any real human fulfilment without the 
                                                 
133
 See for Example Steutel (1998) Carr & Steutel (1999) & Dent (1999). 
134
 Aristotle defines happiness in an almost identical way in the Eudemian Ethics. There he says that 
„happiness must be activity of a complete life in accordance with complete virtue‟ (EE, 1219a38-39). 
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sustained exercise of the virtues (Carr & Steutel, 1999). Kristjánsson 
similarly states that the ‗virtues are at once conducive to and 
constitutive of eudaimonia‘ (2007, p 15). Given that Aristotle places the 
virtues at the very centre of his account of what a human being can 
do to prosper, it seems necessary to flesh out his definition of virtue.  
 
‗Let this be assumed; and about excellence, that it is the best, disposition, 
state, or capacity of anything that has some employment or function‘. (EE1219a1-3) 
 
Aristotle suggests that a given thing‘s excellence is intimately 
related to the optimal performance of its function (EE, 1219a-1219b & NE, 
1098a8-18). He takes the view that the function or purpose of each 
thing is to aim at excellence. A ‗thing and its excellence have the same 
function‘ he states (EE, 1219a19-20). A ‗cloak has an excellence - and a 
certain function‘ he says and the ‗best state of the cloak is its 
excellence‘ (EE1219a2-4). The excellent shoe-maker has the purpose of 
producing excellent shoes and is capable of doing this consistently 
(EE1219a21-24). The function of a harpist, he similarly says is to play 
the harp, whereas the function of a ‗good harpist‘ is to play the harp 
‗well‘ (NE, 1098a8-18). Both the Nicomachean and Eudemian Ethics are 
inquiries specifically concerned with human excellence (anthropine 
arête).  
 
Human excellence he says is a matter that ‗belongs to the soul‘ 
(EE 1219B26-27). Aristotle famously divided the soul into two parts: the 
rational and non-rational (EE1219b25-1220b2 & NE1102a25-1103a10). 
However, he emphasises that both parts of the soul have a share in 
reason, albeit in different ways. He states that ‗one‘s nature is to 
prescribe and the other to obey and listen‘ (EE1219b30-31). He similarly 
adds that there is in the irrational soul a faculty that is ‗receptive to 
reason‘ (NE1102b12-13). In both ethical works Aristotle maintains that 
there are two varieties of human excellence, intellectual135 and moral, 
                                                 
135
  He makes this discrimination in the Eudemian Ethics at (EE, 1220a5-6) where he describes the 
moral virtues as habits or „virtues of character‟. He similarly separates the intellectual and moral 
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that correspond to the two parts of the human soul. The intellectual 
virtues pertain to the rational part of the human soul, whereas the 
moral virtues are excellences of the partially irrational part of the soul. 
 
‘Human excellence will be the disposition that makes one a good man and 
causes him to perform his function well‘ (NE1106b22-23).  
 
In his ethical treatises Aristotle indicates that the moral virtues 
relate to stable dispositions or habits of character (hexis)136 that have 
been refined to the point of excellence (arête). To be sure, he does 
specify that the virtues are not essentially feelings or faculties but 
dispositions (NE1106a12-13). However, he later crucially adds that 
‗moral goodness is considered to be intimately connected in various 
ways with the feelings‘ (NE, 1178a15-16). Virtue, he elsewhere says, is a 
sort of disposition produced by the soul‘s best processes and feelings 
(EE, 1220a29-33). Indeed, in one of the most frequently referred to 
passages of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle declares that moral 
virtue aims to hit the mean or middle ground, in regard to actions and 
feelings137 (or praxis kai pathe). 
 
‗But it is in the field of actions and feelings that virtue operates; and in them excess 
and deficiency are failings, whereas the mean is praised and recognised as a 
success: and these are both marks of virtue. Virtue then is a mean condition in as 
much as it aims at hitting the mean‘ (NE, 1106a23-28) 
 
Aristotle does not anywhere in his corpus provide us with a 
definitive list of moral virtues (Kristjánsson, 2007, p 17-18). However, he 
does employ his famous doctrine of the mean138 to explain how 
various actions and emotions can err by way of excess or deficiency 
                                                                                                                                            
virtues at the start of Book 2 in the NE at (1103a). His intellectual virtues will be discussed in detail in 
chapter 8. 
136
 I borrow this translation from Kristjánsson (2007, p 15). 
137
 Kosman (1980) Irwin (1980) (Macintyre, 1984) Sherman (1999) Steutel & Spiecker (2004) Carr 
(2007b) & Kristjánsson (2007) all for example note that the virtues are states of action and feeling. 
Kosman and Irwin refer to actions (praxis) and emotion (pathe). 
138
 See NE in particular (1106a27-1106b35) for an explanation of the doctrine of the mean (NE 
1107a30-1108b10) and Book 3 for a more detailed discussion of particular virtues. 
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(See NE 1107a30-1108b10 in particular). Courage for example is a virtue, whereas 
rashness is a defect of fear, and cowardice an excess of it (NE, 1107b1-
5). He similarly says that patience is a virtue; the irascible, however, 
feel anger too much and the spiritless not enough (NE, 1108a5-8).  Other 
moral virtues that Aristotle discusses are: temperance, generosity, 
magnificence, great-mindedness, right ambition, friendliness, 
truthfulness and wit139. Aristotle also provides a list of virtues and 
their excesses in the Eudemian Ethics (1220b25-1221a15) where he again 
reiterates his belief that ‗virtue of character is concerned with certain 
means and is itself a certain mean state‘ (EE1220b34-35). The extremes 
of each moral virtue discussed by Aristotle are presented in tabular 
form at Appendices I & II. Although Aristotle is not always entirely 
clear about the precise relation between action and feeling (Kristjánsson, 
2007, p 17-18), his virtues nevertheless are dispositions, crucially 
requiring both activity and proper feeling from mature moral agents. 
That emotions are constituent elements of complete moral virtue is 
vital in at least two respects. Firstly, it means that any proper 
initiation into the virtues can and must involve educating the 
emotions. Steutel & Spiecker (2004) rightly maintain that developing 
sentimental dispositions is both a ‗necessary‘ and ‗significant‘ task for 
moral educators140. Secondly, it further serves to distinguish 
Aristotle‘s account of virtue from the accounts provided by both Kant 
and Peters, for neither of these philosophers thought that proper 
feeling was a necessary feature of all complete virtues. Indeed, 
arguably, both Kant and Peters were more interested in moral agency 
than moral virtue. 
 
Carr and Steutel (1999) maintain that virtue ethics can be 
broadly or narrowly conceived. A broad virtue ethics, they suggest, is 
                                                 
139
 I owe this summary to Kristjánsson (2007, p 16) who has compiled a helpful table detailing all the 
means and extremes of character that Aristotle discusses in the Nicomachean Ethics. 
140
 The discipline and education of the emotions will be the subject of detailed discussion in subsequent 
chapters. 
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‗concerned simply with the promotion of virtues‘ (1999, p 4). Kant141 
and Peters could both be classified as virtue ethicists according to this 
general criterion. However, both philosophers also construe rational 
autonomy to be the main mark of moral maturity. Arguably, this 
emphasis on rational freedom means that neither Kant nor Peters 
should be classified as virtue ethicists according to the more stringent 
criteria.  A more narrowly conceived virtue ethics would place the end 
of autonomy in subservience to the virtues held by moral agents142. 
Sorabji (1980) Slote (1995, 1997 & 2003) and Carr & Steutel (1999) have all 
noted that an Aristotelian ethics of virtue is principally concerned with 
promoting excellent dispositions and traits of character. The latter 
three philosophers argue that Aristotle articulated an agent 
focussed143 aretaic (derived from arête for excellence) ethics. 
Conversely, a deontic ethics such as that advocated by Kant is 
primarily concerned with dutiful adherence to objective rational 
principles. Individual actions are evaluated as right or wrong, rather 
than persons as virtuous or vicious, across a lifespan (Carr & Steutel, 
1999).  
 
Virtue ethics can also be distinguished from other forms of 
teleological ethics, such as trait utilitarianism. Whilst trait 
utilitarianism is concerned with the promotion of happiness, this is a 
collective happiness that aims for the good of the greatest number of 
people. However, a utilitarian ethics only ascribes merit to virtues to 
the extent that they instrumentally produce such majority human 
benefit. Aristotelian virtue ethics, by contrast, rates the normative 
merit of an action not in terms of its actual or projected consequences, 
but by reference to the character traits of agents144. The character 
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 Carr & Steutel (1999, p6) themselves acknowledge that Kant could be classified as a virtue ethicist 
in this broad sense. 
142
 Indeed, Aristotle had no concept of autonomy in the modern sense of the word, as will be explained 
at 5.5. 
143
 See Slote (1995, 1997) Carr & Steutel (1999). They distinguish an agent focussed from an agent 
based ethics. Slote (1997) speculates that Plato may have formulated a more agent based ethics where 
the character of the agent is the only criterion determining the worth of an action. 
144
 Carr & Steutel chapter one (1999) and Slote (1995, 1997 & 2003) provide sound accounts of the 
differences between virtue ethics, deontological ethics and utilitarianism. 
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traits at the core of Aristotle‘s virtues importantly also involve 
significantly more than habitual and mechanical performance.  
 
5.3 Practical Wisdom and Habituation 
 
‗So virtue is a purposive disposition, lying in a mean that is relative to us and 
determined by a rational principle, and by that which a prudent man would use to 
determine it.‘ (NE, 1107a1-3) 
 
Aristotle regarded all mature moral virtues as habits determined 
by a rational principle. However, what principle did he think should 
be employed to establish the good for each person? It is well-known 
that Aristotle thought that the virtue of phronesis (prudence or 
practical wisdom) involved the judicious and sensitive application of 
general principles to the particularities of moral experience145. It is 
practical wisdom that provides virtuous agents with knowledge of, and 
insight into, the principles that govern moral agency and action. In 
Book VI of his Ethics Aristotle specifies that phronesis is an 
intellectual virtue146 that takes time and experience to acquire (NE, 
1142a14-17). Aristotle states that the first principles of practical wisdom 
‗are grasped only as the result of experience‘ (NE, 1142a18-20). 
Aristotle‘s theory of moral knowledge can thus be further 
differentiated from Kant‘s; the former but not the latter believed that 
we must derive moral principles from experience. For Kant, what 
matters most morally, is the rational forming of the categorical 
imperative in the intelligible realm. However, what matters most 
morally, for Aristotle, is not knowledge of any noumenal realm, but 
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 See for example Dunne (1993) Carr (1991, 1996, 2003) (Kristjánsson 2007) (Haydon 2009) and 
indeed MacIntyre (1984). 
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 The relationship that Phronesis has to the other intellectual virtues will be discussed in chapter 8. 
There it will be argued that Aristotle classifies practical wisdom as an intellectual virtue at least partly 
because of its connection to the eternal realm. Aristotle arguably there also supposes that there is such a 
thing as objectively praiseworthy moral behaviour. Such universally valid moral conduct can be 
exemplified in the concrete form of a specific person; the phronimos.  
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acting virtuously in the sensible realm147. Acts are virtuous, he says 
when the agent: 1) knows what he is doing; 2) chooses the act for its 
own sake148; 3) acts from a stable disposition (hexis) (NE1105a26-1105b). 
Although Aristotle makes clear that moral knowledge is a constituent 
part of virtue, such knowledge plays a marginal or negligible part in 
the acquisition of virtues (NE1105b1-3). How, then, did Aristotle think 
that the virtues are developed? In answering this question I will try to 
bring out the important distinction that (Aristotle implies) exists 
between moral habits and moral virtues. 
 
‗In a word, then, like activities produce like dispositions. Hence we must give our 
activities a certain quality, because it is their characteristics that determine the 
resulting dispositions. So it is a matter of no little importance what sorts of habits 
we form from the earliest age – it makes a vast difference, or rather all the difference 
in the world.‘ (NE, 1103b, 20-26) 
 
Aristotle thought that the acquisition of moral habit was an 
inherently practical and experiential affair. He intimates that 
‗anything that we have to learn, we learn by the actual doing of it‘149 
(NE, 1103a32-33). It is well-known that Aristotle thought we become 
‗morally good‘ through the repeated performance of moral actions in a 
process of habituation150 (ethismos). He famously remarked that 
although mankind is fitted by nature to receive the virtues, ‗their full 
development in us is due to habit‘ (NE, 1103a24-26). The moral habits 
we form are, he says, ‗supremely important‘, because it is ‗from the 
repeated performance of just and temperate acts that we acquire 
virtues‘ (NE1105b4-6). Given that our habits make all the world of 
                                                 
147
 It has thus been argued that whereas in virtue ethics principles regulate moral life, in deontological 
ethics, obligations to principles, constitute moral life (Carr, 1991b, Carr 1996, & Steutel 1998). I would 
add that in virtue ethics, principles are also constitutive of moral life, just not wholly constitutive of it.  
148
 More will shortly be said about how the virtuous „choose‟ acts. 
149
 Aristotle is not being entirely perspicacious here. This comment, made towards the end of book one 
is followed by another at the start of book 2 (NE1103a) which makes clear that he thought we develop 
the intellectual virtues not through action and doing but instruction. The significance of this comment 
on instruction will be discussed in relation to the intellectual virtues in chapter 8. I interpret his 
comment here to mean, any practical knowledge that we have to learn, we learn through doing as he 
goes on to cite the example of a builder learning to build through practice and doing. 
150
 See for example Sherman (2004) Dunne (1999) Spiecker (1999) Curren (1999 & 2000) Steutel & 
Spiecker (2004) (Fossheim 2006) & Kristjánsson (2007). 
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difference, it is surprising that151 Aristotle has ‗remarkably little to tell 
us about just what kind of process‘ habituation is (Dunne, 1999, p 58).   
 
It is true that Aristotle‘s texts are not very informative about the 
precise nature of habituation in the early years of a child‘s life152.  Had 
we known more about Aristotle‘s own views on habituation, objections 
that they give rise to a moral educational paradox may not have 
surfaced. It is to this alleged paradox that the present discussion now 
turns. In the course of this process, four potentially damaging 
objections to Neo-Aristotelian ethics will be rejected. It will be argued 
that: 1) Aristotle‘s virtues are not self centred; 2) Aristotle does not 
present an irresolvable moral educational paradox; 3) the intellectual 
virtue of phronesis does provide moral agents with a principled, albeit 
flexible and general, procedure for determining virtuous action; 4) that 
this decision procedure need not preclude prescribing more specific 
rules to the less than virtuous. Given that rules have often been 
perceived as necessary features of school discipline, both in theory 
and practice, the third and fourth arguments are especially important 
in the context of this thesis. 
 
5.4 The moral educational paradox & four objections to Virtue Ethics 
 
‗Onely a sweet and vertuous soul, 
Like season‘d timber, never gives; 
But though the whole world turn to coal, 
   Then chiefly lives.‘ (Herbert, 1975, p 103) 
 
It has been noted by Solomon (2007, p 74) and Kristjánsson (2007, 
p 16) that virtue ethics has attracted criticism for being self-centred 
and insufficiently other-regarding. Kristjánsson and Solomon observe 
                                                 
151
 Kritjánsson (2007, p 33) shares Dunne‟s view that Aristotle‟s works do not tell us much about 
habituation. More will be said about the habituation process in subsequent chapters. 
152
 Both Tress (1997) and Kristjánsson (2007) speculate that a lost work on childhood might have 




that adherents to an ethic of virtue are alleged to be more interested 
in pursuing their own virtue than the virtue or welfare of others. 
Herbert‘s point, in his poem Vertue, however, is not that the virtuous 
person ‗never gives‘ to others, but that they never give in or up in the 
face of worldly challenges and difficulties. Aristotle and Herbert 
maintain that the virtuous are steadfast and resolute. In any case, 
Aristotle seems to have been clear that the virtuous agent necessarily 
considered the interests of others and acted in accordance with those 
interests. In fact, he maintains that ‗virtue consists more in doing 
good than in receiving it‘ (NE, 1120a12-13). Indeed, many of Aristotle‘s 
individual virtues are directed towards improving the welfare of 
others. Some commentators on Aristotle have classified his virtues 
under self, other and publicly regarding categories153. Crucially, 
Aristotle most highly prizes the other regarding virtues, those that are 
‗necessarily…most useful to others: justice, courage and generosity154 
for instance‘ (Kristjánsson 2007, p 16). Furthermore, in his extensive 
treatment of friendship in Books VIII and IX Aristotle indicates that it 
is impossible to live a truly happy life without virtuous friends155 
(NE1170b17-18). Importantly, he there suggests that friendship involves 
putting the needs of friends before one‘s own, or at least on a par with 
one‘s own, when morally appropriate. Friendship he says, consists 
‗more in giving than receiving affection…more in loving than being 
loved‘ (NE1159a27-36). I therefore think that scrutiny of the 
Nicomachean Ethics reveals that the self-centred objection does not 
ring true. What, though, of the other objections to virtue theory? 
  
 ‗The business of moral education consists largely in initiating people into the 
‗language‘ so that they can use it in an autonomous manner. This is done largely by 
introducing them to the ‗literature‘. And so we come to the paradox of moral 
education.‘ (Peters, 1981, p51)  
                                                 
153
 See for example Von Wright (1963) and Carr (1991) for self and other regarding and Slote (1995 & 
2003) & Taylor (2003) for self, other and publicly regarding, classifications. 
154
 For an illuminating discussion of Aristotle‟s views on generosity and of an education into it, see 
chapter 9 (Kristjánsson 2007). This discussion brings home how Aristotle‟s virtues are anything but 
self centred. 
155
 Stocker similarly says that „human life without friendship is hardly human life‟ (2003, p 173-4). 
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Peters ostensibly criticises Aristotle in his chapter entitled 
Reason and Habit: The paradox of moral Education156. There, he states 
that ‗Aristotle…was led into a paradox about moral education which 
resulted from his attempt to stress the role both of reason and habit‘ 
(Peters, 1981, p 45). Peters‘ argument is that it is paradoxical to try to 
develop rational autonomy in children through primarily irrational and 
habitual means157. He stated that the ‗brute facts of child 
development‘ (Peters, 1981, p51) militate against any genuinely rational 
initiation of children into ‗content‘ that would enable them to lead 
independent moral lives. Peters thought that in the ‗most formative 
years‘ of development, pupils are ‗incapable‘ (Peters, 1981, p51) of the 
intelligent and autonomous application of moral principles. Indeed, he 
notoriously remarked that the young ‗must enter the palace of reason 
through the courtyard of habit and tradition‘158 (Peters, 1981, p52). 
 
However, Peters indicates that the apparent dichotomy between 
reason and habit is resolvable. He thinks it is empirically observable 
that the habits of children can and do evolve into more critical 
capacities, no matter how mystifying this transformation may appear 
to be. Kristjánsson (2007) shares Peters‘ conclusion that the paradox is 
resolvable and that psychologists and teachers may have more to say 
than philosophers about the nature of this development from 
irrational to rational agency159. Steutel & Spiecker (2004) and 
Kristjánsson (2007), provide illuminating discussions of the alleged 
moral educational paradox. Steutel & Spiecker theorise that there may 
                                                 
156
 This chapter is found in Moral Development and Moral Education (1981). 
157
 Haydon (2009) forms a similar impression of the alleged contradiction, indicating that although 
Peters saw rational morality as a major goal of education, he also held that educators could not directly 
appeal (initially at any rate) to their pupil‟s rationality, in order to develop it. Kristjánsson too suggests 
that Peters appeared to perceive an „inevitable opposition between habituation and intellectual training‟ 
(Kristjánsson, 2007, p 31). 
158
 This is reminiscent of his utterance that children are barbarians at the gates of civilisation, noted in 
chapter 2. 
159
 Kristjánsson (2007, p 23) points out that learners do not undergo a metamorphosis when acquiring 
the virtues. Learners rather repeatedly act in virtuous ways until these actions become ingrained in the 
character of the learner. The habituation process is thus more like a refinement of nature and realisation 
of potential than outright transformation. 
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be two dimensions160 of paradox; the motivational and epistemic (2004, 
p 535), both of which can be rebutted. The former paradox rests in only 
seeming ambiguity between, on the one hand: the capacity to acquire 
virtuous motivations for actions, when on the other, a virtuous motive 
is itself a precondition of virtue. Steutel & Spiecker suggest that people 
can be virtuous in a ‗thin‘ sense if they act correctly, but not from a 
disposition of choice. Virtue in a ‗thick‘ sense, they acknowledge, must 
be chosen161. The epistemic dimension of paradox relates to how one 
can learn ‗to become‘ practically wise when virtue requires that ‗one 
needs to be‘ practically wise (Steutel & Spiecker, 2004, p 536). As we shall 
go on to see at 5.5, Steutel & Spiecker are probably right to imply that 
children can act from correct principles if they are appropriately 
guided by their tutors.  
 
Peters does to be sure argue that moral habits need not be in 
themselves irrational. There is, he says, ‗no necessary contradiction 
between the use of intelligence and the formation of habits‘ (Peters, 
1981, p57). He seems to think that habits are intelligent when applied 
more creatively in particular situations in accordance with a principle. 
Peters observes an explicit distinction between principles and rules162.  
 
‗A man of principle is one who is consistent in acting in the light of his sensitivity to 
aspects of a situation that are made morally relevant by a principle. But this does 
not preclude adaptability due to differences in situations‘ (Peters, 1981, p 67) 
 
Peters takes issue with Ryle‘s163characterisation of habit as inherently 
inflexible and non-cognitive. A habit designates an action as a being of 
                                                 
160
 Kristjansson (2007) suggests two related but different dimensions of paradox – psychological and 
moral/political. 
161
 More will shortly be said on the need for complete virtue to be „chosen‟. 
162
 Haydon (1999, 2009) also thinks this is an important discrimination. 
163
 Ryle in his Concept of Mind (2000) famously differentiated between habits and intelligent 
capacities. Habits he suggests are only „single track dispositions‟ whereas intelligent practices are 
„multi-track dispositions‟. He explains his reasoning as follows. It is of the very „essence of merely 
habitual practices that one performance is a replica of its predecessors‟. In the case of intelligent 
practices however „one performance is modified to the next. The agent is still learning‟. Habits he adds 
are developed „by drill, but we build up intelligent capacities by training‟ (Ryle, 2000, p 42). More 
recently Spiecker (1999) has suggested that children can be initiated into intelligent multi-track habits.  
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a particular sort, Peters observes. It is something that someone has 
done before and will probably do again (Peters, 1981, p55).  Peters 
suggests that actions done from ‗force of habit‘ do not entail thought. 
However, he also suggests habits can exhibit intelligence when they 
are adapted to concrete circumstances in a manner that reveals an 
understanding of the reasons that morally justify the relevant action. 
Peters indicates that a ‗principle is that which makes a consideration 
relevant‘ (Peters, 1981, p66). Haydon provides some helpful clarity 
regarding what Peters might mean here. For Peters, ‗rules tell one 
what to do, or not do; principles enable one to judge whether the rules 
are justified‘ (2009, 6). Moral principles in other words provide 
explanatory grounds for an action. A rule, on the other hand, is a 
more specific piece of guidance that can be followed without 
background awareness of the reasons that justify that rule or the 
resulting action.  
 
Peters acknowledges that children can be, and often are, drilled 
to follow rules without intelligence. However, if a child ‗has really 
learnt to act on a rule, it is difficult to see how he could have 
accomplished this without insight and intelligence‘ (Peters, 1981, p57). 
Arguably, the implication here is that children who act on rather than 
according to164, rules have over time come to develop a principled 
grasp of the reasons that justify their actions. Peters‘ explanation of 
the man of principle bears more than a passing resemblance to 
Aristotle‘s man of practical wisdom. However, for Peters, habits only 
seem to be morally valuable when accompanied by a principle that is 
understood by the agent in question. In contrast, Aristotle appears to 
have thought that habits are morally valuable (if not constitutive of 
complete virtue) when accompanied by a principle that has not been 
chosen or wholly comprehended by the agent in question.  
 
For some, Aristotle‘s notion of acting from general principles, 
                                                 
164
 This distinction is not mine but Peters (1981, p 57). 
 117 
sensitively applied to moral situations, seems impossibly vague. 
Hursthouse (2003, pp25-28) Solomon (2007, p 74) and Kristjánsson (2007, 
p 16) all note the action-guiding objection165 which suggests that a 
virtue ethical framework fails to provide sufficient practical guidance 
in the forms of rules and procedures for situations of moral perplexity. 
One such critic, Rachels (1999, p 190-193), says that virtue ethics 
should not be regarded as a complete moral philosophy in its own 
right because it does not offer any obvious advice to help moral agents 
decide ‗what they should do‘ in the face of particular moral problems. 
MacIntyre, in his influential After Virtue, remarks that ‗the most 
obvious and astonishing absence from Aristotle‘s thought‘ is that 
there is ‗relatively little mention of rules anywhere in the ethics‘ 
(MacIntyre, 1984, p 150). It is arguably because MacIntyre perceives an 
‗absence of rules‘ in Aristotle that he concludes that the virtues could 
never provide a ‗complete‘ account of moral life (MacIntyre, 1984, p 151). 
MacInytre does think that the virtues should be central to morality in 
any community, but he suggests that rules and laws are required to 
‗supplement‘ any such virtues166 (MacIntyre, 1984, p 151). Does Aristotle‘s 
theory of virtue, then, neglect rules as MacIntyre says?  
 
To be sure, Aristotle does concede that any account of moral 
‗conduct must be stated in outline and not in precise detail‘ (NE, 1104a, 
1-2). He elsewhere remarks that the moral excellence of human beings 
essentially involves activity of the soul implying a principle (NE, 1098a7-
9). However, Aristotle later clarifies why he does on occasion employ 
the (admittedly rather vague) term ‗imply‘ in relation to principles. He 
takes issue with the Socratic view and argues that virtue does not 
always involve only the general principle of practical reason 
(prudence). Virtue is not merely, he says, ‗a state in conformity with 
the right principle, but one that implies the right principle. Whereas 
                                                 
165
 Kristjánsson actually describes this as the action/emotion guiding objection. 
166
 Much of the thrust of this argument I derive from Haydon (2009, p 11) who interprets MacIntyre in 
a similar fashion. Carr (2003, p 256) I think rightly observes that MacIntyre‟s credentials as an 
Aristotelian virtue ethicist are questionable. 
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Socrates thought the virtues are principles...we say they imply a 
principle‘ (NE, 1144b26-30). He continues by saying that the person of 
natural virtue might be good in certain respects, but only the person 
of practical wisdom is ‗good without qualification‘ (NE, 1144b33-1145a3). 
Why is the person of practical wisdom (phronimos) good in an 
unqualified sense?  
 
I think part of Aristotle‘s argument is that conformity to 
principles or rules is not enough for ‗virtue in the full sense‘167. The 
practically wise must themselves choose the correct immediate target 
(skopos) that will enable them to reach the long term goal of 
flourishing (telos)168. Practical wisdom, he says, issues orders that 
‗make‘ us ‗perform the acts that are means towards‘ the end of 
happiness (NE1145a5-12). Phronesis is arguably intrinsically good 
because it is the quality that discerns what practical steps are 
required for morally desirable action. Kristjánsson puts it thus: 
phronesis ‗helps the moral virtues to find their right ends‘ 
169(Kristjánsson, 2007, p17).  
 
Although Aristotle argues that the mean is relative to each 
person, he does specify three rules to guide its practical 
implementation. Everybody should: 1) avoid extreme deviations from 
the mean; 2) be conscious of the moral lapses to which they are prone; 
3) remain particularly vigilant with regard to pleasure and pain 
(NE1109a30-1109b14). He states that by ‗following these rules we will 
have the best chance of hitting the mean‘ (NE1109b14-15). These rules 
are admittedly rather general and it has also been plausibly argued 
                                                 
167
 The other necessary parts of an act done from practical wisdom would seem to be that it is chosen 
and performed from a stable disposition, with proper feeling.  
168
 Annas (2007) argues that the overall aim of life is happiness (telos). She maintains that moral virtue 
is the practical „skill of living‟ (p 21) that enables the correct immediate goals (skopos) to be reached.  
She says that the stoics were clearer than Aristotle about this. I do not think Aristotle however would 
classify moral virtue as a „skill‟. 
169
 Kristjánsson (2007, p 17) here also provides an illuminating interpretation of Aristotle‟s 
problematic, unity of the virtues thesis. He says that the „sense in which the virtues are inseparable, 
then, is the sense in which phronesis correctly oversees all the virtues and judges when and to what 
extent each virtue applies in each case‟. 
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that the doctrine of the mean is less well suited to overseeing other-
regarding virtues170. Although Aristotle believed that the fully virtuous 
should apply general principles sensitively to particular experience, in 
pursuit of moral ends, this does not mean he thought more specific 
rules had no place in moral life; far from it. Aristotle rather seems to 
be of the view that rules can guide the moral action of less than 
mature agents, including, indeed especially, children. Arguably, he 
thought that rules should be employed to ensure that children form 
habit-virtues. 
 
5.5 Aristotle‘s Child: Habit-Virtues, rules and discipline 
 
‗Virtue ethicists want to emphasise the fact that, if children are to be taught to be 
honest, they must be taught to prize the truth, and that merely teaching them not to 
lie will not achieve this end. But they do not deny that to achieve this end, teaching 
them not to lie is useful, even indispensable…virtue ethics not only comes up with 
rules…but further, does not exclude the more familiar deontologists‘ rules.‘ 
(Hursthouse, 2003, p 27) 
 
Aristotle suggests that there are two praiseworthy qualities of 
moral character, ‗natural virtue and virtue in the full sense; and of 
these the latter implies prudence‘ (NE, 1144b16-18). I think that this is a 
vital distinction. Aristotle says that a naturally virtuous disposition 
‗resembles virtue‘ (NE, 1144b14). However, he adds that agents require 
intelligence and insight into the ‗moral sphere‘ in order to turn this 
natural disposition into virtue in the ‗full sense‘ (NE, 1144b10-15). 
Burnyeat (1980) characterises the distinction of natural and complete 
virtue as being one of ‗that‘ and ‗because‘. Burnyeat implies that the 
person of full virtue understands why an action is good; the naturally 
virtuous only have a belief that it is good. Sorabji (1980) interprets the 
Ethics in a similar way. He thinks there are ‗habit virtues‘171 that are 
indicative of right opinions that agents may possess before they have 
                                                 
170
 See for example Carr (1991) and Slote (1995). 
171
 Spieker develops Sorabji‟s point and says that „the habits acquired in early childhood, are not 
complete virtues but habit-virtues‟ (Spiecker, 1999, p 216). 
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knowledge of their goal (ibid, p 213). Sherman (2004) similarly argues 
that the process of choosing goals begins not with each individual 
person, but from a common and shared view.172  
 
Aristotle may not have developed a theory of freedom173, but he 
did discuss at length the notion of choice, compulsion and voluntary 
action in Book III of the Ethics. There, Aristotle suggests that the 
power to set proper ends for oneself on the basis of principles is 
central to the complete possession of virtue and happiness. He states 
that ‗choice implies a rational principle and thought (NE 1112a 15-16)‘. 
However, he argues that ‗both children and animals have a share in 
voluntary action…but not in choice‘ (NE, 1111b 5-10). Complete virtue 
does to be sure require that an act be chosen by the person so acting, 
but what matters more is that the act be ‗morally informed and 
proper‘ (Kristjánsson, 2007, p 178). Aristotle arguably thus believed that 
issuing laws to children was justified because they are not yet capable 
of choosing to act for the sake of virtue from a position of principle. 
 
‗But to obtain a right training for goodness from an early age is a hard thing, 
unless one has been brought up under right laws...For this reason upbringing and 
occupations should be regulated by law, because they will cease to be irksome when 
they have become habitual‘.(NE1179b30-1180a) 
 
In Book X of the Ethics Aristotle indicates his preference for a 
public system of education174 (NE1179b30-1180b28). In the 
aforementioned passage, he arguably suggests that laws and rules can 
serve to develop desirable habits in children. This interpretation is, I 
think, given further credence by Aristotle‘s earlier suggestion that 
rightly formed laws bid us to do brave and temperate things 
                                                 
172
 Importantly both Sherman and Sorabji assert that habituation need not be „mindless‟. Not all 
commentators agree on this. Curzer (2002) for example has argued that habituation is inherently 
„painful‟. Kristjánsson (2007, chapter 3) provides an informative overview of different theories of 
habitation and I will expand upon this subject in chapters 7 & 9.  
173
 Kristjánsson (2007, p43-44) explains that Aristotle could not have had a modern conception of 
freedom to avail himself of; for Aristotle „being free basically meant not being a slave‟. 
174
 Aristotle of course goes into much more detail about the nature of public education in the Politics. 
For an insightful commentary and interpretation on this subject see Curren (2000). 
 121 
(NE1129b19-26). Curren seems to take something like this view. He 
intimates that laws ‗provide a kind of instruction in the varieties of 
acts performed by virtuous and vicious people‘ (2000, p 86). Aristotle 
elsewhere states that children‘s dispositions are ‗apt to be harmful‘ 
without intelligence (NE, 1144b8-10). Taking these comments together, 
Aristotle arguably construes rules as potentially educative, in so far as 
they can direct those with incomplete moral reason to act rightly. He 
seemed to think that rules can help to ensure that the habitual 
actions of children are intelligently directed to proper rather than 
harmful ends. Although actions performed in accordance with 
principles determined by others cannot be classified as virtuous in the 
‗full sense‘, because they are not chosen, they are arguably at least 
‗naturally‘ virtuous. He elsewhere remarks that we should listen to our 
elders ‗because they have an insight from their experience which 
enables them to see correctly‘ (NE1143b13-14). Aristotle also indicates 
that children should follow the prescriptions of their tutors175, 
because the former are not yet capable of complete virtue and 
happiness.  
 
For children...live as their desires impels them, and it is in them that the appetite 
for pleasant things is strongest; so unless this is rendered docile and submissive to 
authority it will pass all bounds...and if these appetites are strong and violent, they 
actually drive out reason. So they must be moderate and few, and in no way 
opposed to the dictates of principle – this is what we mean by docile and 
restrained...the child ought to live in accordance with the directions of his tutor.‘ 
(NE, 1119b6-13) 
 
                                                 
175
 It should be observed that there may well have been more than one type of tutor whose directions 
children should follow. Although Aristotle holds that education is best conducted by the state, he 
remarks that individual tuition is superior to the public sort (NE1180b8-10). Curren (2000, p 233) notes 
that paideia may have originally referred to childrearing - however it most likely referred to formal 
schooling by the time of Plato. A tutor would in one sense formally instruct within schools. However, 
there was arguably another type of tutor who had even greater influence on the young child‟s moral 
development. Each boy (paid, pais) or child (paidion) was accompanied by a slave (paidagogos) who 
was responsible for leading (ago) them to and from their more formal school lessons (ibid, p 12). The 
slave was also thus arguably a tutor of sorts. Indeed, Curren (ibid, p14) implies they had much more 
influence on moral development of the young than tutors of group lessons. Curren also notes the 
perversity of entrusting the moral formation of children to slaves, perverse because the latter were not 
deemed fit to rule themselves as citizens. He (2000, p 84) later indicates that Aristotle thought children 
should be kept out of the company of slaves as much as possible. 
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Aristotle maintains that no child can truly flourish because age 
debars them from virtuous activities (NE, 1099b25-1100a5). He states 
that ‗if children are so described, it is by way of congratulation on 
their future promise…happiness demands not only complete goodness 
but a complete life‘ (NE,1100a3-5). However, Aristotle‘s view of children 
is not as pessimistic as it at first sight appears176. Aristotle did think 
that children were capable of attaining full virtue and happiness in 
the future under the guidance of virtuous adults. In the Politics he 
indicates that the deliberative faculty in the soul is ‗present but 
undeveloped‘ (Politics, 1260a13) in the child. The child already has the 
irrational part of the soul that is amenable to reason, but in 
unfinished form.  
 
‗Nurture and discipline are the acts that convey the potentiality for the 
child‘s own eventual actualisation as ethically complete‘. (Tress, 1997 p 74) 
 
Tress observes that Aristotle‘s corpus of work nowhere contains 
a sustained discussion of childhood (Tress, 1997). However, he 
maintains that Aristotle‘s assorted comments on the subject in the 
Generation of Animals, the Ethics and the Politics permit extrapolation 
of an integrated view. The ‗common defining feature‘ of the three 
works, he says, is ‗that the child is ―unfinished‖ in relation to human 
telos‘ (Tress, p 66). Tress argues that the term unfinished implies that 
the potential of children has not yet been unlocked and realised; it will 
be in the future, however, so long as they receive the ‗right upbringing 
and supervision‘ (NE, 1180a1). On top of the correct nurture and 
discipline177, young persons must also, Aristotle continues, ‗keep on 
observing their regimen and accustoming themselves to it even after 
                                                 
176
 Aristotle makes a number of complimentary remarks about the „young‟ in the Rhetoric. The young 
are, for example, hopeful (1389a20-22) and optimistic (1389a33-35) and they prefer doing the noble to 
what is in their interest (1389a35-1389b). They similarly enjoy their friends for their own sake and not 
as means to their own interests (1389b1-4). Kristjánsson rightly observes that these „are hardly the 
views of a thinker uninterested in childhood‟ (2007, p 26). Aristotle‟s Rhetoric will be further 
discussed in chapter 7. 
177
 Crucially Tress‟s translation and interpretation of the passage (NE1180a1) refers not to „upbringing 
and supervision‟ but „nurture and discipline‟. Nurture, involves providing „affection, shelter and 
sustenance for the child‟ (Tress, 1997, p 76). 
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they are grown up‘ (NE, 1180a1-3). Aristotle‘s child is thus ‗always 
human‘ (Tress, 1997, p 65) but as a potentiality. Aristotle moreover, 
thought that it was schools and parents that should ‗nurture and 
discipline‘ the moral potential of the child into mature actuality. 
Discipline, it seems, is integral to the process of preparing children in, 
and for, the life of virtue. Tress also maintains that the household 
(oikos) is the main locus for ethical formation. Schools largely prepare 
children for civic life, though they can also have a share in moral 
development (ibid, 1997, p 79). Although many habits are undoubtedly 
cultivated in the home and outside of school, schools may also 
importantly influence the discipline and nurture of children. 
 
5.6 Discipline, for Virtuous Habits  
 
In this chapter and the previous one, it has been argued that 
schools should try to help pupils‘ foster virtuous, rather than merely 
rule-following habits. It has been concluded that a neo-Aristotelian 
account of virtues is preferable to a Kantian one. Whereas Kant 
conceived of virtue as a rational principle devoid of emotion, Aristotle 
insisted that moral virtue is a disposition of moderate action and 
feeling mediated by a rational principle. Kant and Aristotle also 
conceived moral ends rather differently. Kant defended the ethical 
primacy of the categorical imperative whereas Aristotle emphasised 
human flourishing. Peters was also inclined to the Kantian view178 
that moral maturity resides in rational autonomy. In Peters‘ pluralistic 
theory of moral development, virtue rather plays second fiddle to 
principles and rationality.  
 
It has, however, also been contended that a virtue ethical 
account of school discipline in no way prohibits the adoption of rules. 
Rules179 can and should play an integral role in helping children 
                                                 
178
 Though not the strictly conceived Kantian view; Peters unlike Kant, emphasised that some habits 
ought to be educated and that habits can be intelligent and adaptable.  
179
 As Hursthouse (2003, p 27) and Sherman (1999, p 38-39) both imply.  
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develop habit-virtues. However, rules are not ends in themselves in 
virtue theory; they serve the more fundamental goal of shaping 
virtuous dispositions. I think that the aspiration to promote such 
virtuous dispositions in pupils through various means, including 
discipline, is a realistic one that reflects the spirit of Aristotle‘s 
concept of virtue. Aristotle thought that children were ‗capable of a 
portion of goodness‘ but he did not think they could fully grasp the 
principles necessary for complete virtue. Children rather needed 
guidance from their tutors. Aristotle may have been like Peters, 
something of a moral educational pluralist180. 
 
‗We should probably be content if the combination of all of the means that are 
supposed to make us good enables us to attain some portion of goodness.‘ (NE 
1179b 17-20) 
 
Haydon (1999) has more recently suggested that education 
should promote a widespread understanding of moral norms that are 
publicly shared. He, like Aristotle before him, implies that relatively 
modest moral educational aims may, for some, be the best that can be 
hoped for. Not everyone, he says, may be capable of deep 
understanding, of such public norms; ‗some trade off between depth 
and breadth may be inevitable‘ (1999, p 102). However, Haydon‘s 
position is also more Kantian that Aristotelian. Although he 
acknowledges that it might be possible for a society to establish a 
general moral consensus, employing a ‗language of virtues‘, he thinks 
that rules would provide a firmer basis for these public norms.  
 
I also think that Aristotle had a more positive concept of 
childhood than either Kant or Peters. Aristotle‘s young person is by 
nature rich in potential. He or she is not outside the palace of reason. 
Children rather require support from the outset from inside the 
palace, so that they can in time learn to navigate more independent 
                                                 
180
 In that they both philosophers seem to think moral development may be aided in more than one 
way. Indeed, in chapter 9 it will be argued that instruction and habituation were both necessary 
processes in a neo-Aristotelian education for virtue. 
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paths of their own. Furthermore, for Aristotle, in the moral realm at 
least, reason is not really a palace at all without proper habit and 
emotion. Aristotle thought that adults should guide children towards 
ethical maturity by initiating them into morally praiseworthy 
character traits of thinking, acting and feeling. Children may not yet 
be capable of exercising the choices that characterise virtue in the full 
sense, but they can, with appropriate nurture and discipline, form 
virtuous dispositions.  
 
‗Discipline consists, on the one hand, in continually discouraging the child‘s 
―wildness‖, i.e., the free action of the passions and desires, and on the other, 
continually encouraging positive acts of virtue that by habituation will form a 
virtuous character‘ (Tress, 1997, p 74) 
 
Whereas Kant construed discipline as largely negative, Aristotle 
appears to have thought it could have both positive and negative 
functions. A neo-Aristotelian theory of school discipline should 
arguably be tasked to properly moderate both excessive and deficient 
feelings in pupils. As we shall see in chapter 7, Aristotle may even 
have thought that the seemingly negative aspects of a proper nurture 
and discipline ought to be evaluated as ‗overall positive‘181 too, in 
virtue of their potential long-term benefits. The discussion in this 
chapter has largely focussed on a prima facie negative component of 
discipline, on how rules can help to direct the moral conduct of the 
young. However, the acquisition of the virtues (in the natural and full 
sense alike) involves considerably more than the following of rules 
designed to moderate excessive feelings. More will be said, in 
subsequent chapters about how proper ‗sentimental dispositions‘182 
                                                 
181
 I borrow this phrase from Kristjánsson (2007, p 51) who suggests that so called „negative emotions‟ 
might be more helpfully broken down into four different categories. I will consider how painful 
emotions can be pleasurable overall in chapter 7 and how discipline may often involve overcoming 
painful emotions in chapter 9. 
182
 I borrow this phrase from Steutel and Spiecker‟s (2004). This paper and that of Tress (1997) also 
informed my broader argument, that school discipline should be tasked to order both excessive and 
deficient feeling. 
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might be developed, particularly in cases where the feeling in question 

































Chapter 6 Platonic Emotions: Controlled & limited pleasures & pains 
 
In this chapter and the next, it will be argued that Platonic and 
Aristotelian moral philosophy can be distinguished by the greater 
focus of the latter on educating rather than rationally controlling or 
limiting feelings. Initially, in this chapter, Aristotle‘s important 
discrimination between the continent and fully virtuous person will be 
explained. It will be suggested that the virtuous, unlike the continent, 
necessarily experience little in the way of conflict between their moral 
principles and affective dispositions. Next, Frede‘s argument that 
Aristotle restated a theory of emotion, first articulated by Plato in the 
Philebus, will be considered. It will be suggested that if Plato develops 
a general theory of emotion at all in the Philebus, it is a very narrowly 
conceived and rationalistic one, one that significantly excludes the 
possibility that sensory pleasures and pains can lead to true 
judgements. However, in chapter 7, it will become apparent that 
Aristotle thought emotions just are judgements that can be properly 
informed by perceptions of pleasure and pain. Aristotle also 
emphasises that emotions are open to persuasion and alteration in 
discussion with others in a way that Plato does not. It will be 
concluded that appreciation and maintenance of these distinctions is 
not merely of exegetical but of pedagogical significance. If school 
discipline was based upon Platonic moral theory, pupils need not (and 
arguably it would be best if they did not) feel anything; they need only 
follow the dictates of reason. However, in a neo-Aristotelian account of 
discipline, attempt must be made to help pupils to act, think and feel 
in the right way. 
 
6.1 Educated pleasures and pains: The continent and fully virtuous  
 
‗For it is with pleasures and pains that moral goodness is concerned….Hence the 
importance (as Plato says) of having been trained in some way to feel joy and grief at 
the right things: true education is precisely this‘. (NE, 1104b9-14) 
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In this significant passage of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle 
indicates that genuine education involves training the young to feel 
happiness, pleasure, sadness and pain in and towards the correct 
objects. He also explains why it is so important that people learn to 
feel sensations proper to each circumstance. Pleasures and pains are, 
he says, the very standards that shape and regulate all our actions 
(NE1105a1-3).  Indeed, the ‗whole concern of morality…must be with 
pleasures and pains, since the man who treats them rightly will be 
good and the one who treats them wrongly will be bad‘ (NE1105a1-3).  
The good man is, for Aristotle, none other than the man of virtue as 
was explained in the previous chapter. It is virtue that ‗disposes us to 
act in the best way in regard to pleasure and pains‘ (NE1104b27-28). 
Educating the young into proper habits of feeling is, it seems, at the 
very heart of an Aristotelian education. Without such dispositions 
children will have little or no chance of later developing virtues in the 
fullest sense; they will only be capable of continence183. Aristotle also 
alluded184 to Plato‘s views on the importance of early years training 
and education. However, Aristotle‘s philosophy can be distinguished 
from Plato‘s in terms of the value the former places on inculcating 
proper feelings in the young. 
 
‗Then I must surely be right in saying that we shall not be properly educated 
ourselves…until we can recognise the qualities of discipline, courage, generosity, 
greatness of mind and others akin to them‘. (Republic, 402b8-11) 
 
In the Republic, Plato suggests that a proper education requires 
recognition of, and allegiance to, the dictates of reason. Plato says that 
education in early childhood is ‗crucial‘ as it is this that will help the 
young to be in ‗conformity with beauty and reason‘ (RP401d1-5). 
Through being appropriately trained to perceive beauty185 in ‗works of 
art or nature‘, the child will ‗grow in true goodness of character‘ 
                                                 
183
 Aristotle‟s concept of continence will shortly be compared to his depiction of full virtue. 
184
 He does so in the aforementioned extracted passage (NE, 1104b9-14). 
185
 The training would also help to reveal the shortcomings of inferior works. 
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(RP401e1-402e2). Plato adds that even though the young cannot yet 
understand why art is beautiful, or conduct good, ‗when reason comes 
he will recognise her and welcome her as a familiar friend because of 
his upbringing‘ (402b2-4). Plato implies that the essential quality of the 
morally educated is the capacity for rational recognition and true 
perception of things and their representations (RP402b2-402c-8). Plato 
also suggests in the Republic that pleasures and pains are illusory186. 
Plato‘s belief that pleasure and pain did not reliably yield true 
perceptions of the world, seems to have informed his view (to be 
explored here) that the phenomena were to be avoided or controlled 
rather than educated. Aristotle, in contrast, insists that education 
necessarily involves some training of felt pleasures and pains. 
Aristotle stressed that mature moral virtue involved right action, 
feeling and reason187. Why did Aristotle, unlike Plato, think that we 
ought to be educated more broadly, to feel pleasure and pain in the 
right ways? The most probable answer can be found within their 
respective conceptions of goodness and virtue. For Plato, goodness 
and virtue ultimately arise through knowledge; for Aristotle goodness 
and virtue entail action, feeling and knowledge188.  
 
The normative import of feeling appropriate pleasures and pains 
becomes particularly apparent when Aristotle‘s distinction between 
the continent and virtuous person comes into view. Aristotle grants 
considerable moral status to the continent agent who, though not fully 
virtuous, is nevertheless morally good in significant ways. To be sure, 
Aristotle does twice suggest in the Nicomachean Ethics that virtue and 
continence might be classified together (NE 1145a17 & 1148a14-15) 
because they are both concerned with the same things. He does also 
in the Eudemian Ethics declare that 'continence rather than 
incontinence is a virtue' (EE1223b11). However, continence does not 
                                                 
186
 These views will be explored at 6.2. 
187
 This was explained in the previous chapter. 
188
 In Chapters 1 & 2 of Educating the Virtues Carr (1991) contrasts Plato‟s view of virtue as 
knowledge and Aristotle‟s, as virtue as character. 
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seem to be a virtue in any very significant or complete sense. 
Continence, he says, ‗is not to be regarded as altogether a virtue, 
either; it is a sort of combination of virtue with something else 
(NE1128b11)‘. While the actions of both the continent and virtuous 
never deviate from the right moral principle, the former has ‗bad 
desires‘ whereas the latter does not (NE1151b27-1152a3). Continence is 
to be regarded as a good thing (NE1151b29), but the continent agent is 
not good without qualification.   
 
Aristotle states that ‗not all continence will be good‘ (NE1146a14-
15). If continence is also accompanied by strong desire, it is not 
compatible with the virtue of temperance (NE1146a10-15). The former 
feels pleasure, but does not ‗get carried away by it‘, whereas the latter 
takes no pleasure ‗in anything contrary to his principle‘ (NE1151b34-
1152a3). Aristotle adds that the feelings of the virtuous, unlike those of 
the continent, are ‗in complete harmony‘189 with reason (NE1102b23-28). 
The final point is crucial as this is, arguably, the main difference 
between the continent and the virtuous.  Whereas the feelings, habits 
and dispositions of the fully virtuous are at one with each other, the 
continent experience a degree of conflict and discontinuity between 
their feelings and principles. The continent, are, nevertheless, morally 
praiseworthy; just not as praiseworthy as the fully virtuous. The 
continent can discern what virtue requires and they are able to 
exercise the will power necessary to act in accordance with moral 
principles. Significantly, in the Ethics, the soul of the continent but 
not that of the incontinent is described as ‗receptive‘ and 'obedient' to 
reason. However, the soul of the virtuous man is ‗presumably more 
amenable‘ to reason (NE1102b23-28). What distinguishes the continent 
from the incontinent is that the former acts upon choice, not desire, 
while the latter acts on desire not choice (NE1111b14-16). The continent 
                                                 
189
 Aristotle does however indicate that some virtues (anger and courage especially) might involve 
mixtures of pleasure and pain and/or a small degree of conflict between feeling and principle, as we 
shall see in the subsequent chapter. Carr observes that 'no coherent conception of virtuous agency 
should exclude the kind of emotional complexity in which both pleasant and painful emotions are 
mixed in the usual human proportions.' (Carr, 2009, p 42) 
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always chooses to act in accordance with the principle of practical 
wisdom; the incontinent never does190. 
 
 ‗A virtue ethics in the fullest sense must treat aretaic notions (like ―good‖ or 
―excellent‖) rather than deontic notions (like ―morally wrong,‖ ―ought,‖ and 
―obligation‖) as primary, and it must put greater emphasis on the ethical 
assessment of agents and their (inner) motives and character traits than it puts on 
the evaluation of acts and choices.‘ (Slote, 1995, p 89) 
 
Aristotle‘s notion of continence importantly distinguishes his 
account of virtue from those of Kant, Peters and Plato. Of these 
philosophers, only Aristotle held that ‗inner motives‘ and feelings had 
to be shaped in certain ways as a prerequisite for genuine moral 
maturity. In section 4.4, it was noted that Kant regarded properly 
conceived virtue as devoid of emotion. In section 4.3, it was also 
observed that Peters did not think that proper emotions and motives 
were a necessary feature of all virtues either. His type a) virtues are 
entirely motiveless, whereas his type d), are higher order virtues that 
have to be exercised in the face of contradictory inclinations. 
Importantly, in the subsequent sections of this chapter, it will be 
argued that Plato thought that pleasures and pains are not to be 
educated, but rather rationally controlled (see 6.2 & 6.3) or limited (see 
6.4 and 6.5). Aristotle by contrast, thought that complete virtue requires 
that both actions and feelings accord with moral principle.  
 
Aristotle‘s requirement for the virtuous to act and feel rightly, in 
tune with moral understanding, has vital educational implications. It 
has been suggested that continence might be understood as a 
developmental stage on the path to becoming fully virtuous191. In the 
next chapter this idea will be discussed further. There it will be argued 
                                                 
190
 Aristotle specifies that there are two types of incontinence: impetuosity and weakness. The weak 
deliberate correctly about what to do but „then under the influence of their feelings fail to abide by their 
decisions; others are carried away by their feelings because they have failed to deliberate (NE1150b19-
23) Kristjánsson (2007) incorporates just this distinction into his Aristotelian theory of moral 
development. This theory is discussed in the subsequent chapter. 
191
 See Burnyeat (1980) Curzer (2002), Kristjánsson (2007) and Carr (2009). 
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that the young should not only be educated in proper feelings, but 
also that they might learn through such feelings. However, since Frede 
has argued that Aristotle‘s theory of emotion is directly borrowed from 
Plato‘s Philebus, it would first seem advisable to give this hypothesis 
some scrutiny, not least because Aristotle broadly defines emotions as 
alterations of judgement concerning pleasures and pains 
(Rhetoric1378a20-22). If Aristotle did in fact resuscitate a Platonic theory 
of emotion, it would have considerable implications for the viability 
and coherence of his account of moral education. If Frede is correct, 
Aristotelian emotions also require limitation rather than education.  
 
6.2 Aristotelian Inconsistency and Mixed Emotion? 
 
‗What is characteristic of all emotions is a single feature: namely thought or belief as 
the efficient cause.‘ (Fortenbaugh, 2008, p 116) 
 
In the opening pages of his influential text, Aristotle on Emotion, 
Fortenbaugh (2008) chronicled a period when members of Plato‘s 
academy, including Aristotle, conducted a groundbreaking inquiry 
into the emotions. The investigation culminated in a theory, fully 
articulated in Aristotle‘s Rhetoric, according to which thought and/or 
belief came to be construed as ‗efficient causes‘ (Fortenbaugh, 2008, p 12) 
of emotion. Fortenbaugh suggests that the Academy‘s investigation of 
emotion was first evident in Plato‘s Philebus. Fortenbaugh claims that 
the Philebus raises questions about the emotions, but it is Aristotle 
who directly addresses and answers these questions in the Rhetoric.  
A significant feature of Aristotle‘s account, Fortenbaugh argues, was 
the creation of a new educational theory of the emotions. Frede (1996, 
footnote 15, p 280) however, indicates that Fortenbaugh does not give 
due credit to the subtlety of Plato‘s own analysis of emotions in the 
Philebus. This chapter and the next will therefore have three main 
tasks: to document the nature of the accounts of emotion in the 
Philebus and Rhetoric; to ascertain the extent of influence of the 
former on the latter; and to consider the educational implications of 
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the Academy‘s exploration of emotions. 
 
'If it is a sign of a truly great mind not to be excessively concerned with consistency, 
then Aristotle displays this kind of greatness of mind to a very high degree…..It is 
from inconsistencies in great minds that we learn.‘ (Frede, p 279, 1996) 
 
Dorothea Frede in her essay Mixed Feelings in Aristotle’s 
Rhetoric (1996) posits that Aristotle provides contrasting accounts of 
the emotions in the Rhetoric and the Nicomachean Ethics. In the 
Rhetoric, she says, Aristotle accepts or essentially restates the 
‗remedial‘ or ‗mixed‘ account of the emotions described by Plato in the 
Philebus. Frede argues that most of the emotions described in the 
Philebus and the Rhetoric are mixed,192 because they contain a 
mixture of pleasant and painful components. She states that no ‗such 
emphasis on their mixed nature is found in his treatment of the 
emotions in his ethics‘ (Frede, 1996, p258). In the Ethics, she says, 
Aristotle 'roundly rejects' the mixed or remedial theory of emotion and 
‗argues that pleasure is tied to perfect activities of the soul‘ (Frede, 1996, 
p259). Such ‗blatant disagreement‘ as to the nature of one of the main 
sources of human motivation, she argues, requires explanation. Much 
of chapter 7 will be concerned with such an explanation. Importantly, 
in section 6.3 of this chapter, it will first be said that it is far from 
clear that Plato develops any theory of emotion, mixed or otherwise, in 
the Philebus. In section 7.2, it will be acknowledged that Phileban and 
rhetorical theories of pleasure do somewhat resemble each other; but 
in section 7.3, it will be argued that Aristotle's emphasis on 
persuasion renders his account of emotion significantly different from 
Plato‘s. Before the discussion goes any further, however, it would 
seem important to unpack exactly what Frede means by a mixed 




                                                 
192
 Frede concedes Aristotle did not himself employ the word mixed. 
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‘pleasure and pain are merely surfaces 
(one itself showing, itself hiding one) 
life’s only and true value neither is’  (E. E. Cummings, 1997, p 63) 
 
Frede‘s description of the Platonic account of pleasure and pain 
as mixed in nature is best exemplified in the Philebus.  However, in 
the Republic, Plato also explores the possibility that pleasure and pain 
are mixed. There (RP583b-588b), he suggests that there is an 
intermediary state of rest between pleasure and pain that is itself 
pleasurable. Neither sensation is directly felt, but is rather a residual 
effect of a resolution of sorts between the two. Under this 
interpretation, pleasure consists in the absence of pain, after a 
moment of pain has passed. Pain conversely consists in the absence of 
pleasure, after the latter felt experience has run its course. However, 
in the Republic, Plato ultimately decides that such an intermediary 
state of mixed pleasures and pains is an appearance of, rather than a 
pure pleasure.  
 
‘The state of rest must appear pleasant by contrast with previous pain or painful by 
contrast with previous pleasure; but judged by the standard of true pleasure, 
neither appearance can be genuine, but must be some sort of conjuring trick…. So 
we must not let ourselves believe that pure pleasure consists in relief from pain, or 
pure pain in the cessation of pleasure‘ (Republic, 584a6-c2) 
 
Frede states that the Platonic notion of two kinds of pleasure in 
the Republic is unsatisfactory as it ‗avoids a clear pronouncement as 
to whether the specious pleasures are pleasures or not (Frede, 1996, p 
261)‘. Indeed, Plato only seems to be confident of the philosopher‘s 
ability to experience real pleasure (RP583b-588b). Frede and Waterfield 
(1980) consider this to be a weakness of Plato‘s view in the Republic. 
However, they both argue that he resolves this issue more 
satisfactorily in the Philebus. ‗There he presents us with a truly 
magisterial solution to the whole problem, a unified account of 
pleasure and pain that is free from all such flaws (Frede, 1996, p 261)‘.  
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Waterfield and Gosling and Taylor (1982) maintain that the Philebus is 
probably a later dialogue than the Republic. Although modern readers 
should not be completely confident in this dating (Waterfield, 1980), 
Frede also adheres to it.  
 
‗Whoever has any pleasure at all, however ill founded it may be really does have 
pleasure, even if sometimes it is not about anything that either is the case or ever 
was the case, or often (or perhaps most of the time) refers to anything that ever will 
be the case… And the same account holds in the case of fear, anger, and everything 
of that sort, namely that all of them can at times be false.‘ (Philebus, 40d5-e2) 
 
Plato devotes considerable attention to pleasure and pain in the 
Philebus (31b-59d). Unlike in the Republic, he emphasises that though 
pleasures may arise in us through false judgement, all pleasures are 
nevertheless real (Frede, 1996, Letwin 1980). Moreover, pleasures and 
pains are presented, Frede says, as intentional states 'defined by what 
they are about' (Frede, 1996, p262). The notion that pleasures and pains 
have a substantive content that can be 'subject to moral evaluation' 
(Frede, 1996, p262) is crucial, she says, to Plato's explanation of complex 
emotions in the Philebus.  Crucially, Frede thinks that this mixed or 
restorative theory of pleasure and pain can be extended to explain the 
emotions. She suggests that the passage (PHI47c-50e) of the Philebus 
represents a fundamental point of agreement between the Philebus 
and the Rhetoric. In both texts, she says, it is found that 'mixed 
emotions are desires to remedy an injury or disturbance combined 
with the pleasant expectation of restoration' (Frede, p263). Before the 
question of whether or not Aristotle adopted a Phileban theory of 
emotion in the Rhetoric can be answered, it first seems necessary to 
consider in detail precisely what the Philebus had to say about 
pleasure and pain. It is to this task that the discussion now turns. 
Specifically, it will be argued that Frede is correct in saying that 
pleasures (or at least some of them) are intentional and therefore apt 
for moral appraisal in the Philebus, but that she is only correct in a 
qualified way. Plato seems really to be of the view that it is our desires 
 136 
and memories that are intentional and susceptible to normative 
evaluation, and he has a very particular conception of desire 
(literally193) in mind. 
 
6.3 Mixed Pleasures & Desire in the Philebus  
 
In the Philebus, Plato supposes that there is a natural state of 
harmony in all living creatures that disintegrates when they 
experience emptiness (Philebus, 31d-32c). It is painful, he says, to suffer 
the decay and destruction of this natural state (Philebus, 42c8-d3). 
However, the emptiness brought about by the disintegration of the 
natural state can be removed by the filling up of whatever has been 
lacking. Crucially, Plato actually defines pleasure at this point as such 
a restoration to the natural state. As he puts it, ‗when things are 
restored to their own nature again, this restoration, as we established 
in our agreement among ourselves, is pleasure‘ (Philebus, 42d5-6). There 
would appear to be sound textual evidence, then, in support of Frede‘s 
declaration that Phileban pleasures are ‗always the restoration of 
some disturbance or the filling of a lack‘ (Frede, 1996, p 262). However, 
further scrutiny of the text reveals that Plato‘s theory of ‗mixed 
pleasures‘ is not quite so straightforward or all encompassing. For one 
thing, Plato offers an alternative, quite different, model of how 
pleasures arise in the human soul (Letwin, 1981). For another, Plato 
explicitly states that there is a class of pleasures that are 'pure' 
precisely because they are not mixed with any pain. The rest of this 
section, however, will be concerned with unpacking the complex ways 
in which Plato says that pleasures and pains are involved in the 
restoration process. 
 
Although Plato defines pleasure as a resolution to the natural 
state it is not obviously the case that he intends this resolution to be a 
singular process, for he specifies that there are three different ways in 
                                                 
193
 I say literally here as Plato specifies in the Philebus that desire is an entirely mental event. 
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which mixed pleasures can arise194. It is possible, he says, for there to 
be mixtures confined to the body, mixtures that exist only in the soul 
and mixtures that are a combination of pleasures and pains in soul 
and body (Philebus, 46b6-46c3 & 50c8-50e). Plato does not clearly explain 
how all of these different combinations of pleasure and pain restore 
beings to their natural state. However, he does at least discuss each in 
turn, so it is possible to interpret the dialogue in such a way as to 
make sense of his declaration that pleasures do return living 
creatures to harmony. Arguably, it would be clearer if these pleasures 
were classified as those of non-perception, perception and mental-self 
representation. As will become apparent, Plato thought that the 
pleasures of perception involve, and should ultimately be governed by, 
preserved perceptions. Recognising that some of Plato‘s mixed 
pleasures are exclusively mental events and some are exclusively 
bodily, is crucial to assessing the validity of Frede‘s assertion that 
pleasures and pains are intentional and apt for moral evaluation.  
 
Plato firstly and briefly alludes to an account of how it is 
possible for there to be mixed pleasures of non-perception that are 
confined to the body. He says that it is possible for some mixtures of 
feeling to extinguish themselves in the body before they reach the 
soul, whereas others penetrate through to the soul. The pleasures that 
remain in the body are not perceived in the soul and are, Plato says, 
pleasures of 'non-perception' (Philebus, 33d-34). Pleasures of non-
perception, it seems, work themselves out in our bodies, restoring us 
to the natural state, before our minds (need to?) become aware of 
them. In order to explain how the pleasures limited to the body differ 
from those that do not, Plato thereafter details his understanding of 
perception, memory and desire. 
 
‗And wasn‘t it the soul that had desires, desires for conditions opposite to the actual 
ones of the body, while it is the body that undergoes the pain or pleasure of some 
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 The view that pleasures are presented in this threefold way is shared by Gosling 1959, Gosling& 
Taylor 1982, Fortenbaugh 2008 and Miller 2008. 
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affection.‘ (Philebus, 41c3-6, p 46) 
 
The first actual example of the process of restoration discussed 
by Socrates and his interlocutor is hunger, where the emptiness of not 
having eaten enough recently is attended with pain. Pleasure in this 
instance, Plato implies, is or has the potential to be two-fold: pleasure 
in the expectation in the soul of the hunger being satiated (Ibid, 32c) 
and pleasure in the actual bodily experience of the emptiness of 
hunger being filled. The latter pleasures, Plato says, are the 'most 
ordinary and well known cases' (Ibid, 31e-32). Hunger and thirst, then, 
would seem to be instances of mixed pleasures that involve the soul 
and the body. Importantly though, the pleasures of the body and 
those of the soul are qualitatively different. The pleasure in the soul is 
one of rational expectation, whereas the somatic pleasure is one of 
bodily gratification. Plato arguably defines desire as this rational 
expectation. Desire is central to the Phileban account of pleasure as a 
restoration to the natural state; for it is desire that drives the 
restoration process (Ibid, 35c12-13).  
 
Socrates:  ‗But do we maintain that he who has a desire desires something?  
Protarchus: Necessarily. 
Socrates: He does, then, not have a desire for what he in fact experiences. For 
he is thirsty, and this is a process of emptying. His desire is rather of 
filling.  
Protarchus: Yes. 
Socrates: Something in the person who is thirsty must necessarily be in contact 
with filling. 
Protarchus: Necessarily. 
Socrates: But it is impossible that this should be the body, for the body is what 
is emptied out.  
Protarchus: Yes.  
Socrates: The only option that we are left with is that the soul makes contact 
with the filling, and it certainly must do so through memory.‘ 
(Philebus, 35b1-35c) 
 
In the account given in the Philebus desire is preceded by a 
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bodily pain or pleasure, but it is not the bodily pain or pleasure. 
Desire, he declares, ‗is not a matter of the body‘ (Philebus, 35c6). People 
experience the physiological pain of hunger in the body and a rational 
desire or expectation for that emptiness to be filled subsequently 
follows. This rational expectation in the soul, moreover, takes the form 
of a memory. In order to make fuller sense of memory and its role in 
desire, it seems necessary to consider Plato‘s construal of perception; 
for he defines memory as the ‗preservation of perception‘ (Philebus, 
34a8). Plato states that perception is the motion of soul and body being 
jointly ‗moved by one and the same affection‘ (Philebus, 34a2-3).  
However, he crucially states that it is through recalling and 
comprehending as fully as possible the perceptions of pleasures of the 
soul without the body, that the nature of pleasure and desire in 
general is revealed (Ibid, 34c4-7). Plato seems to think that it is the 
preserved element of any perception that ensures a truthful 
judgement.  
 
Desires are revealed to be essentially ‗mental events‘ (Letwin, 
1981) that occur in the soul, that are driven by memories of bodily 
perceptions of filling from the past (Philebus, 34b5-34c7). It is not 
therefore perceptions of current particular bodily pleasures or pains, 
in themselves, that make a return to bodily harmony possible; the 
vehicle for restoration is rather the rational desire in the soul. In a 
crucial passage, Plato says that it is memories that direct every living 
creature to the objects they desire (Ibid, 35Cc9-d2).  Frede indicates that 
the point of Plato‘s careful analysis is to demonstrate that pleasures 
and pains are ‗intentional (object directed) states, since all involve 
memory‘ (Philebus 1993, Frede footnote on p 37). Moreover, she adds that it 
is 'the soul that is responsible for determining a pleasure‘s intentional 
object, what that pleasure is about (Frede, 1993, xliv)‘. Letwin (1981) 
similarly takes Plato to be suggesting that pleasures are essentially 
mental events. I take Goldie‘s definition of intentionality to be 
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instructive here195 and, because of this, agree with Frede and Letwin, 
but only up to a point.  
 
‘Intentionality is the mind‘s capability of being directed onto things in the world.‘ 
(Goldie, 2004, p 3) 
 
All desires are portrayed as intentional states in the Philebus, 
involving as they do mental events (memories) about perceptible 
worldly objects. However, given that Plato specifies that at least some 
mixed pleasures arise in the body alone196, it is hard to accept Frede‘s 
point that all mixed pleasures are intentional states, since not all 
mixed pleasures involve memories. It is also hard to accept her view 
that Plato's analysis was intended to establish that all pleasures are 
intentional states. Plato himself clearly states that it is memory that 
directs each creature to the object it desires (Philebus, 35d1-2). The 
pleasures that are intentional would seem to be so, largely because of 
their dependence upon memory and desire. Moreover, Plato has 
Socrates state different reasons for discussing memory and desire; his 
‗argument has established that every impulse, desire and the rule of 
the whole animal is the domain of the soul‘ (Ibid, 35d2-3).  
 
In suggesting that the soul should rule over the whole animal, 
Plato is arguably referring to his ontology (discussed at 6.5 and 6.6) 
and the need for the rational soul of human beings to impose some 
limit on pleasure. Arguably, he has been trying to explain how 
memories should be construed as crucial components of the rational 
soul, crucial, because it is such preserved perceptions that can enable 
moral judgements to be made about how to properly limit current 




                                                 
195
 Goldie‟s definition is to be sure, a rather figurative, phenomenological one. 
196
 As I have already noted at 46b6-7. 
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6.4 Real, and False pleasures and Phileban Emotions 
 
‗And if a mistake is made about the object of judgement, then we should say that 
the judgement that makes that mistake is not right and does not judge rightly….As 
to pleasure, it certainly often seems to arise within us not with a right but with a 
false, judgement.‘  (Philebus, 37e1-10, p40-41) 
 
There has been considerable disagreement over whether or not 
Plato intended to formulate a single theory to explain the nature of 
pleasure in the Philebus. Frede (1996) and Tuozzo (1996), in their 
different ways, conclude that the dialogue does contain a general 
theory applicable to all cases of pleasure. However, Gosling & Taylor‘s 
(1982) view is that anticipatory pleasures constitute a class distinct 
from those of replenishment. Letwin (1981) similarly argues that Plato 
provides readers with not one but two theories of pleasure in the 
Philebus. Although the Philebus is open to interpretation I would 
incline to agree with Gosling & Taylor and Letwin. 
 
Plato states that all pleasures are real, though they can 
nevertheless be accompanied by true or false judgements (Ibid, 37a-b). 
To illuminate this point and explain how judgements about pleasures 
can be true or false, Plato employs a simile. He argues that the soul of 
each individual is comparable to a book. He imagines that two 
craftsmen live within our souls (a scribe and a painter) who 
respectively write the words and paint the pictures that enable us to 
gather information about the sensible world that we live in (Ibid, 38e10-
39d). Importantly, these artisans provide us with a subjective 
impression of the world that is not necessarily a picture and 
description of the world as it actually is. These impressions, Plato 
makes clear, are based on both memories (preserved perceptions) and 
perceptions (Ibid, 39a1). He says that the judgements that determine the 
truth or falsity of a pleasure are also based on a combination of 
memory and perception (Philebus, 38b5-38c). Gosling remarks that in the 
Philebus, ‗anticipation is shown to be a desire consequent on a 
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memory stimulated by a present want‘ (Gosling, 1959, p 46). Gosling 
implies that the pictures painted in the soul are assessments of our 
own prospects of pleasure to come. Critically, then, Plato is not 
arguing that falsity is an attribute of pleasure itself or of the sensation 
of pleasure. He is rather making the case that our predictions of future 
pleasures can be mistaken (Gosling, 1959).  
 
Plato does briefly also explain how false judgements about 
pleasures can arise from a current sense perceptions or impressions. 
He says that a man may mistake another man in the distance for a 
statue, with this perception turning into a mistaken judgement that 
the man is a statue (PHI38c2-38c2). However, Plato is largely concerned 
with how a false judgement may arise from preserved perceptions and 
desires. The mixed pleasures that exist in the soul alone, he says, are 
anticipatory, future pleasures. The writings and paintings in the soul 
concerning these pleasures are similarly future-directed (Ibid, 39d-e5). 
Plato adds that the future-directed images and words of the wicked 
man are usually false, whilst those of the good man are normally true 
(Ibid, 39de9-40c). Frede (1993) construes this to be the point at which 
Phileban pleasures reveal themselves to possess moral content, with 
the fool or wicked man‘s pleasures representing a distorted view of life. 
I would agree that the Philebus therefore indicates that a person‘s 
desires197contain a moral element that can be normatively evaluated 
as better or worse. However, this moral element is only apparent when 
the rational soul (and specifically the preserved perception) is involved 
in pleasure. No mention is made of how a person‘s perceptions might 
be deemed morally praiseworthy or otherwise, only that they might be 
true or false (Phielbus, 39c3-4).  
 
Contrary to Frede, Gosling (1959) suggests that anticipatory 
pleasures are right because they hit the mark of true perception; it is 
less obviously the case, he thinks, that rightness has any connection 
                                                 
197
 That is, their future directed rational pleasures. 
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to the moral sphere. Letwin similarly comments that neither model of 
pleasure198 in the Philebus is able to account for moral activity. One 
view, he says, ‗provides a theory of conceptual analysis which is 
inapplicable to particulars, and the other explains our knowledge of 
particulars without any way of analysing concepts‘ (Letwin, 1981, p 199). 
I agree with his point in general. Memories can play no part in any 
analysis of pleasures confined to the body and only memories (whose 
content is about preserved rather than current particulars) can 
properly account for pleasures confined to the soul or mixed in the 
soul and body. After all, as we have seen, it is the desires that are 
most divorced from the body that reveal the truth of all pleasures 
(Philebus, 34c4-7). Letwin, however, appears to have overlooked Plato‘s 
quite plausible view that it is possible to have future ambitions that 
can be subjected to normative interrogation. It seems to me that many 
general hopes may be judged as better or worse without their needing 
to be directed at a particular object. A general future intent to become, 
for example, a contract killer is surely more morally reprehensible 
than that of becoming a teacher. I need not have a particular ‗mark‘ or 
class in mind before I can determine which desire is more ethically 
defensible.  
 
Plato, in the dialogue, thereafter attempts to explain the nature 
of pleasures confined to the soul and it is at this point (Philebus, 47c-50e) 
that Frede thinks Plato develops a theory of mixed emotions. Although 
it is perhaps in the Philebus that Plato provides his most detailed 
account of the passions (Letwin, 1981), it is far from clear that it is 
Plato‘s intention to present readers with a general theory of these as 
mixed pleasures in this dialogue. When Plato discusses the passions, 
he tends to name particular ones; the occasions on which he actually 
employs the general term (pathos) emotion in the dialogue are 
relatively rare.  
 
                                                 
198
 Letwin (1981) refers to either: restoration to the natural state, or; the soul‟s impression of perception 
and preserved perception. 
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'The case, a common one, where the mixture is a product of affections within the 
soul itself...Take wrath, fear, longing, lamentations, love, jealousy, malice and other 
things like that; don't you regard them as a kind of pain within the soul itself.' 
(Philebus, 47d7-e2) 
 
As the preceding quotation shows, in the passage in the 
Philebus to which Frede refers, it is indeed stated that it is common 
for there to be a mixture of feelings of pleasure and pain produced 
within the soul.  Letwin (1981, p 197) agrees with this element of Frede's 
analysis of the passage (Philebus, 47c-e), for he describes the passions as 
being made up of contrasts between pleasure and pain. However, the 
fact that these affections are produced ‗within the soul itself‘ appears 
to be very significant. It seems to me that such feelings belong to the 
earlier mentioned class of pleasures that are ‗confined to the soul‘ 
(Philebus, 46c1), those I have classified as pleasures of mental-self 
representation. The pleasures of the 'soul itself'', Plato earlier stated, 
depend 'entirely on memory' (Ibid, 33c4-5); they are all, he says, 
concerned with future hopes and expectations (Ibid, 39d5-39e5). As I 
hope to make clear at 6.5, the conception of the soul that Plato 
endorses in the Philebus is not one that involves a bodily aspect.  
  
If Plato did intend to develop a general theory of the emotions in 
this section of the Philebus, one of its distinctive features would seem 
to be that emotions are free of bodily feelings. Letwin concurs with 
this reading of the passage and observes that passions are 
occurrences that are ‗psychological rather than physiological in 
character' (1981, p 196). Crucially, Frede herself states that Plato does 
not adopt the term ‗pathos‘ as a generic term for the emotions; he 
rather describes psychological states that should be called pleasures 
or pains, depending on which of these feelings is dominant (Frede, 1996, 
Footnote 13, p 280). Plato does not define emotions as mixtures of 
pleasure and pain, for he does not say that passions are a mixture of 
pleasures and pain in the soul. He argues only that it is possible for 
there to be affections in the soul alone that involve a mixture of 
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pleasure and pain.  
 
Plato‘s main example of a mixed pleasure in the soul is laughter 
mixed with weeping. Importantly, what is of interest to Plato during 
his discussion of comedy on stage is the ‗state of mind‘ that people are 
in when they laugh maliciously. For people‘s states of mind, he says, 
can contain a mixture of pleasure and pain (Philebus, 48a). Plato does 
not mention the somatic sensations involved in weeping and laughing 
here. Nor does he say that physical instances of laughter and weeping 
can restore mental pains or pleasures to their natural state. In fact, 
Plato ends the passage by making the same point that he had at the 
start of it. He has Socrates state the reason why he has just discussed 
the mixture of mental pleasures and pains stimulated by a comedy. 
His purpose has been to show ‗that there exists the possibility, for the 
body without the soul, for the soul without the body, and for both of 
them in joint affection to contain a mixture of pleasure and pain 
(Philebus, 50d3-5)‘. That Plato might not have convincingly shown that 
laughter and weeping bring with them mixed pleasures of the soul 
alone199 does not alter the fact that this is what he was trying to do. 
Irrespective of his declared purpose, if Plato did present a theory of 
emotions in the Philebus what is most interesting about it is that they 
are portrayed as entirely cognitive judgements, as essentially mental 
events. These cognitive pleasures and pains are also exclusively 
future-directed (Philebus, 39d5-39e5). They are about imagined ‗things 
present in time but not in place‘. (Gosling, 1959, p 51) 
 
‗To gaze at the comic stage, accordingly, is to be given a double sight: the 
external spectacle of others, there on the stage before us, and the inner sight of 
ourselves evoked by comparison.‘ (Miller, 2008, p 271) 
  
Tuozzo (1996) and Miller (2008) argue that the pleasures and 
pains involved in the emotion of malicious laughter are caused by 
                                                 
199
 For both laughter and weeping would seem to invariably involve physical manifestations of some 
sort. 
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entertaining certain cognitions and images about ones self. When we 
observe comic characters who are deluded about their personal 
qualities, our own self-knowledge, relative to theirs, is ‗the cause of 
malicious pleasure‘ (Tuozzo, 1996, p 511). It is highly problematic to 
conclude that the self-knowledge in question has much genuine moral 
import, however; ‗comedy seems only to flirt with self-knowledge‘ 
(Miller, 2008, 273). People who truly know themselves would not allow 
their self-images to be so dependent upon comparison with others 
(Tuozzo, 1996).  
 
Miller implies that the restoration to harmony brought about by 
laughter is a return to a state of ignorance in the soul. Socrates 
explains to his interlocutor that the laughable ‗is the sight of another 
who thinks himself wise when he is not. The opposites in play here are 
ignorance and knowledge‘ (Miller, 2008, 273). The moral significance of 
the passions, Miller intriguingly concludes, resides in our desire and 
capacity to experience discomfort rather than restoration. For it is 
when we are in a state of envious distress that our own ignorance is 
revealed. Miller suggests that Plato‘s termination of the Philebus with 
a promise to continue the discussion with Protarchus tomorrow, is his 
way of inviting us to discover more about ourselves. It is only if we 
revisit and learn from any theatrical unmasking of our own ignorance 
that we might come to possess wisdom and self-knowledge. Although 
Miller‘s postulation is intuitively appealing, Plato is not entirely clear 
about this. He does after all specify in the Philebus that the pleasures 
of learning are pure precisely in so far as they are not accompanied by 
any pain (Philebus, 66c5-6). 
 
‗The Philebus certainly makes clear that Plato saw an intimate relationship between 
emotion and cognition. But it fails to make this relationship clear…Further 
clarification was necessary. (Fortenbaugh, 2008, p 11)  
 
If Plato did at least hint at a theory of intelligent emotions then 
it would seem to be of historic importance to the philosophy of 
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emotion; Bedford (1956) Peters200 (1962) and more recently Solomon 
(1993) have all broadly claimed that emotions are at their core cognitive 
judgements. The foregoing scrutiny of the Philebus201, however, 
arguably renders doubtful the argument that Plato was there 
intending to present readers with a general theory of emotions as 
mixed pleasures. Moreover, Frede‘s failure to discuss in detail the 
different types of mixed pleasure seems to have prevented her from 
recognising that the ‗Phileban emotions‘ differ fundamentally from 
those mixed pleasures that do involve the body. Miller (2008) correctly 
suggests that the latter are concerned with bodily health and well-
being, whereas the former are concerned with the well-being and 
virtue of the soul.  
 
As the remainder of this chapter will show, Plato held that 
reason should prescribe the normative limit for bodily pleasure. In 
contrast, the passion (malicious laughter that excludes the body) 
actually discussed in detail in the Philebus seems to derive its moral 
value from the element of discomfort in pleasure. It is after all the pain 
of malicious envy202 that reveals our own ignorance. The person who is 
relieved by malicious laughter is restored to a state of ignorance, but 
such a state cannot be morally desirable in Plato‘s normative schema. 
Plato repeatedly stresses that the life of knowledge is most worthwhile, 
as will become apparent at 6.5 and 6.6. I agree with Fortenbaugh; 
Aristotle‘s elaboration of themes hinted at in the Philebus was entirely 
necessary for the development of a more complete, clear and coherent 
theory of emotion. The purpose of the Philebus was not to discuss 
emotion, but to ascertain the relative merits of pleasure and 
knowledge as candidates for ends in the best human life, as Plato 
himself makes clear.  
                                                 
200
 Peters‟ concept of emotion and his thoughts on the education of the emotions will be discussed in 
the subsequent chapter.  
201
 Particular focus has been placed on (PHI47d-50e). 
202
 The fact that Plato focuses on „malicious envy‟ in comedy rather than „emulation‟ arguably serves 
as a further point of contrast between the accounts of pleasure and pain in the Philebus and Rhetoric. In 
chapter 7, it will become clear that Aristotle thought emulation was a moral emotion, whereas envy 
was not. 
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6.5 The unlimited nature of pleasure in the Philebus and Phaedrus 
 
Socrates:  ‘We declared the life that combines pleasure and knowledge the 
winner. Didn’t we? 
Protarchus:     We did. 
Socrates: Should we not take a look at this life and see what it is and to which it 
belongs?...it is not a mixture of just two elements but of the sort where 
all that is unlimited is tied down by the limit.’ (Philebus, 30d,) 
 
The principal concern203 of the Philebus is to better understand 
whether a life spent pursuing pleasure or knowledge is more 
worthwhile. Plato draws the conclusion204 that the best human life is 
one that involves the pursuit of both pleasure and knowledge. 
However, Plato‘s verdict is a qualified one; if it were possible for 
human beings to eradicate somatic pleasures entirely, then a life 
spent without these would be better. As we can see, it is knowledge 
that is responsible for qualifying pleasure and finding its 'right limit'. 
Frede notably concurs with this point.  
 
‗Pleasure is an unlimited but somehow necessary ingredient; knowledge is the cause 
of all good mixtures, and is therefore in charge of determining the right limit of 
pleasure‘ (Frede, 1993, xl)  
 
Plato states that pleasure is exceedingly complex (Philebus, 12c3), 
and the content of the text certainly bears out this complexity. Barnes 
nevertheless suggests that microscopic ‗scrutiny of Plato‘s words is a 
prerequisite for understanding Plato‘s thought‘ (Barnes, 1980, p 193). 
Engaging with the often perplexing detail of Plato‘s analyses of 
pleasure therefore seems crucial to a proper understanding of his 
theory. Indeed, it seems to me that Frede (1996) has erred in her 
interpretation of the Philebus, precisely in so far as she reduced his 
anatomy of pleasure to one model. Pleasure, Plato asserts, is by its 
very nature insatiable and unlimited (Philebus, 28a & 31a8-10) and it is 
                                                 
203
 This is stated by Socrates in the initial stages of the dialogue at 11d. 
204
 This is revealed by the foregoing exchange involving his mentor Socrates. 
 149 
this unquenchable nature that means that knowledge must limit the 
extent to which human beings satiate pleasures in their lives. In the 
passage that describes the ‗four-fold ontology of all beings‘ (Ibid, 23c-27c), 
Plato ranks four different states of being in order of importance, with 
the unlimited (the class to which pleasure belongs) being the poorest. 
These states are: firstly, the unlimited; secondly the limit; thirdly that 
which is the mixture of unlimited and the limit; and the fourth and 
most important state that is the cause of all things.  
 
Socrates emphasises to his interlocutor that their digression 
into ontology is not an idle one (Ibid, 30d6). On the contrary, reason has 
been declared as the cause of all things (Ibid, 30e1) and eternal ruler of 
the universe (Ibid, 30d8). It is reason, a sort of incorporeal order (Ibid, 
64b), that is both the source of and final arbiter in any harmonious 
order established in human bodies. Plato‘s position is that ‗thought is 
the creative force of the universe‘ (Letwin, 1981, p188). It is further 
suggested by Plato (Philebus, 26b-c) that it is not so much mortal but 
divine reason that limits unlimited pleasure. He suggests that it is a 
Goddess who divinely imposes order on boundless mortal desire (Ibid, 
26c). In this regard, Frede (1993, p 29) and Letwin (1981, p 188) both 
interpret Plato to be saying that human reason may enable the 
harmonious imposition of rational limit on unlimited pleasure, by 
virtue of its source in and at least partial similarity to divine reason.  
This point is important to the extent that it supports my earlier 
suggestion that it is human memories (preserved perceptions) that 
limit current perceptions of pleasure. There are arguably parallels 
here with the Phaedrus where Plato also explored the need for 
pleasure to be limited by reason. In the Phaedrus he figuratively 
proposes that the souls of gods and men alike may be compared to a 
charioteer and two horses.  
 
‗Now in the case of the gods, horses and charioteer are all both good in themselves 




Only gods occupy the realm of ‗being which really is‘. Their 
minds (and hence their souls, their souls being all mind) are 
nourished by and possessed of knowledge that is true and unmixed 
with earthly concerns (Phaedrus, 247c5-e5). The equine allegory is further 
developed and human life is likened to a chariot race (Ibid, 248a7-d). 
Mortal beings, he says, strain to reach above themselves towards the 
gods, but failing205, they are instead drawn into a race in which they 
jostle to get ahead of each other. Those engaged in the race ‗with great 
labour depart without achieving a sight of what is and afterwards feed 
on what only appears to nourish them. (Ibid, 248b4-6)‘ In the Phaedrus, 
then, Plato reasserts his belief of the Republic; that the sensible world 
is capable of revealing only appearances of what is, rather than reality 
itself.  
 
The soul of man, like those of the gods, is also made up of a 
charioteer and two horses, but the natures of the two horses are 
opposed. One horse is god-like and led by reason to be ‗good‘; the 
other horse is licentious and bent on desire (Ibid, 253d). The rational 
part of the soul206 has observed the divine realm, of things as they 
really are, but few can recollect these memories and those who can 
are driven mad by them (Ibid, 250a). When the licentious horse 
encounters a beautiful god like face: ‗there is no limit to the trouble it 
causes‘ (Phaedrus, 253b3), this again reinforcing Plato‘s view of the 
unquenchable and unlimited nature of pleasure.  The rational horse 
and charioteer are placed in a state of conflict with the non-rational 
horse and its unrestrained urges. In the end, the powerful desire for 
beauty forces the parts of the soul in contact with the divine to yield to 
the part that is not (Ibid, 254b1-4).  The beauty that inspires erotic 
desire offers the charioteer the illusory prospect of reconciliation with 
the divine realm (Ibid, 254b5-7) – illusory since it can only ever lead men 
to earthly or mortal pleasures. The charioteer and rational horse must 
                                                 
205
 The failure is due to the charioteers‟ incompetence. 
206
 The rational part being the horse obedient to the charioteer. 
 151 
therefore exert firm control (Ibid, 254d-255) over the licentious one so as 
to tame it and bring it in line with reason. Frede concludes that the 
Philebus differs from the Phaedrus because the soul in the former is 
nowhere presented as a battleground of conflict between its three 
component parts of horses and charioteer. She notes of the Philebus 
that ‗no tri-partition is ever mentioned‘ (Frede, 1993, li). As such, the 
troublesome dark horse is not so much to be limited by reason as 
controlled by it. Where the Philebus seems to differ most from the 
Phaedrus is that the former dialogue indicates that it is possible for 
mortal feelings and appetites to be guided by reason from the divine 
realm. 
 
6.6 Divine Knowledge and Unlimited Pleasure 
 
It is perhaps in the final ranking of the goods (Philebus, 64c-67b) 
that Plato makes it most clearly known that he somewhat reluctantly 
admits knowledge and pleasures into the best human life. After all, 
Socrates had earlier reminded his interlocutor that the main concern 
in their discussion was human reason rather than divine or true 
reason (Ibid, 22c). However, pleasure is by no means placed on an equal 
footing with knowledge in the final rating of goods. Knowledge remains 
‗far superior to pleasure and more beneficial for human life‘ (Ibid, 66e2).  
Thus, he states that that which is ‗connected with measure‘ (Ibid, 66a8) 
is the highest good. Frede (1993) suggests that measure here is that 
which determines the limit or harmony in human life. The items that 
actually have the right measure and proportion are ranked second 
(Ibid, 66b1). Reason and intelligence are ranked third (Ibid, 66b3-4), with 
fourth place going to the arts, sciences and opinions (Ibid, 66b6-66c3). 
Pleasures are ranked last, in fifth place (Ibid, 66c5-6). Significantly, the 
pleasures assigned to fifth place are 'pure pleasures', and Plato has 
earlier specified that only the pleasure of learning belongs to this class 
(Ibid, 52b 5-9). The pleasure of learning is pure precisely because it is 
not accompanied by pain (Ibid, 66c5-6); because it does not, as Frede 
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notes, 'presuppose a felt lack' (Frede, liii, 1993). The Phileban assertion 
that only the 'very few' can attain pure pleasure is reminiscent of the 
view in the Republic that only the pleasures of the philosopher are 
worthwhile or true207.   
 
Mixed pleasures do not feature in the final ranking of the goods; 
there is still no place for bodily pleasure in and of itself as a good. 
Frede‘s description of mixed pleasures as remedial is apt, then, in the 
sense that they can only restore the body to a pure state of harmony. 
It is precisely because they are mixtures of pleasure and pain that 
they cannot be pure. As Plato himself puts it, pleasure is a process of 
generation and becoming for the sake of something else and, as such, 
it belongs in a lower class than that which is good in itself (Ibid, 54c). 
Pleasures may be unlimited, but they do belong to a category of things 
that really (ontologically) exist. Still, although pleasure is no longer 
ontologically suspect it remains inferior to knowledge (Frede, 1993). 
Gosling and Taylor similarly remark that Phileban pleasures cannot 
be criteria of worth, as it is ‗intelligence that produces the right 
ordering that makes life good. Pleasure has no such role‘. (Gosling & 
Taylor, 1982 p 132) Pleasures do not therefore merit pursuit for their own 
sake, because 'that would mean the cultivation of incompleteness' 
(Frede, 1993, lvi).  
 
In sum, Plato‘s metaphysics in the Philebus arguably 
substantiates an idea also explored in the Phaedrus and Republic; 
namely, that the source of any correct moral judgement actually 
comes not from the sensible but from the intelligible or divine order of 
things. Bodily feeling and perception is reason‘s handmaiden in the 
Philebus; all the former can do is eternally feed and empty in 
obedience to the latter. All the latter can do is limit the former, and so 
restore and maintain harmony for as long as possible. Arguably, what 
most distinguishes the accounts of pleasure and pain in the Philebus 
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 However it could be inferred (as Frede does for example 1993) that Plato is broadening the field of 
candidates for pure pleasures to include non-philosophers. 
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and the Rhetoric is the nature of the process by which judgements 
come to be made by people with regard to them. Plato inclines to the 
view in the Philebus that any judgement about bodily pleasure and 
pain is more like an adjudication, or ruling by divine reason, with the 
purpose of limiting pleasure. For Aristotle in the Rhetoric, by contrast, 
many pleasures and pains are capable of being altered or educated in 
social experiences. It is to Aristotle‘s views on the nature (and 




























Chapter 7: Aristotelian Emotions: Learning through pleasure & pain 
 
In this chapter it will be argued that schoolchildren can and 
should be guided in their pleasures and pains: firstly, because 
appropriate feeling is necessary for moral virtue208; secondly because 
children can learn through their affectations. Initially, it will be 
observed that feelings are, in themselves, distinctively reactions to 
circumstances, rather than experiences that are actively chosen. 
However, it will be suggested that the virtuous can be properly 
responsible for directing their actions and feelings if they have formed 
the right sort of dispositions. It will thereafter be maintained that 
Aristotle‘s account of emotion is consistent across his texts, contrary 
to Frede‘s assertion. The different emphases that Aristotle places on 
pathos (passion), in the Rhetoric and Ethics, can be explained by the 
fact that he was concerned with discussing virtue in the latter, and 
what good use understanding of the emotions could be put to by the 
aspiring orator, in the former. Moreover, his emphasis on emotional 
appeal and persuasion in the Rhetoric is educationally salient. It will 
be concluded that a theory of moral development can be extrapolated 
from Aristotle‘s texts, and that imitation, shame, and emulation, are 
all different motives which the young can learn through. 
 
7.1 Emotional Reactions and Virtuous dispositions 
 
‗Again, when we are angry our frightened it is not by our choice; but our virtues are 
expressions of our choice or at any rate imply choice. Besides, we are said to be 
moved in respect of our feelings, but in respect of our virtues and vices we are said 
to be not moved but disposed in a particular way'. (NE, 1106a 2-7) (Italics are my 
emphasis) 
 
Arguably, a central point of distinction between Platonic and 
Aristotelian thought is the respective ways in which mature moral 
                                                 
208
 The requirement that the fully virtuous agent be able to act, feel and reason in the manner 
appropriate to the circumstances, was explained in chapter 5 and at 6.1. 
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agents might be said to be both altered by, and responsible for, their 
feelings and emotions. Aristotle, unlike Plato, appears to have thought 
that the virtuous can be both favourably influenced by, and at least 
partially responsible for, their feelings. The virtues are, after all, 
among others things, dispositions to experience pleasure and pain in 
specific, morally proportionate, ways. However, the feelings of the 
virtuous and virtue itself are 'not chosen in any simple sense' (Kosman, 
1980, p 111). The factors that inform each virtuous act are not just 
related to an isolated episode or event. As was made clear in chapter 
5, the virtues are rather performed in the context of a life lived as 
whole. 
 
To be sure, feelings and emotions per se are characteristically 
for Aristotle, Plato and Peters, more like reactions to current 
circumstances than choices. Pathos (passion or emotion, taken from 
the verb to suffer or experience), Konstan suggests, ‗looks to the 
outside stimulus to which it responds (Konstan, 2007, P 4)‘. Arguably, 
when we suffer emotions, the object of those feelings is, at least in 
part, acting on us. To suffer an emotion is arguably to become aware 
of an object of experience209, in a particular way. As Kosman puts it, if 
‗I am afraid, something is frightening me; when I am angry something 
is angering me. When, in general, I am experiencing an emotion or 
feeling of the sort Aristotle would call a pathos something is affecting 
me' (Kosman 1980, p104-105). The source of each emotion is, in an 
important sense, outside of agents. Emotions act on us, in so far as 
they are our felt reactions to external events and circumstances. 
Importantly, the felt component of an emotion is, for Aristotle, a 
cognitive210 response (though not exclusively so), as we shall see at 
7.3. We are at least partly passive with regard to passions and it is the 
                                                 
209
 Sartre (1971) Bedford (1956), Kenny (1961) Nussbaum (1996) Pugmire (1998) and Goldie (2000) 
amongst others suggest that our emotions are „intentional‟ in that they are, at least in part, mental states 
directed at, or about real world objects. 
210
 Carr (2009) also indicates that Aristotle adopts a cognitive theory of emotions and Goldie (2000) 
suggests that Aristotle was one of the first to so do. Kristjánsson (2007) similarly describes Aristotle as 
the „forefather‟ of cognitive theories of emotion. 
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aspect of passivity that takes them beyond the realm of what we can 
wholly choose. 
 
‗Emotions, like the weather, come over us and one of their main functions is to 
distort and cloud judgement. Indeed, if we say that a judgement is an expression of 
emotion we are suggesting that it is a pretty poor sort of judgement.‘ (Peters, 1962, p 
119-120) 
 
Peters (1962) also maintains that our emotions are cognitive 
judgements about objects of experience. His article, ‗Emotions and the 
Category of Passivity‘ provides extensive treatment of the subject. 
Peters there states that ‗we naturally use the term ―emotion‖ and its 
derivatives to pick out our passivity‘ (1962, p121). But though the 
emotions are defined by their passivity, he observes they can on 
occasion also lead to action. As he puts it, ‗we can act in as well as out 
of fear (Peters, 1962, p 121)‘. Peters is probably correct in saying that 
emotions are ‗contingently‘ not ‗necessarily‘ related to action. Like 
Plato,211 however, he is rather sceptical about the accuracy of 
appraisals that arise from standard emotions. Emotions, he says, are 
typically more like blind and undiscriminating wishes212, than 
reasoned motives213 for action (Peters, 1962, p 128-9). He states that 
there is ‗no conceptual connexion between being subject to an emotion 
and wanting to do whatever is appropriate‘ (Peters, 1962, p 129). Given 
Peters‘s view that emotions tend to skew judgement, it is not 
surprising that he claims that the one of the most important tasks of 
emotional education should be to ensure that people form objectively 
true appraisals on their basis214 (1972b, pp 476-477).  
                                                 
211
 Plato in the Republic, if we recall from 6.1, thought that our real world sense perceptions are 
illusory. 
212
 Peters repeats this suggestion, of relation between emotion and wild wish at (1972b, p 473).   
213
 He elsewhere similarly suggests that there may well be “a conceptual connection between „emotion‟ 
and „passivity‟ and between „motive‟ and „action‟” (Peters, 1972b, p 471). 
214
 Peters (1972b, p 480) remarks that greater awareness of the conditions that lead to the formation of 
more settled sentimental dispositions (settled to achieve true emotional appraisals that is); could 
significantly improve our understanding of emotion education. Peters also explicitly defends the 
education of the emotions in both Ethics and Education (1970) and the Logic of Education (1975). In 
the latter text, he similarly suggests (in, as we shall see, a distinctively Aristotelian manner) that 
education of the emotions consists largely in the social development of reliable appraisals of judgement 
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‗Although we may in some narrow sense not be responsible for our feelings, we are 
responsible for character as the dispositional source of those feelings.' (Kosman, 
1980, p 112) 
 
Unlike Peters and Plato, Aristotle seemed to think that our 
emotions can dispose us to act virtuously215. Kosman (1980) and 
Kristjansson (2006 & 2007) both suggest that moral virtue often entails 
a certain reciprocity between passionate reaction and action (pathos 
and praxis). Kosman maintains that Aristotle developed a ‗doctrine of 
passive potentiality‘ (1980, p 107), whereby fully developed moral virtues 
are capacities of discrimination; the virtues admit and indeed require 
the experience of appropriate feelings, but they also help us to avoid 
inappropriate feelings.  To be sure, people may suffer emotions in that 
they are centrally passive with regard to them, but dispositions of 
feeling need not be passive. We do not perhaps choose to become 
angry about something in a specific moment, or during an affective 
episode, but we can shape how we respond to things more broadly, 
through the habits of feeling we acquire. Sherman & White (2007) have 
recently suggested that we are more than merely ‗indirectly 
responsible‘ for our emotions, in so far as we choose our dispositions. 
Our emotional habits, they say, are open to revision in social 
interaction with others. They think Aristotle did not hold the view that 
people are essentially passive in regard to their emotions. This 
perspective Sherman & White, say, is implicit in Aristotle‘s Rhetoric.  
 
In this chapter, therefore, Aristotle‘s detailed analysis of the 
emotions (ta pathe) in the Rhetoric will be unpacked. At 7.2, it will be 
acknowledged that Aristotle‘s concept of pleasure resembles its 
Phileban predecessor in certain respects. However, at 7.3 and 7.4, it 
                                                                                                                                            
(Peters, 1975, p 49-52).  However, in chapter 9 it will be maintained that Peters‟ emphasis on 
„transcending‟ (1972b, p 481) false appraisals results in his account of sentimental education being too 
focussed on the rational element of emotional experience. 
215
 See chapters four, five and six for explanation of how neither Plato nor Peters think proper feelings 
are necessary for virtue. Peters does to be sure identify compassion as a „motive virtue‟ but it would not 
seem to be a dispositional one. 
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will be argued that Aristotle does not offer an inconsistent account of 
emotion and that his concept is significantly different from that 
attributed to Plato in the Philebus216.  It will be maintained that the 
different emphases that Aristotle places on emotion in the Rhetoric 
and Ethics can be explained by the fact that he was concerned with 
discussing virtue in the latter and what good use understanding of the 
emotions could be put to by the aspiring orator in the former. At 7.5 it 
will be argued that persuasion and emotional appeal can be 
educational and at 7.6 it will be suggested that shame and emulation 
are emotions particularly characteristic of young learners. 
 
7.2 Pleasure and Pain in the Rhetoric 
 
'Let us then suppose pleasure to be a certain process of the soul and specifically an 
instantaneous sensory resolution to the natural state, and pain the opposite.' 
(Rhetoric, 1369b36-38) 
 
Striker (1996) remarks that it is patently clear that Aristotle's 
definition of pleasure in the Rhetoric is borrowed from the Philebus. 
There are unquestionably profound similarities between the two. 
Firstly, in his discussion of pleasure in Chapter 1.11, book V (Rhetoric, 
1369b-1372a2), Aristotle agrees with Plato in stating that it is generally 
pleasant to have an inclination toward the natural state, but 
particularly so when this natural state has been lost (Ibid, 1370a2-4). 
Pleasure, for Aristotle, seems to be at its most intense when it entails 
a resolution to the natural state. Whilst he does not explicitly state in 
his definition, that pleasures generally contain a mixture of pain (and 
vice versa) he does remark that it is 'pleasant to make good lacks‘ (Ibid, 
1371b27). He also thinks that some individual pleasures currently 
being experienced carry with them the potential for pain in the future. 
For example, being in the company of, or remembering, a loved one is 
pleasant whilst their absence is painful (Ibid, 1370b16-26). Secondly, like 
                                                 
216
 In the previous chapter, it was of course, argued that it is doubtful that Plato intended to articulate 
(or convincingly succeeded in) a concept of emotion in the Philebus. 
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Plato in the Philebus, he specifies that objects of appetite are perceived 
as pleasant (Ibid, 1370a15-17) in so far as they bring with them the 
promise of a return to the natural state. Furthermore, objects of 
memory and expectation are also pleasant. As Aristotle puts it: 'all 
pleasant things must be either in the perception of things present or 
in the recollection of things past or in the expectation of things to 
come' (Ibid, 1370a31-33).  
 
Frede's claim, then, that Aristotle accepts a Phileban definition 
of pleasure in the Rhetoric is well supported by the content of each 
text. However, there are also important differences between the 
Phileban and Rhetorical accounts of pleasure; the most significant of 
which (at least for this thesis) relates to the feelings typically 
experienced by learners. Although Aristotle states that learning is 
pleasant for the most part, 'for in learning a resolution to the natural 
condition occurs' (Ibid, 1371a 43-44); he is also of the view that learning 
can, and often does, involve pain217. This is quite different from the 
Philebus where Plato stresses that the pleasures of learning are pure 
because they do not involve pain218. Aristotle also discusses at least 
three other aspects of pleasure that Plato does not mention and this 
provides his outlook with a broader purview.  
 
Firstly, Aristotle observes that 'habit makes things pleasant' 
(Rhetoric, 1370a12) and there is no such mention of the role of habit and 
pleasure in the Philebus. Aristotle suggests that habit makes things 
become like nature in an unforced way (Ibid, 1370a 10-12) and this 
would seem to concur with the ethical naturalism of the Ethics219. 
Secondly, it is not obviously the case that Aristotle thinks that all 
pleasures are accompanied by pain. He says, for example, that 
                                                 
217
 This will become clearer at 7.6. 
218
 See previous chapter for an account of the pure pleasures of learning in the Philebus. 
219
 Aristotle‟s concept of habit as a sort of second nature is similar to that provided by Kant and to a 
lesser extent Peters (see chapters four and five respectively for explication of their concepts of habit). 
However, Aristotle greatly valued actions that were from second nature whereas Kant emphatically did 
not.  Peters also only thinks habits are morally valuable when they are performed flexibly in accordance 
with principle. 
 160 
laughter is pleasant (Ibid, 1371b39); but, unlike Plato, he does not 
mention any pain that it might involve. Thirdly, Aristotle emphasises 
that some pleasures are very public in nature in a way that Plato does 
not. Friendship is ranked by Aristotle as a pleasure (Ibid, 1371a23-26), 
as is love of another (Ibid, 1370b16-26), and winning in competitive 
games (Ibid, 1371a2). While all of these pleasures would seem to require 
the presence or company of others, Plato does not consider such 
interpersonal pleasures in any detail. In emphasising that habit and 
friendship are pleasant, Aristotle is arguably paving the way for the 
more central role he allots to them in his ethical works. At the very 
least, he would not appear to be saying anything that would engender 
major inconsistency between his texts. 
 
Crucially, in his discussion of pleasure in the Rhetoric, Aristotle 
also states that there are two different types of appetite: irrational 
appetites and those accompanied by reason (Ibid, 1370a18).  The 
irrational appetites resemble their Phileban220 counterparts in being 
natural, as they are and present in the body (Ibid, 1370a19-21). Of the 
appetites that are accompanied by reason, Aristotle maintains that: 
'we have (them) from being persuaded, since men have an appetite to 
see and possess many things from hearing and being convinced (Ibid, 
1370a25-7).'  Although Plato does in the Philebus divide his theory of 
pleasures into different kinds, he does not say that there are 
pleasures that are amenable to rational persuasion by others. As 
Letwin (1981) notes, Plato leaves unanswered in the Philebus, the 
question of whether or not the pleasures of the soul alone (those 
pleasures that Frede takes to be constitutive of emotions) are 
essentially private events or public ones specifiable in a shared 
community of discourse. Aristotle's emphasis on persuasion in the 
Rhetoric therefore marks a significant departure from the Phileban 
view of pleasure and emotion.  
 
                                                 
220
Well the first two types of pleasure Plato discusses in any case. The third category of pleasure for 
Plato, does not involve the body, as was discussed in chapter 6. 
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7.3 Emotions, Persuasion and Judgement in the Rhetoric  
 
In the Rhetoric Aristotle discusses in depth a range of emotions: 
anger, calm, friendship, enmity, fear, confidence, shame, favour, pity, 
indignation, envy and emulation. To be sure, at least some of these 
emotions appear to be aiming at a measure of restoration. Calmness, 
for example, is defined as the ‗suspension and placation of anger‘ 
(Rhetoric, 1380a8-9).  However, there are at least three reasons why 
Frede's argument that Aristotle borrows a Phileban theory of emotions 
fails to convince. Firstly, Aristotle himself provides a very different 
structural model to explain his emotions. Secondly, the potential 
scope of judgements involved in rhetorical emotions is much broader 
than in any supposed Phileban counterpart, largely because they are 
not limited to being about rational wishes for the future. Thirdly, 
Frede seems to have underestimated the import of Aristotle's wider 
purposes for analysing the emotions in the Rhetoric.  
 
A number of the emotions described by Aristotle in book VI of 
the Rhetoric quite clearly fail to fit into the restorative model.  Frede 
herself admits that neither friendly feeling nor hatred fit into the 
structure of emotion as a disturbance of the soul in need of 
appeasement (Frede, 1996, p 271). Indeed, both friendly feeling and 
hatred seem to be more like enduring traits of character than short 
lived desires. Significantly, Aristotle himself offers a quite different 
model for the emotions. He suggests that understanding emotions 
requires examination of the particular personal, social and moral 
conditions under which they arise. He stipulates that three elements 
must be present for an emotion to become manifest. He takes the 
example of anger and says that it must be established: what state 
persons are in when they are angry; who they are angry with; and in 
what circumstances (Rhetoric, 1378a). He says anger would be impossible 
if one of these conditions is missing. Crucially, the other emotions 
that Aristotle discusses in the Rhetoric also require this threefold 
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structure. Aristotle says that: ‗it is the same with the others‘ (Ibid, 
1378a) and Cooper comments that ‗we get this tripartite structure 
presented in every chapter, in virtually the same language each 
time'(Cooper, 1996, p 243)221.   
 
There is no consensus among more recent commentators about 
precisely how Aristotle intended to portray the emotions in the 
Rhetoric and the apparent divergence of views tends to suggest that 
Aristotle was not as clear as he could have been on this matter. 
Amelie Rorty‘s edited collection Essays on Aristotle’s Rhetoric (1996b) 
contains no fewer than five contributions centring on the subject222. In 
these papers, the emotions are variously interpreted as: appearances 
(phantasia); opinions (endoxa); beliefs (also endoxa); or some 
combination of these; about objects of pleasure or pain that 
somewhere along the way entail a change in judgement. Prior to 
teasing out some of the different insights that Leighton, Cooper, 
Striker, Nussbaum and Frede contribute to the debate about 
rhetorical emotions, it should be observed that they all seem to agree 
on at least one thing: that the most sustained and detailed account 
that Aristotle provides of the emotions is to be found in the Art of 
Rhetoric.  
 
Cooper suggests that Aristotle does not provide an in depth 
analysis of the emotions anywhere in his ethical works, and Striker 
quite sensibly concludes that we should look to the Rhetoric to 
supplement the lack of detail provided about the emotions in the 
Ethics. Konstan observes that Aristotle‘s ruminations in the Rhetoric 
represent ‗the most sophisticated and detailed analysis of the 
emotions to come down to us from classical antiquity‘ (Konstan, 2007 p 
41). However, Aristotle is not mainly concerned with emotions in 
themselves in this text either. As will become clear, he rather analyses 
                                                 
221 It should be noted, however, that neither friendly feeling nor hatred, fit into Aristotle‟s own 
structure either.  
222
 See Leighton, Cooper, Frede, Striker & Nussbaum all 1996. 
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the emotions in depth with a view to enabling aspiring orators to 
induce certain emotional responses and judgements in their audience. 
That different interpretations of Aristotle‘s account of emotion in the 
Rhetoric have arisen is perhaps unsurprising, given the ambiguity of 
his definition of such experiences. 
 
‗Emotions are those things by the alteration of which men differ with regard to those 
judgements which pain and pleasure accompany, such as anger, pity, fear and all 
other such and their opposites.‘ (Rhetoric, 1378a24-26, p 141) 
 
I interpret Aristotle‘s definition of emotion as follows: 1) 
emotions must involve the alteration of a person; 2) this alteration of a 
person is reflected in their judgement; 3) the sorts of judgement 
altered are those caused by and/or result/resulting in, pleasure 
and/or pain. Arguably, Aristotle has at least two tests that require 
satisfaction for a personal state to be classed as an emotion. Firstly, 
emotions must precede or be an alteration in judgement. In other 
words, an emotion must either be constitutive of, or, a consequence of, 
a change of judgement. Secondly, the change of judgement must also 
be accompanied by pleasure or pain or some mixture of both. In 
relation to the latter point, Leighton observes that a particular 
pleasure and/or pain must attend each particular emotion by 
conceptual necessity. Without pleasure and/or pain there would be no 
emotion. ‗The pleasure or pain is part of the concept of emotion….they 
complete the emotion.‘ (Leighton, 1996, p 220) Leighton concludes that 
Aristotle is well equipped to explain how the process of an alteration of 
judgement unfolds223.  
 
What is particularly significant about Leighton‘s reading of the 
Rhetoric is the compelling answer he provides to the important 
question of why Aristotle discussed the phenomena of appetite 
(epithumia), pleasure (hedone) and pain (lupe) in a separate chapter 
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 Leighton (1996) argues that at least four convincing explanations as to how emotions alter 
judgement can be inferred from Aristotle.  
 
 164 
(Book V) to that in which he discussed emotion (pathos) (Book VI). 
Cooper (in what he himself admits is conjecture) wonders if Aristotle 
had merely already said all he needed to about appetite, pain and 
pleasure in Book V and saw no need to repeat himself later. Leighton, 
however, suggests that Aristotle deliberately omitted pleasure, pain 
and appetite from his discussion of the emotions.  He argues that in 
the Rhetoric Aristotle is attempting to explain how emotion is 
distinguishable from the other elements of a person‘s inner life. 
Emotion may well entail a combination of sensation, desire, thought, 
perception, attitude, pleasure and pain and yet still be identifiably 
different from each of these.  Leighton holds the view that Aristotle is 
trying to show how emotion and desire are separate concepts in the 
Rhetoric.  
 
Emotions, he argues, ‗have a much more wide ranging aim. 
Through expectation, they alter the way we put things together. 
Moreover they require judgements that are subtle and complex in 
structure (Leighton, 1996, p 225)‘. Desire (orexis), he says, is not one 
‗homogenous, all encompassing domain: rather it includes 1) 
spiritedness (thumos); 2) wish (boulesis); 3) appetite (epithumia) 
(Leighton, p 222)‘.  Of the three, only spiritedness is demonstrated by 
Aristotle to be an emotion, as only it involves a change of judgement 
relating to pain and pleasure. In epithumetic desire, the alleviation of 
hunger or thirst and the attendant pleasure do not, or at least do not 
have to, constitute a change of judgement (Leighton, 1996). At most, it 
would seem to involve a simple judgement or adjudication from 
reason, similar in kind to the Phileban model of mixed pleasures 
combined in the soul and body224. 
 
Crucially, Leighton thinks that boulesis should not be confused 
with emotion because wishes only involve pleasure and pain 
incidentally and not by necessity. Wish is more like a thought, he 
                                                 
224
 See previous chapter for an account of Phileban pleasures, 
 165 
says, and ‗while pleasure and pain may attend my thoughts, there is 
no necessity to it‘ (Leighton, p 221). Indeed, Goldie (2000) and Frede (1996) 
actually define boulesis not as wish, but as rational desire, and note 
that thumos and epithumia are the non-rational desires. In the 
previous chapter, it was said that the Phileban ‗pleasures of the soul 
alone‘, are essentially wishes or rational desires about the future. As 
such, they seem to have more in common with Aristotle‘s account of 
rational desire than with emotion. Striker (1996) notes that though the 
Aristotelian account of desire and pleasure in book V of the Rhetoric 
resembles its Phileban predecessor, his discussion of emotions as 
influencing judgements in Book VI does not. For Aristotle, the 
emotions are open to persuasion by reason in a way that desires 
cannot be. We give grounds for emotion, but: ‗only causes for thirst 
and other epithumai…the former but not the latter, is, in this sense, 
conquered by argument‘ (Leighton, 1996, p 227). 
 
'The things, then, by which the emotions are engendered and dissolved, from which 
come the related proofs, have been given.‘ (Rhetoric, 1388b) 
 
The key to understanding the significance of Aristotle's analysis 
of the emotions is to be found, I think, in the sentence with which he 
concludes his discussion of them in the Rhetoric. In summing up, he 
states that rhetorical speech creates and removes emotions in the 
audience in such a manner as to establish the truth of the orator‘s 
argument. The purpose of Aristotle‘s emphasis in some places, on 
engendering and dissolving emotions in the Rhetoric, is less that he 
can restate the general Phileban restorative model of the emotions (as 
Frede would have it); and more that he can explicate the specific role 
of emotions in political or legal proofs. In Book I of the Rhetoric 
Aristotle remarks that there are three forms of rhetorical proof: those 
residing in the character of the orator; those occurring when the 
audience is persuaded into certain emotional states by the orator; and 
those of the speech itself (Rhetoric, 1356a1-24).  I would have to agree 
with Cooper's conclusion that in the Rhetoric 'it is mostly in 
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connection with the first and especially the second of these objectives 
that Aristotle provides information about the emotions' (Cooper, 1996, p 
239). For me, the commentators who have most convincingly 
scrutinised Aristotle‘s analysis of emotion in the Rhetoric are those 
who have not lost sight of his broader purposes for the analysis. 
Indeed, it seems to me that Frede‘s view (that emotions are processes 
of restoration to the natural state) misses the mark, at least in part, 
because she has not paid sufficient attention to the role of judgement 
and persuasion in the Philebus and the Rhetoric. She possibly 
concedes this much herself (Frede, 1996, footnote 18 p 280-281) in saying 
that Aristotle‘s emphasis on persuasion may make her theory of the 
Philebus’s influence on the Rhetoric more indirect than she makes it 
sound. I would have to concur. What though should be made of 
Frede's additional claim of Aristotelian inconsistency between the 
Ethics and Rhetoric? 
 
7.4 Emotions in the Ethics  
 
 'By feelings I mean desire, anger, fear, daring, envy, joy, friendliness, hatred, 
longing, jealousy, pity and in general all conditions that are attended by pleasure or 
pain.‘ (NE, 1105b 21-24, p 38) 
 
The most obvious discrepancy between the definitions of 
emotion that Aristotle provides in his Rhetoric (see 7.3) and Ethics is 
that emotions in the former involve an alteration of judgment, whereas 
in the latter they do not. However, the sentence immediately preceding 
the definition (of sorts) of feelings in the Ethics, stipulates that feelings 
are a modification in the soul (1105b21, p 38). This is arguably similar to 
Aristotle‘s point in the Rhetoric that emotions alter (or have the 
capacity to alter with) judgement. Moreover, in both texts, Aristotle 
states that at least some irrational feelings or appetites belong to the 
part of the soul that is not based on, but can be persuaded by, reason 
(NE, 1102b & Rhetoric 1370a). Similarly, in the Eudemian Ethics (1220b) 
Aristotle says that character traits are susceptible to feelings and he 
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defines affections as 'such things as anger, fear, shame, desire - in 
general anything which, as such, gives rise usually to perceptual 
pleasure and pain.' In all three definitions, we have lists of various 
states of feeling that are accompanied by pleasure and/or pain. Given 
these similarities why does Frede suggest that Aristotle offers 
inconsistent accounts of emotion in the Rhetoric and the Ethics? 
 
 To recap, Frede thinks that an emotion is ‗mixed by definition‘, 
according to the Rhetoric, due to its being accompanied by a 
combination of pleasure and pain. However, she says that Aristotle in 
the Ethics drops his rhetorical theory of mixed emotions, principally 
because he develops a different account of pleasure there (Frede, 1996, p 
272). In the Nicomachean Ethics, she says that Aristotle now construes 
pleasure as a ‘perfection’ of activity rather than a process of it. Her 
logic seems to imply that emotions should now be classed as 'perfect 
activities' in the Ethics, perfect because they are completed by feelings 
of pleasure. Frede certainly thinks that emotions in the Ethics no 
longer entail a mixture of pleasure and pain. In her defence, Aristotle 
does advance the idea in the Nicomachean Ethics that all activities are 
completed by their pleasures and this is different to his discussion of 
such phenomena in the Rhetoric.  
 
 
'As pleasure does not occur without activity, so every activity is perfected by its 
pleasure.' (NE, 1175A 20-22) 
 
Aristotle spends a considerable amount of time discussing 
pleasure in the Nicomachean Ethics and he famously offered two, 
seemingly contrasting, accounts of it. Rorty (1980) and Annas (1980) 
agree that in Book VII pleasure is conceived of as 'unimpeded activity', 
whereas in Book X, pleasure is presented as 'perfecting activities'. It 
clearly appears to be the book X account that Frede is basing her 
claims on. Annas notes that whilst some of the detail in these 
accounts differs in certain respects, Aristotle is consistent in his view 
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that pleasure has a place in the good life. As she puts it, books VII 
and X 'agree in rejecting the theses that pleasure is in itself a bad 
thing' (Annas, 1980, p 287). Rorty suggests that these different accounts 
of pleasure actually complement one another. She seems to be of the 
view that exercising intellectual virtue is central to the pleasant 
completion of all activities. As was noted in chapter 5, the moral 
virtues require the right measure of feeling but they also require 
principled determination by practical wisdom. Annas suggests that 
theoria (I take her here to mean phronesis), properly conceived 
'completes and perfects the practical life (Rorty, 1980, p 377)'. However, 
she also observes that theoria (I take her here to mean sophia225) is 
also 'the self-contained activity par excellence' (Rorty, 1980, p 378). In 
Book X, Aristotle does indeed state that the life of contemplation is the 
most pleasant in so far as it is the highest form of activity (NE, 1177a20-
21) and the only one conducted for its own sake (NE, 1177b1-2). So 
Frede is right in saying that Aristotle‘s' conceptualisation of pleasure 
has shifted between the Ethics and the Rhetoric. However, she seems 
mistaken in both her claim that Aristotle has dropped his theory of 
emotion from the Rhetoric, and in her statement that Aristotle makes 
no mention of conflicting pleasures and pains in his discussion of 
emotions, in the Ethics. 
 
Many, if not all, of the moral and intellectual virtues require 
completion by proper feelings; but this does not mean that the virtues 
are such feelings. Aristotle is in fact clear that the moral virtues are 
not feelings (NE, 1106a12), but dispositions determined by a rational 
principle that entail the right measure of feeling (1107a). Aristotle does 
not discuss the emotions in depth in the Ethics because they are not 
his main concern there (Striker, Leighton & Cooper all 1996). His purpose is 
rather to explain the nature of virtue and its role in the flourishing 
life. However, just because he does not analyse the emotions in depth 
in the Ethics does not mean that his thinking has radically shifted on 
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 Aristotle‟s concept of sophia (theoretical or speculative wisdom) will be explained in the subsequent 
chapter. 
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the subject. Indeed, it seems to me that there is ample evidence in the 
Ethics to support his analysis of emotions in the Rhetoric. A close 
reading of Book VII surely reveals that he did not think that all 
pleasures were perfect. What is distinctive about the licentious, the 
akratic (weak-willed) and the continent agent226is that they all have 
feelings that conflict with those of the virtuous. Similarly, in Book I 
Aristotle observes that though virtuous actions must be pleasurable in 
themselves (1099a21-22), 'most people find that the things which give 
them pleasure conflict (1099a12-13)'. Furthermore, Aristotle is clear that 
the feelings involved in some virtuous activities are not pleasant and 
that some emotions entail conflict between pleasure and pain. 
 
‗It is not true, then, of every virtue, that the exercise of it is pleasurable, 
except in so far as one attains the end.‘ (NE, 1117b, 15 -17) 
 
 In the Nicomachean Ethics some emotions (courage, fear and 
anger are examples that Aristotle gives) involve a mixture of pain and 
pleasure. Aristotle actually defines anger as involving both pleasure 
and pain; pain in the anger itself, but pleasure in the retaliation and 
expiation of this anger (NE, 1117a6-7). Frede's earlier noted statement 
that no indication of the mixed nature of the emotions is given in the 
Ethics, seems increasingly suspect in this light as this is virtually 
identical to the account of anger Aristotle provides in the Rhetoric 
(1378a).  Frede's partial concession that there is the 'barest hint' of a 
mixture of emotion here (Frede, 1996, footnote 2, p279) does not do justice 
to the similarity between the definitions. Similarly, in the Ethics, 
Aristotle indicates that courage involves a combination of pleasure 
and pain (NE, 1117a29-1117b17). It predominantly involves pain brought 
about by fear in the attendant circumstances, but it can involve 
pleasure if one successfully overcomes fear and acts courageously. 
The courageous227 man, he says, endures pain because it is the fine 
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 This was explored in the previous chapter at 6.1. 
227
 At 9.6 it will be suggested that school discipline may contribute to the development of courage, 
when learners are supported to endure and overcome difficult feelings associated with learning. 
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thing to do (NE, 1117b 6-9).  In the case of courage, not only do pain and 
pleasure conflict; this very conflict is a necessary part of the virtue. 
Moreover, the fact that the emotions of the virtuously courageous or 
angry person are dependent, at least in part, upon the conditions they 
find themselves in (that is, the virtuous agent gets angry at a 
particular person for a particular reason in a particular place) hardly 
represents a serious departure from the Rhetoric. There, the emotions 
discussed228are, as we have seen, described as adaptive to change 
according to the particular conditions in which agents find 
themselves. Aristotle, then, seems to have been consistently of the 
view that emotions are, or at least have the potential to be, cues to 
virtuous action. 
 
‗There are some things at which we actually ought to feel angry, and others that we 
actually ought to desire - health for instance and learning…irrational feelings are to 
be considered no less part of human nature than our considered judgements. It 
follows that actions due to temper or desire are also proper to the human agent.‘ 
(NE, 1111a31-1111b4, p 54) 
 
It has been well documented229 that Aristotle held a favourable 
view of the emotions; he thought that ‗they were supposed to be part 
of our way of viewing the world (Leighton, 1996, p215)‘. He saw them as 
both a proper part of human nature and as constitutive of the 
flourishing life. As we can see from the often-cited foregoing passage, 
Aristotle thought it impossible to be properly human, let alone fully 
virtuous, without feeling, thinking and acting in the manner 
appropriate to the particular circumstances. Aristotle stated that it is 
sometimes the perception of the particulars of a case that enables a 
sound moral decision to be made (NE, 1109b13-27). Sherman therefore 
remarks that emotions are the 'medium by which we discern the 
particulars' (Sherman, 1999, p 40).  Striker (1996) and Sherman (2004) are 
of the view that emotions have the same capacity to provide 
                                                 
228
 There are notable exceptions of friendly feeling (philia) and hatred (misos). 
229
 See for example Leighton, Striker both 1996, Sherman 2004 & 1999 & Stocker 2003. 
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understanding of particulars.  The emotions can importantly direct 
'one's attention to the practically or morally relevant features of a 
situation' (Striker, 1996 p 298). Stocker goes further and argues that 
right emotional judgements have epistemic value230; emotions, he says 
can actually constitute forms of ‗evaluative knowledge‘ (2003 p 182). 
 
Although I would accept Frede, Leighton and Striker‘s 
observation that Aristotle is not as clear as he could have been about 
whether or not the emotions are mixed or perfect in the Ethics, this 
slight ambiguity in no way supports Frede‘s assertion that Aristotle‘s 
account of the emotions is inconsistent. Markedly, both Leighton and 
Striker conclude that the differing details concerning emotion that 
Aristotle provides in the rhetoric and the ethics ultimately support and 
complement each other. Leighton even states that Aristotle skilfully, 
subtly and knowingly employs different elements of emotion to 
demonstrate particular points in different arguments. ‗In the Rhetoric 
Aristotle develops a notion of emotion to which he turns elsewhere. As 
well as coming to this notion, he isolates those features that set 
emotion apart from other elements of the human soul‘ (Leighton 1996, p 
230-231).  
 
7.5 Persuasion as Emotion Education 
 
If Aristotle had essentially restated a Platonic theory of emotion 
in the Rhetoric then this would have considerable implications for the 
education of the emotions. A logical consequence, after all, of Plato's 
views on the emotions is that they are in important ways uneducable. 
Emotions are for Plato, not so much to be educated, as rationally 
                                                 
230
 He adds, however, that his argument is made irrespective of, „whether or not it is Aristotle‟s 
(Stocker, 2003, p 185). In chapter 8, it will be argued that practical wisdom can yield a form of moral 
knowledge derived from experience. However, it is far from clear that Aristotle thought that emotions 
per se can generate knowledge. Arguably it would be the necessary principle rather than the passion 
component of moral virtue that most contributes to any moral knowledge. 
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controlled or limited231. One of the great strengths of the revival in 
interest in Aristotelian thought within education, it seems to me, is 
the reclamation of emotions as not only educable but as vitally 
requiring education for the full development of virtue in persons232. 
Fortunately, the foregoing discussion has demonstrated that Aristotle 
does not recapitulate a Phileban model of emotion. For Plato, in the 
Philebus, bodily pleasure is unlimited and reason alone can determine 
its proper limit. Perceptions of pleasures and pains in the body cannot 
in themselves provide us with reliable cues to virtuous action. 
Emotions that are not wishes are to be limited not educated by reason. 
Unlike Plato, Aristotle holds that our perceptions of pleasure and pain 
can provide us with accurate information about the world; information 
moreover that can assist virtuous behaviour. An emotion is a 
judgement about pleasure and pain and true judgements can and 
should involve current perceptions (as opposed to only remembered 
ones). Importantly, these judgements are susceptible to persuasion 
under the wise advice of others. Emotions do not need to be controlled 
or limited by reason; they can be educated under the proper 
instruction and guidance of others.  This is where I think that 
Aristotle's discussion of emotions in the Rhetoric assumes particular 
pedagogical significance.  
 
It seems to me that Aristotle regarded persuasion as a quite 
legitimate educational tool233. To be sure, the Rhetoric does not find 
Aristotle explicitly stating that persuasion is a means that should be 
used to aid the development of virtue, in the less than virtuous. 
However, Aristotle's discussion of the role of emotional appeal, in 
political and legal settings, strongly suggests that he held that 
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 In the previous chapter it was argued that Plato thought pleasures and pains should be rationally 
controlled or limited. A similar rational view of emotions has also been attributed to Plato by Carr 
2005, 2009, and Kristjánsson, 2000, 2006, 2007. 
232
 For compelling accounts of this point see for example Carr 2005, 2009, and Kristjánsson, 2000, 
2006, 2007 & Steutel & Spiecker (2004). 
233
Konstan (2007, p 97) and Kristjánsson (2007, p19) also interpret the rhetoric in a similar light. 
Maxwell (2008, p 132) suggests that educating the moral emotions should involve teacher requests to 
pupils to imagine, imitate and re-appraise their emotional responses so as to make them normatively 
proper. This theory is further discussed at 7.7, and again in chapter 9. 
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persuasion could improve the judgements of the less than virtuous. 
Reeve (1996) is of the view that Aristotle thought rhetorical persuasion 
could, in the right hands, 'be a powerful force for good, counteracting 
distorting feelings and emotions' in others, so as 'to move a city 
towards genuine eudaimonia' (Reeve, 1996, p 203). The good orator would 
employ emotional appeal to correct the emotions and desires of the 
less than virtuous; as he puts it, 'persuading the bad to pursue the 
good involves corrective deception'(Reeve, 1996, p 203). Aristotle, in the 
Rhetoric, importantly depicts the character of the young as being 
largely appetitive and as such less than fully virtuous (1389a-1389b16). 
The young are exactly the sort of agents, in other words, that he 
seems to think can and should be234 correctively persuaded towards 
right judgements. 
 
Halliwell (1996) also notes that judgements in 'rhetorical contexts 
involve an interplay between audience and rhetorician...Aristotle 
appears to assume that the main determinant of it (the judgement) 
will be the skill of the orator (Halliwell, 1996, p 178)'. Arguably, the skilled 
teacher could and should similarly help to determine the judgements 
of the pupils in their classes. More than this, if teachers are the right 
sort of persons, they will by Halliwell's logic be in an excellent position 
to significantly influence such judgements. But what are the traits of 
the skilled orator? These traits would, after all, seem to be ones that 
prospective educators of emotions should have. Aristotle, as we have 
seen, thought that the skilled orator would himself be virtuous. As he 
puts it, 'character contains almost the strongest proof of all‘ (Rhetoric, 
1356a12-13). 
 
 The skilled orator must therefore have some sort of reflective 
grasp of virtue (Ibid, 1366b), and a comprehension of what virtuous 
emotions are and how to engender them in others too (Ibid, 1356a25-26). 
In order to be persuasive, arguably the good teacher should be 
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 This will I hope become clear at 7.6. 
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virtuous and possess emotional insight with regard to both herself 
and her pupils235.  Persuasive teachers would also probably need to 
cultivate positive relationships with their pupils, given Aristotle‘s 
assertion that people judge differently in relation to those they love 
and hate236. Striker (1996) suggests that if rhetoricians are of virtuous 
character (as they ought to be in Aristotle‘s terms), then their 
influence of argument upon the emotions of their audiences may be 
exactly what such audiences need to see things in a moral light. The 
argument that teachers should correct the distorted emotions of the 
young to help them to see what they should see may go beyond what 
Aristotle says, but it is consistent with his general reasoning, in the 
Rhetoric, and elsewhere. 
 
Persuasion Konstan (2007) notes was central to how ancient 
Greeks understood emotions, and scrutiny of other Aristotelian texts 
bears out this observation. In the Politics, Aristotle indicates that it is 
the capacity for language that differentiates people from animals. 
Although other animals have voice, man alone has speech. Animals 
feel pleasure or pain and they can use their voices to express pleasure 
or displeasure. However, it is speech that helps humanity to articulate 
its definitive attributes – and particularly moral character. Aristotle 
states that speech can indicate what is ‗just and unjust…the real 
difference between man and other animals is that humans alone have 
perception of good and evil‘ (Politics, 1253a13-16). Whereas the good man 
in the Philebus seems to derive his character from a divine source, 
Aristotle reaffirms in the Politics his view that we can learn about 
moral matters in conversations with others. This is a view he further 
alludes to in the Poetics. 
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Stocker (2003, p 183) maintains that we will not be able to fully understand the lives and activities 
of others, or for that matter our own, if we cannot, too, grasp their and indeed our, emotions. 
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 Aristotle actually says that „things do not seem the same to those who love and those who hate, nor 
to those who are angry or those who are calm, but either altogether different or different in magnitude. 
For to the friend the man about whom he is giving judgement seems either to have committed no 
offence or a minor one, while for the enemy it is the opposite (Rhetoric, 1177b31-1178a2, p 141). More 




‗The discussion of reasoning can be reserved for my Rhetoric, since it has 
more to do with that field of enquiry. Under reasoning fall those effects which must 
be produced by language; these include proof and refutation, the production of 
emotions (eg pity, fear, anger etc), and also establishing importance or 
unimportance.‘ (Poetics, 56a19-56b) 
 
In this passage, Aristotle reinforces, I think quite unequivocally, 
the significance of his treatment of emotions in the Rhetoric. The 
emotions, far from being irrational, are actually forces that may be 
harnessed in the service of reasoning itself. The speech-acts of the 
skilled orator (skilled in part because of his own virtue) can engender 
emotions in the audience that are in themselves (the emotions that is) 
forms of reasoning. He declares that the Rhetoric is importantly 
concerned with reasoning, and that reasoning must be mediated 
through language. Such reasoning is said to be a consequence of both 
proof and emotional appeal.  Significantly, the reasoning produced by 
rhetorical language can establish the importance or otherwise of a 
given subject matter. Aristotle does not explicitly state in the Poetics, 
what might qualify as important or unimportant. However, I do not 
think it would be too much of a stretch to suggest that the virtues 
would fall into the category of the important, given Aristotle‘s well 
known view that the virtues are vitally important for human 
flourishing. If this is the case, then language and the ability to 
persuade would seem to be a necessary tool for the development of 
reasoning, balanced emotions and ultimately virtue, in all human 
agents. A teacher‘s ability to so persuade should, it seems, be 
grounded in his or her own good character and in a keen and 
articulate understanding of their own emotions and those of their 
pupils. Whilst the young may arguably learn through emotional 
persuasion, it may well be the case that very young children learn first 




7.6 Aristotelian Moral development: Is it inherently painful?  
 
‗For it is the nature of the many to be ruled by fear rather than by shame, and to 
refrain from evil not because of the disgrace but because of the punishments...but of 
that which is fine and truly pleasurable they have not even a conception, since they 
have never had a taste for it. What discourse could ever reform people like that? To 
dislodge by argument habits long embedded in the character is a difficult, if not 
impossible task.‘ (NE, 1179b10-18) 
 
In the foregoing passage Aristotle holds that argument and 
persuasion will not be able to move the majority of people to noble 
actions. This extract is preceded by a similar implication that 
discourses are generally not sufficient in themselves to ‗make people 
moral‘ (NE1179b3-7). Certain habits need to be in place before reasoned 
argument, and emotional appeal will have any moral educational 
effect. Although some of the young, and the liberal-minded, may be 
fortunate enough to be naturally endowed with these habits237, 
arguments ‗are incapable of impelling the masses towards human 
perfection‘ (NE1179b7-10). The ‗many‘, it seems, do not yet, and may not 
ever, possess such habits. As a result, Curzer (2002) says external 
punishment and fear are rather required to motivate ‗the many‘ into 
moral action. 
 
Curzer takes the same passage (NE1179b7-13) and the parts that 
precede it, as a starting point for the construction of an Aristotelian 
theory of moral development in his article, ‗Aristotle‘s Painful Path to 
Virtue‘ (2002). There, he suggests that five different stages of moral 
development can be inferred from Aristotle‘s ethical treatise. Firstly, 
there are the ‗many‘ (hoi polloi) who are ‗moral beginners‘ (2002, p 154), 
who nevertheless have the potential for full virtue. Adults and children 
belong to this category, from which most people ‗simply fail to move 
up‘ (Curzer, 2002, p 155) and progress beyond238. The second stage is 
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 Kristjánsson similarly indicates that some children may possess certain morally desirable habits 
from birth (2007, p 22). 
238
 Kristjánsson makes much the same point (2007, p 20). 
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that of the ‗generous-minded‘ (eleutherios) (Curzer, 2002, p 154), who 
have elected to pursue the life of virtue but are confused about how to 
achieve it. Thirdly, come the ‗incontinent‘ who have the ability to 
determine which acts are virtuous but are nevertheless prevented 
from acting virtuously, by their wayward passions. Although the 
‗incontinent‘, generous minded and ‗many‘ are united in lacking the 
habits of action and feeling necessary for virtue, the incontinent are 
‗more morally advanced than most people‘ (Kristjánsson, 2007, p 21) 
because they do have correct opinions, at least hypothetically, about 
what it is best to do. The incontinent may, fourthly, proceed to 
‗continence‘, when they are able to consistently act in accordance with 
the moral principle and resist their baser impulses. 
 
‗Moderate tasks and moderate leisure, 
Quiet living, strict-kept measure 
Both in suffering and in pleasure – 
 ‗Tis for this thy nature yearns. 
 
But so many books thou readest, 
But so many schemes thou breedest, 
But so many wishes feedest, 
 That thy poor head almost turns‘. (Arnold, p 49, 1898) 
 
Matthew Arnold in his poem, The Second Best, arguably 
provides a fine illustration of the sorts of feelings, principles, 
intentions and temptations experienced by a person at the ‗second 
best‘ stage in an Aristotelian theory of moral development; that of 
continence. The continent aspire to moderation (both in suffering and 
pleasure) but they do on occasion experience feelings that give rise to 
inner conflict239. However, continent agents are not ‘turned‘ to vicious 
action by these appetites. For Curzer and Kristjánsson, the final stage 
of moral development is, unsurprisingly, full virtue wherein the agent 
has the ‗tall order‘240 of consistently thinking, feeling and acting in the 
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 This was explained at 6.1. 
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 I borrow this phrase from Kristjánsson (2007, p 21). 
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morally correct manner. Kristjánsson also attributes a sequential 
theory of moral development to Aristotle241. However, he proposes six 
stages of progress, rather than five.  Kristjánsson subdivides the 
generous-minded into the ‗soft‘ at stage two, who ‗are easily overcome 
by pain‘, and the ‗resistant‘ at stage three, who can ‗hold out‘ over 
painful appetites, but cannot yet control their inclinations for pleasure 
(Kristjánsson, 2007, p 21). Kristjánsson, I think rightly, observes that 
though Aristotle does not himself articulate a ‗comprehensive stage-
theory of moral development similar to that, of say, Kohlberg242‘ he 
does nevertheless ‗devote considerable space to describing people at 
different levels of moral excellence‘ (Kristjánsson, 2007, p 20). 
 
Curzer also draws another significant conclusion concerning the 
‗many‘ and ‗generous-minded‘. He states that the ‗many‘ are 
habituated into virtue through punishment and threats of 
punishment, whereas the ‗generous-minded‘ are habituated through 
the pain inherent in shame (aidōs243) (Curzer, 2002, p 158). Curzer 
therefore opposes the well-known argument of Burnyeat, maintaining 
that learners come to desire virtue for its own sake, through pain and 
fear of punishment rather than pleasure (Curzer, 2002, p 159). Burnyeat 
(1980) himself implied that habituation was a two stage process 
whereby learners are first conditioned into the ‗that‘ of morality, before 
being later instructed about the ‗because‘244. Sherman (2004) and 
Sorabji (1980) take the opposite view to Curzer, indicating that 
habituation is, at least partly, a rational process from the very 
beginning. However, both Curzer‘s and Sherman/Sorabji‘s 
perspectives seem rather extreme and probably not representative of 
Aristotle‘s own position245. To be sure, Aristotle does state that 
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 See Kristjánsson (2007) pages 19-25 for full explication of his theory. 
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 For an insightful critique of Kohlberg‟s theory see Carr (1996). 
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 As we shall shortly see, I do not think Curzer is employing the correct term for shame here. 
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 I briefly try to explain what Burnyeat might mean by the „that‟ and „because‟ of morality in chapter 
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Burnyeat‟s argument. 
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 Kristjánsson indicates that both Curzer and Sherman are „guilty of an overly radical either/or way of 
thinking‟ (2007, p 36). 
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‗learning brings pain, and while children are learning they are not 
playing‘ (Politics1339a27-29). Furthermore, habituation may not, in itself, 
constitute a ‗truly critical practice‘ (Kristjánsson, 2007, p 36) either. 
However, I do not think that early learning is, as Curzer suggests, a 
process that is exclusively driven by fear and pain, a view that 
becomes particularly apparent upon consideration of Aristotle‘s 
concept of imitation (mimêsis). 
 
7.7 Education through imitation, shame and emulation  
 
‗Imitation comes naturally to human beings from childhood (and in this they 
differ from other animals, i.e. in having a strong propensity to imitation and in 
learning their earliest lessons through imitation): so does the universal pleasure in 
imitations.‘ (Poetics48b6-9) 
 
In his Poetics (1996), Aristotle states that people first learn 
through imitation and he stresses that imitative acts are 
pleasurable246. This directly contradicts Curzer‘s assertion (2002, p 161) 
that pleasure does not play a role in the development of either ‗moral 
beginners‘ (the many) or the ‗generous-minded‘. Although much of the 
Poetics discusses representative imitations in art and drama, Aristotle 
states that mimesis247 is generally of people. As he puts it: ‗those who 
imitate, imitate agents; and these must be either admirable or inferior‘ 
(48a1-2). Aristotle continues by saying that the character of the people 
being mimetically copied may be defective, similar (to the agent 
copying that is) or excellent (48a2-5). Tragic dramas present agents of 
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 Fossheim (2006) also interprets this passage in the same way. 
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 In another important contribution to the debate on the education of the moral emotions, Maxwell 
claims that imitation involves „requests to modulate one‟s emotional response so as to achieve the 
normatively required measure and proportion of emotional response which a situation calls for‟ (2008, 
P 141). Whilst I agree with Maxwell, when he later says that „imitation seems intimately linked with 
the Aristotelian tradition‟ (2008, P 143), I am not at all sure that Maxwell‟s concept of imitation is, 
strictly speaking, Aristotelian. Mimesis, does not, it seems to me, involve rational requests or 
implorations to alter the emotional response of another it is rather - as Aristotle himself says – the 
copying of other persons, good or bad. As such, as we shall see, Aristotle seems to have thought that 
mimesis per se is essentially non-moral, and that shame and emulation retain considerably more moral 
educational potential, than imitation. Given the emphasis placed on verbal request, Maxwell‟s concept 
of imitation might be better explained, at least in an Aristotelian scheme, as an example of emotional 
persuasion. Maxwell‟s broader theory of emotion education is nonetheless, most worthy, and it will 
receive further discussion in chapter 9. 
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admirable character, whereas comedies portray people of deficient 
character (48a16-18). Aristotle later adds that character ‗is the kind of 
thing that discloses the nature of a choice‘ (50b10-11). In the Poetics, 
Aristotle arguably alludes to how the young may begin to learn to 
choose an act for its own sake, in a way that is pleasurable rather 
than painful (Fossheim, 2006). 
 
‗Hence mimetic desire ensures that, whatever the learner fastens on, relating 
mimetically to it will at the same time mean relating to it as something to be 
savoured for its own sake. Thus an action which might otherwise be done in order to 
receive a reward or to avoid a punishment will, if it is instead performed mimetically, 
be done without ulterior motives.‘ (Fossheim, 2006, p 113)  
 
In Habituation as Mimesis (2006), Fossheim maintains that 
habituation first takes the form of imitative association with and of 
others. He argues that imitation allows learners to focus on the 
pleasure in the performance of the imitation itself, rather than on any 
consequent pleasure. Fossheim suggests that repeatedly performed 
imitative actions are character forming, in line with Aristotle‘s scheme 
of moral development. He rightly implies that the concept of imitation 
also carries with it the need to protect the young from less than 
admirable models and representations. The motive to imitate is after 
all ‗the general human desire to become (to be like) whatever is 
presented as an option for mimesis248’ (Fossheim, 2006, p 116). The young 
have as yet no clear understanding of what is vicious or virtuous, or of 
why, and this is what makes their ‗protection so important‘ (Fossheim, 
2006, p 116). Similarly, Fossheim (2006, pp 113-114) acknowledges that a 
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 Tsuji, in an exploration of Benjamin‟s concept of mimesis, has recently suggested that when we 
learn through imitation we generally do so by replicating „models that embody the values of our own 
society, culture and institutions‟ (2010, p 127). Tsuji‟s article is an interesting one that may well do 
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merely mimetic replication, of even an admirable action, cannot be 
performed for its own sake in the same way that a fully virtuous 
action may be. I have to agree with Kristjánsson‘s (2006b) point that 
moral education should aim at considerably more than imitation249. 
 
A mimetically good (in the moral sense) action is only partially 
praiseworthy as it is not accompanied by comprehension on the part 
of the agent performing it about what it is that makes that action 
good. However, learners are arguably, through mimetic performance, 
beginning to develop habits of action proper to the moral agent. 
Moreover, they may also be taking pleasure in these actions. While 
pain undoubtedly plays a role in learning, Curzer‘s argument that 
habituation is inherently painful250 must be rejected. As Kristjánsson 
puts it, ‗Aristotle probably saw a place for both pleasure and pain in 
the habituation process‘ (Kristjánsson, 2007, p 36). Furthermore, there 
are also two ‗semi-virtues‘ that are typical of young learners: namely 
shame and emulation251. Significantly, both these emotions seem to 
involve aspects of both pleasure and pain. 
 
‗And since shame is an imagination connected with disrepute, and felt for its 
own sake and not for its consequences...one must needs feel shame before those 
whom one holds in regard’. (Rhetoric, 1384a31-34) 
 
Aristotle maintains that shame (aiskhunê252) is a type of pain 
felt when one‘s reputation is being, or might be, sullied (Rhetoric 
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 He makes this point in the context of a critique of character education programmes, not of 
Aristotle‟s concept of mimesis. Kristánsson (2006bpp40-41) insightfully draws upon Nietzsche and 
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 Konstan convincingly maintains that that it is aiskhunê, not aidôs, that Aristotle chooses to analyse 
in the Rhetoric‟ (2007, p 96). Konstan implies that where the former concept can be felt both 
prospectively and retrospectively, the latter is typically only felt in regard to future pains. Aristotle is 
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1383b11-15). Shame is at its most acute moreover, when one‘s 
behaviour is witnessed by others (Rhetoric, 1384a43-b), especially those 
that one admires (ibid1384a35-36&1384b37-39). Thus, shame is arguably 
a distinctively moral253 emotion that is intimately connected with 
public standards or norms of acceptable behaviour. Konstan notes 
that in modern times there has been a tendency to deride shame for 
being only a primitive form of guilt. The modern argument maintains 
that whereas shame is a response to the judgements of others, guilt is 
an ‗inner sensibility‘ of morally autonomous agency (Konstan, 2007, p 
91).  Kristjánsson similarly observes that a Kantian moral outlook is 
one that construes moral failure to reside in guilt rather than shame 
(2007, p 108). However, he adds that Aristotle‘s view of moral 
development is essentially non-autonomous. 
 
Konstan similarly maintains that Aristotelian shame is not a 
mere response to a perceived ill. It rather arises from specific states or 
events, whether committed or intended, that should bring about 
disgrace in the eyes of others (Konstan, 2007, p 100-101). Shame is not 
therefore an emotion that one ought to feel, or be encouraged to feel, 
indiscriminately. It is rather only appropriate (and indeed morally so) 
in certain conditions. Crucially, Aristotle says that it is ‗shameful not 
to have a share of... education to the appropriate extent and similarly 
with the others‘ (1384a15-17). Therefore, shame is arguably an emotion 
that can and should spur one to become better educated when one 
has not yet reached their full potential. Burnyeat interprets shame in 
something like this light, remarking that it ‗is the semi-virtue254 of the 
learner‘ (1980, p 78.) Kristjánsson similarly adds that whilst shame 
would not be felt by the fully virtuous, (who would not by definition 
have anything to be properly ashamed of), ‗it is a virtue of moral 
                                                                                                                                            
clear in his definition, that shame is felt „whether present, past, or future‟ (Rhetoric 1383b13) disrepute 
is at hand. I would therefore be inclined to agree with Konstan. 
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 Konstan remarks that shame has a fundamentally ethical character (2007, p 104). 
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 Though I agree with the classification of shame as a semi-virtue Aristotle does in the Eudemian 
Ethics categorise shame as a virtue (1221a1) in that it is a mean state between shamelessness and thin-
skinnedness. 
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learners‘ (2007, p 55). Shame is arguably a more developmentally 
mature motive of action for its own sake255 than imitation.  The 
former, unlike the latter, requires a degree of awareness of the moral 
worth of one‘s own actions or capacities in relation to more public 
standards.  
 
Emulation256 (zêlos) is also arguably a semi-virtue of the 
learner257 marked by even greater moral maturity than shame. 
Aristotle defines emulation as a pain felt towards someone who has 
valued goods that the emulous person lacks (Rhetoric1388a32-39). 
Notably, Aristotle distinguishes between emulation and envy 
(phthonos). Envy, Aristotle says, is ‗base‘ because the envious want to 
deprive their neighbour of valued goods (Rhetoric1388a36-39). Emulation 
however, ‗belongs to reasonable men‘ because it motivates them to 
attain the valued goods for themselves (Rhetoric1388a32-39). 
Kristjánsson provides some useful clarification here: ‗through 
emulation...we simply express, with admiration, the desirability of 
being like B258 in some respect, or having the same thing as B, 
without wanting to take anything away from B (2006b, p 42). 
Importantly, Aristotle identifies the virtues as examples of such 
valuable goods. He specifies that the virtues ‗must be‘ proper objects 
of emulation (1388b13-16). He adds that it is clear that we ought to 
emulate men ‗who have acquired...courage, wisdom and rule‘ (1388b13-
16).    
 
Emulation is arguably a motive worthy of higher praise than 
shame, because the former involves considerably more awareness of 
the goods and virtues that one lacks. Emulation also requires that one 
take active steps to obtain these admirable qualities, allied to a 
                                                 
255
 Aristotle does after all specify that shame is „felt for its own sake‟ (Rhetoric, 1384a32). 
256
 Konstan suggests that emulation rather than jealously is the correct translation of zêlos. The term 
jealousy (zêlutopia) he says, appears only once in Aristotle‟s „corpus, in the late compilation On 
Marvellous tales (2007, p 222). 
257
 Kristjánsson (2006b & 2007, chapter 7) provides a persuasive case for emulation being regarded as 
a virtue of the learner. 
258
 B here represents a person in possession of valued goods. 
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capacity to realise such qualities in the end. This is not to say, of 
course, that shame cannot be a motive for self improvement; one 
would hope that it would be. It is rather to say that in the case of 
emulation one must try, and be able to, better one‘s character. As 
Kristjánsson puts it, one cannot be emulous ‗without making an effort 
to acquire the admired qualities‘ (2006b, p 44). Aristotle implies that the 
‗young‘ are typically emulous in two ways. They both think themselves 
worthy of, and are able to procure, valuable goods (Rhethoric, 1388b1-4). 
Kristjánsson suggests that Aristotle must mean that the emulous 
perceive ‗themselves as the kind of people who would be able to 
actualise the relevant qualities or actions and, as a consequence, come 
to deserve the fitting goods‘ (Kristjánsson, 2006b, p 44). Kristjánsson 
theorises that emulation is so complex as to involve four separate 
components: 1) pain at the goods one lacks; 2) the zeal to make efforts 
to deserve them; 3) true self understanding in the sense of being able 
to direct oneself towards obtainable goods; 4) and a striving for these 
morally appropriate goods. Emulation, as a semi-virtue of the young, 
is when so construed both educationally important and morally and 
intellectually demanding. 
 
7.8 Learning is Pleasurable overall  
 
In this chapter, it has been maintained that Aristotle does not 
advance a Platonic theory of emotion in the Rhetoric. Aristotelian 
emotions do not as a class possess a reductive or singular purpose, be 
it restoration to the natural state or anything else. Aristotle is rather 
clear that different emotions have different purposes and objects. Far 
from being inconsistent, Aristotle is throughout of the view that the 
emotions can, may and should be educated. Arguably there are two 
compelling and distinctly Aristotelian reasons in support of educating 
moral emotions. First, as proper emotions are necessary for complete 
virtue, it would seem vitally important that teachers try to habituate 
pupils into such feelings as best they can. As Steutel & Spiecker put 
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it: as ‗the proper aims of moral education cannot be achieved without 
sentimental education...a considerable part of our moral educational 
efforts should be devoted to cultivating the child‘s sentiments‘ (2004, p 
532). Secondly, Aristotle also suggests that the less than fully virtuous 
(and he includes the young in this category) can actually learn through 
their pleasures and pains - a view he alludes to elsewhere in the 
Ethics, Politics and Poetics. It seems that the experience of appropriate 
shame can be educational, as can imitating, emulating and listening 
to exemplary adults. Steutel & Spiecker appear to share the view that 
children can learn through their sentiments. They indicate that proper 
emotional dispositions are a ‗prerequisite for effectively promoting 
other mental qualities, particularly those involved in the intellectual 
virtue of practical wisdom‘ (2004, p 532). 
 
‗Also learning and admiring are for the most part pleasant. For admiration contains 
the appetite for learning‘ (Rhetoric, 1371a41-42) 
 
Aristotle also appears to have thought that learning in and 
through our emotions is pleasant, rather than painful, overall. 
Although the semi-virtues of shame and emulation are felt as pains in 
the short term, the potential for moral development that they bring in 
the long term arguably means that they are pleasant, in a more 
fundamental sense. In chapter 9, an attempt will be made to explain 
how children in school can be helped to develop moral habits through 
both pleasure and pain. However, it first seems necessary to consider 
Aristotle‘s intellectual virtues. He does, after all, specify that ‗the mind 
of the pupil has to be prepared in its habits if it is to enjoy and dislike 
the right things‘ (NE1179b25-26). And, practical wisdom is not the only 
intellectual quality Aristotle thinks worth acquiring either; far from it. 
As we shall see, he seems to have been of the view that a range of 
distinctively intellectual and theoretical activities actually constitute 
the highest form of human flourishing. In the subsequent chapter, 
Aristotle‘s intellectual virtues will therefore be analysed in detail. This 
analysis will importantly come to impinge upon the Aristotelian theory 
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of pedagogy, discipline and instruction that is articulated in the third 
part of the thesis. There, it will also become apparent that Aristotle‘s 
intellectual virtues have aroused relatively little recent in depth 
interest in educational theory and philosophy. This is surprising given 
that Aristotle allots them a vitally important place in his framework of 





























Chapter 8: Aristotle‘s Intellectual Virtues 
 
The intellectual virtues have been the subject of much recent 
epistemological debate. This discussion has, broadly put, suggested 
that epistemic evaluation should focus upon traits of persons rather 
than qualities of propositions. Zagzebski has argued that the 
intellectual virtues are motivations for knowledge and she defines 
knowledge as an act of intellectual virtue rather than the traditional 
explanation of justified true belief. Whilst she has indicated that her 
position is essentially derived from Aristotle‘s Ethics, it will be argued 
that this claim is doubtful. Her theory involves a collapse of the 
distinction between the moral and intellectual virtues. Aristotle 
however, was clear that these two types of virtue are acquired 
differently and contribute to the flourishing life in contrasting ways. 
The purpose of the moral virtues is to realise the good in action; the 
intellectual virtues in contrast aim at truth. After exploring some of the 
various states of mind that Aristotle analysed in Book VI of his Ethics 
it will be proposed that: 1) knowledge (in speculative form at any rate) 
should instead be defined as eternally true belief; 2) Aristotle held 
wisdom in higher regard than knowledge; 3) Aristotle's intellectual 
virtues are virtues because they directly contribute to, or, are 
constitutive of, flourishing; 4) as such resourcefulness and 
understanding are valuable intellectual qualities but not virtues. It 
will be concluded that the prospects of children becoming educated 
and flourishing centrally depend upon their receiving the right sort of 
habituation and intellectual instruction. 
 
8.1 What is Virtue Epistemology? 
 
The literature pertaining to virtue epistemology has in a 
relatively short space of time become too vast and various to admit to 
comprehensive review within a single chapter. The aims of this 
chapter are therefore less ambitious and mainly twofold. In the fourth 
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chapter, it was argued that the theories of discipline described up to 
that point were all, in different ways, beset by epistemic weaknesses, 
weaknesses that I argued Aristotle‘s theory is well placed to overcome. 
In chapter three, it was similarly suggested that education (and any 
discipline that is part of it) should be something that assists pupils to 
develop, amongst other things, practical and theoretical knowledge 
and wisdom. This chapter will therefore firstly aim to explain the 
nature of these concepts as conceived of by Aristotle. The chapter will 
secondly provide an overview of recent developments in virtue 
epistemology, as some scholars in this field claim their theories are of 
Aristotelian lineage. It is to the second task that the remainder of this 
section (8.1) now turns. What is virtue epistemology and what is it 
that distinguishes it, from other branches of the theory of knowledge?  
 
In order to elucidate the main concerns of virtue epistemology, it 
may be prudent to briefly restate259 the principal concerns of 
epistemology. There are arguably three central questions of 
epistemology that are intimately related but importantly distinct. 
Firstly, what is the nature of knowledge? Secondly, what conditions 
must be satisfied before it can be said with confidence that a 
particular person knows something? Thirdly, what is it about 
knowledge that makes it more valuable than true belief or, what is it 
that generally gives knowledge value? Virtue epistemology provides, I 
think, different answers from traditional epistemology to each of these 
questions. However, the former is most easily distinguishable from the 
latter on account of the answers it provides to the third of these 
questions. The question of why knowledge is more valuable than true 
belief has until recently been given surprisingly little attention in 
epistemology (Zagzebski 1996, Riggs 2002 & Pritchard 2007). Much virtue 
epistemology, however, addresses the value question (Riggs, 2002) in 
ways different to traditional epistemology. Indeed, Pritchard indicates 
that virtue epistemology has given rise to a certain ‗rapprochement 
                                                 
259
 For a discussion of a traditional epistemology, within the context of education, see chapter 2. 
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between epistemology and ethics‘ (Pritchard, 2007, p 1).  Roberts and 
Wood (2007) suggest that the field is concerned with philosophical 
reflection upon the intellectual virtues. It has been claimed260 that the 
intellectual virtues can resolve some of the internal tensions in 
epistemology revealed by Edmund Gettier. But what do they mean by 
this? A brief consideration of the first two questions I have argued are 
central to epistemology should, I think, provide illumination here. 
 
A central aim of the first question (what is the nature of 
knowledge?) is to establish a satisfactory definition of knowledge. Near 
the beginning of enquiries into epistemology, it is often261 stated that 
it is the branch of philosophy concerned with the theory or concept of 
knowledge. Taking Plato‘s Theaetetus as inspiration, knowledge has 
traditionally been defined by philosophers262 as justified true belief. 
Answers to the second question have traditionally taken the form of 
statements about the conditions necessary and sufficient for a 
particular person knowing a given proposition263. These statements 
have often been expressed in formal, partially algebraic terms, where 
S (the subject or knower) is said to ‗know that P’ (the fact expressed by 
the proposition) when such and such necessary and sufficient 
conditions are satisfied. Historically, the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for a person knowing a proposition have been held to be 
that they have a justified true belief about it, justified in the light of 
sound supporting reasons. 
 
However, Edmund Gettier in his famous brief paper, ‘Is Justified 
True Belief Knowledge?’ (1963), argued that there can be instances 
when someone does not possess knowledge of a proposition, even 
though they have a justifiable true belief about it. In the cases Gettier 
explored, Smith holds a true belief, and he has solid evidence to 
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 See for example Zagzebski 1996, Greco 2007 and Roberts and Wood 2007. 
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 See for example, the opening pages of Craig 1990, Kvanvig 2003 & Roberts & Wood 2007. 
262
 A point noted by amongst others Riggs 2002, Blaauw & Pritchard 2005, & Pritchard 2007. 
263
 A point also made by Taylor, 1990, Gettier, 1963 & Kvanvig, 2003. 
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support his true belief. However, Smith's belief is true for entirely 
different reasons to those that he entertains. Gettier argues, in effect, 
that a person cannot know a proposition is true if it is mere luck 
rather than the capacities of the agent that are responsible for 
generating the true belief. After Gettier, knowledge was defined by 
some264 as non-accidentally true justified belief. However, Zagzebski 
(1996) has argued that precluding justified true beliefs that have been 
accidentally struck upon from the category of knowledge, does not add 
much, if anything, to the correctness of any epistemic account. Thus, 
in section 8.3, Zagzebski‘s attempt to explain why exceptional cases of 
justifiable true belief are inferior to knowledge will be noted. In section 
8.2, John Greco‘s more plausible account of the higher epistemic 
status of knowledge, over luckily obtained true belief, will first be 
elucidated. At section 8.4, it will be intimated that Aristotle's 
epistemology (if it can rightly be called that) can satisfactorily resolve 
Gettier type problems of epistemic luck, but not for the reasons that 
virtue epistemologists have until now supposed. 
 
In summary, epistemologists have taken considerable recent 
interest in the intellectual virtues. A brief survey of some of the 
literature265 of what has come to be known by some as virtue 
epistemology reveals that the virtues have been employed in diverse 
ways to explain the nature and value of knowledge and knowing. 
These interpretations of the intellectual virtues do nevertheless seem 
to have at least two core common features. Firstly, as already 
indicated, virtue epistemologists have been especially concerned with 
the question of why knowledge is valuable. Secondly, virtue 
epistemology ‗has come to designate a class of recent theories that 
focus epistemic evaluation on properties of persons rather than 
properties of beliefs or propositions‘ (Zagzebski & Fariweather, p 3, 2001). 
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 A point noted by both Zagzebski 1996 and Taylor 1990. 
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 For instructive introductions to the subject see for example, Pritchard 2007, Roberts and Wood 
2007, and especially the edited collections by Zagzebski & Fairweather 2001 & Depaul & Zagzebski 
2007. 
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Virtue epistemologists have allotted primary relevance to a person‘s 
intellectual qualities, in at least five different ways. These may be 
classified (albeit somewhat reductively) as dispositions towards: 
reliability in obtaining truth; motivation for truth; personal 
responsibility for obtaining reliable truth; proper regulation of truth 
seeking inquiries; and a teleological valuing of knowledge and truth. It 
should be noted that some individual proponents of virtue 
epistemology are clearly concerned with more than one of these 
categories. In the next part of this chapter the key features of the first 
four views will be considered.  
 
8.2 What Virtue Epistemology? 
 
Ernest Sosa was the first to suggest that the virtues of persons 
could be important in epistemology. Towards the end of his influential 
paper ‗The Raft and the Pyramid‘ (2000 though first published in 1980) 
he intimated that the intellectual virtues should become the primary 
source of justification for true beliefs. He thought of the intellectual 
virtues as stable dispositions that vitally contribute to the reliable 
formation of true beliefs. Agents should only be described as 
knowledgeable, Sosa stated, if they are reliable sources of information. 
Importantly, he also noted that moral and intellectual virtues need to 
be carefully distinguished. As we shall see, this point seems to have 
gone unheeded by Zagzebski, whose theory has encountered problems 
as a consequence. Virtue epistemology began as a theory of 
reliabilism266. In such epistemology, the intellectually virtuous agent 
will have a reliably high success rate in achieving truth and avoiding 
falsehood.  
 
Montmarquet (1987) also explored the possible relation between 
knowledge and value and between what he called epistemic virtue and 
justification. He alluded to what he saw as Aristotle‘s legacy in relation 
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 A point made by both Depaul & Zagzebski 2007 and Pritchard 2007. 
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to the virtues - that they are of such importance that we want them to 
be ingrained in our character. The epistemic virtues will invariably be 
possessed, he implies, by agents who desire truth as a matter of habit. 
Anyone who seeks after the truth, he argues, just is seeking virtuously 
formed true beliefs. A belief cannot be held virtuously, he adds, unless 
an agent‘s epistemic character has played some role in explaining why 
they now believe that p. Montmarquet distinguishes his virtue 
epistemology from reliabilist varieties on the grounds that his view 
only requires that ‗epistemic character traits be suitably connected to 
the desire, not the likelihood, of attaining truth (Montmarquet, 1987, p 
495).‘  Montmarquet is arguably the first motivation-based virtue 
epistemologist. The theorist who brought wider attention to the idea of 
a motivation-based virtue epistemology, though, was undoubtedly 
Linda Zagzebski. 
 
‗In the form of virtue theory I call motivation based, the value of reliability 
rests on the value of the motive for knowledge.‘ (Zagzebski, 1996, p 312) 
 
For Zagzebski (1996), reliability in obtaining true beliefs per se 
has no special value or disvalue (Riggs 2002, Pritchard, 2007). Successfully 
obtaining knowledge is less important for Zagzebski than the 
motivation for knowledge. The superiority of the desire for knowledge 
over the possession of knowledge in her virtue epistemology is 
revealed by her declaration that ‗the goodness of the reliability 
component of an intellectual virtue derives from the goodness of the 
motivational component (Zagzebski, 1996, p 209).‘ Unlike Montmarquet 
however, Zagzebski is also a reliabilist in an important sense for she 
frequently stresses that intellectual virtues are success terms. Success 
is measured by a capacity to generate knowledge reliably, or as she 
puts it: a reliable ability to realise the ‗aim of the motivation specific to 
that virtue‘ (Zagzebski, 1996, p 247). The motivation for knowledge is at 
the very heart of Zagzebski‘s account of the intellectual virtues267.  
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 This will be more fully explained in section 8.3. 
 193 
 
‗When we attribute knowledge to someone we imply that it is to his credit 
that he got things right. It is not because the person is lucky that he believes the 
truth – it is because of his own cognitive abilities.‘ (Greco, 2007, p 123) 
 
John Greco (2001) argues that the Aristotelian virtues combine 
elements of reliability and responsibility. He opines that knowledge 
should only be attributed to an agent when they deserve credit for a 
true belief on account of their intellectual efforts and abilities (Greco, 
2007). He thinks that there are both subjective and objective conditions 
that are necessary for a person to be described as knowing something. 
He puts it like this: ‗a belief p is epistemically justified for S if and only 
if S is both subjectively praiseworthy and objectively reliable in 
believing p’ (Greco, 2001, p 138). He similarly argues that a person only 
knows p, if their believing the truth of p reveals their reliable cognitive 
character (Greco, 2007). A person is subjectively justified in believing a 
proposition, Greco says, if they have manifested dispositions 
characteristic of a person trying to unveil the truth about it. The same 
person is objectively justified in believing that proposition if their 
dispositions ensure they are reliable at discovering the truth of p. 
Greco implies that the intellectually virtuous are those who are 
habitually and subjectively responsible for establishing knowledge in 
this objectively reliable way. He observes that ‗getting the truth as a 
result of one‘s virtues is more valuable than getting it on the cheap‘ 
(Greco, 2007, p 134). A great strength of Greco‘s theory of knowledge is 
that it successfully circumvents Gettier-type concerns of accidentally 
justifiable true beliefs. 
 
Sosa‘s later writings on the intellectual virtues (Sosa, 2001 & 2007) 
also explore the possibility that reliability in ‗hitting the mark of truth‘ 
(Sosa, 2007, p 164) is not the only or fundamental epistemic value. Sosa 
intimates that the person who is not directly responsible for procuring 
a true belief through their own intellectual efforts might have a truth 
of potentially limited epistemological value. He may well be, Sosa 
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states, (2007) like a puppet dancing to the rhythm of a puppeteer. Sosa 
thinks it preferable for true believing to be attributable to a person‘s 
own doing rather than the passive reception of external or externally 
imposed influences. Sosa rightly notes that Aristotle gave pride of 
place to truth obtained through the exercise of intellectual virtue. 
However, in the subsequent chapter it will become clear that his 
implication that true beliefs obtained with help from others are 
possibly less valuable than knowledge accumulated on one‘s own 
seems profoundly un-Aristotelian.  
 
Riggs (2002) implied that the person in a state of knowing is 
more worthy of epistemological attention than the abstract 
justification of knowledge. Hookaway, Riggs and Roberts & Wood (all 
2007) similarly contend that the real promise of the intellectual virtues 
is to be found in the ways that they can extend epistemology beyond 
its traditional preoccupation with knowledge and its justification. They 
all argue that intellectual virtues should be employed to redefine the 
main concerns of epistemology. As will become apparent, it only really 
makes sense to speak of a genuinely Aristotelian epistemology if the 
value of all the intellectual virtues is scrutinised. Hookaway maintains 
that it is mistaken to conceive epistemology in such a way as to 
preclude from the start the possibility that knowledge might be less 
important and valuable than has been historically supposed. He does 
suggest a definition of knowledge broadly similar to those of Zagzebski 
and Montmarquet. He characterises it as: ‗virtuously acquired true 
belief‘ (Hookaway, 2007, p 192). He is also, like other virtue 
epistemologists, of the view that epistemic success depends upon 
virtues of character. However, he argues that epistemic success or 
reliability should be measured differently. He states that the primary 
role of the intellectual virtues should be to regulate our intellectual 
lives, deliberations and inquiries. The intellectual virtues should help 
to ensure true belief formation, but the value of any such process of 
inquiry is to be found in the fact that it has been regulated by the 
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virtues. Knowledge and justified belief, he indicates, might be better 
thought of as a conclusion rather than the focus of epistemology.  
 
A similar view, that the virtues should first and foremost 
regulate truth seeking practices has been fleshed out in more detail by 
Roberts and Wood (2007). They argue the intellectual virtues have 
enormous potential to broaden the scope and importance of the theory 
of knowledge. They claim that the English speaking epistemology of 
the twentieth century was analytic in nature, focusing on analysing 
and defining concepts of knowledge, justification and rationality. They 
also declare that ‗all (my emphasis) of the virtue epistemologies of the 
last twenty five years have been attempts to turn the intellectual 
virtues to the purposes of analytic epistemology‘ (Roberts & Wood, 2007, p 
20-21). Whilst there has undoubtedly been a marked tendency in this 
direction (affirmed by Riggs, Pritchard & Hookaway all 2007), the work of 
Hookaway and Riggs (significantly first published in 2003) demonstrates 
that not all recent virtue epistemologists have focussed on analysing 
justification and knowledge.  
 
Notwithstanding their overstated claims to originality, Roberts 
and Wood do provide some insight into the debate about how the 
intellectual virtues might be acquired (as also to her credit does Zagzebski, 
1996). Taking Locke, rather than Aristotle, as their inspiration, they 
argue that the virtues should regulate the intellectual habits of agents 
and help eliminate deficiencies in their epistemic inquiries, methods 
and practices. They state that we ‗need not rule-books, but a training 
that nurtures people in the right intellectual dispositions (Roberts & 
Wood, 2007, p 22)‘. Responsibility for the formation of such excellent 
intellectual habits in persons, they say, is ‗clearly the business of 
schools and parents…They are the chief educators of character‘ 
(Roberts & Wood, 2007, p 23). In briefly detailing the nature of some of the 
virtue epistemologies that have evolved to date, it has not so much 
been my intention to demonstrate the superiority of one approach over 
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another. My interest in the subject stems rather from a desire to make 
clear both those ways in which Aristotle‘s intellectual virtues are 
related to the flourishing life, and the approaches by which such 
qualities may be fostered. The pedagogical implications of virtue 
epistemology, and especially of Aristotle‘s intellectual virtues, will 
therefore be postponed until chapter 9. However, it is to the 
philosopher who has most explicitly modelled her virtue epistemology 
on Aristotelian thought that the discussion now turns. 
 
8.3 Is the desire to know the primary intellectual value? 
 
There is little doubt that Linda Zagzebski has been a major 
influence on contemporary epistemological debate about the 
intellectual virtues. I would echo the sentiments of Annas (2007) who 
suggests that epistemologists and ethicists alike owe Zagzebski 
gratitude for the exciting paths of inquiry her seminal text Virtues of 
the Mind (1996) has opened up. In that book, Zagzebski claims to be 
the first person to have closely modelled an epistemology on Aristotle‘s 
virtue theory. She certainly has interpreted his Ethics in a bold, 
interesting and innovative way. Despite the importance of her 
contribution, however, Zagzebski has not been without her critics. 
Although Blaauw & Pritchard (2005) describe Zagzebski as a neo-
Aristotelian epistemologist, at least four of her innovations of the 
Nicomachean Ethics are questionable and only doubtfully Aristotelian: 
1) her definition of knowledge; 2) her identification of love of knowledge 
as the primary intellectual virtue; 3) her insistence that her theory is 
non-teleological; 4) her modelling of intellectual virtue on moral virtue. 
To be sure, my argument is not that Zagzebski completely 
misunderstands Aristotle on all these points, for Virtues of the Mind 
suggests that she does broadly grasp Aristotle‘s conception of the 
intellectual virtues. My claim is rather that Zagzebski has so 
fundamentally re-imagined the intellectual virtues that they are no 
longer recognisable as Aristotelian; and that it is therefore inaccurate 
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to describe her epistemology as Aristotelian.  
 
Zagzebski (1996) firstly argues that her normative epistemology 
is well placed to resolve Gettier-type difficulties. It can do so, she 
implies, by shifting focus from qualities of propositions to the virtues 
of persons. The standard notion of knowledge as propositionally 
expressed justified true belief has become mired she says, in a 
seemingly intractable debate between internalists and externalists. An 
internal account of justification suggests that the holder of a belief 
must have personal cognitive access to the evidence that grounds that 
belief (Zagzebski 1996 & Roberts and Wood 2007). By contrast, an externalist 
account of knowledge requires that the 'most important or salient 
justifying features are typically inaccessible to the agent's 
consciousness (Zagzebski, 1996, p 5).' An Aristotelian epistemology 
however, she says, possesses both internal and external aspects268. 
Though I find Zagzebski‘s notion to be a little unclear, I take her to 
mean that whereas the motivation to seek knowledge supplies the 
internal feature of her theory, reliability in procuring knowledge 
provides the external feature. This interpretation is supported, I think, 
by her general conceptualisation of knowledge269.  
 
Zagzebski states that the component of motivation is cognitively 
accessible to the virtuous agent. Successfully realising the goal of the 
motivation (that is, actually being reliable in forming knowledge) is the 
external feature of her epistemology. She emphasises that the aim of 
the intellectual virtues is to be knowledge, rather than merely truth 
conducive (Zagzebski, 1996, p 190). Knowledge for Zagzebski is more 
valuable than true belief because genuine knowledge has been driven 
by a personal quality (of desire or emotion) that has intrinsic value; 
namely, the love of truth (2007). Motives and ends she argues are not 
the same thing. A person who accidentally arrives at a given truth 
may lack the desire to know that truth. The cognitive activities of the 
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person who knows the truth are characterised by their deeply felt care 
for the truth (2007). She defines knowledge as ‗a state of cognitive 
contact with reality arising out of acts on intellectual virtue‘ (Zagzebski, 
1996, p 298). She claims her definition defeats Gettier-type cases of 
epistemic luck because ‗whatever knowledge is in additional to truth 
entails truth‘ (Zagzebski, 1996, p 299). She appears to think that the 
motive to know ‗guarantees‘ that the intellectually virtuous agent will 
know the truth of the matter at hand. Although she later defines 
knowledge more simply as ‗an act of intellectual virtue (Zagzebski, 2007, 
p 153)‘ I find her logic in each case to be circular and unconvincing.  
 
In section 8.4, it will be maintained that her portrayal of 
knowledge is very far removed from Aristotle‘s discussion of it in his 
Ethics. Roberts and Wood share my scepticism and point out that 
‗defining the justifier‘ (2007, p 14) of knowledge in such a way as to 
guarantee that he or she obtains the truth is not a strategy that is 
open to other epistemologies attempting to work through Gettier 
issues. It is one thing to suggest that people properly exercising 
intellectual virtues are generally reliable truth seekers. It is quite 
another to argue that they are invariably infallible truth seekers in 
virtue of their motivation. I believe that Greco270 provides a more 
persuasive account of how a virtue epistemology may account for 
instances of lucky knowledge.  
 
Zagzebski, secondly, identifies love of, or desire for knowledge as 
the highest or primary intellectual virtue. Roberts and Woods appear 
to agree with this remarking that love of knowledge is ‗a virtue that is 
basic to the whole of intellectual life‘ (Roberts & Wood, 2007, p 73). It 
involves, according to them, a general disposition of excitement at the 
prospect of learning about and/or understanding reality. They imply 
that it is both a virtue in its own right and a virtue that is associated 
with or active in other virtues too. However, they do not seem to share 
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Zagzebski‘s view that love of knowledge is a motive that essentially 
involves desiring knowledge.  They develop a considerably more 
nuanced and detailed concept. They argue that it is possible to love 
knowledge for a variety of reasons: intrinsically and instrumentally 
and virtuously and non-virtuously. An intrinsic desire to know, they 
say, is a good in itself. Some knowledge that has no actual practical 
application just is nevertheless deeply enriching and valuable. 
Instrumental motivations too need not necessarily be non-virtuous, 
but ‗there is something intellectually immature, to say the least, about 
somebody who seeks the kind of knowledge in question for solely 
instrumental reasons (Roberts & Wood, 2007, p 173)‘. Significantly, they 
point out that a scrutiny of the individual intellectual virtues reveals 
that they are diverse in structure271. Each virtue tends to have its own 
motivation, and ‗the motive characteristic of a virtue is in no case, or 
almost no case, the desire to have the virtue‘ (Roberts & Wood, 2007, p 77). 
I agree with Roberts and Wood on this point. However, I do not accept 
their wider view that love of knowledge is the primary intellectual 
virtue that unifies the others272.  
 
Both Roberts and Woods and Zagzebksi attempt to justify their 
stance by reference to Aristotle‘s famous dictum that 'by nature all 
men long to know' (MP, Alpha 1, 980a). Zagzebksi claims that the 
‗intellectual virtues can be defined in terms of motivations arising 
from the general motivation for knowledge and reliability in attaining 
the aims of these motives.‘ (Zagzebski, 1996, p 166) She clarifies her 
position by stating that all the intellectual virtues are grounded upon 
a primary, but not exclusive, desire for knowledge. She thus opens up 
the possibility for intellectually virtuous inquiry to be directed at 
something other than knowledge. To her credit, one of the main 
strengths of her interpretation of Aristotle's intellectual virtues is her 
recognition that he did not neglect, but greatly valued, wisdom and 
understanding. However, in remarking that the motive to know 
                                                 
271
 A similar point is made by Annas 2007. 
272
 My reasons for thinking this will become apparent at 8.5. 
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incorporates the motive to understand (Zagzebski, 1996, p 184) she again 
reinforces her view that knowledge (or rather the desire for it) is the 
virtue of highest value.  
 
Aristotle clearly did think that wanting to know is a natural 
human appetite. He also certainly moreover thought that possession 
of knowledge is an intellectual virtue. However, he did not appear to 
hold the view that desire for knowledge is. Even if desire for knowledge 
is somehow granted the status of a full intellectual virtue (and I do not 
think the Nicomachean Ethics in any way supports this reading) 
Aristotle would not have regarded it as the most important one. He 
did, after all, declare that ‗those who possess knowledge pass their 
time more pleasantly than those still in pursuit of it‘ (NE, 1177a27-28). 
As will be explained at 8.4, he is clear that the most complete 
intellectual virtue is wisdom (Sophia).   
 
Zagzebski, thirdly, insists (1996 & particularly 2007) that her 
account is non-teleological because it is based on motivation, rather 
than any conception of human flourishing. However, her claim to have 
developed a non-teleological epistemology on the basis of Aristotle's 
Ethics is surely paradoxical. As will become apparent at 8.4, for 
Aristotle, the real value of knowledge and the other intellectual virtues 
was to be found within a teleological framework. This point has more 
recently been noted by Sosa (2007) and Roberts and Woods (2007), and 
it has been especially well pressed by Annas and Riggs (both 2007). 
Zagzebski further differentiates her account from Aristotle's, by 
devising a new list of intellectual virtues (as do Roberts & Wood). She 
indicates that the intellectual virtues include 'intellectual carefulness, 
perseverance, humility, vigour, flexibility, courage, and thoroughness, 
as well as open-mindedness, fair-mindedness, insightfulness and the 
virtues opposed to wishful thinking, obtuseness, and conformity' 
(Zagzebski, 1996, p 155). She says that intellectual integrity and 
originality are particularly important additional intellectual virtues, 
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remarking that 'we value intellectual originality and inventiveness 
more than knowledge learned from others' (Zagzebski, 1996, p 155).   
 
‗Virtue then is of two kinds, intellectual and moral. Intellectual virtue owes 
both its inception and its growth chiefly to instruction, and for this reason needs 
time and experience. Moral goodness on the other hand, is the result of habit‘. (NE, 
1103a14-17)  
 
Aristotle (as the foregoing quotation shows) famously argued 
that whereas the intellectual virtues are largely taught, the moral 
virtues are acquired by habit. Most curiously, however, Zagzebski 
(fourthly) argues that Aristotle's division of the virtues into two kinds 
is not important. The intellectual virtues, she says, ought to be 
understood as a class or 'subset' of the moral virtues. She states that 
'epistemic evaluation is a form of moral evaluation' (Zagzebski, 1996, p 6); 
the former derives from the latter. Later in her book (1996), she puts 
the point more emphatically, stating that it 'greatly distorts the nature 
of both to attempt to analyse them in separate branches of 
philosophy. Intellectual virtues are best viewed as forms of moral 
virtue' (Zagzebski, 1996, p 139). The intellectually virtuous life, she 
argues, often entails hitting the mean of virtue and avoiding the 
contrary extremes of vice. Practical wisdom is required to play the 
mediating role of determining the mean of the intellectual as well as 
the moral virtues.  
 
Zagzebski is not a lone voice amongst virtue epistemologists in 
this273. Audi (2001) similarly explains the intellectual virtues, in 
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 Similarly, some philosophers concerning themselves with educational questions have also 
maintained that the intellectual virtues are a sub-class of moral virtues. For an interesting discussion of 
how Scheffler (though he refers to intellectual virtues as rational passions), Dearden and Quinton are 
inclined to construe the intellectual virtues as a sub-class of moral virtues see Steutel & Spiecker 
(1997). Steutel and Spiecker argue that whereas the intellectual virtues are unified by a „concern and 
respect for truth‟ the moral virtues are united by a „concern and respect for persons‟ (1997, p 64). They 
claim this distinction shows (better than the philosophers‟ views they critique) that the intellectual 
virtues are „in certain respects‟ (ibid, p 65) moral virtues too. I agree with their logic that the 
intellectual virtues can have an important bearing on moral life when persons respect other persons by 
appealing to their rationality. However, I do not think this discrimination reveals that intellectual 
virtues ought to be classified as a sub-class of moral virtues, or that the intellectual virtues are in some 
ways moral virtues. It only shows that the concerns of the two different types of virtue often overlap. 
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reference to the moral ones, arguing that people can conduct their 
intellectual lives well (virtuously) or poorly (viciously) in the same way 
that they can their moral lives. More recently, however, Annas (2007) 
has insisted that neither the intellectual nor moral virtues should be 
perceived as a sub kind274 of the other. I wholeheartedly agree. While 
it might be logically possible to model the structure of the intellectual 
virtues on the moral ones, this was not Aristotle‘s position. Annas 
correctly points out that ‗Aristotle‘s intellectual virtues in the 
Nicomachean Ethics VI are highly diverse (Annas, 2007, p 20)‘. Zagzebski 
(1996) is of course aware of the distinction that Aristotle draws between 
the moral and intellectual virtues, but in considering this to be 
unimportant, and in merging the two together, I believe she is guilty of 
a ‗category mistake‘275. 
 
Despite the allusion Annas makes to Book VI of the Ethics, 
somewhat remarkably, no-one claiming to be a virtue epistemologist 
(at least in the literature I have come across) has to date undertaken a 
systematic analysis of the intellectual virtues discussed by Aristotle 
there. Roberts and Wood complain about the 'paucity of analysis of 
particular virtues' (Roberts & Wood, 2007, p 67) in epistemology and Riggs 
(2007) makes a similar point.  It is to this exegetical task that the 
present discussion therefore shifts. In the course of this, it will be 
confirmed that Aristotle‘s intellectual virtues have neither uniform 
structure nor spheres of concern. If anything, however, his moral 
virtues are at the service of the intellect, not the other way around. 
Zagzebski‘s theory therefore rests upon a central misreading276 of the 
relationship between the moral and intellectual virtues and the 
respective parts they should play in the flourishing life. 
                                                                                                                                            
Aristotle‟s virtue of phronesis was after all an intellectual virtue concerned with correct thinking in the 
moral sphere.  And as we shall see, Aristotle seems to have thought that the moral virtues serve the 
intellectual virtues. 
274
 Carr (1991, p 57) also made a similar point about the crucial distinction between the moral and 
intellectual virtues. 
275
 I borrow this phrase from Professor David Carr who used it to describe Zagzebski‟s work in a 
conversation with myself and Dr. Gale Macleod. 
276
 Misreading in the sense that she has failed to appreciate how important the distinction between 
Aristotle‟s moral and intellectual virtues is. 
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8.4 A Teleological Epistemology: Aristotle‘s Intellectual Virtues 
 
'Thus the attainment of truth is the task of both of the intellectual parts of the soul; 
so their respective virtues are the states that will best enable them to arrive at the 
truth.' (NE, 1139b10-12) 
 
As this quotation shows, Aristotle appears to define the 
intellectual virtues (in general) as mental states whose function is to 
arrive at truth277.  However, near the beginning of the Nichomachean 
Ethics Aristotle famously remarks that the trained mind only expects a 
precision in truth to the extent that each subject matter will admit (NE 
1094b19-26). The full significance of this statement emerges upon 
consideration of his discussion of the intellectual virtues in Book VI of 
his Nicomachean Ethics. There, Aristotle makes clear that there are 
some matters that admit of certainty and some that do not. To 
properly understand Aristotle's intellectual virtues it is necessary to 
identify both their general and respective spheres of concern. The 
general provenance of the intellect, Aristotle remarks, must be 
ultimate or particular things (NE1143a28-29).  He correspondingly sub-
divides the rational part of the soul into two parts; 
scientific/theoretical and deliberative/practical (NE1139a5-11).  
 
Aristotle indicates that the best state of each of these theoretical 
and practical parts will be their virtue (NE1139a16-18). Virtue, he adds, 
is after all related to the proper functioning of each thing (NE 1139a18). 
The notion that intellectual virtue is characterised by the optimal 
functioning of each part of the rational soul clearly reflects the broad 
virtue epistemological view, that it is possible for one's intellect to 
function well or badly when in pursuit of truth. However, as will 
become clear, truth production is less important for Aristotle than a 
flourishing (eudaimonia) life. The scientific part of the rational soul 
contemplates ultimate things, 'those things whose first principles are 
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 Curren (1999, p 67-68 & 2000, p 202) also interprets Aristotle‟s intellectual virtues to be essentially 
truth orientated. 
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invariable' (NE1139a8). The practical part of the rational soul, by 
contrast, deliberates over particular things that are variable (NE1139a9). 
Aristotle therefore specifies that there are two varieties of intellectual 
virtue, the theoretical and the practical, distinguishable by their 
respective concerns with ultimate and particular things278. 
 
‗Intellectual excellence is itself of two kinds, theoretical and practical, the former 
identical with a systematic grasp of objective truth, the latter consisting in the 
systematic capacity to realise in action correct (i.e. true) conceptions of what should 
be done or brought about‘. (Taylor 1990, p 117) 
 
In the case of the theoretical intellect right and wrong, Aristotle 
says, just are truth and falsehood respectively (NE1139a26-28). In the 
case of the practical intellect, correctness requires thought, but it 
must additionally correspond to right appetite and action too 
(NE1139a26-35). At 8.5, it will be explained that a component part of all 
of the faculties of the practical intellect is that they must involve some 
sort of action, choice, deliberation or judgement in the realm of 
particular things. Truths reached by the purely theoretical intellect, in 
contrast, are not contingent upon any such action and calculation 
towards states of affairs in the finite realm. Indeed, what is arguably 
distinctive about truths afforded by the theoretical intellect is that 
they cannot affect or be affected by any practical action.  
 
‗Let us assume there are five ways in which the soul arrives at truth by affirmation 
or denial, namely art, science, prudence, wisdom and intuition.‘ (NE, 1139b 15-17) 
 
Aristotle indicates there are five states of mind - scientific knowledge; 
art; practical wisdom; intuition; and wisdom - that can help the 
intellectually virtuous person to arrive at or realise truth. He also 
discusses two other mental abilities pertinent to this discussion; 
understanding (which can lead to right judgement); and 
                                                 
278
 Saugstad (2005, p 353) somewhat similarly remarks that there are two different categories of 
knowledge: „the theoretical that exists out of necessity and the practical that admits variation‟. Whilst I 
agree with Saugstad‟s general view here, it is important to note that Aristotle speaks about virtues of 
the theoretical and practical intellect, rather than theoretical and practical knowledge.  
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resourcefulness (which aims at a sort of correct thinking). The five 
states he appears to have regarded as virtues each aspire to a 
different variety of truth. Only one of them has scientific knowledge 
(episteme) as its target. It is thus noteworthy that Aristotle‘s 
intellectual virtues all aim at truth rather than specifically scientific 
knowledge. Episteme in the Ethics is only one type of truth amongst 
others.  
 
‗What we know cannot be other than what it is…Therefore it is eternal, because 
everything that is of necessity in the unqualified sense is eternal.‘  (NE1139b20-24) 
 
Aristotle suggests that scientific knowledge (episteme), intuition 
(nous) and wisdom (Sophia) pertain to the theoretical intellect whereas 
practical wisdom (phroneses) and art (techne) belong to the 
deliberative or practical part of the soul. His usage of the word 
knowledge (episteme) in the Ethics suggests that he intended it to refer 
to the class of ultimate things that the human mind could know with 
certainty. The object of scientific knowledge, Aristotle says, is 
necessity (NE1139b23). Necessity refers to the class of eternal things 
that are unqualified and unchanging and ‗what is eternal cannot come 
into being or cease to be‘ (NE1139B24-25). The necessary truths at which 
episteme aims, are thus ones that admit of no exception. A truth can 
be an epistemic truth, if and only if, its sphere of concern is the eternal 
and unchanging.  
 
Furthermore, for Aristotle, theoretical knowledge must always 
be correct. He puts it thus: ‗there is no such thing as correctness of 
knowledge, since there is no such thing as error of knowledge‘ 
(NE1142b10-11). Aristotle also re-states the unchangeable nature of 
episteme in his Posterior Analytics. There, he states that ‗scientific 
knowledge cannot be other than what it is' (2009, p 8).  For Aristotle, 
theoretical knowledge is infallible because its subject matter does not, 
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and cannot ever, alter279. Scientific knowledge can therefore arguably 
be defined in a traditional way as eternally true belief. Scientific 
knowledge, Aristotle explicates: ‗consists in forming judgements about 
things that are universal and necessary‘ (NE 1140b30-31). The necessary 
and sufficient conditions of a person so knowing can therefore 
arguably be expressed as follows: 
 
S theoretically knows that P if i) P is a necessary universal truth 
ii) S has formed a correct judgement 
about P 
     
This definition of knowledge is markedly different from the one 
inferred from Aristotle by Zagzebksi. Episteme (theoretical knowledge) 
is not, as Zagzebksi puts it, an act of intellectual virtue. It is rather an 
intellectual virtue that cannot entail action280. It was not, moreover, a 
necessary condition of scientific knowledge for Aristotle that one must 
grasp why a given proposition is true, only that it is always true. 
Indeed, the first principles of scientific truths cannot be properly 
judged by scientific knowledge itself; and the same is true of art and 
practical wisdom (NE 1140b33-35). Intuition is rather ‗the state of mind 
that apprehends first principles (NE1141a8-9)‘. Intuition seems to be the 
intellectual virtue that makes comprehension of theoretical knowledge 
possible. The necessary and sufficient conditions of intuitive 
knowledge might be articulated as follows: 
 
S intuits that P if S grasps the principles that justify P's eternal truth 
 
The Aristotelian intellectual virtue of greatest import, however, is 
wisdom, which Aristotle declares to be ‗the most finished form of 
knowledge (NE1141a15-16)‘. Wisdom has explanatory value, as the wise 
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 Kristjánsson similarly comments that „theoria refers to knowledge of necessary (non-contingent) 
things that cannot be other than what they are. It is a priori knowledge of the unchanging‟ (2007, p 
163). Saugstad (2002 & 2005) also observes that the subject matter of episteme is eternal and certain. 
280
 At least that is action in the sensible world. 
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agent both knows and understands first principles (NE1141a16-18). 
Wisdom might therefore be defined as justified eternally true belief. 
The necessary and sufficient conditions of the wise agent on this 
account would be that; 
 
S is wise about P if S i) knows that P is eternally true and 
ii) S intuitively understands the principles 
that justify P's eternal truth.  
 
Significantly, wisdom has normative import because of its 
subject matter. Aristotle himself refers to wisdom as ‗scientific and 
intuitive knowledge of what is by nature most precious‘ (NE1141b4-5). 
Riggs notably defines wisdom in a similar way remarking that if 
knowledge is important, ‗wisdom entails understanding the things 
that are most important (Riggs, 2007, p 221)'. Riggs suggests that wisdom 
would rank most highly in any hierarchy of virtues because of its 
particular teleological value and capacity to engender flourishing 
(eudaimonia) over the span of a person's whole life. Wisdom (Sophia), 
Aristotle says, does not directly study happiness, for this is the 
concern of practical wisdom (NE1143b20). However, wisdom does 
produce happiness for the person who possesses and exercises it 
(NE1144a3-5). Aristotle confirms the teleological primacy of the 
intellectual life in Book X.  
 
‗We ought, so far as in us lies, to put on immortality, and do all that we can to live in 
conformity with the highest that is in us…Indeed it would seem that this is the true 
self of the individual…Therefore for man, too, the best and most pleasant life is the 
life of the intellect, since the intellect is in the fullest sense the man. So this life will 
also be the happiest.‘ (NE 1177b35-1178a10,) 
 
Aristotle, in Book 10 also states that eudaimonia is constituted 
by contemplation281 (NE, 1177a18). I take him here to mean, 
contemplation of eternal matters, since he says that contemplation is 
                                                 
280 Curren (2000, p 67) also attributes to Aristotle the view that the life of contemplation is best.  
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the only activity that is always performed for its own sake (NE, 1177b1-
2). By way of contrast, he also comments that we expect to benefit 
from activities that involve practical actions (NE, 1177b3-5). Purely 
theoretical virtues, then, are all concerned with truths that are in 
some way eternally valuable. The person with theoretical knowledge 
need only know that a given p is eternally true. The agent of intuitive 
virtue need only understand why that p is eternally true. The person 
of wisdom must know and be able to explain why p is eternally true. 
What distinguishes the intellectually knowledgeable from the 
intellectually wise agent is precisely this ability to know the factual 
principles of eternal matters and comprehend the intuitions that 
govern these facts. Crucially, though, the purely theoretical virtues are 
virtues because they enable the contemplation that constitutes the 
highest human flourishing. Indeed, the teleological value of any truth 
is determined for Aristotle by the extent to which it constitutes or 
contributes to flourishing. Truth is, to be sure, the aim of the intellect. 
However, truth is a target because of its particular relation to the end 
that supervenes on all others, that of happiness. To subvert 
Blackburn‘s (2001) aphorism: truth is virtue's handmaiden, as virtuous 
theoretical contemplation is the key component of flourishing. 
 
The virtues of the theoretical intellect have the epistemic merit of 
defeating Gettier problems. Epistemic luck does not impinge upon the 
purely theoretical virtues because they only refer to a sphere in which 
luck, chance and change cannot occur. However, the problem with 
this eternal schema is that truths of genuine epistemological status 
are few and far between. Like Plato282 before him, Aristotle seems to 
have thought that mathematics is one of the few forms of inquiry that 
can directly study eternal verities283. He suggests this by implication 
when he remarks that maths, unlike philosophy and natural science, 
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 At 2.2 it was indicated that Plato thought mathematics was extraordinarily effective at turning the 
soul towards truth. 
283
In book 6, at any rate, he does not appear to identify any others. However, he does, as we shall see 
imply that practical wisdom, and arguably natural science, can generate necessary truths of a different 
sort, through systematic engagement with objects of experience. 
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‗deals with abstractions, whereas the first principles of the latter two 
are grasped only as the result of experience (1142a15-20)‘.  Taylor 
argues that episteme and nous appear ‗to be very special kinds of 
cognitive state, constituting at best only a small fraction of our total 
body of knowledge' (Taylor, 1990, p 121). Taylor also suggests that 
Aristotle's portrayal of theoretical knowledge in the Ethics is strictly 
limited to universal and necessary truths284. Taylor adds, however, 
that we often take ourselves to know truths about perceived objects 
that are neither universal nor necessary. Crucially, he states that 
Aristotle‘s discussion of the intellectual virtues in Book VI precludes 
the possibility of there being any such type of perceptual knowledge. 
While I shall go on to dispute this aspect of Taylor‘s argument, I agree 
with his other conclusion that Aristotle elsewhere unequivocally 
pronounces that human beings can have knowledge of perceptual 
objects.   
 
In the Posterior Analytics, for example, Aristotle indicates that 
the repeated experience of sense-perceptions285 can bring forth 
natural scientific knowledge of objects in the world (PA, 2009, p 75). 
Aristotle also contrasted a sort of perceptual knowledge, with 
theoretical knowledge, in Chapter V of De Partibus Animalium 
(DP644b20-646a). There, he intimates that the investigation of eternal 
and imperishable objects brings great pleasure and value, but 
concedes that we ‗are better equipped to acquire knowledge about the 
perishable plants and animals because they grow beside us…and 
information about them is better and more plentiful (DP644b28-645a2)‘. 
Seeking perceptual knowledge of human beings and other animals is 
not without value either (DP645a26-28). The study of natural things can 
also grant enormous pleasure (DP645a15-17). The idea that Aristotle 
reverses this tendency - that he neither recognises the possibility of, 
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 Kristjánsson seems to agree with Taylor. He remarks that „Aristotle considered theoria to be 
incommensurable with practical (contingent) matters‟ (2007, p163). 
285
 He calls this process „induction‟. The pedagogical importance of learning by induction will be 
explored in the next chapter. 
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nor values, perceptual knowledge in the Ethics - must seriously 
undermine the legitimacy and usefulness of any epistemology 
constructed on the basis of this treatise. In the following section, it 
will be argued that Aristotle did imply that it was possible to have a 
type of knowledge of contingent matters in Book XI of his Ethics. 
 
8.5 ‗Knowledge‘ of the contingent and the Practical Intellect  
 
Good Hamlet, cast thy nighted colour off, 
And let thine eye look like a friend on Denmark. 
Do not for ever with thy veiled lids 
Seek for thy noble father in the dust. 
Thou knows't 'tis common: all that lives must die, 
Passing through nature to eternity. 
Ay, madam, it is common. (Hamlet Act 1, Scene 2, Shakespeare 1992, p 9) 
 
In this dramatic exchange, Gertrude, Queen of Denmark, 
implores her son Hamlet to both relent in grieving for his father and 
remain in the country. She also implies that it is commonly possible 
to have knowledge of finite and particular objects. Is it possible to 
draw the same conclusion from Aristotle's Ethics? He is, admittedly, 
far from clear on this matter. However, I think his utterances in Book 
VI regarding perception and knowledge of particulars warrant a more 
generous interpretation than that offered by Taylor. To start with, as 
Taylor himself acknowledges, none of Aristotle‘s major works 
specifically set out to address the nature of knowledge. Taylor 
concedes that issues of knowledge and its justification were of 
peripheral concern to Aristotle. 
 
 
‗On the whole, he does not seek to argue that knowledge is possible, but, assuming 
its possibility, he seeks to understand how it is realised in different fields of mental 
activity and how the states in which it is realised relate to other cognitive states of 
the agent.‘ (Taylor C, 1990, p 116) 
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I wholeheartedly agree with Taylor‘s sentiments. Indeed, on the 
basis of them, it is mildly perplexing to find him attributing to 
Aristotle‘s Ethics such a sceptical view of perception. It is apparent 
from Book VI that Aristotle‘s priority is to explain the value of various 
mental states in terms of the contributions they can make to 
eudaimonia rather than to knowledge formation.  However, I also 
think that in Book VI Aristotle makes it quite clear that he ‗assumes 
the possibility‘ of perceptual knowledge in at least two ways. First, 
when discussing political science (which is itself a variety of practical 
wisdom) he states that ‗knowing one‘s own interests will be one 
species of knowledge, but it is widely different from the other species‘ 
(NE1141a35-NE1142a). Since Aristotle specifies that political science 
‗deals with particular circumstances‘ (NE1141a25), I think that it is fair 
to infer from this that Aristotle assumed that knowledge of particular 
things was possible. Theoretical knowledge of necessary truths is one 
type of (particularly valuable) knowledge, but there appears to be 
another: a sort of perceptual or practical knowledge of particular 
things and people. Secondly, on the basis of Aristotle‘s account of 
practical wisdom, I think there can be little doubt he thought that 
some sort of perceptual knowledge existed. Knowledge of particular 
things is arguably a necessary component of practical wisdom. It is to 
the mental states that make up the practical intellect that the present 
debate will now focus. 
 
The practical intellect, Aristotle says, can only deliberate over 
things that do admit of exception. Aristotle argues that it is impossible 
to deliberate about eternal things, about things that are ‗necessarily 
so‘ (NE1140b2). On the basis of the intellectual virtues examined so far, 
Aristotle seems to restrict theoretical knowledge (episteme) to a narrow 
class of things that human beings can know and comprehend, if not 
change. Contemplation of such knowledge might realise the highest 
human good, but people effectively remain impotent to act in the world 
on the basis of such knowledge. Aristotle does after all say that 
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wisdom is marvellous and profound, but practically useless (NE1141b6-
8). It is practical wisdom that is concerned with human goods – 
wisdom (Sophia) itself is not (NE1141b9). He confirms the limited scope 
of the theoretical virtues by remarking that 'no process is set going by 
mere thought - only by purposive and practical thought, for it is this 
that also originates productive thought (NE1139a35-1139b)'. Only the 
practical part of the intellect, then, can initiate action286. It can do so, 
in part, because it has a much wider range of concerns than the 
theoretical intellect. Practical wisdom seems to require knowledge of 
both particular as well as ultimate things. 
 
  Aristotle pronounces that practical wisdom ‗involves knowledge 
of particular facts, which become known from experience‘ (NE, 1142a15-
16). Indeed, practical wisdom is especially concerned with knowledge 
of particular circumstances (NE, 1142a21-22). Practical wisdom and art 
are, as we have seen, states of the practical intellect that are truth 
directed. Both are concerned with variable rather than unchanging 
things. He describes practical wisdom, as: ‗a true state, reasoned and 
capable of action with regard to things that are good and bad for man 
(NE 1140b5-7). Art (techne or technical skill) is defined as ‗a productive 
state that is truly reasoned‘ (NE, 1140a20-21). In stark contrast to 
scientific knowledge, all art is the practice of bringing ‗into being 
something that is capable of being or not being‘ (NE, 1140a13). Aristotle 
explains that the person practising art causes their product to exist. 
Natural objects have their origin in themselves (NE, 1140a10-16). The 
necessary and sufficient conditions for art might be expressed as 
follows: 
 
S is artful if, they i) reason truly so as to 
ii) bring into being particular object P  
                                                 
286
 Saugstad similarly states that while man „has no influence on the theoretical area...the practical area 
is affected by human action‟ (2005, p 353). 
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iii) where P is important and valuable287 
 
However art, Aristotle says, unlike practical wisdom, can be 
neglected or forgotten. ‗Whereas there is an excellence in art, there is 
no such thing in prudence…prudence is a virtue not an art‘ (NE, 
1140b20-30). Why might Aristotle have wanted to so distinguish techne 
and phronesis here? There are, I think, at least two plausible 
explanations, both of which relate to his teleological conception of 
reason. Aristotle declares that the functions of art and practical 
wisdom do not include each other. 'Action is not production, nor 
production action'(NE 1140a5). Practical wisdom and technical skill aim 
at truth and action or production respectively, in the finite realm. 
However, the former is concerned with right or true moral action 
whereas the latter aims at true production or bringing into being. 
Practical wisdom consequently inherits a broader teleological role than 
technical skill, in at least two ways. Firstly, the moral actions that 
arise from proper exercise of practical wisdom are themselves 
necessary features of the flourishing life. Secondly, practical wisdom 
is the only part of the practical intellect that seems to involve an 
aspect of man‘s chief good, i.e. contemplation of eternal things.  
 
While the conduct that is a necessary part of any moral virtue 
occurs in the realm of particulars the intellectual aspect of practical 
wisdom must take account of both universals and particulars 
(NE1141b15-17). Significantly, it is a sort of perception that enables 
practical wisdom to apprehend the ultimate particular (NE1141b26-30). 
Although the idea of an ‗ultimate particular’, strikes one as being 
somewhat abstract, Aristotle does, I think, offer a plausible 
explanation of its meaning. He states that ‗it is from particular 
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 Spangler says that „art is a good habit of the mind whereby the intellect has the firm disposition to 
be able to direct the making of things in a reasonable fashion‟ (1998, p 29). Kristjánsson (2007, p 158) 
similarly remarks that, the good state of techné is „worthy products‟. He adds that techné itself is 
„correct thinking‟ based on a plan or design (eidos) that issues in making or production (poesis). This is 
probably the case, but it does also seem important to emphasise that the virtue of techné would not be 
complete without the element of production. Correct thinking in itself is not sufficient for the virtue as 
Aristotle specifies that all art is concerned with bringing into being. 
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instances that general rules are established. So these particulars need 
to be perceived; and this perception is intuition‘ (NE1143b3-5). I take 
Aristotle to mean that in moral matters there are certain unchanging 
principles that belong to the category of necessary truths288. The 
person of practical wisdom will with time and experience in the 
particular realm become able to apprehend the moral principles of the 
ultimate realm (NE1142a14-16). 
 
The partial concern of practical wisdom with ultimate things is 
important as I do not think either Zagzebski or Roberts and Woods 
have properly accounted for it in their treatments of the intellectual 
virtues. Zagzebksi289 and Roberts and Wood290 both indicate that all of 
their intellectual virtues just are, in a vital sense, manifestations of 
practical wisdom. Practical wisdom is 'theoretically necessary to make 
sense of morally right action and justified belief in a virtue theory' 
(Zagzebksi, 1996, p 220).  Roberts and Woods similarly indicate that 
practical wisdom involves pursuing knowledge291. Zagzebski and 
Roberts & Wood seem to think that practical wisdom is a little like the 
master regulator of our intellectual inquiries. Zagzebski reasons that 
thinking itself is a form of acting. This may be so, but the thoughts 
and judgements she construes as actions from practical wisdom do 
not share the same concerns and qualities as the thoughts and 
purposes Aristotle ascribed to these.  
 
To be sure, practical wisdom may provide knowledge of 
particular things but it ultimately expresses a sort of moral rather 
than theoretical knowledge292, the value of which depends on proper 
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 Kristjánsson (2007 p 162) seems to agree with this reading. He suggests that Aristotle endorses a 
„universal ethical theory‟ where practical wisdom produces natural and normative generalities. 
Saugstad also remarks that „phronesis builds on two kinds of knowledge, knowledge of general and 
knowledge of particular matters‟ (2002, p 381). Dunne similarly indicates that phronesis can generate 
„a type of universal knowledge‟ (1999, p 51). 
289
  See especially Zagzebski (1996 p 217-231). 
290
 See Roberts & Wood (2007) - especially their final chapter. 
291
 Though the knowledge Roberts and Wood have in mind need not be rigorously defined or even 
necessarily obtained, as they explain in their final chapter (Roberts & Wood, 2007). 
292
 Taylor (1990) also interprets Aristotle in this way. 
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moral action. Aristotle emphasises that the aim of the action 
component of practical wisdom is true moral action not true epistemic 
belief. The major function assigned to practical wisdom by Zagzebski 
and Roberts & Wood therefore appears to have more in common with 
the mental capacities Aristotle describes as understanding and 
resourcefulness.  Although these states resemble practical wisdom 
they have at least four important differences. Firstly, actions out of 
practical wisdom, unlike those from resourcefulness and 
understanding293, must be distinctively moral. Secondly, practical 
wisdom involves deliberation about particulars and contemplation of 
absolutes (NE1141b15-17). The concerns of resourcefulness and 
understanding, in contrast, seem to be restricted to the realm of 
particulars. Thirdly, resourcefulness and understanding do not 
appear to be virtues. Aristotle, fourthly, fell short of saying that they 
could generate knowledge. 
 
While he nowhere describes resourcefulness and understanding 
as virtues, Aristotle nevertheless implies they can have intellectual 
value. Resourcefulness is an intellectual quality that closely resembles 
practical wisdom as they both involve true and proper deliberation of 
particular things. What seems to distinguish these forms of 
deliberation is the connection the former, but not the latter has, to 
absolute ends and human flourishing (NE 1142b28-36). Aristotle states 
that resourcefulness is successful deliberation or inquiry (NE 1142b2-5) 
that involves reason and correct thinking (NE 1142b14-16). Indeed he 
defines it as ‗correctness in estimating advantage with respect to the 
right object, the right means and the right time‘ (NE1142b26-28). It is 
not resourcefulness if the right particular end is achieved by false 
means (NE1142b23-25). Given this emphasis on correct thinking and 
inquiry and success in obtaining particular objects and ends in true 
ways, resourcefulness would seem to be an intellectual quality of 
considerable practical value. It would also seem to me to be of 
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 And for that matter cleverness see (NE 1143b24-30). 
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particular interest to theorists like Roberts and Wood who after all 
think that the intellectual virtues just are habits that should regulate 
truth-seeking inquiry and thought in human affairs. At least some of 
the intellectual states they describe as virtues294 might be better 
classified (at least in terms of Aristotle‘s epistemology) as qualities of 
intellectual resourcefulness. However, for Aristotle, practical wisdom 
has a more fundamental purpose than the regulation of epistemic 
inquiry. It partly determines the action necessary for moral virtue and 
it partly constitutes the wisdom that is our highest human 
flourishing. I would therefore distinguish practical wisdom and 
resourcefulness accordingly.  
 
S is practically wise if i) S correctly deliberates over p and 
ii) P is a particular and eternal moral truth  
iii) and S acts295 appropriately from this 
wisdom 
 
S is intellectually resourceful if i) S correctly deliberates over P when 
     ii) P refers to a particular matter and 
     iii) S properly obtains the end of P 
 
Understanding is also concerned with variable rather than 
eternal things, but its aim is neither action nor production (NE 1143a4-
6). Understanding and prudence share concerns but they ‗are not the 
same, because prudence is imperative (since its end is what one 
should or should not do), and understanding only makes judgements‘ 
(NE 1143a8-10). I interpret Aristotle, moreover, to intimate that 
understanding effectively refers to good or right judgement about 
another person‘s account of finite (rather than necessary) matters (NE 
1143a12-19). I infer this meaning from Aristotle because he compares 
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 And I am thinking specifically here of the intellectual virtues they imply can have instrumental 
ends. 
295
 Again Kristjánsson (2007, p 158) would seem to agree on this point. He indicates that the good state 
of practical wisdom is wise action. 
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understanding to the process by which we develop scientific 
knowledge of eternal matters (NE 1143a13-14). When the subject matter 
is ‗within the scope of prudence‘ (NE 1143a14), however, the ‗act of 
judging is called understanding‘ (NE 1143a16-17). Understanding does 
seem to involve a mental process similar to that which occurs in the 
intellectual virtue of intuition (nous). However, understanding is 
concerned with particular and changing, rather than necessary and 
eternal, matters. Therefore it can be said that: 
 
S understands that P if i) S forms a right judgement about P  
ii) on the basis of an another‘s exposition of P  
iii) when P refers to a particular matter 
        
In summary, in book VI of the Nichomachean Ethics Aristotle 
explores a broad constellation of intellectual concepts that have a 
diverse range of concerns. I interpret Aristotle to be of the view that 
two types of knowledge are possible: scientific/theoretical; and 
perceptual/practical296. The former seems to be more valuable on 
account of its essential relation to necessary and ultimate rather than 
particular and contingent things. Aristotle could undoubtedly, 
however, have been more pellucid in regard to perceptual knowledge 
in Book VI.  I think that problematic interpretations of his concept of 
practical wisdom would not have arisen had he unambiguously stated 
that traits like resourcefulness and understanding could generate a 
sort of practical or perceptual knowledge. His utterances do suggest 
that he assumed this view. In the subsequent section, the discussion 
will move to consider how resourcefulness, understanding and other 
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 In the subsequent chapter, possible educational ramifications of this interpretation will be explored. 
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8.6 Education as instruction and discipline? 
 
'Prudence (phronesis) does not exercise authority over wisdom or over the higher 
part of the soul...for it does not use wisdom, but provides for its realization; and 
therefore issues orders not to it, but for its own sake.' (NE1145a7-11) 
 
Over the course of this chapter, it has been put forward that the 
intellectual habits that matter most are those that generate different 
forms of knowledge and truth within a wider framework of human 
well-being and happiness. Aristotle‘s epistemology seems to have had 
such a distinctively teleological emphasis. Contrary to Zagzebki‘s 
schema (which places practical wisdom (phronesis) at the heart of all 
epistemic inquiry) I believe that Book VI reveals that wisdom (Sophia) 
is the intellectual virtue around which the others gravitate. Indeed, if 
the foregoing quote is indicative of Aristotle‘s general view, it seems 
fair to conclude that he thought the moral virtues (to which practical 
wisdom issues orders) are ultimately at the service of the intellectual 
virtues297. I therefore do not think that the distinction between the 
moral and intellectual virtues should be so readily dispensed with in 
the way that Zagzebski proposes.  
 
On the basis of what Aristotle had to say about the seven 
mental aptitudes explored in sections 8.4 and 8.5, I think that only 
five of them (scientific knowledge, intuition, theoretical wisdom, techne 
and practical wisdom) can be confidently described as full intellectual 
virtues. Aristotle seems to have reserved the title of intellectual virtue 
to those mental states that directly contribute to flourishing through 
the attainment of truth. Whilst resourcefulness and understanding do 
not appear to be virtues, they are probably mental qualities Aristotle 
thought well worth fostering. As such, I think that teachers should try 
to help pupils acquire resourcefulness and understanding as well as 
the five better known intellectual virtues. How, though, did Aristotle 
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 Spangler (1998, p 11-12) similarly holds that intellectual virtue is man‟s chief good although the 
moral virtues are necessary for the acquisition of intellectual virtue. 
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think that these numerous intellectual capacities ought to be 
developed? What are the virtues that teachers might need to promote 
them? Are there virtues in educational processes of teaching and 
discipline? What sort of curriculum moreover, might best enable 
pupils to form the character traits necessary for a life of intellectual 
and moral virtue? These are important questions that will be 
addressed in the final section of this thesis. In particular, it will be 
argued that education should centrally involve instructional 























































Chapter 9: Instructional encounter and Discipline in Education 
 
In this chapter, consideration is given to how neo-Aristotelian 
teaching approaches might positively influence pupil discipline. It will 
first be said that though much good teaching should involve virtuous 
praxis, teaching is not per se a virtuous praxis. In this respect, 
Aristotle appears to have thought that some desirable intellectual 
capacities could be proficiently taught without the necessary exercise 
of moral virtue. He also seems to have believed that instruction could 
help the young to form knowledge, intuition, wisdom, understanding 
and resourcefulness, as well as true moral and perceptual beliefs and 
technical skills. It will be argued that Aristotelian teaching should 
entail instruction and habituation. In discussing these processes, I 
hope to make clear that their virtuous pursuit presupposes: 1) that 
teachers‘ themselves possess a plurality of intellectual and moral 
qualities of character; and 2) that students repeatedly exercise the 
discipline required for each aspect of their learning and schooling. 
Importantly, discipline will be redefined in broader terms as an active 
process that can and should foster the development of virtue in school 
pupils. It will be argued that discipline may help pupils to form 
virtuous sentimental dispositions, especially if they are supported to 
overcome difficult feelings during worthwhile learning. 
 
9.1 Is teaching itself a virtuous praxis? 
 
‗You say that teaching is itself a practice. I say that teachers are involved in a variety 
of practices and that teaching is an ingredient in every practice. And perhaps the 
two claims amount to very much the same thing; but perhaps not.‘ A. MacIntyre298 
(MacIntyre & Dunne 2002, p 8-9) 
 
When Alasdair MacIntyre and Jospeh Dunne engaged in a 
philosophical ‗dialogue‘ a few years ago (MacIntyre & Dunne, 2002), they 
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 Dunne (2003) opens his further response to MacIntyre by discussing this very passage. It is not 
surprising that he does so, as I think MacIntyre has here articulated the essential differences between 
the two. 
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disagreed about whether or not teaching is, per se, a practice. When 
Dunne directly posed the question to MacIntyre, the latter maintained 
that ‗teaching itself is not a practice, but a set of skills and habits put 
to the service of a variety of practices‘ (MacIntyre & Dunne, 2002, p 5). 
Dunne responded, stating ‗that teaching is itself a practice‘ (MacIntyre & 
Dunne, 2002, p 7 & Dunne, 2003). Why do these philosophers reach the 
divergent conclusions that they do? There appear to be two principal 
reasons. Firstly, MacIntyre construes teaching as an activity whose 
goods are distinct from the actions that constitute it. Dunne, in 
contrast, thinks that the goods of teaching are part of the activity of 
teaching. As such, MacIntyre secondly insists that at least some 
subject disciplines are necessary for teaching, whereas Dunne does 
not. Put broadly, for MacIntyre, subject disciplines are the ‗goods‘ of 
teaching whereas for Dunne teaching itself is299. Which philosopher 
holds the winning hand in this particular debate? It first seems 
necessary to briefly consider MacIntyre‘s characterisation of a 
practice.  
 
In his well-known work, After Virtue (1984), MacIntyre suggested 
that a practice is a complex activity concerned with the promotion and 
realisation of human goods (ibid pp 187-203). The pursuit of a practice, 
he said, depended on the goods in question being ‗internal‘ rather 
than ‗external‘ to the practice in question. MacIntyre appears to think 
that teaching cannot have goods internal to it, because it is only a 
‗means‘ to some further end, namely, student learning. As he puts it:  
‗all teaching is for the sake of something else and so it does not have 
its own goods‘ (MacIntyre & Dunne, 2002, p 9). What is the ‗something else‘ 
here? MacIntyre indicates that the end of education, at which teaching 
aims, is the ‗development of its student‘s powers‘ (MacIntyre & Dunne, 
2002, p 7). Importantly, MacIntyre suggests that some subject 
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 MacIntyre does to be sure clearly hold teaching and especially education in high regard even if he 
does not think the former has its own goods. Dunne in turn is clear that teaching is not the only good in 
education. Indeed, as we shall see, he perhaps implies that the goods of teaching actually serve the 
more fundamental task of forming pupil virtue. 
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disciplines are necessary for such development of student powers; he 
thinks that some subjects ought to be part of a core curriculum. 
MacIntyre says that ‗there are some things that every child should be 
taught...Mathematics...English language and English literature...but 
also including at least one Icelandic saga...and a good deal of history 
together with...civic studies‘ (MacIntyre & Dunne, 2002, p 14).  
 
Dunne attempts to refute MacIntyre‘s position in two ways. In 
conversation with MacIntyre, he firstly isolates aspects of MacIntyre‘s 
notion of ‗practice‘ and ‗tries to show‘ how teaching can be included 
within its range (MacIntyre & Dunne, 2002, p 7). Notably, Dunne says that 
teaching (especially primary teaching) can be conceived of as a 
practice, because it has its own internal standards of excellence. He 
states that ‗the excellence of teachers is extended through greater 
realisations of excellence in their students‘ (MacIntyre & Dunne, 2002, p 7). 
He secondly, in a later paper, adopts a different tactic and instead 
critiques MacIntyre‘s ‗impoverished‘ (Dunne, 2003) conception of 
teaching. Although Dunne eloquently brings to light some integral 
features of good teaching, I am not ultimately convinced that either of 
his strategies proves that teaching necessarily has its own goods. 
Dunne seems to imply300 that the goods he perceives as internal to 
teaching actually find deeper value in an end that is external to 
teaching: namely, the acquisition of virtues by pupils. Dunne says 
that what ‗makes teaching a distinct practice...is neither subject-
matter per se, nor solicitous caring...what good teaching especially 
aims at is the kind of enablement in one practice that can bear on 
other practices, so that through all of them students acquire 
intellectual and moral virtues that are goods in their own lives‘ (Dunne, 
2003, p 368).  
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 Dunne appears to here indicate that it is „through‟ practices that pupils acquire virtues. Though it is 
perhaps not his intention to do so, this arguably gives rise to the conclusion that practices „lead‟ to 
virtues. Virtues are (for Aristotle at any rate) more valuable than practices. A virtue, as we saw in 
chapter 4 involves action (praxis) and feeling for its own sake – praxis is only part of a virtue as we 
shall shortly see. Dunne certainly does suggest here that subject disciplines are not a necessary part of 
teaching (good or otherwise). 
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Although I remain unconvinced by Dunne‘s critiques, I will leave 
unanswered the question of whether or not teaching is a practice 
according to MacIntyre‘s formulation of the concept301. What will 
become apparent, I hope, is that there are at least two reasons for 
thinking that teaching is not an Aristotelian302 praxis (action). Firstly, 
nowhere in his corpus does Aristotle indicate that praxis303 is at all 
related to the activity of teaching. Secondly, Aristotle‘s comments on 
praxis, instruction and habituation, taken together, do seem to make 
it difficult to see how teaching could be, in and of itself, a form of 
praxis. In this chapter, I will therefore explore Aristotle‘s concept of 
instruction, through demonstration (at 9.2) and through induction (at 
9.3). At 9.4, it will be explained that pupil reason must be actively 
engaged in such instruction if they are to become educated. 
Importantly, at 9.5 it will be suggested that teachers with virtuous 
personal qualities and practical dispositions are more likely to 
promote disciplined engagement with learning than those who rely on 
more technical and managerial approaches. At 9.6, I will argue that 
school discipline has most value when it: 1) constitutes successful 
intellectual instruction; and/or 2) centrally contributes to the 
habituation of children into morally virtuous dispositions. I will first 
turn to Aristotle‘s notion of praxis in the remainder of this section. 
 
‗Where there are ends distinct from actions, the results are by nature 
superior to the activities...the ends of the directive arts are to be preferred in every 
case to those of the subordinate ones, because it is for the sake of the former that 
the latter are pursued‘. (NE1094a5-6) 
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However, I would be inclined to sympathise with Carr (2003b). Carr suggests that MacIntyre‟s 
notion of practice involves „a public project with a socially defined point or purpose‟ (ibid, p 261). 
Importantly, Carr thinks Aristotle‟s virtue theory better explains (than MacIntyre‟s practice), the forms 
of „moral association‟ involved in the project of good teaching. For a nuanced account of why Dunne 
and Wilfred Carr are mistaken to construe teaching as praxis and excellent teaching as praxis guided 
by phronesis, see chapter 11 of Kristjánsson (2007). 
302
 Kristjánsson (2007, p 172) I think rightly observes that MacIntyre‟s notion of practice „coincides 
only partially with Aristotle‟s praxis.  MacIntyres concept is broader than Aristotle‟s. They do 
however, as we shall see, both seem to agree that the goods and goals of teaching are often external to 
it. 
303
 I owe this insight to Kristjánsson (2007, p 170). 
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The preceding passage from the opening paragraph of the 
Nicomachean Ethics may help us get right to the nub of Aristotle‘s 
notion of praxis; and to the question of whether or not teaching is 
itself a mode of praxis. What should perhaps be drawn from this is 
that praxis has ‗an end in itself (namely good ethical conduct)‘, 
(Kristjánsson, 2007, p 170). The end of action (praxis), as Aristotle puts it 
‗is merely doing well...with regard to things that are good and bad for 
man‘ (NE1140a7-8). However, praxis as such, should not be confused 
with virtue304. In chapter five, it was established that the moral virtues 
are states of action and feeling (praxis kai pathe) performed for their 
own sake. Praxis is the action component in a virtue; it is the 
realisation of the good in action. But praxis is not morally virtuous 
when it is unaccompanied by right feeling and/or reason. Thus, the 
performance of virtue is always for its own sake, whereas the 
performance of praxis need not be. In subsequent sections, it will 
become apparent that whilst teaching is often a ‗directive art‘, it need 
not be a virtuous praxis. 
 
9.2 Aristotelian Instruction I: Deductive Demonstration 
 
Although Aristotle‘s moral virtues have been the subject of 
much fruitful discussion in contemporary educational philosophy, 
relatively little interest has been shown in his intellectual virtues305. 
That the intellectual virtues have not aroused much curiosity in 
education might in part be explained by the fact that the Nicomachean 
Ethics offers us an epistemology with particularly exacting criteria that 
some306 have claimed excludes the possibility of perceptual 
knowledge. However, as we saw in the last chapter, Aristotle‘s 
references to knowledge of particular things in the Ethics, and 
especially in the De Partibus Animalium and Posterior Analytics, 
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 MacIntyre also distinguishes virtue from practice (1984, p 187). He emphasises that his „argument 
will not in any way imply that virtues are only exercised in the course of what I am calling practices‟. 
305
 Dunne 1993 & 1999, Curren 1999 & 2000, Spangler 1998, Steutel & Spiecker 1997, Steutel 1998, 
Saugstad 2002 & 2005, Kristjánsson, 2007 being some notable exceptions. 
306
 See for example Taylor (1990). 
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suggest that he assumed there were two varieties of knowledge, both 
of which had value. Indeed, in the last chapter it was argued that 
Aristotle‘s epistemology emphasised the significance of a wide range of 
intellectual qualities. 
 
 In the remainder of this chapter, we shall now see that a 
coherent account may also be inferred from the same Aristotelian 
works307 of how such intellectual qualities (including theoretical 
knowledge, true perceptual and moral belief, and productive 
reasoning) can be fostered in the young. Although there is not an 
Aristotelian treatise specifically devoted to teaching (Spangler, 1999, p 4) I 
think that it is reasonable to ascribe four main pedagogical 
imputations to him on the basis of these three texts. The proficient 
teacher must: firstly, possess knowledge or true reason regarding the 
subject in which they are to instruct in; secondly, be able to discern 
the current intellectual qualities of his or her pupils; thirdly, be able 
to advance these same qualities, often through shaping the 
judgements of pupils; fourthly, be able to help students form the 
habits of thinking, acting and feeling, required for right moral action.  
 
In Book VI of the Ethics Aristotle specifies that ‗all scientific 
knowledge is supposed to be teachable and its object capable of being 
learnt.‘ (NE, 111139B24-26) Aristotle adds that ‗scientific knowledge 
implies the ability to demonstrate‘ (NE1140a33-34). Indeed, instruction 
is so central to the possession of episteme that Taylor (1990) in places 
defines it as demonstrative, rather than scientific or theoretical 
knowledge. Arguably, possession of scientific knowledge requires the 
wherewithal to demonstrate it to, and advance its development in, 
others. Spangler seems to agree with this interpretation308. In relation 
to theoretical knowledge, she states: ‗Aristotle holds that the teacher 
must know‘ (Spangler, 1998, p 18) adding that ‗the activity of teaching is 
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 That is the: Ethics and especially in the De Partibus Animalium and Posterior Analytics. 
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 Craig (1990) also famously suggested that the concept of knowledge arose in Ancient Greece in the 
first place to identify those people whose testimony could be trusted. 
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a sign of his knowledge‘ (ibid, p 19). Suggesting that teachers ought to 
possess aspects of episteme is perhaps not as speculative and abstract 
as it sounds. Mathematics and geometry do after all seem to have 
been important aspects of this form of knowledge309. Teachers (at least 
primary school and maths) would seem to require such mathematical 
knowledge if they are to properly teach it. However, as we shall see in 
the subsequent chapter, it is a matter of concern that many Scottish 
primary school teachers report either: a lack of confidence in; or are 
mistakenly confident about, their ability to foster learning in science 
and Maths. 
 
In the previous chapter, an important distinction was observed 
between the virtues of the theoretical and practical intellect. In 
discussing each part of the intellect, it became apparent that 
(Aristotelian) theoretical knowledge (episteme) referred to a narrow 
range of unchanging things. Importantly, however, it was also argued 
that it may be possible to have a different sort of knowledge, of objects 
of perception. Can this perceptual knowledge, like episteme, also be 
demonstrated? Aristotle is not explicitly clear about this, but he seems 
of the view that it can be. He says that ‗demonstrations may be 
either…universal or particular‘ (PA, 2009 p 37), but concludes that 
universal demonstrations are better because they yield greater 
knowledge310. Barnes states that Aristotle does not restrict his theory 
of demonstration to mathematical disciplines: ‗on the contrary, he 
strongly implies that he is talking of scientific knowledge and the 
sciences in general‘ (Barnes, 1969, p 137).  
 
 Aristotle says that the first principles of natural science and 
philosophy, unlike those of mathematics, are only grasped through 
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 As we saw at section 8.4, maths and geometry appear to be the only disciplines of episteme that 
Aristotle explicitly identifies in book VI of his Ethics. 
310
 This is of course broadly consistent with his epistemology from the Ethics where he appeared to 
value theoretical truths more highly than practical ones because of the certitude that they carry. 
Incidentally, Spangler (1998) is also of the view that demonstration is a method that can be used to 
develop knowledge that is less than certain. 
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experience. He states that the young can ‗repeat the doctrines‘ of 
natural science ‗without actually believing them‘ (NE1142a18-22). 
Arguably, Aristotle is here suggesting that knowledge of material 
matters depends on sustained experiential engagement with them311. 
Although the young cannot yet know the first principles of objects of 
experience, they can arguably form and restate true beliefs in regard 
to them, on the basis of the teaching of others. Aristotle‘s only says 
after all, that the young need not believe the doctrines that they 
repeat; he does not say that they cannot believe them. His utterances 
regarding the potential of the young to reproduce doctrines of natural 
science and philosophy suggest to me that they could have true beliefs 
regarding real world objects, if they have received ‗true‘ teachings.  
 
It is certainly plausible to hold that while pupils may not yet be 
able to justify some true beliefs in the rigorous way required for 
knowledge, they can still form true beliefs based upon the reliable 
expositions of others. A solid case can therefore be made for saying 
that teachers must have some knowledge of the subjects they plan to 
teach so that they can help pupils to arrive at true beliefs about them. 
How, though, should such new knowledge be introduced? In the 
Ethics, Aristotle suggests that arguments must proceed from what is 
known by learners (NE 1095a30-1095b5). Indeed, for Aristotle, the 
necessary starting point of all instruction is knowledge that is already 
grasped by the learner. This view becomes particular evident upon 
scrutiny of his Posterior Analytics. 
 
‗ALL instruction given or received by way of arguments proceeds from pre-existent 
knowledge…The mathematical sciences and all other speculative disciplines are 
acquired in this way…for each of these…make use of old knowledge to impart new‘. 
(Posterior Analytics, 2009 p 3) 
 
In the Posterior Analytics, Aristotle prescribes that instruction 
must employ what is known, so as to make known, what is not. He 
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 He certainly makes clear that this is his view in the Posterior Analytics, as we shall shortly see. 
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explains that new knowledge can be generated from old in two ways. 
He states that ‗we learn either by induction or demonstration‘ (PA, 2009 
p 29). He adds that ‗demonstration develops from universals, induction 
from particulars‘ (Posterior Analytics, 2009 p 29). He says that what we 
know (epistemologically), ‗we do know by demonstration‘ (PA, 2009 p 4). 
He broadly defines such demonstration as a ‗syllogism that proves the 
cause‘ (PA, 2009 p 39) of a given matter. Aristotle‘s explanation of 
demonstration (apodeixis) in the Posterior Analytics may strike the 
modern reader as more than a little obscure312. Comprehension of his 
theory is not helped by the fact that Aristotle does not, anywhere in 
his corpus, provide a single unambiguous example of a demonstration 
(Barnes, 1969). Despite these challenges however, it does seem possible 
to bring out the pedagogical import of this concept. Aristotle suggests 
that demonstration is a specific type of logical, step by step, deductive 
movement from known to unknown (Barnes313 1969 & Spangler 1998).  
Aristotle defines deduction (sullogismos) as follows: 
 
‗A deduction is a discourse in which, certain things having been supposed, 
something different from those supposed results of necessity because of their being 
so‘. (Prior Analytics 24b18-20) 
 
In the Prior Analytics314 Aristotle suggests that deductions 
involve three related terms (PrA25b32) or premises that affirm or deny 
something (PrA24a15-16). He says that a deduction is ‗complete if it 
stands in need of nothing else besides the things taken in order for 
the necessity to be self evident‘ (PrA24b23-24). Thus, deductive 
demonstrations arguably involve the use of two propositions that are 
known to be true by learners to generate a third proposition which up 
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 Barnes (1969) makes much the same point at the start of his article devoted to Aristotle‟s theory of 
demonstration. 
313
 Aristotle says that „a demonstration is a kind of deduction, but not every deduction is a 
demonstration‟ (Prior Analytics25b30-31). Barnes explains that a demonstration is one out of fourteen 
types of deduction delineated by Aristotle. 
314
 Smith, in his introduction to his translation of the Prior Analytics (1989), indicates that there has 
been much controversy regarding the dating of this work and its relationship to the Posterior Analytics. 
However, Smith remarks that; „I take the Prior Analytics to be what Aristotle says it is: a theoretical 
preliminary to the Posterior‟ (1989, xiii). As such, this would seem to be a sensible point of reference 
when trying to understanding Aristotle‟s theory of instruction. 
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until that point had been unknown to them315. An example might help 
here. If in a previous mathematics lesson, a class had established that 
2 plus 2 of any x, always equals four of that x, it could be 
subsequently demonstrated that Paul will have four tickets to a 
football match, if it was also previously known that he: already had 
two; and is given two extra by his brother.  
 
1) (previously known premise) 2x + 2x = 4x 
2) (previously known premise) Paul had two tickets (2x) to the 
football match and has been given two more (2x) 
3) (new knowledge) Paul now has four tickets to the football 
match316. This may also be expressed as: 2x + 2x = 4x 
 
Such demonstrations are highly formal: deductive, rather than 
experiential, proofs. It is not necessary for Paul or the football tickets 
to be present in the class in order to demonstrate that he now has (in 
theory) four tickets; the truth of this becomes evident through logical 
inference. Aristotle does, however, emphasise that we cannot generate 
new truths from old, without some sort of prior reference to the world 
of experience. Aristotle says that ‗since it is possible to familiarise the 
pupil with even the so-called mathematical abstractions only through 
induction…it is consequently impossible to grasp universals except 
through induction‘ (PA, 2009 p 29). Aristotle‘s reasoning seems basically 
sound here. In the infant classroom children often seem to grasp 
abstract numbers by first counting, subtracting and adding with 
concrete blocks, or even their fingers. But though demonstration 
requires previous experiential knowledge, it does not as a process 
                                                 
315
 Barnes (1969, p 148) Smith (2007) and Spangler (1998, p 6) all describe deduction/demonstration in 
more or less this way. I would however be inclined to disagree with Spangler‟s view that deduction 
involves a movement from two known general truths to an unknown particular one. It seems to me that 
deduction involving epistemic content may also remain at the universal level. 
316
 While the example of a deduction given here may not precisely conform to any formulated by 
Aristotle in the Prior or Posterior Analytics, it is hoped that it will help to show that deductive 
demonstrations typically involve two related premises (at least one of which is necessarily true) being 
used to generate new knowledge. The new knowledge here is not a new necessary truth (for 2x + 2x = 
4x was already known) but a particular one, pertaining to the number of tickets now in Paul‟s 
possession. 
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employ experience, but logic. Aristotle specifies that syllogistic 
demonstration cannot, in the end, be generated by or from, sense 
information. He informs us that ‗scientific knowledge is not possible 
through the act of perception‘ (PA, 2009 p 4). But how did Aristotle 
characterise inductive learning from perception and experience? 
 
9.3 Aristotelian Instruction II: Inductive and experiential learning 
 
In explaining the process of induction (epagôgê), Aristotle says 
that we ‗must start by observing a set of similar…individuals and 
consider what element they have in common‘ (PA, 2009 p 69). He 
continues his discussion with an example, saying that if inquiring into 
‗the essential nature of pride…we should examine instances of proud 
men we know of to see what, as such, they have in common‘ (PA, 2009 p 
69). He implies that an ‗inferential movement‘ from particular to 
general may be made on the basis of these observations, with certain 
common traits of pride becoming apparent in the process. This 
reasoning also implies that any inferred conclusion may be more 
robust, if observations of ‗several‘ (PA, 2009, p 69) proud men are made.  
 
Later in the text, Aristotle more clearly indicates that he 
perceived a correlation between giving objects of experience sustained 
attention, and the development of reliable natural scientific knowledge 
and/or true artful reasoning. Aristotle states that ‗out of sense 
perception comes to be what we call memory, and out of frequently 
repeated memories of the same thing develop experience‘ (PA, 2009, p 
75). He immediately thereafter implies that when certain actions or 
perceptions are repeated, stable universal truths can arise in the soul. 
He says that it is ‗from experience again‘ that ‗the skill of the 
craftsman and the knowledge of the man of science‘ (PA, 2009 p 75) 
originate. Aristotle‘s choice of the word ‗experience‘ seems especially 
significant here, as it connects with his earlier noted assertion that it 
takes time and experience to acquire natural scientific knowledge 
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(NE1142a18-22); and, for that matter, practical wisdom (NE1142a14-16). It 
also makes clear that Aristotle thought techne (art) was acquired in a 
similar way – with time and repeated experiences. In the final chapter, 
Aristotle‘s view that that all good craftsmen must develop their 
productive skills under the guidance of a teacher317 (NE, 1103b7-12) will 
also be discussed. 
 
 Barnes concludes that Aristotle‘s theory of demonstration was 
not intended ‗to guide or formalise scientific research: it is concerned 
exclusively with the teaching of facts already won…it offers a formal 
model of how teachers should impart knowledge‘ (1969, p 138). Barnes 
therefore says that the main function of induction, like that of 
demonstration, is to instruct. Put broadly, Aristotle‘s theory of 
instruction seems to have involved both formal reasoning through 
logic (demonstration/deduction) and more regular and habitual 
exposure to the deliverances of sense experience (induction). On this 
view, it seems that one cannot grasp universal knowledge without at 
least some engagement with the world of experience. The purpose of 
Aristotelian instruction is to help learners use the reason and 
experience that they have, to develop intellectual qualities they (prior 
to the teaching), do not. Particular intellectual qualities that would 
appear to be thus teachable include: wisdom, true perceptual and 
moral belief, and true artful production.  
 
Arguably, Aristotle thought that there are various valuable 
intellectual qualities that can only be truly developed by different 
means318. Moreover, though instruction was not a unitary process, his 
account of demonstration significantly implies that he thought 
teaching was not so much praxis (action) but rather poesis (making); 
                                                 
317
 Sherman also interprets this passage in the same way. She remarks that „since the capacities are not 
latent excellences a teacher must be on hand to direct the progress‟ (2004, p 180). 
318
 Saugstad (2002 & 2005) at first sight similarly suggests that Aristotle broadly endorsed employing 
different instructional methods to suit different bodies of knowledge. Saugstad‟s (2002) argument that 
Aristotle developed a broad theory of knowledge does not in any way however reflect Aristotle‟s view. 
As we saw in the previous chapter, Aristotle in his Ethics rather developed a very narrow theory of 
knowledge (episteme) within a nuanced discussion of different intellectual virtues and qualities. 
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and, in particular, the production of new knowledge and intellectual 
qualities in learners. Kristjánsson (2007, p 172) similarly suggests that 
Aristotelian teaching is more like a process of making than action. He 
states that: ‗the goods of teaching are only understandable 
independent of the practice, because the end of that practice – the 
production of moral and/or intellectual virtue in the student – is a 
product beyond the activity‘ (2007, p 171).  
 
Spangler (1998, p 29-32) actually describes Aristotle‘s concept of 
teaching as poesis, not praxis. In her systematic discussion of 
Aristotelian pedagogy, Spangler says that Aristotle ‗maintains that 
teaching is a process which must be built on the knowledge possessed 
by the student…the teacher cannot instruct his pupils if he proceeds 
from ideas unfamiliar to them (Spangler, 1998, p 4)‘. In order to instruct 
properly, it seems that teachers must be able to assess reliably the 
current state of pupil knowledge. What character traits might help 
them to do this? From an Aristotelian perspective, it is arguable that 
teacher discernment of current pupil knowledge and aptitude, would 
involve (ideally) practical wisdom, but at least, intellectual 
resourcefulness. As was explained at 8.5, a sort of practical wisdom 
may engender knowledge of people319.  
 
Ideally, then, teachers ought to be practically wise enough to be 
able to assess320 the existing knowledge of their students, so as to 
impart new knowledge. However, the quality of intellectual 
resourcefulness might also support proficient instruction, particularly 
so, if teaching is narrowly conceived as the forming of new knowledge 
                                                 
319
 At the passage (NE1141a35-NE1142a) Aristotle suggests that political science is a species of 
practical wisdom that enables knowledge of particular things and people. The perceptual knowledge in 
question is here distinguished from epistemic knowledge of the unchanging. 
320
 Teachers would in this respect also need to work in a climate where formal pupil assessment is 
consistent and valued. In the next chapter we shall see that curricular developments in Scotland may 
undermine rather than promote a teachers capacity to reliably assess some pupil knowledge/and or 
skills. 
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in others321. As we saw at 8.5, resourcefulness is an intellectual 
quality that may enable correct thinking of a means to end sort. 
Arguably, such thinking may equip teachers with sufficient awareness 
of their pupils‘ current intellectual qualities for instruction to proceed 
successfully. Kristjánsson remarks that ‗there need be no logical 
connection between a teacher‘s morality and the goodness of the 
product of teaching‘ (2007, p 171). Instruction ought to involve moral 
virtues, but it seems that it logically need not322. Still, while some 
instruction need not in itself require virtue from teachers at 9.5, I will 
try to show that proper habituation into moral virtues does necessitate 
teacher possession of such character traits. In the following section, I 
will first consider some of the qualities of the pupil who is, or can be, 
successfully educated through instruction. 
 
9.4 Understanding, intellectual authority and instructional encounter 
 
‗In relation to every study and investigation, humbler or more valuable alike, there 
appear to be two kinds of proficiency. One can be properly called knowledge of the 
subject, the other as it were a sort of educatedness. For it is characteristic of an 
educated man to be able to judge what is properly expounded and what is not. This 
in fact is the kind of man that we think the generally educated man is‘. (DP, 639a1-
11) 
 
Given that ‗the entire De Partibus Animalium is a contribution to 
general education‘ (Reeve, 1996, 193)323, it is surprising that it has been 
largely neglected in recent educational philosophy. As the foregoing 
passage from this text illustrates, Aristotle distinguishes between 
those who have a deep knowledge of a subject and those who are more 
                                                 
321
 Spangler (1998, p vii) for example restricts her Aristotelian account of teaching to „the explaining of 
a given subject matter‟. However, at 9.5 I will maintain that this does not reflect the spirit of Aristotle‟s 
wider ethical thought. 
322
Possession of the intellectual virtue of episteme appears to be a prerequisite for mathematical 
demonstrations. However, as we saw in the previous chapter Aristotle does not seem to have classified 
knowledge of particular matters as an intellectual virtue. As such, it seems logically possible to instruct 
without the necessary involvement of virtue, intellectual or moral. 
323
 Reeve also points out this text is a study of natural science too. Whilst the text does offer rich 
insight into Aristotle‟s views on education it does seem to have natural science rather than education as 
its principal focus. 
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generally educated in respect of it. He indicates that educated persons 
are largely defined by their ability to correctly judge the accounts of 
matters presented to them by other people. Learners would seem to 
have the best possible chance of becoming educated, if the delivery 
and content of expositions that they listen to is both true and aptly 
pitched. Moreover, in De Partibus Animalium, Aristotle also makes 
clear that it is possible to have two different types of knowledge: 
eternal/universal and contingent/particular324. Arguably, Aristotle‘s 
texts325 taken together, suggest that he thought that exposition, 
demonstration and induction could advance various intellectual 
qualities in the young, and so help them become educated, if not fully 
virtuous. 
 
Although scientific knowledge and wisdom belong to a restricted 
class of ultimate things, Aristotle emphasises that it is possible for the 
young to ‗develop ability in geometry and mathematics and become 
wise in such matters‘ (NE1142a13-14). Thus, Aristotle thought that 
young persons could attain not only aspects of knowledge, but 
wisdom. This is so, he says, because the principles governing 
mathematics are not hard to see (1142a20-22). In chapter 8, it was 
noted that it is intuition that enables comprehension of the reasons 
that justify scientific knowledge. As such, intuition would seem to be 
an intellectual virtue that is especially important to cultivate in pupils 
(at least in mathematics teaching), as it is this quality that enables 
wider understanding of scientific knowledge. Arguably, wisdom 
(Sophia)326 should be developed through a combination of deductive 
                                                 
324
 Though Aristotle does not speak of the hypothetically necessary in the Ethics his general logic in De 
Partibus Animalium is, I think, entirely consistent with the two types of knowledge he alludes to in his 
Ethics. He says that there is a necessary cause for all natural and eternal things, but states that this 
cause is not present in the same way in each (DP639b20-25). „The absolutely necessary is present in 
what is eternal, but it is the hypothetically necessary that is present in everything that comes to be‟ 
naturally (DP639b24-26) He reiterates that it is the practical intellect that investigates particular 
matters because „none of the abstract objects can be studied by natural science‟ (DP641b12-13).  
Conversely, the pure „intellect has the intelligibles as its object‟ (DP641b1). For further discussion of 
this treatise see previous chapter. 
325
 I refer here specifically to the Ethics, the Posterior Analytics and De Partibus Animalium. 
326
 Wisdom, as we saw in the previous chapter necessarily contains knowledge and intuition. It is worth 
mentioning that Aristotle also seems to have perceived contemplation of the stars as a form of 
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demonstration and inductive inquiry. However, Aristotle‘s virtues of 
the theoretical intellect only refer to a narrow range of cognitive 
activities. For the purposes of education, pupils should therefore also 
be initiated into other bodies of knowledge and be encouraged to 
experience a range of intellectual challenges, during their schooling. 
 
In the last chapter, ‗understanding‘327 was defined as the 
capacity to judge properly someone else‘s account of contingent 
matters. Given Aristotle‘s previously noted remarks in the De Partibus 
Animalium about the educated man being able to judge correctly what 
is expounded, understanding would also seem to be an intellectual 
quality of paramount educational importance. Understanding is 
arguably necessary for, and even distinctive of, being generally 
educated - for it is understanding that would seem to enable 
prospective learners to grasp the meaning of the utterances of others. 
Indeed, Aristotle implies that those who exhibit understanding are 
good at learning. He remarks that we ‗often say understand instead of 
learn‘ (NE1143a17-20). The process of becoming educated seems to 
hinge: firstly, on the truthfulness and reliability of the 
pronouncements of those who know, and; secondly, on the listener‘s 
ability to actively engage with, rightly judge, and learn from, those 
pronouncements. 
 
Richard Peters (1973) argued that teachers are put in positions of 
‗provisional authority‘ for school based learning, because they have 
‗qualified‘ as authorities in their subjects. While teachers begin the 
teaching process as knowledgeable authorities in their subjects, their 
purpose is to guide those they are teaching to a similar position of 
knowledgeable authority. This is what makes the teacher‘s authority 
only provisional. The role of the teacher is manifestly not, he says, ‗to 
stuff the minds of the ignorant with bodies of knowledge‘ (Peters, 1973, p 
                                                                                                                                            
theoretical wisdom (NE1141b1-3). The ability to so contemplate heavenly bodies of stars may not be 
easily fostered by either induction or deduction. 
327
 I articulated the necessary and sufficient conditions of understanding at 8.5.  
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47). Authoritative teachers must rather make use of their knowledge 
and experience to help pupils get on the inside of a subject. Similarly, 
whilst Aristotle‘s theory of demonstration does prima facie resemble 
the sort of formal and traditional pedagogy much criticised by child-
centred educationists328, there are at least two ways in which his 
theory of instruction may (taken as a whole) overcome any such 
objections.  
 
‗The problem of education is twofold: first to know, and then to utter...and 
the best of teachers can impart only broken images of the truth which they 
perceive...all speech, written or spoken, is in a dead language until it finds a willing 
and prepared hearer‘. (Stevenson329, 1914, p 3) 
 
First, as we saw at 9.2, even logical demonstrations require 
teacher comprehension of both the subject to be taught and the 
current level of knowledge of students. Furthermore, current pupil 
knowledge must have been, somewhere along the way, derived from 
experience. Crucially, demonstration does not involve pupils merely 
‗passively receiving‘ knowledge either. Far from it; for though the 
teacher may instruct pupils in the content of a particular subject, it is 
the pupils who must, ultimately, move themselves towards new 
knowledge. Pupils must actively listen and reflect in any instructional 
encounter, if their intellectual capacities are to be truly furthered. As 
Spangler puts it: ‗without this active principle, the teacher could not 
achieve his purpose...the teacher...must depend upon the light of 
reason within the student‘ (1998, p 17). Secondly, induction would seem 
to be an instructional process whereby learners are repeatedly 
required to engage with a given skill, or subject of experience, under 
the guidance of teachers.  
 
On this view, good instruction can be broadly conceived as a 
                                                 
328
 Traditional and child centred theories of teaching were explored in chapters 2 and 3 respectively. 
329
 Robert Louis Stevenson‟s interesting essay, Lay Morals, suggests he thought education was a matter 
of considerable moral importance. Moreover, the general tone of the essay has both Christian and 
Aristotelian hues. 
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dynamic rather than passive educational encounter, relying upon the 
mutual effort of teacher and pupil alike. The teacher must be 
conversant with a subject and be able to communicate it to pupils in 
such a way that the intellectual powers of the latter may be enhanced. 
Pupils must also in turn try to make known their current interests, 
experiences and aptitudes, so that the teacher can ensure that pupil 
engagement in learning is appropriately directed. One may thus define 
Aristotelian instruction generally as any educational encounter in 
which a teacher deliberately guides the active development of 
students‘ intellectual capacities330. Sherman has suggested that 
Aristotle‘s theory of instruction is at least partly dialogical in 
character. She says that education is ‗a matter of bringing the child 
into more critical discriminations‘ (2004, p 172) through spoken 
exchange about the matter at hand. Whilst Sherman‘s interpretation 
of instruction probably goes beyond what Aristotle says about it in the 
Posterior Analytics, I see no reason to question her conclusion. 
Teachers should be authorities331 in their subject or subjects. They 
should be able to know and utter; but they must, at the right times, 
be prepared and able to listen to their students‘ utterances too. How, 
though, might teachers support more active pupil engagement in 
learning? What are the personal qualities of the good teacher? 
 
9.5 The virtuous teacher and the disciplined pupil 
 
‗In order to establish discipline and authority with a class of variously motivated and 
potentially unruly teenagers, teachers need to acquire or have acquired a range of 
qualities of personality and character more than any off the peg management skills‘ 
(Carr, 2003b, p 261) 
                                                 
330
 This definition is influenced by Hirst‟s and Peters‟s general characterisation of teaching as „the 
teacher intending to bring about learning‟ (1975, p 78). Pring has similarly argued that to „teach is to 
engage intentionally in those activities which bring about learning‟ (2001, p 105). 
331
 For excellent accounts of the concept of authority see especially De Jouvenel (1997) but also 
Winch (1967). De Jouvenel defines authority as „the faculty of gaining another man‟s assent‟ (1997 p 
35). Whilst both authority and power are concerned with getting one‟s proposals accepted, De Jouvenel 
stresses that authority is very different from power. Authority entails voluntary association whereas 
power involves intimidation and threats or actual, recourse to force. 




 In his article ‗Character in Teaching‘, Carr suggests that 
teaching proficiency is significantly enhanced by the ‗possession and 
exercise of personal qualities and practical dispositions that are not 
entirely reducible (if at all) to academic knowledge or technical skills‘ 
(2007b, p 369). Some particularly praiseworthy character traits that he 
identifies include: trustworthiness; respectfulness; fairness; patience; 
loyalty; discretion; conscientiousness; good humour; wit; optimism; 
self-restraint; persistence and liveliness. Notably, he suggests that 
learning and class discipline may often break down, not so much 
because of a failure of pedagogical or managerial technique, but more 
due to underlying shortcomings in the personal character of the 
teacher. Carr implies that authentic pupil involvement in learning is 
most dependent on teachers being able to make practically wise and 
context specific judgements that promote the delivery of interesting 
and relevant lessons. While ‗behaviour incentive schemes…can go 
some way to restoring order…teachers may forfeit the attention of 
pupils because their lessons are insufficiently stimulating‘ (ibid, p 380). 
However, the ability to capture student imagination and convey the 
educational importance of a given subject is not the prime reason for 
supposing that teachers ought to be certain sorts of people rather 
than others. Virtuous character is, Carr says, an end in itself, rather 
than just a means to pupil learning. Teachers who are virtuous would, 
in short, seem well placed to find flourishing and fulfilment in their 
own lives too. 
 
Teachers who have friendly and agreeable relations with 
students are also probably more likely to bring on their learning, than 
those with awkward and/or adversarial approaches to association and 
communication. Kristjánsson332 actually classifies agreeableness as a 
moral virtue of teachers. Agreeableness, he says is a sort of ‗social 
glue that binds relationships and communities. By exuding likeability, 
                                                 
332
 See (Kristjánsson, 2007, chapter ten) for account of this argument. 
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positivity and good manners, the agreeable person strengthens that 
glue, and thus contributes to eudaimonia‘ (2007, p 142). At all events, 
good teaching probably does most often involve a considerable degree 
of personal give and take, and dialogue333 between teacher and 
pupil/s.  Both parties must share a commitment to the learning at 
hand.  Moreover, teachers who themselves possess commendable 
character traits may well be able to inspire and guide the development 
of morally virtuous dispositions in pupils. 
 
‗Aristotle‘s favoured teaching methods are those of habituation and direct 
instruction‘. (Kristjánsson, 2007 p 171) 
 
 So far, discussion in this chapter has focused on how 
instruction in schools might help to bring on the intellectual aptitudes 
of learners‘. However, I now want to briefly consider how teaching 
might also deliberately set out to shape the moral formation of 
students. Whilst Spangler implies that Aristotelian teaching should be 
narrowly directed towards developing intellectual virtues, I think that 
the scope of his theory should be broadened to encompass education 
of the moral virtues too334. In the second section of this thesis, it was 
after all made clear that Aristotle placed much stock on initiating the 
young into proper moral habits. What role might schools have in any 
such habituation? Pupils will inevitably bring with them to school a 
host of habits acquired outside of school. However, I think that 
schools can, should and actually do set out to positively influence the 
habituation of young persons.  
 
                                                 
333
 Oakeshott famously characterised education as a conversation between generations of mankind. He 
says that ‗As civilised human beings, we are the inheritors, neither of an enquiry about ourselves and 
the world, nor of an accumulating body of information, but of a conversation, begun in the primeval 
forests and made more articulate over the course of centuries. It is a conversation which goes on in 
public and within each of ourselves…Education, properly speaking, is an initiation into the skill and 
partnership of this conversation.‟ (Oakeshott, 1959, p 11) 
334 Aristotle himself implies that education must develop both the intellectual and moral talents of the 
young. He says that „we must not forget the question of what education is to be, and how one ought to 
be educated…for there are no generally accepted assumptions about what the young should learn… nor 
yet is it clear whether their education ought to be conducted with more concern for the intellect than for 
the character of the soul.‟ (Politics, 1337a) 
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Arguably, subject content, teacher character and style, and 
attitudes to discipline are factors that particularly impact upon the 
habits pupils acquire; at least pupil habits in school. As such, it 
seems highly desirable for curricula, teacher character/styles and 
disciplinary approaches to be centrally directed towards helping 
pupils to develop habits of thinking, acting and feeling that are 
conducive to their long term flourishing. Indeed, I think that the main 
purpose of discipline in schools should be to enhance the moral and 
intellectual capacities of students as far as circumstances allow. 
Whilst teacher authority may well contribute to pupil discipline, the 
process of discipline itself may also help to lay the foundation for such 
intellectual and moral progress. What sort of quality, though, is 
discipline?  
 
9.6 Discipline as intellectual development and moral habituation 
 
A case could perhaps be made for saying that discipline is a 
semi-virtue of the learner, a little like shame or emulation335. Aristotle 
does, after all, in the Eudemian Ethics define ‗endurance‘ as a virtue 
(EE1221a9). However, that is not the line of argument I want to pursue 
here. It seems to me that discipline is rather more like imitation336. If 
a person exercises discipline often enough in any activity, then habits 
may well follow; but such habits need not be intellectually or morally 
praiseworthy. One could for example be disciplined in respect of an 
activity that has no inherent worth, or worse, one that is just 
downright vicious337. Thus, arguably, the normative and epistemic 
value of discipline is irrevocably linked to the quality of the activities 
in which one is being disciplined. That is why it is necessary for 
activities in schools to be humanly worthwhile. That is why it seems 
too much of a stretch to describe discipline, in and of itself, as a 
virtue. Discipline is rather a process that has significant potential to 
                                                 
335
 I discussed shame and emulation in detail in chapter 7. 
336
 I also discussed imitation in detail in chapter 7. 
337
 Ryle (1972) for example, speculates that Fagin‟s disciples learned vices from him. 
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contribute to the development of intellectual and moral virtue. A neo-
Aristotelian theory of pupil discipline can therefore, arguably, be 
defined in broad terms as follows.  
 
School discipline has most value, when pupils repeatedly338 
perform worthwhile activities, where each performance is accompanied 
by: 1) the right exercise of intellectual qualities for; and 2) feelings 
proper to, that activity. 
 
I think such a neo-Aristotelian concept is preferable to Wilson‘s 
theory of discipline, as child-centred interest339.  To be sure, the 
current interests of prospective learners are no doubt often of value 
and vital to the success of educational encounters; accomplished 
teachers are therefore rightly employed in monitoring them. However, 
our curiosities and interests are probably in the vast majority of 
instances at least partially outcomes and developments of interactions 
with others. Wilson‘s theory is radically individualistic; it places no 
onus on pupils to learn or be disciplined with others. It is arguable 
that the responsibility for school discipline should rather be shared 
between teacher and pupils. While it is incumbent on teachers to 
ensure that pupil discipline is directed in pursuit of worthwhile ends, 
it is also incumbent on learners to actively340 engage in activities that 
promote these ends. Teachers need not always select each school 
activity; but they do need to ensure that each activity is worthwhile 
and pitched at the appropriate level for all prospective learners.  
 
This notion may also encompass within its range the value of 
                                                 
338
 The repetition I have in mind here is not of the sort where the same activity is undertaken over and 
over again. Rather, pupils ought to be challenged with a range of worthwhile activities that are 
repeatedly matched to improve their current intellectual, moral and technical potential. This point will 
receive further discussion in the final chapter. 
339
 Importantly, I do think it is apt to describe this concept of discipline as Neo-Aristotelian. Frankena 
(1970), for example, broadly suggests that Aristotle thought the good life is realised when activities 
that are in good in themselves, are pursued to the point that they become dispositions of excellence. For 
a full critique of Wilson‟s theory see chapter 3. 
340
 In the final chapter it will be emphasised that the active engagement of pupils ought to be most 
often, cognitive.  
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pupils being disciplined: 1) intellectually, through engagement with a 
theoretical or practical subject; and 2) morally, through acquiring 
virtuous habits of thinking, acting and feeling, under the care and 
tutelage of their teacher. A neo-Aristotelian theory of discipline does 
therefore bear some resemblance to that proposed by Richard 
Peters341. However, I think that the former has three distinct 
advantages. Firstly, unlike Peters‘ account, it is clear that practical as 
well as theoretical activities can have genuine educational value342. 
Secondly, the purpose of a neo-Aristotelian discipline is not merely to 
learn the rules that govern an activity, or to restore class order, as 
Peters would have it343; it is rather to develop habits conducive to 
pupil flourishing in their schooling and beyond. If disciplined order is 
restored in the right sort of way, it may be that this is, in and of itself, 
also a type of worthwhile activity that can be morally educational in 
the long term. Thirdly, whereas Peters did not seem to advocate the 
fostering of virtuous dispositions of feeling during school discipline344, 
a neo-Aristotelian concept would seem to require that teachers make a 
concerted effort to so educate and order the sensibilities of the young.  
 
It is worth emphasising here that the ‗appropriate feelings‘ of 
disciplined pupils‘ would not be the same as those of the fully 
virtuous. As was noted in the second section of this thesis, whereas 
adults in possession of mature virtue tend to have well ordered and 
moderate sensibilities, the less than fully virtuous may often 
experience conflict between their feelings and principles. With this in 
mind, ideally learners ought to have such ordered harmony of reason 
and feeling when engaging in worthwhile activities. However, since 
                                                 
341
 Peters‟s concept of discipline was discussed in chapter 2. 
342
 In chapter 2 it was noted that Peters dismissed many practical activities as knacks. In fairness to 
Peters, in the next chapter it will be noted that he suggested practical activities can be educational when 
they are not pursued for entirely instrumental reasons. Aristotle is in contrast clear that technical 
production is an intellectual virtue worth pursuing for its own sake.  
343
 These are the two central functions Peters ascribes to discipline, as noted in chapter 2. 
344
 Peters was, to be sure, very much in favour of educating the emotions (see 7.1 for discussion of 
this). He just did not seem to think that 1) discipline had much potential role in this and 2) that the felt 
component of pupil emotion ought to be shaped in a more dispositional sense. Peters‟ focus in emotion 
education seems rather to have been on developing accurate rational judgements from feelings. 
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most (if not all) mortals are at times less than fully virtuous, it seems 
unrealistic to expect pupils to always engage in their learning in such 
a rich and balanced way. Thus, teachers often have to, where 
necessary, encourage and cajole struggling345 pupils to persevere with 
the school-work at hand. By habitually persevering in challenging but 
profitable tasks, young persons may over time learn to take 
appropriate pleasure and pride in such tasks. It is possible that such 
overcoming of prima facie negative feelings may in the long term 
contribute to the development of the virtue of ‗courage‘. Aristotle does 
after all specify that the courageous man endures pain because it is 
the fine thing to do (NE, 1117b 6-9). It is therefore arguable that 
discipline should be a process where teachers support pupils to 
gradually master: not only the content of worthwhile activities; but 
also, the range of painful and pleasurable emotions that occur during 
such valuable learning.  In this respect, it may be that particularly 
close educational attention ought to be paid to the emotional life of 
pupils experiencing failure and/or the fear of it346. It is perhaps during 
such moments that learners have an especially high likelihood of 
giving up and/or rejecting the particular educational encounter.  
 
I think that Maxwell‘s (2008) formulation of ‗compassionate 
empathy‘ may offer some insight into the complex network of 
judgements that teachers might have to make to help pupils overcome 
obstacles to learning. Maxwell broadly characterises compassionate 
empathy as a moral emotion that has affective and cognitive 
components347. It arises, he says, when one person correctly reacts to 
                                                 
345
 The word „struggle‟ is not used here euphemistically. I do not mean that pupils who are struggling 
in some sense have a habitual tendency to produce „poor‟ school work. I rather use struggle to refer to a 
particular task a pupil is finding it hard to do. However, it may well be that pupils who are not 
adequately supported in a succession of particular struggles end up acquiring a more dispositional 
tendency to struggle with learning. If this is the case it only reinforces the importance of teachers 
taking very seriously the difficulties pupils have with particular tasks. 
346
 In this regard, in the final chapter, the inevitability of assessment and failure in education will be 
considered. 
347
 He emphasises that the cognitive component precedes and overlaps the affective component. As he 
puts it: „the operation of the latter is a precondition of experiencing the former in that one can hardly 
have aversive feelings about other people‟s suffering unless one is first aware that they are suffering‟ 
Maxwell (2008, p41).  
 245 
and shares the distress felt by another. Importantly, upon rational 
recognition of the suffering of another, the compassionate person is 
moved to act in order to assuage it. Maxwell also indicates that such 
empathy may not be moral if a person misjudges the pain of another 
or if they do not act in the right way in response to genuine suffering. 
He states that such compassionate empathy is potentially richer in 
scope than Peters‘ view of emotion education. The latter approach only 
requires a ‗rational scrutiny‘ of the conditions underlying a ‗student‘s 
feeling of shame after failing a maths test‘ (Maxwell, 2008, p 71).  
 
It is arguably therefore preferable for teachers to be able to: 1) 
imaginatively perceive the correct inner state and/or plight of the 
particular pupil; 2) in response to this shared feeling experience the 
motivation necessary to alleviate the suffering of the pupil; and 3) 
possess the judgement to know what specific advice and direction to 
offer the pupil to help them re-engage with their learning. In some 
instances, teachers may focus most on the affective distress of young 
people experiencing temporary educational setbacks. Perhaps more 
often, however, the core business of teaching will involve specific 
academic and/or practical advice about the steps pupils need to take 
to overcome their particular learning difficulties348. Indeed, arguably 
the most important practical action that teachers may need to take, to 
prevent pupils encountering too steep a learning curve, is to ensure 
that each task is properly matched to pupil ability from the outset. 
 
Although Steutel & Spiecker (2004) make the sound point that it 
is at first sight hard to comprehend quite how habits of feeling might 
arise from the repeated performance of actions, they do nevertheless 
argue that it is possible to develop appropriate sentimental 
dispositions349. They suggest that a sentimental education should 
                                                 
348
 Indeed, in the final chapter it will be maintained that long term pupil confidence is most likely to 
emerge from such specific teaching. 
349
 Ryle (1972, p 443) somewhat similarly indicates that we can be schooled to „feel amused, indignant 
or penitent‟. Steutel and Speicker (2004, p 538) are right however to suggest that Ryle (1972) presents 
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focus on developing350 proper affections, whilst also trying to temper 
improper ones. I think that discipline in school can and should have 
this dual focus. Thus, while the relationship between proper feeling 
and habitual action may remain somewhat difficult to pin down, I do 
think that there are at least three general ways in which teachers 
might seek to educate the feelings of their pupils in the course of 
trying to establish discipline in their classes. Firstly, teachers should 
aim to counsel and support pupils who exhibit an excessive tendency 
to prima facie negative affections like anger, so as to moderate and 
educate such emotions351. Secondly, as has been suggested, it would 
seem important for pupils to possess emotional resilience, at least to 
the extent that they are able to persevere in tasks they find 
challenging352. Judicious and context-appropriate teacher intervention 
might help pupils develop such resilience. Indeed, the emotionally 
educative aspect of discipline may centrally entail the sensitive 
encouragement of pupils to overcome the feelings of frustration that 
learning often brings.  
 
Thirdly, teachers must arguably both embody353, and in their 
communications make clear, the standards of thinking, acting and 
feeling they want to instil in pupils. As suggested in the previous 
section (9.5), teachers should have certain intrinsically valuable traits 
of character: they should themselves be intellectual and moral 
authorities354. Such personal qualities would seem necessary for 
                                                                                                                                            
a muddled account of moral virtue and skill. Indeed, Ryle muddles the difference between the 
intellectual and moral virtues too. He appears to think that all virtues are moral virtues.  
350
 Kristjánsson (2007) and Steutel & Spiecker (2004) have both discussed the potential impact of 
fostering positive pupil feeling, through service learning. In service learning pupils are, supported by 
schools to engage in charitable actions in their communities, in the hope that they will amongst other 
things, eventually come to take pleasure in such charitable actions. 
351
 See Kristjánsson (2007) for an excellent account of teaching justified anger. 
352
 Dewey to his credit emphasised the importance of perseverance to discipline, as noted in chapter 3. 
353
 In this regard I agree with Kristjánsson who says that „for Aristotle, standards for proper action and 
emotion are followed by the phronimos because they are morally appropriate, and not that they are 
morally appropriate because they are followed by the phronimos’ (2007, p 168). 
354
 Aristotle remarks that the „man of character…is a sort of standard and yardstick of what is fine and 
pleasant (NE, 1113a 29-38). It seems to me that the teacher should aspire to be a sort of „moral 
yardstick‟ so that their pupils might learn „proper feelings‟ from them. Similarly, in chapter 7 it was 
explained that shame and emulation are semi-virtues of the learner; semi-virtues that may only become 
manifest in pupils if teachers are worthy of emulation in the first place. 
 247 
sensitive and consistent teacher communication of moral standards 
that pupils may need to keep, or set them, aright. Maxwell (2008) 
implies that teachers often do successfully employ ‗speech acts‘ (ibid, p 
141) of emotional persuasion355 when attempting to establish and 
maintain disciplined learning in their classrooms. Common teacher 
expressions such as please do not be angry, play nicely, stop sulking 
or I am disappointed in your behaviour, are he says, ‗injunctions to 
make one feel what one does not at present feel‘ (ibid, p 141). He adds 
that such educational pleas may help pupils to moderate their 
‗emotional reactions so as to achieve the normatively required 
measure‘ (ibid, p 141). Thus good teachers arguably can, should and 
actually do, make use of personal example, judicious judgement and 
appropriate communication to discipline and morally educate the 
emotions of pupils. 
 
9.7 Discipline, for Pupil Virtue 
 
 ‗knowing how little will make the difference, 
 that a single letter lost or doubled ruins  
 not just the manuscript but the whole school?‘ (Paterson D, 2003, p 7) 
 
In this chapter it has been argued that broadly conceived 
processes of instructional encounter and discipline should be central 
to education. The hallmark of the educated person just was for 
Aristotle, the ability to critically engage with the teachings of others. 
The intellectual quality of understanding (of being able to receive and 
actively form, judgments proper to each matter) therefore appears to 
be of paramount importance to the whole endeavour of school-based 
education. As such, it seems vital that pupils in schools receive ample 
                                                                                                                                            
 
355
 Maxwell suggests a threefold teacher strategy of re-appraisal, imitation and imagination. He stresses 
that speech acts intended to encourage pupils to feel what they do not should not be regarded as 
manipulative. He provides an excellent example of a nursery teacher who tries to prevent Carol from 
destroying Larry‟s tower of bricks by asking her how she would feel if Larry were to do the same to 
her. „What she is inviting Carol to do, in other words, is to imagine how she would feel if her brother 
were to destroy her tower (Maxwell, p 135, 2008)‟. For a detailed discussion of Aristotelian emotional 
persuasion in education see chapter 7. 
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opportunity for development of their understanding of the world, 
through instruction. Aristotle also identified a range of other valuable 
intellectual qualities that instruction should foster in pupils, 
including: resourcefulness and the intellectual virtues of knowledge, 
wisdom, intuition and art. It has here been maintained that a 
coherent theory of instruction can be extrapolated from the Ethics, the 
Posterior Analytics and the De Partibus Animalium. Aspects of 
Aristotle‘s theory do nevertheless strike the modern reader as highly 
formal. Instruction has thus been more broadly defined as any 
educational encounter wherein a teacher intentionally oversees the 
active student development of valuable intellectual qualities.  
 
Moreover, Aristotle seems to have held the view that instruction 
and habituation are both legitimate forms of teaching. It has therefore 
been indicated that teaching should develop the intellectual and moral 
capacities of students. It has been argued that instruction can, but 
need not, be a virtuous activity. The practically wise and the 
intellectually resourceful are both capable of proficient instruction. 
However, only practically wise teachers are virtuous on account of 
their capacity to both comprehend and act from general moral 
principles. Instruction is arguably virtuous when the teacher exercises 
one or more virtues during the process. Furthermore, it has been 
argued that the proper habituation of moral virtue in students 
requires that teachers possess at least some measure of moral virtue 
themselves. But at all events it seems generally fair to conclude that 
teachers should be moral and intellectual authorities. 
 
 Discipline is arguably the quality in pupils that can most 
significantly foster their engagement in worthwhile activities. As such, 
enacting discipline in schools in the right way seems to be of 
considerable pedagogical importance. Indeed, discipline should, I 
think, be arranged with the long-term purpose of pupil virtue and 
flourishing in mind. Pupils ought to be encouraged to develop the 
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right sorts of habits of thinking, acting and feeling in schools over time 
and under the (ideally) wise counsel and inspiration of their teachers.  
In this regard, it has been suggested that pupils may acquire the 
virtue of courage if they are consistently helped to work through any 
challenging or painful feelings that arise during meaningful learning. 
Generally, it has been argued that the success of instruction and 
discipline in schools largely depends upon: 1) the character and 
mutual effort of teacher and pupil alike; and 2) the content of the 
curriculum. Therefore, in the final chapter, the possibility that 
curricula ought to be geared to the promotion of pupil virtue will be 
further considered. In particular, it will be argued that if careful 
attention is not given to the promotion of worthwhile activities, the 
curriculum educators are now being tasked to construct in Scottish 





















Chapter 10: A Curriculum for Virtue? 
 
In the final chapter of this thesis, the four capacities that 
underpin the Scottish curriculum for excellence will be scrutinised 
through a neo-Aristotelian lens. Initially, some of the key features of 
the policy will be explained and it will be suggested that the principal 
innovation has been to make the excellent pupil the aim of schooling, 
rather than the educated pupil. The aspiration to support all pupils to 
reach their potential may be laudable in intent but it remains far from 
clear: 1) what might be meant by excellence; 2) how excellence might 
be educationally valuable; 3) quite how pupils might be supported to 
realise excellence. It will be argued that educators should seek to 
promote pupil virtue, rather than pupil excellence, through the 
consistent promotion of worthwhile activities. With reference to the 
philosophy of Richard Peters and Aristotle, it will be maintained that 
learning activities are especially worthwhile when they develop the 
intellectual, moral, and productive capacities of pupils. It will be 
concluded that the emergence of such intrinsically valuable human 
excellences (virtues) may depend most on the ‗active passing on‘ of 
collective wisdom through well planned processes of instruction, 
discipline and assessment.  
 
10.1 The Curriculum for Excellence 
  
In 2004, Scottish Executive356 ministers accepted the proposed 
changes to the Scottish national school curriculum presented to them 
by the curriculum review group and enshrined in the policy, A 
Curriculum for Excellence (ACfE) (Scottish Executive, 2004). The desire for 
change seems to have been motivated by a belief that previous 
curricula had not been adequately enabling all pupils to reach their 
potential. The report of the review group states that; ‗although the 
current curriculum has many strengths, a significant proportion of 
                                                 
356
 The Scottish Executive is now referred to as the Scottish Government. 
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young people in Scotland are not achieving all that they are capable of‘ 
(ibid, 2004, p 13). It was thus argued that a new curriculum would better 
prepare Scotland‘s young for entrance into, and employment in, a 
society rapidly changing under various global, social, political and 
economic influences. The report also adds that with the advancement 
of new technologies, a better comprehension of how children learn and 
a wider range of adults involved in school based learning, the 
‗educational process itself is changing‘ (ibid, 2004, p 13). The 
recommendations in this and subsequent reports357are significant and 
indeed potentially far reaching. What specifically are these? 
 
Briefly, the new curriculum is to be the first in Scotland to 
encompass provision for the entire period of schooling from 3-18 
(Scottish Executive, 2004). It is claimed that this unifying development 
may de-clutter the curriculum, provide greater continuity for pupils 
during their formal education and achieve enhanced integration 
between academic and vocational experiences (ibid, p 13). The report of 
the review group indicates that learning ‗will‘ be based on well-
planned ‗experiences‘ that are more active and include both ‗subject-
based studies and activities which span several disciplines‘ (ibid, p 16). 
Furthermore, schooling should also provide pupils with greater 
personal choice over their learning (ibid, p 17).  Significantly, the 
overarching purpose of the curriculum is to enable all young people to 
develop four capacities of excellence, namely: successful learning; 
confidence; responsible citizenship; and effective contribution358.     
 
However, ACfE has not been received without controversy. 
Professor Lindsay Paterson has been one prominent local critic. He 
has maintained that the proposed reforms are ‗vague to the point of 
confusion on too many matters to be a proper basis for new 
                                                 
357
 For a helpful summary and commentary on the various government reports published in relation to 
ACfE, see SPICe’s Briefing Curriculum for Excellence (Kidner, 2010) and Priestley & Hume (2010). 
358
 See Appendix III for full documentation of the four capacities detailed in (Scottish Executive 2004). 
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educational practice‘ (Paterson359, 2007). Paterson argues that one 
significant problem relates to the lack of debate about the value of 
human knowledge traditionally made available to pupils through 
subject disciplines. With regard to traditional subject disciplines he 
states that the curricular reforms ‗threaten to destroy an inheritance 
by ignoring it‘ (Paterson, 2007). Paterson suggests that a discipline360 is 
more than a ‗mere arbitrary collection of facts, despite what is often 
implied by the fashionable orthodoxy. It is indeed a deep foundation of 
factual knowledge‘ (2009, p 11). Graham Donaldson, the Chief of 
Scotland‘s schools inspectorate361 has tried to refute these claims. He 
insists that the aims are not vague, but rather non-prescriptive, 
claiming that the reforms ‗build from subjects rather than the reverse‘ 
(Donaldson362, 2009).  He adds that ACfE ‗is not a rejection of the child at 
the centre or 5-14 or standard grade. It stands on the shoulders of 
these reforms‘ (Donaldson, 2009). To be sure, some more precise detail 
has been provided since the publication of ACfE (2004). However, it 
remains far from clear quite how a curriculum can both ‗build from 
subjects‘ and retain the principle of the ‗child at the centre‘ of 
learning.   
 
It has been confirmed that as of 2012/13, pupils will undertake 
national qualifications in literacy and numeracy, during the ‗senior 
phase‘ of their secondary schooling, from 3rd year onwards (Kidner, p 3, 
2010). Educators have also been told that the following academic 
session will see ‗National 4‘ and ‗National 5‘ qualifications replacing 
standard grade general and credit exams. Furthermore, eight broad 
curricular areas have been identified, namely: Numeracy and Literacy, 
Sciences, Expressive Arts, Social Studies, Languages, Religious and 
                                                 
359
 Paterson (2007) made these comments in an article published in the Times Education Scottish 
Supplement. As I accessed this article online there is no page number to accompany the quotation. 
360
 The notion of a subject discipline being founded upon distinct knowledge is arguably similar to the 
liberal view of Peters and Hirst explored in chapter two. 
361
 Donaldson since these comments has in 2010, retired from his position as chief schools inspector. 
362
 Donaldson‟s comments are extracted from an article in the Times Education Scottish Supplement 
from 13
th
 November, written by Buie E (2009) and accessed online – which explains why there is no 
page number. 
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Moral Education, Technologies and Health and Well-being (ibid, 2010, p 
9). Significantly, there is to be an emphasis on inter-disciplinary 
rather than discipline-based study in the areas of literacy, numeracy 
and health and well-being (ibid, 2010, p 9). Given, that implementation 
of all the curricular areas is also referred to in terms of ‗experiences 
and outcomes‘, it is difficult to discern how the curriculum might 
‗build‘ from subject disciplines. Notably, in May 2009, the Scottish 
Secondary Teachers‘ Association (SSTA) voted to delay the 
introduction of the curriculum for a year due to concerns that the 
National 4 qualification might be devalued through not being 
externally assessed (Kidner, p 14, 2010). Although ACfE is now being 
implemented in Scottish schools, the fact that the SSTA considered 
holding a further full ballot over industrial action in August 2010 
because of ‗huge‘ concerns ‗about the lack of information about a 
curriculum for excellence‘ (Ballinger363, 2010) arguably further shows 
that Paterson‘s (2007) initial scepticism may have been justified.  
 
It has recently been maintained that the ‗historical amnesia‘ 
and ‗lack of theoretical sophistication‘ (Priestley & Humes 2010, p 359) 
displayed by the architects of the new curriculum has resulted in 
conceptual muddle. Priestley and Humes claim that the policy 
simultaneously construes knowledge as: 1) ‗something that is 
constructed by learners on the one hand‘ (ibid, p 358); or 2) pre-
specified content ‗to be acquired and tested on the other‘ (ibid, p 358). 
They conclude that although initial curricular documents offered 
promise that the ‗constraining mould‘ of Scottish education could be 
broken, more recent documents have regrettably ‗constrained this 
aspiration, potentially reducing the freedom and creativity of teachers 
and learners, and rendering classrooms predictable, limited and 
uncreative‘ (ibid pp 358-359). I share Priestley and Humes‘ concern that 
the new curriculum might not, as it stands, provide a solid foundation 
for all learners to reach their potential. However, in this chapter, I 
                                                 
363
 These comments were made by Ann Ballinger, SSTA general secretary to the Scotsman Newspaper 
in Macloed F (2010). 
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shall broadly defend the merit of ‗curriculum as content and 
education as transmission‘ (ibid, p 346). Priestley & Hume364 seem to 
prefer a conception of ‗curriculum as process and education as 
development‘ (ibid, p 346). In this respect, I would agree that 
‗development‘ is a proper and important end for education. However, it 
is my view that the active transmission of collective wisdom may be a 
proper route to valuable development and, specifically the 
development of pupil wisdom and virtue365. It is arguable that the 
wisdom and virtue in question: 1) ought to be enshrined in both 
curriculum content and teacher character; and 2) should be actively 
promoted, over time, through the mutual effort of teacher and pupil 
alike366. 
 
At all events, it seems that considerably greater clarity about 
the purposes and content of ACfE is still required before teachers may 
be sure about how they might go about trying to bring it to life in their 
schools. In this chapter, some attempt will therefore be made to 
explore the meaning and possible educational value of the concept 
excellence. At 10.2, some important differences between notions of 
education, excellence and virtue will be elucidated, since the reforms 
do seem to require that teachers refocus their efforts to make pupils 
excellent rather than educated. It will be maintained that for the sake 
of clarity, it might be preferable for educators to refer to things that 
pupils: 1) have potential to do, but cannot yet as capacities; 2) are able 
to do as abilities; 3) can do to an optimal standard as excellences. 
                                                 
364
 Priestley & Hume (2010) critique ACfE using three curricular archetypes identified by Kelly. 
Namely curriculum as: 1) content; 2) product; 3) process. They suggest that curricular documents 
showed most promise in the early stages when they had „an implicit emphasis on process‟ (ibid, p 358). 
Whereas my analysis (sections 10.2-10.7) of ACfE focuses more on the concept and educational value 
of „excellence‟, arguably Priestley & Hume focus more on the concept of curriculum.   
365
 Priestley & Hume (2010, p 355) do to be sure also suggest that the curriculum ought to be based on 
the „accumulated wisdom of the world‟ citing Dewey in this respect. However, they do at this point 
also seem to suggest that this shared wisdom should contribute to the development of the four 
capacities. It is my view (as we shall shortly see) that the wisdom of a community should rather be 
employed to enable the development of pupil virtue. As was suggested in Part one of this thesis; 
Dewey and Aristotle seem to have had very different ideas about the nature and value of the received 
wisdom of a culture. 
366
 See previous chapter for more detailed discussion of issues of teaching, learning and discipline 
within a neo-Aristotelian scheme 
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Consideration will thereafter (10.3-10.6) be given to the educational 
worth of each of the four capacities of excellence. In the process, it will 
be suggested that valuable abilities and virtues are most likely to 
develop if pupils‘ learning experiences are intellectually, technically 
and morally challenging and consistently so. What, though, are the 
qualities of an excellent as opposed to an educated person and what 
distinguishes virtue from excellence? 
 
10.2 Education for Excellence: Capacities, abilities and Virtues  
 
A perusal of the Oxford (OED, 1991) and Chambers (Chambers-
Cambridge1998) English Dictionaries suggests there are at least three 
different ways in which a person may exhibit ‗excellence‘. Excellence 
may involve a person: 1) surpassing others in performance367; 2) 
surpassing one’s own368 previous performance; 3) having good 
personal qualities (virtues) in high degree369. Each of these notions of 
excellence may well have their own educational merit. The first 
perhaps has the least promise however, in so far as it appears to 
require that schools or students be pitched in competition with each 
other in search of excellence370. If the primary criterion of excellence is 
that of being able to surpass others in a given activity, then not all 
pupils (and perhaps too few) would seem capable of achieving 
excellence. I will instead argue that the second, and especially the 
third, meanings of the word may better explain how all pupils might 
be supported to reach their full potential. What then might it be to 
educate for excellence?  
 
                                                 
367
 The (OED, 1991) states that the word excellence, derives from the Latin root excellere – meaning to 
surpass or lofty. The state of excelling thus means to surpass in merit or quality. The (Chambers-
Cambridge, 1998) specifies that being excellent involves surpassing others in good quality. 
368
 The (OED, 1991) states that excelling oneself involves surpassing ones own previous performance. 
369
 The (Chambers-Chambers, 1998) suggests that a person of great virtue has good qualities in high 
degree. 
370
 This is not to say that competition is inherently non-educational; far from it. Students may well 
strive for higher standards at least in part because of a desire to emulate or better the performance of a 
peer. Indeed, later in this chapter it will be maintained that excellence must be associated with high 
standards of performance. However, it will also been stressed that the most valuable human excellence 
(virtue) involves the genuine fulfilment of one‟s own potential over the span of life.  
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‗‖Education‖...suggests passing on the ultimate values of a community, so that the 
individual can make them his own. ―Education‖ suggests not only that what 
develops in someone is valuable but also that it involves the development of 
knowledge and understanding. Whatever else an educated person is, he is one who 
has some understanding of something‘. (Peters, 1972, p 3)  
 
In Education and the educated man (1972) Richard Peters 
suggested that educated persons are, in an important sense, defined 
by their ability to understand a given matter. Peters‘ notion of the 
educated man is in this respect reminiscent of the one that Aristotle371 
arrives at in De Partibus Animalium. Peters explains that the modern 
concept of the educated person arose in the nineteenth century and 
came to differentiate those who had been trained in some specialist 
skill or knowledge from those who had been broadly educated. He 
states that ‗we distinguish educating people from training them 
because for us education is no longer compatible with any narrowly 
conceived enterprise‘ (Peters, 1972, p 10). He specifies that the ‗educated‘ 
necessarily come to understand not just anything but: 1) knowledge; 
that is 2) of value. Peters suggests that the ‗educated‘ can give reasons 
to explain why they ‗know‘ something: their knowledge is based on 
more than intuition (ibid, p 6). In particular, he maintains that the 
concept of an educated person involves depth of knowledge, breadth of 
knowledge and knowledge of the good372 (ibid, p 13). Importantly, the 
value of such knowledge relates to its having been pursued ‗for its own 
sake‘ (ibid, p 11). For Peters, education especially involves the idea of a 
community passing on knowledge that is more than instrumentally 
valuable. Educational activities must, in other words, have more than 
functional or vocational ends.  The educated person, Peters says, has 
engaged in reflection of a more theoretical character and come to 
develop a special regard for clarity, correctness and truth (ibid, p 12).  
 
                                                 
371
 As we saw in the previous chapter Aristotle argued that the educated man is none other than he who 
is able to understand the pronouncements of others. 
372
 Peters appears to have distinctively moral knowledge in mind when he speaks of knowledge of the 
good. 
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As we shall further see at 10.6, Peters does seem to suggest that 
education is particularly concerned with promoting learning (certainly 
theoretical but perhaps also practical learning) that is directed 
towards standards of excellence in an activity. Indeed, in an often 
overlooked aspect of their work, Hirst and Peters suggest that ‗human 
excellences... could surely be regarded as aims of education as well as 
culminating points of development‘ (1975, p57). However, they add that 
a person may demonstrate a particular excellence whilst lacking the 
breadth of knowledge indicative of the ‗educated‘. Conversely, they 
also recognise that a person can be broadly educated without having 
acquired any specific excellences (ibid, p 58). Perhaps, then, the 
educated have attained a certain breadth of knowledge and/or skills. 
By contrast, excellence might be ascribed to the person who has a 
particularly deep grasp of a more specific body of knowledge, or the 
ability to perform a particular practical task with great precision and 
care. Hirst and Peters imply that excellence is most evident when 
‗rational capacities‘ are developed ‗to the full‘ (ibid, p 53).  
 
‗Yet, if the good life includes excellent activities and if education for it 
includes the formation of dispositions to act in accordance with standards of 
excellence, then education for the good (as well as for the moral) life entails some 
kind of teaching and learning of standards‘ (Frankena, 1970, p 36)  
 
Perhaps it is Aristotle, though, who provides us with most 
insight into how educational processes might help to foster human 
excellences. In chapter 5, it was noted that he broadly defined 
excellence as: the optimal performance, or best state of, a given 
thing373. Aristotle crucially suggested that human excellence 
(anthropine arête) involved the habitual exercise of a broad range of 
intellectual qualities and moral character traits. When these virtues 
(arête) are consistently performed for their own sake and to an optimal 
standard, then the person so performing them, will in effect be in the 
process of realising his or her potential for deep and lasting 
                                                 
373
 See 5.2 in particular. 
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happiness374 (eudaimonia). Aristotle thought that people have a 
natural capacity (dunameis) for moral virtue that requires habit for its 
full development (NE, 1103a24-27). Significantly, the virtuous 
dispositions that frame ‗the good life‘ thus consist ‗of actualisations, 
not of potentialities‘ (Frankena, 1970, p 20). Aristotle implied that the 
natural potentialities with which nature endows each person, can only 
become mature excellences through repeated performance of the 
actions indicative of that excellence375 (NE, 1103a27-1103b2). Importantly 
he emphasises that moral virtues and craft-type technical skills only 
develop over time and if their habitual practice is also accompanied by 
teaching (NE, 1103b9-15). Similarly, he specifies that it also takes time, 
teaching and experience to develop the intellectual virtues (NE, 
1103a14-17). Sherman concludes that in so far as Aristotle‘s ‗capacities 
are not latent excellences, a teacher must be on hand to direct the 
progress‘ (2004, p 180). As we saw in the previous chapter, both types of 
virtue arguably take disciplined learner effort and instruction (from a 
person already proficient in that activity) to reach mature fruition.  
 
It seems to me that Aristotle‘s distinction between natural 
capacity (dunameis) and full virtue (arête) can shed considerable light 
on an aspect of the Scottish Curriculum that seems troublingly 
ambiguous: namely, the difference between pupil capacities that have 
been realised, and importantly those that have yet to be376. The word 
‗capacity‘ may be employed in at least two, very different ways: as 
potential, and as actual, ability377. A tutor might, for example, quite 
                                                 
374
 Frankena (1970) similarly observes that for Aristotle intrinsic interest and cognitive involvement are 
necessary for excellence in an activity. However he suggests that the excellence of an activity is 
realised most by reaching a certain level of performance. As he puts it: „what makes playing the flute 
well intrinsically good is not just the pleasure involved but also the fact that it is excellent by the 
standard appropriate to flute playing…It is not the fact that cognition is present that makes such 
playing good…but the more general fact that excellence…is present‟ (Frankena, 1970, p 27). 
375
 Aristotle specifies that the excellence of building, of the musician and of the just and brave person 
all arise through repeated performance. 
376
 More will be said about the assessment of capacities in the subsequent section. 
377
 The Times-Chambers English Dictionary states that you „have the capacity to do something when 
you are able to do it, or able to learn how to do it‟ (1997, p 147). The Advanced Oxford English 
Dictionary (2010) also notes the difference between a capacity „to contain‟ something and an „ability to 
do‟ something. The Online Dictionary (2010) distinguishes between „actual‟ and „potential‟ capacity. 
Winch (2008) also notes confusion over the meaning of the terms capacity and ability in recent 
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legitimately say that Karen has the capacity (in the potential sense) to 
master Spanish in the future, because she has a willingness to learn it 
and a keen ear for languages. Conversely, Karen might fairly say that 
she has the capacity (in the actual ability sense) to speak fluent 
German because she has already successfully undertaken a degree in 
the subject. But, from an educational perspective it seems important 
that Karen (and her Spanish tutor) appreciate the difference between 
her capacity for learning Spanish and her capacity to speak 
German378. Although the term has this dual meaning, I think Scottish 
educators might do well to only employ the word ‗capacity‘ to refer to 
what pupils could (potentially) learn in the future. On the other hand, 
when a pupil ‗is able to‘ do something, already, then the word ‗ability‘ 
is perhaps more apt.  
 
‗The first thing that can be said about a virtue is that it is an excellence, although 
not every excellence is a virtue.‘ (Zagzebski, p 84, 1996) 
 
Aristotle‘s account can perhaps also help to make clear the 
difference between ability, excellence and virtue. While a person with 
ability can do something, a person possessing excellence can do that 
something to an extremely high standard or optimal level. In 
Aristotle‘s philosophy, the intellectual and moral virtues were 
particularly important excellences. The virtues were for him 
intrinsically worthwhile character traits that both contribute to, and 
constitute, human flourishing. Carr has put it thus: for the virtuous 
‗the virtues are not just a means to a flourishing life, but what a 
flourishing life means‘ (Carr, 2007, p 379). As we saw in part 2 of this 
thesis, Aristotle held that wisdom (in theoretical and practical form) 
                                                                                                                                            
educational dialogue. He implies that whereas capacities are innate, abilities are rather acquired. 
Cigman (2001) has implied that a weak sense of capacity exists when pupils have potential to do 
something and a strong sense when they have the actual ability to do something. 
378
 Gilbert Ryle similarly says that the words „can‟ and „able‟ are used in different ways. He gives the 
example of John Doe who „can‟ swim because he has learned and Richard Doe who „can‟ swim 
because he is willing to learn. As he puts it to „say that something can be the case does not entail that it 
is the case (2000, p 122)‟.  
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represented the culminating point and purpose (telos) of each person‘s 
intellectual and moral development.  
 
‗For Aristotle, full virtue requires practical wisdom – and wisdom clearly 
requires (what might nowadays be called) lifelong learning‘ (Carrb, 2007, p 384) 
 
Significantly, the standards by which virtue and wisdom are 
measured are in one important sense relative379 to the natural 
capacities of each person (NE, 1106a33). A person is virtuous if they 
truly do realise their own potential and lead a consistently worthwhile 
life. Carr suggests that the cultivation of virtue is a ‗matter of non-
instrumental self-perfection‘ (Carr, 2003b, p 262) in the long term. Thus, 
while some pupils may be capable of developing intellectual virtue by 
the end of their schooling, the emergence of mature moral virtue will 
in all probability take much longer380. However, it would seem realistic 
for schools to aim to foster morally virtuous dispositions in pupils381. 
In sum, I think that the virtues are excellences of character that are 
especially worth educating. However, are the four capacities of ACfE 
equivalent in value to ‗virtues‘? How, moreover, might intrinsically 
valuable human excellence(s) be engendered in the communities we 
live in, today? 
 
10.3 Successful learners 
 
 ‗The capacity to learn must, in many cases, it seems, be supplemented by 
specific abilities to do certain things if it is to be effective‘ (Winch, 2008, p 651) 
 
What is it to be a successful learner? Is ‗learning how to learn‘ a 
distinct capacity that is prerequisite for excellence in learning in other 
                                                 
379
 Each person‟s potential for virtue may be limited by their natural capacity, for it. However, at 10.5 it 
will be stressed that assessment against valid criteria of performance ought to nevertheless be an 
integral part of helping all pupils to acquire genuinely valuable excellences. To recognise that different 
people have aptitudes relative to their nature is not to argue that there are no more general criteria of 
excellence that all should reach for too. 
380
 This point was of course, explained in the previous chapter. 
381
 In chapter 5 it was argued that the young could be supported to develop habit-virtues, if not 
complete virtues. 
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areas? Christopher Winch (2008) has recently addressed the latter 
question. He argues that ‗learning how to learn‘ is not a general 
mental power. Winch puts it thus: ‗if I do have a capacity for learning, 
I won‘t need an ability to learn, let alone an ability to learn how to 
learn‘ (Winch, 2008, p 651). He concludes that it is rather such specific 
abilities as literacy, numeracy, speaking, listening and moral virtue 
that are transferable and can ‗be put to work in a variety of contexts 
in order to assist further learning‘ (Winch, 2008, p 651). Aristotle, 
centuries before, made much the same point382. He specified that the 
young must learn to read and write, as these qualities ‗are often the 
means to learning yet further subjects‘ (Pol,1338a39-40). In this respect 
it is encouraging to note that ACfE states that successful learners will 
be ‗able to use literacy, numeracy and communication skills‘ (Scottish 
Executive, 2004, p 15). However, it is more difficult to comprehend quite 
how educators should work towards two other central 
recommendations for teaching and learning contained in ACfE; 
namely: 1) ‗active‘ learning (Scottish Executive 2004, p 16); and 2) the 
enhanced integration of academic and vocational learning (Scottish 
Executive 2004, p 13).  
 
First, it is important to note that ‗active learning‘ need not be of 
only one kind. Indeed, if active learning is to be successful, then pupil 
activity arguably must vary according to the particular demands of 
each learning task. It certainly seems mistaken to suppose that active 
learning must involve physical or bodily movement. The form of 
activity required for much cognitive development would rather be 
activity of the mind383. If it is accepted that one of the key mandates of 
education is to facilitate the intellectual progress of pupils, then the 
form of activity most often required for learning must be largely 
                                                 
382
 Indeed, as has Paterson in a recent address to Scottish Educational professionals. He says that one 
cannot „learn thinking skills in the abstract, but only in the context of a discipline‟ (2009, p 12).  
383
 For example, whilst one might well learn a great deal by physically acting out scenes of 
Shakespeare on stage there is a vital sense in which learning must here centrally involve activity of the 
mind. To act out any such scene pupils must surely be able to commit to memory, or be able to at least 
read, the relevant words. Hopefully engagement with the text would also help pupils to understand 
some of the emotional complexities of the characters and maybe their own lives, now, and/or later, too. 
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mental rather than physical384. As was noted in the last chapter, 
successful teaching and learning encounters often depend upon ‗the 
light of reason‘ in students. This is not, of course, to dispute the fact 
that valuable learning will often involve many physical movements. 
Physical and technical education spring to mind, in this connection. 
But even here, genuine excellence would also seem to necessarily 
involve complex mental engagement on the part of pupils.  
 
Second, ACfE stipulates that schooling should more effectively 
integrate academic and vocational learning (Scottish Executive, 2004, p 13). 
Controversy over how to balance academic and vocational subjects is 
of course, far from new. In ancient Athens, there appears to have been 
much debate about whether education ‗should be directed at things 
useful in life, or at those conducive to virtue‘ (Politics, 1337a33-1337b). 
Aristotle suggested that young people should receive both liberal385 
and vocational instruction. He says that though there are some useful 
things that the young must learn, ‗they must not learn all useful 
tasks‘ (Politics, 1337b4-8). Carr386 has more recently concluded that 
young ‗people do not need vocational learning instead of liberal 
learning; they need both‘ (2010, p 99). But it also seems that provision of 
quality academic and vocational learning need not necessarily require 
integration of the two. It is arguably more important that learning 
consistently involve worthwhile pupil activity.  
 
                                                 
384
 Indeed, as was noted in chapter 2, Peters suggests that an essential criterion of educational activities 
is that they have a cognitive perspective. 
385
 Aristotle does not, to be sure, speak of a liberal education but rather an education for leisure. He 
puts it thus: „In order to spend leisure in civilised pursuits, we do require a certain amount of learning 
and education…and these subjects studied must have their own intrinsic purpose, as distinct from those 
necessary occupational subjects which are studied for reasons beyond themselves.‟ (Politics, 1337b54-
60)However, as the central focus of a liberal education and an education for „leisure‟ is on the study of 
things for their own sake I think it is quite natural to view the two as broadly similar. Although 
Aristotle stipulates that citizens should not be constantly asking what is the use of something (Politics, 
1338a44-47), he does stress that there are some „useful things too, in which the young must be 
educated‟ (Politics, 1338a37-38). He elsewhere remarks that the virtues of leisure can function in 
periods of work too as „a lot of essential things need to be provided before leisure can become possible‟ 
(Politics, 1334a19-21). 
386
 In this paper Carr refutes the post-modern notion that education is itself a contested concept. 
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For Aristotle and Richard Peters, worthwhile learning activities 
seem to have characteristically involved theoretical challenge and the 
pursuit of wider standards of intellectual, moral or technical 
excellence. Aristotle generally stressed the importance of young people 
being initiated into the received wisdom of their community. For him, 
habitual and reasoned engagement in virtuous activity (both 
intellectual and practical) was valuable because it actually constituted 
living well. It is thus arguable that Scottish educators will not be able 
to promote learning of lasting worth unless sustained effort is made to 
help pupils develop forms of distinctively theoretical understanding 
and excellence in knowledge-based and/or intellectual, moral and 
practical/vocational activities.  
 
‗For tradition, properly understood, means tradere, an active passing on, a living 
transmission of the resources of the past into the present so as to enable us to 
consciously shape the future, not a passive acceptance or re-endorsement of 
everything that is merely given‘. (Passerin d‘Entrèves, 1987, p 241) 
 
Passerin d‘ Entrèves (1987) suggests that Aristotle does not offer 
a prescriptive account of tradition, but rather a view that traditions 
are to be ‗actively passed on‘. Carr, too, indicates that great cultural 
traditions are concerned less with engendering broad acceptance of 
current social convention and more with a continual search for truth. 
And such search for truth in Aristotle‘s ethical theory is especially 
concerned with the active development of one‘s potential: it is ‗above 
all a matter of making myself‘ (Carr, 2003b, p 259) more virtuous. 
However, if teachers are to help pupils to actively develop virtue and 
wisdom, it seems important that they too possess something of these 
qualities. In a recent address to educational professionals in Scotland, 
Paterson claimed that teachers must have deep knowledge of subject 
disciplines if they are properly to guide pupil learning, whether inter-
disciplinary, or otherwise. It is in this respect concerning that he cites 
evidence from the Trends in International Maths and Science Survey 
(TIMMS, 2007) that suggest that primary teachers are especially lacking 
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in such discipline-based knowledge (Paterson, 2009 pp 14-16). Paterson 
notes that teachers have consistently overestimated pupil achievement 
in science, and a majority of primary teachers report lacking the 
necessary confidence to teach well in this area. Despite the 91% 
report of confidence of P 5 teachers to instruct well in mathematics, 
pupils actually performed well below average for developed countries 
(12th out of 16). Furthermore387, successful pupil learning would here 
seem more likely if teachers are the sorts of people who can convey 
the educational significance of maths or science in an ‗authentically 
engaging‘ (Carr, 2003b) manner. The educational goal of pupil wisdom 
rests on teachers themselves being wise and widely educated (Carr, 
2007b). 
 
10.4 Responsible Citizens 
 
In Books VII and VII of his Politics (1981), entitled Education for 
Citizenship and Education as a Public Concern, Aristotle suggested that 
all Athenians should be qualified for a share of rule after they had 
participated in some sort of liberal education388. He implies that in so 
far as scholē (leisure) is the best end of a community, citizens ought to 
be prepared, through their education, with this end of leisure in mind. 
However, Aristotle emphasises that leisured learning is not play. 
Whereas the main benefit of play is relaxation from the stress of work, 
leisure contains its own pleasure (Politics, 1337b34-50). Aristotle does, 
however, advocate supervised play and games, for children under six 
years of age, so long as these experiences do not interfere with natural 
                                                 
387
 A similar point was also stressed in the last chapter. 
388
 He states that a „good citizen must have the knowledge and ability both to rule and be ruled. That is 
what we mean by the virtue of a citizen‟ (Politics, 1277b9-16). Aristotle famously in this passage also 
maintained that „it is not possible to be a good ruler, without having first been ruled. Not that good 
ruling and good obedience are the same virtue‟. Aristotle states that „education must be one and the 
same for all, and that the responsibility for it must be a public one‟ (Politics, 1337a25-27). While an 
Athenian liberal education was undoubtedly elitist in that it seems to have been restricted to wealthy 
males, it was, within these admittedly narrow parameters, arguably committed to a form of progressive 
social justice - through equality of opportunity for education, and for rule in the state. Aristotle does 
after all take seriously the view that the collective judgements of a whole community might be at least 
as good as those of the wise few, even when many individuals in that community do not themselves 
possess the qualities to rule alone (Politics, 1281a39-1282b14). For an excellent account of how 
Aristotle was one of the first to argue for an equal public education for all see Curren (2000). 
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growth. Up to this age he says ‗it is not a good plan to try to teach 
them anything‘ (Politics, 1336a23-37). After the age of five, however, 
children ought to receive lessons (ibid, 1336b35-37). Aristotle indicates 
that four things are to be taught389 to children in their preparation for 
a life of future citizenship and civilised leisure: reading and writing; 
physical training; music; and drawing (Politics, 1337b23-26). He specifies 
that ‗children can be called citizens only in a hypothetical sense: they 
are citizens but incomplete ones‘ (Politics, 1277b). This old idea390 that 
children must be educated in distinct liberal subjects and practical 
enterprises as preparation for their eventual membership in a 
community, runs contrary to a view, prevalent in recent debate about 
citizenship education, namely, that: children are citizens ‗now‘, rather 
than ‗in waiting‘391.  
 
But, merely asserting that children are citizens ‗now‘, rather 
than citizens in ‗waiting‘, is probably vacuous unless serious 
consideration is given to how children can in fact be citizens now in  
and/or out of schools. Arguably, the best way in which whole schools 
might promote some sort of active citizenship is through approaches 
to discipline and moral education that seek to develop virtuous habits 
of thinking, acting and feeling in pupils over the long term392. Given 
the noted emphasis on inter-disciplinary learning in ACfE, it is 
somewhat surprising that little importance appears to be attached to 
fostering either pupil discipline or moral education in any such whole 
school way393. While responsible citizens are expected ‗to develop 
                                                 
389
 In the previous chapter it was noted that Aristotle advocated two forms of instruction; 
formal/deductive and more experiential/inductive. It was thus argued that instruction might be helpfully 
defined as any encounter where a teacher intentionally guides student learning. 
390
 Miller (2007) provides an interesting discussion of „the old idea of a liberal education‟. 
391
 Ross et al (2007, p 251) interestingly found that whereas primary schools tended to see their role as 
developing citizens for the future, „secondary school discourse tends not to see the purpose of 
participation as something that lies beyond the school‟. 
392
 The notion of discipline for such dispositions has of course been substantially discussed in previous 
chapters. 
393
 This is certainly true of SPICe’s Briefing Curriculum for Excellence (Kidner, 2010, p 9) which only 
stresses that literacy and numeracy and health and well being are to be taught across the whole 
curriculum. Whilst health and well being does mention mental and emotional learning, learning that is 
distinctively moral does not get much if any mention at a whole school level. Indeed, it seems that 
religious and moral education is to be pursued as a discrete experience/ outcome (ibid, p 9).  
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informed, ethical views of complex issues‘ (Scottish Executive, 2004, p 15), 
no mention is made of the desirability of developing habits of moral 
action in pupils in, or out of394, school.   
 
In an interesting paper, Ross et al (2007) interrogated teacher 
understanding of active citizenship in 14 Scottish case studies. They 
note that ‗some schools have chosen to understand active 
participation and citizenship in terms of pupil decision-making per 
se395 and others in terms of involvement in pupil decisions about their 
learning‘ (Ross et al, 2007, p 244). It is revealing, however, that in the case 
studies there ‗is little evidence that participation…is intended to 
develop critical political literacy, as applied either to society…or to the 
school396 as institution‘ (ibid, p 254). However, as we have seen, in 
ancient Athens, attainment of citizenship depended upon people 
developing a certain criticality of mind through their education that 
would enable them to understand and actively engage with matters of 
importance in their lived communities. If approaches to education for 
citizenship do not focus on providing pupils with sustained 
opportunity for both intellectual challenge and moral action, it is 
difficult to perceive quite how ‗pupil-citizens‘ can be active, now or 
later, in anything other than an attenuated sense.  
 
10.5 Confident Individuals 
 
‗For confidence is the opposite of fear‘ (Rhetoric, 1383a16-17) 
  
In order to explain his definition of confidence, as the opposite 
of fear, Aristotle remarks that it arises in people in one of two ways: 
‗either by not having been put to the test or by having protections, as, 
                                                 
394
 It may be that programmes of service learning (briefly discussed in previous chapter) may be a 
possible way to promote active citizenship in the wider community. 
395
They record that the school council was by far in a way the most commonly mentioned mechanism 
of pupil participation (Ross et al, 2007, p 244). 
396
They note that active participation did not in the vast majority of cases challenge existing school 
structures. Indeed, „responsibility and greater levels of participation tend to be skewed towards older 
pupils‟ (Ross et al, 2007, p 249) and over generalised concepts may „obscure the fact that participation 
may be confined to particular groups of pupils‟ (ibid, p 250). 
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with the dangers at sea, those unfamiliar with storms are confident for 
the future and those who have protection because of their experience‘ 
(Rhetoric, 1383a32-36). It seems likely that the latter person will be more 
deeply ‗confident‘ than the former as a result of having successfully 
overcome testing circumstances. Ruth Cigman (2000, 2001 & 2004) has 
in the last few years built on this basic observation of Aristotle‘s and 
attempted to locate the possible educational merit of fostering pupil 
confidence397. She suggests that the confidence of adults is different 
from that felt by children. Ethical confidence is, she says, a 
‗composite398 virtue‘ that arises in pupils when teachers ‗patiently‘ 
(Cigman, 2000, p 655) help them to experience appropriate doubt. 
Moreover, the doubt she has in mind here appears to have both 
ethical and intellectual aspects399. But how should pupils be 
intellectually and ethically challenged to experience appropriate 
doubt? Arguably, pupils can both learn and become more confident 
through having been consistently challenged by worthwhile tasks.  
 
Pupils with enough basic self-esteem will, Cigman says, 
experience the ―feeling ‗I can‘ in a multitude of directions‖ (2001, p 568), 
providing them with confidence to act. This ‗basic self-esteem400‘ will 
also provide a ‗bulwark against all kinds of failure‘ (ibid, p 568). Cigman 
maintains that the task of educators is to engage with the basic 
feeling, ‗I can‘, in ways that become ‗increasingly realistic401 as pupils 
grow older‘ (ibid, p 572). Reflective self-esteem will gradually form in 
                                                 
397
 Like Aristotle before her she says that we „talk about confidence in those areas where doubt, fear, 
uncertainty are appropriate…Confidence and doubt are interconnected, which means that they are 
appropriate or inappropriate together‟. (Cigman, 2000, p 656) 
398
 Though Cigman does not herself explain quite what she means by the term „composite‟, I infer her 
to mean that confidence is a little like a  semi-virtue that can aid other learning. As we shall see, if this 
is what she means, her stance is very dubious. 
399
 She states that it is „particularly important that teachers think for themselves. How can they teach 
children to do so otherwise?...What we want for teachers is...the kind of confidence which is 
consequent on thinking well, and knowing that one thinks well‟ (Cigman, 2000, p  645). 
400
 Smith (2002) has also claimed that whilst self esteem should not be a chief aim of education it may 
be one aim to be valued among others. 
401
 Cigman elsewhere remarks that teachers‟ often „do not expect creative confidence to be grounded in 
too much reality: they praise children‟s paintings indiscriminately. Of course this changes when 
children get older…In ethics, the situation is different. It is vitally important that children learn what is 
right and wrong, and we do not expect ethical confidence in what is not grounded‟. (2000, p 655) 
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pupils, she implies, when they develop confidence in their ability to 
actually do specific things well. Testing pupil ability to perform 
specific tasks more or less well does, of course, bring with it the threat 
of or actual experience of failure. However, as Aristotle noted, learning 
ought not to be thought of as amusement, since it inevitably ‗brings 
pain‘ (Politics, 1339a26-29). A temporary educational setback may well 
lead to both deeper confidence and eventual success in a particular 
activity, if it is accompanied by sensitive and supportive teaching. 
Cigman expresses this as follows: ‗helping the child to fail well needs 
to be a real objective of the teachers work‘ (ibid, p 573). She concludes, 
however, that the currently prevailing educational climate ‗stresses 
the avoidance of failure rather than its inevitability‘ (2001, p 575).   
 
The educational salience of a concept of ‗basic‘ or general self-
esteem that equips pupils with confidence to act in all manner of 
different contexts is, however, somewhat dubious. For one thing, there 
is good reason to believe that: ‗confidence gained in one area is not 
automatically transferable to another, confidence in reading does not 
equate to confidence in doing long division, for example‘ (Winch, 2008 p 
661). For another Kristjánsson‘s (2007a) extensive scrutiny of social 
scientific studies on the matter reveals that there are only weak 
correlations between low global self-esteem and low educational 
achievement. Nor is ‗high self-esteem connected to long-term 
educational success‘ (Kristjánsson 2007a, p 256).  In fact, ‗high levels of 
global self-esteem may engender feelings of invulnerability, which in 
turn encourage risk-taking‘ (ibid, p 256). Kristjánsson says that 
teachers should rather help pupils to: 1) set worthwhile goals in 
school work; 2) measure their achievements correctly; 3) take proper 
pride in their achievements (ibid, p 258). Teachers, it seems, should try 
to promote ‗justified‘ confidence402 by focusing on pupil learning in 
domain specific tasks.  
                                                 
402
 Kristjánsson (2007b) actually speaks of „justified self-esteem‟ but I think that Winch is correct to 
observe that confidence is very often domain specific too. Ferkany (2008) has taken issue with 
Kristjánsson‟s dismissal of having general self-esteem as a viable educational aim. Ferkany advances 
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Whilst any curricular ambition to foster pupil confidence may 
be appealing at first sight, the central aim of ACfE to reduce 
assessment (Kidner, p 16) may well, over the course of time, inhibit 
rather than enable such justified confidence. Paterson has recently 
welcomed the announcement that ACfE ‗tests of literacy and 
numeracy are now to be absorbed into the disciplines where they 
belong, English and mathematics‘ (2010c, p 8). However, he expresses a 
legitimate concern that the new assessment structures may be inferior 
to the old ones. He theorises that the internal assessment method of 
the new national 4 course may lead to both lower standards and lower 
student motivation. Meaningful assessment, he stresses, has to be 
demanding (ibid, p 16).  
 
If different pupil aptitudes are not subject to formal examination 
in specific and appropriate ways, then perhaps only a weak kind of 
confidence may result. A stronger sense of confidence is arguably 
more likely to arise when all pupils are consistently tested and 
challenged and when they are adequately supported by teachers to 
overcome any identified failings and weaknesses403. Indeed, in the 
previous chapter, it was stressed that school discipline may often 
hinge on the ability of teachers to help pupils persevere in the face of 
difficulty and setback. Arguably, nothing breeds more confidence in 
one‘s ability to do something than previous success in that task. Such 
success would seem to rest on the experience of having actually been 
put to the test. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
an „attachment account‟ of self-esteem where one has a „disposition to take a certain attitude towards 
the self‟ (ibid, p 123). He claims that it is important for educators to foster self-esteem, especially in 
specific domains of Physical education and the arts, where lifelong engagement, rather than high 
achievement, may be the aim of teaching. Although Ferkany sets himself in opposition to Kristjánsson 
I actually think one of the main arguments of the former endorses rather than challenges the view of the 
latter. Ferkany does after all agree that instruction in specific domains can improve confidence/self-
esteem. 
403
 The basic principle of a more sustained union of assessment and learning is to be sure evident in 
another recent Scottish policy: namely, Assessment is for Learning (AIFL, 2005). However, my 
concern echoes that of Paterson‟s (2009) and relates specifically to the possibility that some students 
may no longer be presented for formal examination in subject areas where they used to be, as a result 
of the proposals of ACfE. Success in a nationally moderated exam is arguably more likely to bring 
deep confidence and value than success in a locally moderated one.  
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10.6 Effective Contributors 
 
 It is also supposed in ACfE that effective contributors will have 
an ‗enterprising attitude, resilience and self reliance‘ (Scottish Executive, 
2004, p 15). However, it is perhaps the case that truly effective 
contributors will not so much need an enterprising attitude, but rather 
specific abilities. One need only watch an episode or two of the 
popular BBC2 programme ‗Dragons Den‘ to realise just how important 
it is that budding entrepreneurs have a sound head for figures, astute 
business acumen, polished communication skills and of no less 
importance – a good product to sell. Furthermore, what is not directly 
stated in suggested criteria for the fourth capacity404 is exactly what 
learners may be expected to effectively contribute to. One might 
speculate that the driving force here is a desire to best prepare pupils 
to make effective economic contributions to society upon their eventual 
entry into it.  If this is the case405, questions should be raised about 
the curricular and pedagogical functions that schools might be 
expected to have in preparing pupils for the world of work.  
 
It has already been noted that education ought to include both 
liberal and vocational elements. However, wherein might the 
distinctive educational value of a seemingly employment-focused 
capacity be located? As already mooted, the sorts of abilities promoted 
by the subject disciplines of maths, English (for communication406), 
business studies and accounts would seem especially relevant to 
effective entrepreneurship. Recently, however, Hodgson (2009) has 
argued that teachers should revisit Peters‘ question of who the 
educated person might be. In seeking to establish who the educated 
                                                 
404
 At least within the aptitudes identified as indicative of effective contribution (Scottish Executive, 
2004, p 15 & Appendix III).  
405
 And I see no reason to doubt the general idea that economic and employment related contributions 
figured prominently in policy makers‟ minds. The capacity of responsible citizenship does after all 
ostensibly delineate the need for pupils to develop the ability to bear different social responsibilities. 
406
 It must be stressed that I do not think that the study of English should be restricted to fostering 
formal skills of communication – far from it. A central aim of English must, it seems to me, involve 
promoting sustained pupil engagement with a canon of literature. 
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person is today, she claims that Peters‘ ‗account does not take 
seriously enough the current role of the economic imperative‘ or the 
entrepreneurial self407 (2009, p 110). However, whilst Peters does 
question the educational merit of purely instrumental activities, I am 
not sure this criticism is entirely fair408.  
 
Although Peters may have409 questioned the extent to which 
some practical activities might stimulate cognitive development, in 
Education and the educated man, he actually specifies that a liberal 
education need not preclude practical activity. He concludes, in fact, 
that practical activities may be educational too when they are not 
‗pursued under a solely instrumental aspect‘ (1972, p 12). He suggests 
that a practical activity can be educational when: 1) it is ‗transformed 
by theoretical understanding‘ (1972, p 12) or; 2) when the person 
pursues the activity in a skilled way according to ‗the standards which 
are constitutive of excellence in his art‘ (ibid, p 12). Peters‘ point seems 
to be that a person is not really educated if they are only performing a 
task for instrumental, or for that matter economic, gain410. However, 
any person who accrues economic benefit from an act, or who acts 
partly from instrumental motive, may also be considered educated, if 
they perform the task itself well with theoretical understanding, 
and/or in accordance with wider standards of performance. Arguably, 
a key role of schools might therefore be to ensure that pupils are 
initiated into more instrumentally valuable vocational activities in 
                                                 
407
 Hodgson cites Foucault and appears to suggest that the entrepreneurial self is one who comes to be 
aware that they exists in conditions of „permanent economic tribunal at every level‟ (2009, p 114). 
408
 Hodgson‟s brief treatment of Peters‟ Educated person is I think, somewhat confused. She prefaces 
her criticism that he does not take seriously enough the economic imperative by saying that „Peters 
does not view education as restricted to instrumental purposes‟ (2009, p 110). Indeed he does not, far 
from it. He rather thinks that instrumental activities are only educational when they have an element of 
intrinsic engagement to them. Even more perverse is Hodgson‟s insistence that her discussion of what 
it means to be educated „differs markedly‟ (ibid, p 122) from Peters‟ exploration, because of her focus 
on language. Peters in fact actually begins his analysis of the educated man by considering dictionary 
definitions of the word and how its meaning changed in the C19th. It seems to me that Peters spends 
much longer discussing the linguistic meaning of the word „educated‟ than Hodgson. 
409
 In his discussion of the value of practical activities here,  Peters is somewhat contradicting his well 
known position from the Logic of Education (1975), discussed in chapter 2, where he and Hirst dismiss 
at least some practical activities as „knacks‟. 
410
 As was noted in Chapter, 8 Roberts and Wood (2007, p 173) suggests that the person who only 
seeks useful knowledge is intellectually immature. 
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such a way, that they appreciate, and come to reach for, the 
theoretical and practical standards proper to it.  
 
Aristotle‘s virtue of techne411 (art) may perhaps also offer an 
explanation of how more practical skills can be refined to the point 
where they may be legitimately described as excellent. In the 
Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle explains that techne is a form of correct 
thinking that is necessary for successful making (poesis). It is, he 
says, an intellectual virtue needed for true production (NE, 1140a20-22). 
Technical excellence requires not only correct thinking but also a 
degree of pride and pleasure in performing the task itself well. Thus, 
while a person might be economically contributing to society if they 
can build houses proficiently, they are perhaps not making a virtuous 
contribution, if they do not demonstrate the mode of thought 
characteristic of technical excellence or if they are only working to 
make money. As noted in previous chapters, Aristotle also indicated 
that technical excellences, like that of building, are learned through 
repeated practice accompanied by teaching (NE, 1103b, 7-13). The notion 
that one may best learn a craft through practice under the supervision 
of a person already well versed in it need not, it seems to me, be 
restricted to traditional trade skills either.  
 
For example, in our modern global economy, there are 
undoubtedly many emerging technological skills which can also be 
performed with more or less diligence in accordance with publicly 
comprehensible standards. The vital pedagogical point seems to be 
that schools ought to try to ensure that pupils learning skills or taking 
subjects of a more work-related bent are properly supervised and 
supported to: 1) develop the mode of thought characteristic of 
excellence in each practical activity and; 2) develop skills that 
measure up to accepted standards of production/performance in 
these activities. This supervision might be carried out by teaching 
                                                 
411
 For a more detailed discussion and definition of techne see chapter 8. 
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staff (for example the teacher of computing or design and technology); 
or it may perhaps also occur in apprenticeship schemes of work 
experience. However, if teaching and learning in more vocational and 
practical areas is not conducted in a rigorous way, then the 
opportunity to bring out and reinforce the intellectual interest and 
challenges of such activities may be lost. If pupils are only encouraged 
to perform vocationally orientated tasks for instrumental reasons, 
they are not arguably being supported to become effective, let alone 
excellent contributors.  
 
10.7 Communities of Collective Wisdom 
 
‗Wise conduct is the key to happiness‘ (Heaney, 2004, p 56) 
 
In this thesis I have sought to defend the view that education 
should have the ultimate aim of cultivating virtue and wisdom. As 
such, I believe teaching and learning, pupil discipline and curriculum 
content should all be structured with the end of pupil virtue and 
wisdom in mind. In this chapter, it has been suggested that the four 
capacities of the new Scottish Curriculum are laudable in intent but 
ambiguous in detail. There would appear to be nothing questionable 
about the basic aspiration to help all school pupils to reach their 
highest potential. However, questions must be asked about how 
schools ought to go about shifting focus from pupil education, to pupil 
excellence. It is far from clear that the four capacities of excellence are 
equivalent in value to virtues. It has therefore been argued that 
Scottish educators should seek to promote pupil virtue rather than 
pupil excellence, as the virtues are intrinsically valuable character 
traits that each person has the capacity to realise relative to their own 
nature412.  
 
                                                 
412
 While the circularity of the broad aspiration for education to enable all pupils to reach their potential 
is far from overcome by neo-Aristotelian theories of teaching and learning, it does seem plausible to 
maintain that pupils might meaningfully develop their natural capacities by being supported to 
habitually engage in worthwhile and challenging learning tasks. 
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It has been emphasised that schooling should be especially 
concerned with fostering virtuous intellectual, moral and technical 
character traits in pupils. According to Aristotle, the development of 
mature virtues hinges on the notion of pupils repeatedly engaging in 
intrinsically worthwhile activities that: 1) are intellectually and/or 
morally challenging and; 2) have identifiable standards of excellence. 
Moreover, the pursuit of virtue would appear to be much more 
arduous if pupil activity and progress are not carefully supervised by 
adults who are themselves virtuous, wise, knowledgeable and/or 
skilled in the task at hand. However, recent Scottish curricular 
documents have so far been far from clear about the need for 
sustained activity-specific instruction and assessment, especially 
beyond the traditional subject disciplines of maths and English. 
Furthermore, concern has been expressed that lack of, or mistaken, 
teacher confidence in mathematical and scientific knowledge may lead 
to the content of these traditions being watered down, in the crucial 
early years of schooling. 
 
It has also been maintained that ‗confidence‘, ‗effective 
contribution‘ and ‗learning how to learn‘ are not general abilities that 
can or should be educated. It is not easy to appreciate quite how 
pupils might ever truly be sure that they are successful learners, if 
their mastery of knowledge and/or technical skills, has not been 
formally measured according to valid criteria of performance. If pupils 
are not helped to identify what they are really able to do well and what 
they are not yet able to do, then schooling is not likely to instil in 
them the sort of confidence that is realistically grounded and likely to 
have meaning in school or, for that matter, in the world beyond. A 
deep sense of confidence is more likely to grow in pupils who have 
achieved specific educational successes and/or who have been 
properly supported when they have failed. In the Politics, Aristotle 
suggested that communities of collective wisdom were most likely to 
arise when citizens were encouraged to participate actively in them, 
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and importantly made ready to do so through their education. He 
seems to have thought that guided and systematic instruction in 
worthwhile activities was vital to the flourishing of individuals and 
communities. Pupil potential might be best advanced by the new 
Scottish curriculum if teaching, learning and discipline, are ‗built‘ on 
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Deficiency Mean Excess 
Cowardice Bravery Rashness 
Insensibility Temperance Intemperance 
Stinginess Generosity Wastefulness 
Niggardliness Magnificence Vulgarity 
pusillanimity Great-mindedness Vanity 
Under-ambitiousness Right Ambition Over-ambitiousness 
Impassivity Mildness (of temper) Irascibility 
quarrelsomeness Friendliness Obsequiousness 
Self-deprecation Truthfulness (about 
oneself) 
Boastfulness 
Boorishness Wit Buffoonery 
 
 
The contents of this table are reproduced from Kristjánsson (2007, p 16). The only 
difference is that Kristjánsson characterises ‗stinginess‘ as ‗ungenerosity‘ and 































Deficiency Mean Excess 
Impassivity Gentle temper Irascibility 
Cowardice Bravery Foolhardiness 
Thin-skinnedness Shame Shamelessness 
Insensibility Temperance Intemperance 
(unnamed) Fair-mindedness Envy 
Disadvantage Justice Gain 
Meanness Liberality Prodigality 
Mock-modesty Truthfulness Boastfulness 
Churlishness Friendliness Flattery 
Unaccomodatingness Dignity Servility 
Imperviousness Endurance Softness 
Meanness of spirit Pride Vanity 
Niggardliness Magnificence Extravagance 
Unworldliness Practical Wisdom Unscrupulousness 
 
 























Appendix III: The four capacities of the Scottish Curriculum for 
Excellence 
 





> enthusiasm and motivation for learning 
> determination to reach high standards of 
achievement 
> openness to new thinking and ideas 
and able to 
> use literacy, communication and 
numeracy skills 
> use technology for learning 
> think creatively and independently 
> learn independently and as part of a group 
> make reasoned evaluations 





> self respect 
> a sense of physical, mental and emotional wellbeing 
> secure values and beliefs 
> ambition 
and able to 
> relate to others and manage themselves 
> pursue a healthy and active lifestyle 
> be self aware 
> develop and communicate their own beliefs 
and view of the world 
> live as independently as they can 
> assess risk and take informed decisions 
















Responsible citizens  
with 
> respect for others 
> commitment to participate responsibly in 
political, economic, social and cultural life 
and able to 
> develop knowledge and understanding of 
the world and Scotland‘s place in it 
> understand different beliefs and cultures 
> make informed choices and decisions 
> evaluate environmental, scientific and 
technological issues 





> an enterprising attitude 
> resilience 
> self-reliance 
and able to 
> communicate in different ways and in 
different settings 
> work in partnership and in teams 
> take the initiative and lead 
> apply critical thinking in new contexts 
> create and develop 
> solve problems 
 
All the information in Appendix III is directly quoted from A Curriculum for Excellence 
(Scottish Executive, 2004, p15) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
